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Organisations have been analytically conceptualised as being somewhat analogous to individuals 
for a long time. They have culture; they can learn; and they can behave in various odd ways. 
But how far can the simile be stretched? What other types of organisational cognition can we 
imagine? And what benefits can we gain by introducing new perspectives of this kind? 
This study shows that organisations can exhibit familiar symptoms of stress, such as closing 
themselves to the outside world and becoming unreceptive to external stimuli and input. They 
retreat to what is familiar and safe and put on blinders to hide anything that does not already 
fit with how they feel things should be, often in situations where they would be best served 
by being as open to and perceptive of these external stimuli as possible. Using a model of 
organisational behaviour that connects external pressure to an internal mode of operation and 
to specific knowledge-seeking behaviours, the study examines two case pairs—two success stories 
and two catastrophic failures—to examine patterns of organisational cognition. By comparing 
and contrasting the failure of the FBI during the 1993 Waco siege with its subsequent success 
during the 1996 Montana Freemen standoff, and doing the same with the Swedish Foreign 
Ministry’s handling of the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami and the 2006 evacuation from the 
war in Lebanon, a pattern emerges where certain types of knowledge proved to be the key to 
staying as open-minded, responsive, and dynamic as these crises demanded. This knowledge can 
be used both during a crisis to resolve some of the confusion and time pressure that is endemic 
to such situations, as well as before a crisis to mitigate or even stave off the approaching chaos.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In the spring of 1993, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was put 
in a very familiar position that was at the same time something wholly unlike 
anything the agency had been faced with in its 85 years of operation. On the 
face of it, the FBI was involved in a hostage negotiation with a cult-like off-shoot 
of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church in rural Texas. Just over 100 people had 
established themselves in a communal home at the Mount Carmel compound, 
but had in recent years become the target for accusations of systematic child abuse, 
drug manufacturing, and of illegal possession and modifications of weapons and 
explosives. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) had started to 
investigate these allegations, yet when trying to serve the close-knit community 
with a search warrant to inspect the compound, the reception was violently hostile.
A two hour long gunfight ensued, leaving several dead on both sides, The 
deaths of federal agents made the matter fall under the FBI’s purview, and what 
followed was the 51 day long stand-off that has been labelled the Waco Siege. 
In the end, the agency’s negotiation efforts failed and an attempt to break the 
stalemate by forcing the residents of the compound out of their shelter using tear 
gas ended in disaster – a fire broke out that left more than 70 dead, cementing 
the event as one of the blackest moments in the agency’s history. The political, 
judicial, and cultural fall-out was significant, creating a decade of investigations 
and recriminations trying to uncover the truth of what had happened. The 
question on everyone’s mind was, what had gone wrong? What caused a seem-
ingly straight-forward negotiation to generate such meagre results over a nearly 
two month period and how could it come to such a disastrous and fiery end?
What became apparent in the many reports and hearings on the matter was 
that this was not an ordinary hostage/barricade situation against an entrenched 
group of criminals, like the ones the FBI were used to dealing with, but rather a 
thoroughly asymmetric conflict of faith. Even though the FBI was up against an 
established religious group that communicated in biblical quotations and parables, 
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religion was never a factor in the FBI’s analysis of the motives and motivations of 
the opponents. Even though there were English-speaking Christians on both ends 
of the phone line, it is doubtful if the two sides ever spoke the same language. 
Somewhere along the line, the FBI had failed to identify and rectify a crucial 
knowledge gap in its operative arsenal, even as it was opening up before its very 
eyes, and it had taken a nasty tumble as a result.
Three years after the Waco siege, the FBI got a chance to redeem its image. 
In Jordan County, Montana, a right-wing militia group called the Montana 
Freemen, belonging to the larger Christian Identity (CI) movement had for 
some time clashed with the local law enforcement community and had, among 
other things, tried to sentence a local judge according to their own biblically 
based “Common Law” judicial system, committed several counts of fraud. In 
addition, there were suspected ties to a number of robberies in the area. When 
two members of the militia were caught with what appeared to be a trunk full 
of stolen goods and incarcerated, the remaining Freemen barricaded themselves 
in their compound and waited for the FBI siege. This time, however, there was 
something different about the dynamics of the conflict. Instead of relying on 
a select few, tried and tested experts in the field of criminal profiling, the FBI 
had begun building a nascent network of scientists in a number of somewhat 
related fields: from the classical psychology and criminology scholars to legal and 
religious scholars. The FBI also went beyond just the scholarly field for aid and 
advice. Members of related militia movements were invited as intermediaries, 
as were old friends of the Freemen and even a group of lawyers whose every-day 
business was to defend Christian Identity members such as these from the US 
legal system.
In the end, there was no Waco-like siege. While the FBI had the compound 
surrounded for more than 80 days, at no point did the conflict escalate to the 
exchange of gunfire, and at no point did the negotiations come to a complete 
halt. In the end, the issue was untangled by the CI legal team, who was able to 
“translate” the Freemen’s view on the issue, which was stated in terms of their 
particular Common Law system, into the US legal language the FBI negotiators 
could understand and vice versa. The standoff ended in a whimper as the Freemen 
agreed to take the matter to court rather than to fight it out in the Montana 
forests, and the incident has all but passed from public memory since it never 
really became a crisis. What explains this drastically different outcome, and why 
did such a similar situation not turn into the same massive crisis as the Waco 
siege had done only three years earlier?
In many ways, the Freemen standoff was a direct echo of the Waco siege: the 
same actors – in some cases even the same individuals – were involved in both 
events. Both required the FBI to negotiate with an opponent who had a radically 
different world-view on things that might seem very mundane and common, 
where religious extremism was a cornerstone in how the opponents interpreted 
everything going on around them. In both cases, there was great pressure to get 
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things over with through tactical means; for example,some kind of assault on 
the compound and mass-arrests of anyone found there. Yet, the two episodes 
played out in radically different ways. Why?
At first glance, an obvious difference seems to be the way the FBI chose to 
attack the problem of understanding its opponent. In the Waco case, the FBI 
came into the situation with the perception that it was essentially a hostage 
negotiation: the classic deranged “cult leader” using a group of people as a human 
shield to keep the authorities at bay. Consequently, the FBI brought its usual 
tool set for the job in the form of people who could advise on hostage-taking 
mad-men. The only real change in perception that happened during the siege 
was the realisation that the supposed hostages were apparently there of their free 
will, but this did not generate any greater change in the strategies employed. In 
the aftermath of the crisis, this singular vision, and inability – some even sug-
gested unwillingness – to consider alternative interpretations was often quoted 
as a key factor in determining the disastrous outcome. In the Freemen case, on 
the other hand, the FBI agents seemingly went into the situation with the same 
basic perception, but they were now willing to consider that the tool set they 
had brought might not be the best for the job. In fact, the FBI had even built 
a separate support structure for the purpose of, not just providing other tools, 
but figuring out which tools would be best for the job. In the end, it turned out 
that what was needed was someone who could debate and re-frame the same 
issues within two radically different legal philosophies and judicial systems. Still, 
the FBI, as such, did not actually change its approach; it just used a different 
“filter” between that approach and the opponent – a filter that translated this 
odd behaviour that the FBI did not understand into something it could use its 
normal strategies against, and which then translated those chosen strategies back 
into actions to be used against the opponent.
This all good and well, but it only shifts the question in a slightly different 
direction: why did the FBI suddenly use this radically different approach? The 
organisational studies literature would suggest that this was a case of organisational 
learning, but that explanation does not quite reach all the way, and only hints 
at the underlying issue. What had the FBI learned? It was not just to consult 
experts – the bureau had plenty of those around for the Waco case. It was not 
to consult “the right” experts – the FBI still brought the same expertise to bear 
on the Freemen case, and given the similarity of the two cases, it is unlikely that 
these experts would be the wrong ones in one instance, but not in the other. 
Furthermore, in spite of the similarities it was a completely different set of experts, 
working from a drastically different perspective, that broke the Freeman case than 
what the critics had claimed were missing from Waco to such catastrophic effects. 
Maybe the FBI had learned to use more experts, but that still relies on knowing 
which ones to listen to in the end, and as mentioned, one of the core issues was 
that the bureau did not know which ones were the “right ones” and which were 
the “wrong ones.” The lesson rather seems to be that the FBI learned to be more 
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open and accepting of different ideas, and to the notion that its perception going 
into the situation might not be the correct one. In other words, the FBI learned 
to be open to the idea that maybe it had no idea.
As mentioned, the Freemen case seems to suggest that, in actuality, the funda-
mental outlook of the FBI had not significantly changed its world view: to them, 
it was still essentially a matter of negotiating with a criminal opponent over the 
safe release of a number of innocent people – presumably hostages of some kind 
or another. This means that the shift between openness and closed-ness in the 
FBI was not so much a matter of a change in outlook, but in the policy of using 
unorthodox tools to get that negotiation job done.
In a more general sense, this raises the question of whether bureaucratic 
organisations universally can be described in terms of being open or closed, 
and, for that matter, exactly what open or closed would entail that case. How 
is it expressed in the organisation? Is it a matter of breaking out of the bureau-
cratic mould, or something more complex? Moreover, how can we expect this 
openness or closed-ness to influence the organisations problem-solving abilities 
and the kinds of tools it makes use of? These questions become particularly 
interesting if the behaviour of the organisation has to be adapted in the face of 
external constraints such as the time pressure inherent in crises. Conceivably, if 
there is nothing holding it back, an organisation might experiment with new 
ways of doing things “just because”, but the inherent uncertainty of a crisis has 
historically shown to make both individuals and organisations grasp at what 
familiarity the situation can offer, and commonly this entails falling back on 
known operational practices. If nothing else, such practices offer the promise of 
knowable time-frames for whatever solution is chosen, and a course of action 
can be chosen in light of how these time-frames compare to the (lack of ) time 
available to deal with the crisis. The additional complication of a crisis should 
therefore create a least-likely scenario that further throws in relief the differences 
between organisations that are open to the possibility of adding new tactics, new 
knowledge, or new people and those that are not: displaying the same kind of 
versatility under such adverse conditions would indicate a very high degree of 
openness to alternative solutions.
However, this is not the only imaginable constraint that might affect the 
decision-making process or – as an extension – the outcome of that process. 
The FBI cases offer an example from an (ostensibly) singular actor in a narrowly 
defined sector within the domestic domain, but what other constraints would 
we come across if we expanded the borders somewhat and added a new set of 
variables that might impact the procedures being used and also fundamentally 
alter the processes the agency has to follow in order to do things “the right 
way”? The Waco and Montana Freemen cases offer two very handy points of 
comparison since it is the same actors facing the same class of problems in, if 
not the same, then at least a very similar situation. So can a similar pair be found 
elsewhere? One candidate for further study would be the Swedish Government 
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Offices’ handling of the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami and the 2006 evacuation of 
Swedes from a war-torn Lebanon. Again, we have the same set of (bureaucratic 
and governmental) actors, the same class of problems, and again very similar 
situations. Just as with the FBI cases, the second of these two events is generally 
considered a successful case of crisis management, whereas the earlier one has 
gone down in history as a management disaster. So again, the question is: why 
the different outcomes?
During the tsunami, the Swedish Foreign Ministry became the central node 
in the government’s effort to deal with a crisis that affected tens of thousands of 
Swedes halfway across the globe. However, this was not a task the ministry was 
at all familiar with, nor was it used to handling consular matters on the sheer 
scale of this disaster. At the same time, by virtue of being the formal connection 
between the Swedish government and other nations, all other national actors 
had to go through the Foreign Ministry in order to do their work abroad. Even 
agencies such as the Swedish Rescue Service Agency, who had a relatively free 
mandate to send aid and personnel to other countries, had to clear its actions 
with the ministry and defer to its judgement on what kind of operations might 
be needed. As a result the Foreign Ministry quickly became a severely overloaded 
central node, and its inability to respond to queries in a timely manner hampered 
the efforts of a large number of other agencies involved in the crisis management 
effort. The ministry itself also suffered greatly in terms of its ability to collect and 
manage the many input streams from those outside agencies, and thus could not 
aggregate and co-ordinate the knowledge needs of the whole operation. Moreover, 
having the final say in the matter of who was allowed to go where, the Foreign 
Ministry declined a number of requests to send personnel from various agencies 
abroad, simply because the ministry staff members – who were not subject-matter 
experts – deemed it unnecessary or counter-productive.
Just like the FBI, the Government Offices got the chance to redeem itself two 
and a half years later, when the Israeli invasion of Lebanon left a large number 
of Swedes stranded in the region and in need of evacuation. Just like after the 
tsunami, the exact same set of agencies had to solve the exact same problems: 
identifying people in the area and evacuating them back to safety, and potentially 
dealing with large numbers of shocked and injured individuals. This time, 
however, the agencies had set up a number of co-ordination mechanisms and 
joint working groups that, at least theoretically, allowed the various actors to 
share knowledge and information far more effectively and distribute the work-
load according to competences and availability of personnel. The Government 
Offices had also been given a different mandate in the aftermath of the tsunami 
and it was not afforded a bit more freedom in deploying its people in other 
countries, without having to abide by the full set of strictures laid forth by the 
Foreign Ministry, and likewise, the Foreign Ministry no longer had any need 
to try to incorporate the processes of other agencies into how it did its own 
work. Perhaps more importantly, all the agencies involved had had their roles 
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scrutinised and clarified within the context of a larger crisis-management system, 
so the individual formal responsibilities were much more clearly defined this 
time around. Just like the (normally) domestic-oriented agencies were freed from 
some of the formal restrictions previously imposed by the Foreign Ministry, the 
ministry itself was somewhat freed from having to adapt its work-flow to match 
the requirements of those other agencies. This operation was largely hailed as a 
great success and a testament to the learning and organisational improvements 
that had happened since the tsunami. However, this seemingly goes against how 
these kinds of governmental organisations normally behave. Why were all the 
other involved agencies allowed to bypass the Foreign Ministry and act outside 
of the nation’s border on their own, or – perhaps more accurately – why did the 
Foreign Ministry allowed this reduction in political clout, and what were the 
actual effects of this revised setup?
At the same time, it might be debatable whether the outcome really was all 
that different, and what this difference consisted of. In many ways, the desk 
officers that handled the Lebanon crisis did a much worse job than they had 
after the tsunami, but the involvement on the political level was much higher. 
Perhaps the measure of a “good outcome” in these cases was more a matter of 
public perception of the government actually doing something, with less regard 
to exactly what it was doing. At least someone was in charge and was making 
decisions at an early stage during the Lebanon crisis, unlike the evasiveness that 
had characterised the initial phase of the post-tsunami rescue effort. Maybe 
the “success” actually lay in the agencies’ ability to keep their respective depart-
ments, ministries, and ministers out of the limelight, and the fact that the best 
way to accomplish this just so happened to be to serve the public interest in an 
expedient manner?
Here, too, there are some differences between the two cases that could be 
attributed to classical organisational learning, but once again this perspective 
does not quite go all the way in explaining the differences. It certainly does not 
– or at least should not – explain how certain parts of the effort were managed 
even worse in the latter of the two cases. Perhaps the same framework based on 
openness and closed-ness to external aid can help us in understanding what was 
done differently and why, only now we also have the added hurdle of dealing 
with a layer of international relations and foreign-policy dimensions on top of 
the set problems that had to be solved. This fact alone adds the complicating 
factor that most, if not all, decisions had to go through the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and receive the blessing of the appropriate ministers, which circumscribed 
the freedom of action in a way that was not applicable to the FBI’s handling 
of its crises. While the FBI certainly had to appeal for a go-ahead from the 
attorney general regarding the final assault against the Davidians at Waco, the 
decision-making happened on a much lower level in these cases, and the “veto 
power” (and, perhaps more importantly, the power of approval) of the political 
leadership level was rarely a concern.
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A unifying theme for all these crises is that they all revolve around a critical need 
for knowledge that could not be found within the existing organisations. For the 
FBI, it was the knowledge and understanding of an opponent that on the surface 
might not have looked very different, but which operated in accordance with a 
radically different world-view. For the Swedish Government Offices, it was the 
knowledge and understanding of a disaster context that, once again, was similar 
to things it already knew about, but which had some key differences that made 
that knowledge all but useless. In all cases, the fundamental issue can be boiled 
down to a number of key questions: how did the respective organisations deal 
with this knowledge gap? Did they even perceive that the gap existed, and how 
did they come to realise this? Once (if at all) the realisation set it, what measures 
did they take to remedy the situation? What organisational knowledge structures 
were in play, and how adept were this structures at reorganising themselves to 
meet a hitherto unforeseen problem? Or, in more general terms, can we see a 
behavioural difference in how organisations perceive and attack such a problem, 
and can this difference be explained by some common characteristic in the cases 
or the organisations? In addition, can this difference help us explain the different 
outcomes we see among the four cases? These questions are made all the more 
interesting as we note that the organisations involved in these cases are all bureau-
cratic organisations – that is, at least in the Weberian sense, organisations that 
are supposed to be defined by specialisations in subject-matter expertise and in 
solving problems related to these matters. So the question becomes even more 
pertinent: how do organisations that are supposed to be experts at dealing with a 
particular issue handle a situation where their much-vaunted expertise will not 
carry them all the way? Do they accept this shortcoming and try to fill in the 
gaps with new knowledge, or do they fail to (or even refuse) to acknowledge their 
knowledge deficit and simply go with what they already know?
1.1 Aim & purpose
The aim of this thesis is to create an analytical framework for studying the 
dynamics of organisational permeability to external knowledge. This will be 
achieved by tying together a number of theories on how external factors affect 
the openness and ‘closed-ness’ of bureaucratic organisations and, in turn, how 
this degree of openness/closed-ness affects the ability of an organisations when 
to identify and solve knowledge needs that cannot be satisfied within the organ-
isation. Openness, in this case, means the organisation’s willingness and ability 
to investigate, adapt to, and adopt new situations and solutions provided by 
outside sources – ‘closed-ness’ being the opposite trait: an inability to accept 
outside ideas. These two notions are closely linked to more general concepts such 
as organisational flexibility and rigidity, but are more focused on the acceptance 
of external ideas rather than on some (in)ability to rearrange the inherent and 
pre-existing structures to fit an unfamiliar situation.
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The background for this particular inquiry is an observation that, although spe-
cialist organisations (such as most bureaucratic institutions) have the collection 
and application of expert knowledge on some particular subject matter as one 
of their main purposes and roles, their ability to fulfil this role can change very 
quickly when circumstances take an unexpected turn or when their actions and 
methods are circumscribed by rules that are being imposed from an external actor 
or context. The classic perception of a “bureaucracy” may conjure up images of 
something slow and rigid, but which still are steadily absorbing subject-matter 
knowledge to further their goal. However, this image does not hold up to closer 
scrutiny. Occasionally, the situation demands a quick reassessment and after a 
sudden and unexpected flurry of activity – sudden and unexpected, at least, from 
such a lumbering beast – the bureaucracy evolves and delivers far more expert 
knowledge more than this classic image would suggest. On the other hand and 
on other occasions, this Weberian machinery simply breaks down. It is no longer 
slow, and certainly not steady, but is rather wavering at a standstill, or even 
devolving in what kind of knowledge it produces; advice and recommendations 
that have long since been discarded or labelled as outdated suddenly re-appear 
because in the heat of the moment, it is all the organisation can conjure up that 
gives it an option it at least somewhat comfortable with.
It almost seems like, in times of crisis, organisations as a whole might exhibit 
some of the disaster behaviours we see in individuals. They might become 
near-catatonic and almost seem shell-shocked, or, on the other hand, they 
might rise to the challenge and over-perform in ways not even they imagined 
themselves capable of. So what causes these shifts? Is there a way to determine 
beforehand which way these organisations will take when a crisis hits? At the 
same time, there are organisations that are normally very hardened against these 
kinds of situations – they might even have crises as their every-day business – but 
which still exhibit variations in how well they handle high-pressure situations 
when they are forced to act outside of their “comfort zone”. What causes this 
regression in behaviour?
In particular, organisations that are very well adapted to every-day crisis 
management can become bogged down when forced to conform to some new 
bureaucratic context or when having to adapt to an unfamiliar rule set or to 
unfamiliar processes that are required in the co-operation with other actors. 
One such change of contexts is when agencies with a largely domestic focus 
are required to act outside the national borders and either interact with similar 
actors from other countries, or when they are forced to go through intermediaries 
to do the job they normally handle themselves. Whether due to constitutional 
constraints or because the ministry asserts it as its “turf ”, national agencies 
are commonly required to not act on the international arena without going 
through the Foreign Ministry or some similar branch of the government and 
this introduces procedural changes that are not part of how these organisations 
operate. Even for the Foreign Ministry itself, these collaborative efforts require 
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changes in work processes, which can cause all kinds of hiccups to occur. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly and much like crisis situations do, these kinds of constraints and 
enforced processes seem to limit organisations’ ability to act with the degree of 
freedom and agility that one might otherwise expect from them, and as a result, 
they can no longer do their work to the best of their ability.
1.2 A quick note on crises
Before venturing further into the details of these questions, it is worth discussing 
exactly what constitutes a “crisis.” It is, after all, the very special context of a crisis 
that makes these cases interesting in and of themselves, and it further accentuates 
the question of what caused the different outcomes. This thesis takes as its point 
of departure the definition proposed by Boin et al. (2005; 2017), where three 
key characteristics separate a crisis from an every-day situation: a sense of urgency 
in the decisions that need to be taken, a high degree of felt uncertainty about 
what is going on, and a perception that critical values are at stake. Of particular 
importance in this definition is the wording of sense of urgency, felt uncertainty 
and perception of values at stake. It is a subjective definition where an event is 
not a crisis for any given person unless that person thinks of it in terms of a crisis. 
Nor is it a static concept. Just because someone dismisses an event as a non-crisis 
does not mean that he or she will not at a later stage feel the pangs of urgency, 
uncertainty and values at stake coming on as more information becomes available 
(or, for that matter, fails to materialise, contrary to expectations).
This categorisation alone helps in explaining many of the things that can, 
and often do, go wrong in crises. On the one hand, the three defining factors 
point towards cognitive problems that, each on their own, can be difficult to 
handle and which, when combined, can cause vastly diminished problem-solving 
capabilities as the mind struggles to resolve the conflict between these three 
different issues all at once. On the other hand, the fact that it is a subjective defi-
nition aids in illustrating and explaining many of the common issues that crop 
up in connection with the coordination of efforts in times of crises. To put it 
simply, it is far from certain that different people – let alone different groups and 
different organisations – perceive any single event in the same way. What is an 
earth-shattering disaster for one might seem entirely mundane for another, and 
even among those feeling the chaos and confusion of the crisis, the source and 
solutions to those problems might be wildly different. This divergence in per-
ception, in turn, often causes a secondary set of issues where one party becomes 
convinced that the other is nothing short of hysterical, whereas that other party is 
further devastated by what it sees as the completely unfeeling and even ignorant 
indifference of the first party when help is needed the most.
In and of itself, then, the Boin et al. definition provides a high degree of 
explanatory and analytical power, but it is not – nor is it meant to be – the final 
word on what explains all manners of crisis behaviour. Rather, it provides the 
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tools to define the special context “a crisis” presents us with, and then lets us 
prod at and pick apart that context using other analytical tools at our disposal. 
For the purpose of this thesis, it has numerous uses. Firstly, it provides a tool 
for answering the very fundamental question of “is this a crisis?” Secondly, it 
serves as a gateway into, and a point of convergence for, a large literature dealing 
with decision-making under difficult circumstances. Thirdly, as has already been 
mentioned, it works as an analytical tool for certain questions regarding the per-
ception and handling of crises. The use of Boin et al. also serves a slightly more 
indirect purpose. It provides us with a set of factors that might help to explain 
why organisations choose an open or closed approach to problem solving, and 
at the same time, it provides us with a context in which these factors come to a 
head: situations that act as least (or most) likely cases for some theorised course 
of action. A more in-depth discussion of this definition and what it brings to 
the study can be found in Chapter 2.
1.3 Closing in on a question
This jumble of issues and contextual factors can in essence be boiled down to a 
few macro-level questions that provide a topic for further study:
• Under what circumstances will bureaucratic organisations make use of relevant 
expertise outside of their own institutions?
• In particular, what difference does it make for an organisation’s use of exper-
tise that there are external restrictions on the organisational behaviour and 
working processes?
• Moreover, what kinds of changes in this organisational behaviour do the 
special circumstances inherent in crises cause?
A quick overview of the cases seems to suggest that there is a distinction to be 
made between open and closed organisations – that is, some organisations that 
are more or less accepting towards outside ideas – and this might in turn help 
explain why we see such a drastic shift in outcomes between the two pairs of crises. 
However, this requires us to adopt a couple of a priori assumed definitions that 
separate the two categories of organisations. Here, an open organisation is one 
that allows for new tools and methods to be employed without much preparation 
and training, and which is dynamic enough to adjust itself to its current needs 
depending on the feedback on both old and new methods. On the other hand, 
we have the assumed closed organisation that relies on tried and true methods 
and that is almost completely insensitive to feedback from the environment 
regarding the effectiveness of those methods. Whether or not these definitions 
will hold up all the way is a matter of both empirical and theoretical research.
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In order to get to the bottom of this mystery, there are also a few other problems 
that need to be solved. First of all, there is the question of the nature of the 
crisis context and how it might affect bureaucratic organisations. Then, there 
is the matter of how these bureaucratic organisations “store,” and make use of 
the subject-matter expertise that define them. Lastly, there is the more general 
problem of how expert knowledge is actually discovered and acquired. It is worth 
pointing out that this line of reasoning rests on the assumption that being able to 
identify and acquire “the right” knowledge will coincide with a better use of the 
available expertise and, in turn, with the ability to make “informed” decisions. 
It is quite beyond the scope of this thesis to determine exactly what is the right 
knowledge for a given situation and whether or not we can always make that 
link between good knowledge and good (or at least informed) decision-making. 
It will certainly not make a case for the idea that informed decision-making is 
a guarantee for good outcomes since history has already shown such a link to 
be tenuous, at best.
The important last step in this chain is one that so far has largely been left 
out, but which deserves more emphasis: the original question was what caused 
the different outcomes in the two pairs of crises. An immediate observation that 
can be – and, indeed, has been – made is that when they got a second chance 
at taking on the same problem, the organisations in question knew to acquire 
more information in order to better formulate their strategies. This involves a 
process of discovering and incorporating external knowledge into the normal 
flow of activities, and the fundamental question is really how an organisation’s 
capacity and capability of observing or even remembering this process is affected 
by outside factors such as crises and imposed political strictures. Huber (1991) 
divided this process into two activities he called the “sourcing” and “grafting” of 
knowledge. This knowledge can be more accurately described in terms of the triplet 
of different types of organisational knowledge: meta-knowledge, empathic knowledge 
and second-order knowledge (henceforth abbreviated as MESO-knowledge).
1.4 Research questions
To reiterate, the main questions for this thesis, then, are how do the two external 
factors of crises and unfamiliar externally imposed work processes affect the degree 
to which an organisation is open or closed, and how do these varying degrees of 
openness in turn affect the organisation’s willingness and ability to discover and 
make use of outside expertise?
To this end, the thesis sets up and tests three hypotheses related to the 
different steps along this row of interrelated attributes. The exact details and 
argumentation behind these hypotheses will be the main topic of Chapter 2, but 
working backwards from the observation of different outcomes the short version 
of the chain of logic is as follows: the final decision on how to act depends on 
what kind of information is available to the decision-maker and the availability 
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of information depends on how well the organisation can identify and acquire 
knowledge and information – in other words, how well the organisation can apply 
its MESO-knowledge. The organisation’s ability to apply its MESO-knowledge 
is in turn affected by the degree of openness or closed-ness the organisation 
exhibits at any given moment, and this can vary over time depending on external 
factors. Two of these factors will be studied in this thesis: the stress induced by a 
crisis and the stress of having to incorporate and adhere to new and unfamiliar 
problem-solving processes. The assumption is that both of these stress factors 
will increase the closed-ness of the organisation.
Thus, the following three hypotheses will be tested in order to provide answers 
to the aforementioned questions of how different external factors, through the 
mechanism of openness/closed-ness, affect the information and knowledge 
processing that formulates the basis for decisions:
ii) Organisations will fall back on well known, prescribed, and preferably 
consistent problem-solving procedures when subjected to the stress 
of a crisis. Crises will thus push organisations towards a more closed 
behaviour.
iii) Organisations can be forced to limit their problem-solving creativity 
by external regulations. Unless already anticipated and incorporated 
in how the organisation interacts with outside actors, the presence of 
an externally enforced process will thus push organisations towards a 
more closed behaviour.
iv) The degree to which an organisation is open or closed decides how well 
and how willingly an organisation makes use of external knowledge. 
An organisation that moves towards increased closed-ness will thus 
lose its ability to apply its MESO-knowledge.
Hypothesis i describes the assumed influence crises will have on the organisa-
tional behaviour. When faced with the dreadful combination of time pressure 
and indecision, organisations will tend towards what they perceive as familiar 
and “safe” behaviours. For an organisation that is already fairly closed, this 
familiarity can be found in the standard operational procedures – a standardised 
toolbox intended for situations when the chips are down. For an inherently more 
open organisation, the familiarity may rather be found in familiar tool selection 
processes. They may not have any standardised crisis toolbox, but they have 
standard ways of finding out what tools might be useful and where to get them.
Hypothesis ii describes the assumed influence that unfamiliar and surprising 
requirements will have on the behaviour of an organisation. For instance, relation-
15
Chapter 1: Introduction
ships between nations is a heavily politicised arena and requires a diplomatic touch 
before anything can be decided, much less acted upon, which demands a certain 
work-order before decisions to be made. This need to enlist the political and/or 
diplomatic corps before taking action means that there is a new point of vetoing 
power – or even an entire host of them – injecting into the work process that 
puts a damper on how innovative an organisation can be in its problem-solving 
efforts. Conversely, in trying to be the gate-keeper for international contacts, 
the foreign office has to adopt formal requirements of a domestic agency into 
its processes in order to be able to collect and pass on information that is vital 
for that agency’s work. While these kinds of strictures can obviously be found 
elsewhere, they are very apparent in the foreign policy domain. It is an area that 
often has a single ministry or a single office that in most cases acts as the singular 
official sieve for any kind of question with a trans-boundary component to it, 
no matter what the actual subject matter is.
Hypothesis iii describes how the variations in openness and closed-ness caused 
by crises and the presence of enforced formalities will influence one particular 
behaviour of interest for this thesis: the organisation’s readiness to identify, find, 
and integrate external sources of knowledge. In a sense, the organisation is the 
“black box” we are trying to unravel, and this application of MESO-knowledge 
is the measurable output of that black box as we vary the inputs in the form of 
stress level and behavioural strictures.
1.5 Design
This thesis will employ three main methods of getting to the answers to these 
questions, two of which are borrowed wholesale from George & Bennett (2005): 
the structured, focused comparison in order to get as full a spectrum of variation 
as possible from just a few cases; and process tracing in order to create a clear 
picture of why one particular course of action was chosen over other possible 
choices given what was known at the time. However, a third method is required 
to determine the “base level” of openness or closed-ness of the organisations that 
will be studied. In order to avoid a completely circular logic, this method has 
to be disconnected from what is fundamentally the dependent variable in the 
study: the application of MESO-knowledge (in essence, the ability to make use 
of external expertise). This is instead done in through an ideal-type comparison of 
the actors involved. Chapter 3 is dedicated to expanding on these methodological 
challenges and providing a useful analytical framework that lets us spot the 
answers to our many questions within the empirics.
The four cases against which the hypotheses will be tested have already 
been presented: the 1993 siege outside Waco and the 1996 standoff against 
the Montana Freemen from the perspective of the FBI, and the 2004 Boxing 
Day tsunami and the 2006 evacuation from Lebanon from the perspective of 
the Swedish Government Offices – in particular that of the Swedish Foreign 
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Ministry (Utrikesdepartementet, or UD). In both case pairs, there are numerous 
other actors involved. Indeed, without those, it would be difficult to discuss the 
matter of making use of external expertise and knowledge of that expertise, but 
here the FBI and the Foreign Ministry are the principal actors whose knowledge 
needs and uses will be the subjects of the investigation.
This cluster of cases can be sectioned in a number of different ways to provide 
variance between the different variables. The expectations of processes vary between 
the two actors’ first incidents and their second, both of which were very similar 
cases and where they had the opportunity to learn from previous mistakes. There 
is also some variation between the two actors themselves, although it can (and 
will) be argued how comparable the two really are, in that the FBI is “merely” 
an agency that has to operate within a tangle of local and federal law, and is 
ultimately controlled from above by the U.S. Department of Justice, whereas UD 
is a part of the central government, and operates more on a political and policy 
level. While UD as a ministry certainly is also bound by various national laws, it 
is usually the one who sets policy for, or even directly controls, external agencies 
and who is therefore more accustomed to having others adopt its procedures 
than the other way around.
A variation in the crisis variable can be found between the Montana case and 
the other three cases. The Waco siege was an transformative event for the FBI, just 
as the tsunami was for the Swedish state. Calling it “revolutionising” might not 
be far off the mark, since research done on the topic hints at the poor manage-
ment of the tsunami crisis was a contributing factor to the Social Democrats 
being ousted from power in the 2006 Swedish general elections. The Lebanon 
case, while perhaps not as earth-shattering as the tsunami yet still a significant 
crisis for the Swedish government, was successfully managed and thus did not 
create the kind of aftermath seen with the two other crisis cases. The Montana 
case began as the spectre of a repeat of the Waco disaster, but soon lost one of 
the key factors that would allow us to call it a crisis according to the definition 
presented earlier. In fact, while the actual FBI operation lingered, the event faded 
from public consciousness, and today almost only exists as a vestigial, abandoned 
build-up to a “second Waco that never happened.”
Finally, the variance in the use of expertise shows up between the first and 
the second case in the two pairs: the Waco and tsunami cases exhibit one pattern 
whereas the Montana and Lebanon cases exhibit something rather different.
Exactly how these influences should look will be the topic of Chapter 2, 
where the theoretical model for the pressure on organisations is drawn up based 
on what the literature on crisis management, knowledge management, foreign 
policy decision-making, and bureaucratic organisations have to say on the matter.
17
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.6 Relevance
A final question that needs to be addressed is: why bother? What is the practical 
and theoretical use of this study? The practical concern is fairly easy to address: 
it is very much in fashion to call for increased co-operation and information 
sharing, and better use of the expertise available within both the public and 
private spheres of society. Public-private partnerships are all the rage, as is the use 
of think tanks and other kinds of research institutions to guide both strategic 
policy-making and more operational day-to-day decisions. However, this philosophy 
is founded on the belief that such collaborations will provide a better exchange 
of ideas, and that this, in and of itself, will be a panacea for all kinds of problems 
that crop up in today’s complex society.
What this study hopes to show is that this notion actually rests on rather 
precarious grounds; that there are numerous external factors – beyond the control 
of the actors involved in these exchanges of expertise – that might cause these 
efforts to come to naught because just when the knowledge is needed the most 
is when it is the least likely to actually be used. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the relevance of this research is rather different. 
The thesis employs a set of theoretical fields that, while in many ways connected, 
are rarely mixed together even though they share a lot of common ground. The 
crisis management literature is certainly already a melange of all kinds of research 
on decision-making, but it has a tendency to focus on exactly that: the making 
(and makers) of that decision. If the presence of advisors is acknowledged, it is 
usually because they are part of the “inner circle,” which essentially makes them 
decision-makers as well, or at least part of the decision-making “function” within 
the larger organisation. The question of how this decision-making actor (whatever 
its nature) interacts with external sources of knowledge is very rarely addressed. At 
the opposite side of the spectrum, we have the knowledge management literature, 
which is consumed by the question of how independent actors can exchange and 
assimilate knowledge, but which pays little heed to the complicating factors such 
as crises or an asymmetric set of behavioural strictures, or to how these factors 
might impede this idealised flow of information.
Additionally, this thesis will explore and apply a new kind of organisational 
knowledge: the hitherto rather mysterious MESO-knowledge mentioned earlier 
in the chapter. More accurately, it will lay bare a kind of knowledge that is not 
actually new, as such: it is implicitly present in the literature on organisational 
knowledge and knowledge management, but is never fully verbalised. However, 
this concept can actually serve a number of very useful analytical purposes in the 
study of how organisations expand on their knowledge base. In particular, this 
(re)conceptualisation may prove fruitful for the study of organisational learning 
since the three knowledge types represent a set of organisational skills that can 
be used as indicators of a learning process.
18
Stressing Knowledge
The thesis also introduces the concepts of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ organisations, 
which are somewhat similar to, but not exchangeable with, the more common 
notions of flexible and rigid organisations, and which can help us understand 
some of the preferences, methods and behaviours of an organisation.
There is also an interesting empirical relevance of the study. Among the cases 
selected, there are two that fall into a fairly uncommon category, from a research 
standpoint: the (supposedly) “successfully” managed crisis. This kind of case 
is perceived as uncommon and as rarely occurring, but the reality is quite the 
opposite. In fact, they happen every day, but we as researchers have a problem 
catching them on our “interesting case radar.” An event that evolves into a full-
blown disaster is hard to miss; one that is handled well might not even evolve 
beyond the faintest “blip.” As a result, we risk ending up only studying failed 
instances of crisis management, and all we learn is what not to do. Even in crises 
that have a happy ending, there is the lingering fact that it became a crisis to 
begin with – perhaps that escalation was avoidable, and in many ways, it was 
not actually that well managed at all.
The cases studied in this thesis might not aspire to quite those heights of 
“good management”, since, again, they did evolve into critical issues that had to 
be handled with both speed and care. The Montana Freemen case comes close, 
though, since it ended in that much more desirable whimper, rather than the 
Waco-like bang. It had the escalation that one might associate with a oncoming 
crisis, but then nothing happened. What these cases do provide, though, is an 
interesting example of two highly comparable instances of “good” and “bad” 
management: the exact same actors in the exact same situations, facing the exact 
same problems, but with drastically different outcomes. With this kind of setup, 
not only can we make a case for what not to do, but we might also be able to say 
what to absolutely do. Such an opportunity should not be missed.
Last, but not least, the thesis aims to investigate the trade-offs governmental 
organisations make to serve their two different masters: the “higher-ups” in the 
larger governmental hierarchy and in the political arena, and the common good 
for which the organisation was originally created. As both the cases and the 
theory will show, it is not at all clear that when a substantial problem appears, 
an organisation will focus on solving that problem. Instead, the mere fact that a 
crisis is brewing might cause the organisation to swerve away from its assumed 
crisis management duties and instead try to solve (and in the process perhaps 
even cause) the political problem that often accompanies a large-scale crisis.
1.7 Structure
The thesis is divided into 8 chapters, each dealing with its own facet of the over-
arching problem. Chapter 1 has been spent on setting up the problem area and 
introducing both the questions that need to be answered and the empirical cases 
that will help answering them. Chapter 2 will delve into the theoretical model 
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of how external influences shape an organisation’s behaviour when it comes to 
seeking external aid. It will bring in and employ theories from a number of fields 
and literature related to the question at hand, most notably crisis management, 
knowledge management theory, and organisational theory.
Chapter 3 will go into detail about the methodology of the case studies that 
will be used to test these initial hypotheses. The chapter will describe and adapt 
the general methods of structured, focused comparisons and process tracing, as 
well as argue the relevance of the cases and discuss how the hypotheses might be 
falsified in the course of the study. Chapter 4–7 will present the empirics of the 
four cases – more specifically the two pairs of cases. In Chapter 8, comparisons 
of the data from the two case pairs will be made, both within these two sets of 
cases and between the pairs themselves. Finally, the information gleamed from 
this analysis will be used to draw the conclusions of this thesis and thus answer 
the questions set up here in Chapter 1.
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Chapter 2: The Framework
This chapter will discuss the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis. It will describe 
the logic and reasoning behind the hypotheses and also discuss a number of core 
concepts that will be necessary to fully answer the research question set up in 
Chapter 1. The thesis revolves around a model of organisational behaviour that 
dictates how organisations respond to external pressures. In order to describe both 
the pressures and the behaviour, this chapter draws on organisational learning 
theory, knowledge management theory, crisis management theory, and the theory 
of cybernetic decision-making. In particular, it takes a fairly long detour through 
the knowledge management literature to (re)conceptualise thee specific forms of 
organisational knowledge, or three skills that an organisation can use to obtain 
knowledge from external sources.
2.1 Modelling the pressure on organisations
The basic framework for this thesis revolves around the inherent characteristics 
of bureaucratic organisations in terms of openness and ‘closed-ness’, how these 
characteristics are affected by certain external constraints and contexts, and how 
these characteristics in turn affect the organisations’ propensity to make use of 
expert knowledge. While the study will mainly focus on the circumstances under 
which these organisations look for external knowledge sources, the framework itself 
is not limited to any given locus for these experts. Indeed, the same mechanics 
could produce the insight that the knowledge needed to face unforeseen and 
unfamiliar problems may actually already be found in the organisation’s existing 
structure, but that it just has never been called for or been brought to anyone’s 
attention. It may be the case that the knowledge the organisation uses for its 
every-day business is applicable to other areas and that all that is needed is a new 
perspective on that knowledge in order to find a solution to a new and surprising 
problem. As a very trivial case, an analytical firm that dissects decision-making 
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for a living might for instance face problems that stem from their own internal 
decision-making processes, and might have to turn its analytical eye inwards on 
itself. Or maybe the organisational culture is such that it has attracted lots of 
people with a particular personal interest that is unrelated to the normal work 
the organisation performs, and suddenly that informal internal interest group 
holds the key knowledge needed to untangle some otherwise incomprehensible 
problem that has just arisen. Nothing about the framework precludes such 
scenarios – they are just not the focus of this thesis. There is already an entire 
literature on organisational cognition and culture and on the vague overlap 
between large groups and full organisations (cf. Janis 1971; ’t Hart, Rosenthal 
& Kouzmin 1993; Martin 2002; Schein 2004; Deverell 2012; Lindkvist, Bakka 
& Fivesdal 2014). In addition, there are even some who more specifically study 
the internal feedback mechanisms that turn various organisational features into 
direct causes (or cures) for crises and similar misfortunes (cf. Perrow 1984; Weick 
1987, 1988; Mitroff et al. 1989; Roberts 1989). This thesis, however, concerns 
itself with external factors that influence or cause similar behaviours, pathologies, 
and feedback mechanisms.
At the heart of the matter is the notion that the degree of openness or closed-
ness of a bureaucratic organisation will directly influence the way in which the 
organisation in question goes about solving problems. A closed organisation will 
tend towards using prescribed, tried and tested practices directly aimed at solving 
a given class of issues, and will be less sensitive to external indicators that might 
suggest that the problem at hand may actually belong to a completely different 
class and that the problem-solving tools available to the organisation might not 
be fully up to the task. An open organisation, on the other hand, is more likely 
to try to extensively and accurately classify the problem before figuring out how 
to attack it, and is less likely to have pre-made standard operational procedures 
for all conceivable eventualities. It is worth noting that there is no normative 
value to these terms, and that the process leading up to how either of these 
organisational cultures came into being is well beyond the scope of this study. 
Any given organisation can have a multitude of reason for choosing – actively or 
otherwise – to go in either direction. While there may be some subtle processes 
that make organisational behaviour naturally tend towards openness or closed-
ness, self-conscious and deliberate choices influence far more how the organisation 
develops in the long run. Perhaps the nature of the problems the organisation is 
meant to deal with are of such a time-critical, yet highly technical nature, that 
check-list diagnostics routines are vital to keep people from overlooking critical 
details. Or perhaps the kind of problems the organisation expects to face are of 
such a varied nature that no common pattern exists between them, so no attempt 
has been made to come up with any step-by-step procedures because it has been 
identified as a largely futile and wasteful effort. What matters is how (or even if) 
the organisation has set itself up to identify and cope with unexpected situations.
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However, this is only the default state of the organisation, and it cannot realis-
tically be expected that any such institution will be completely predictable in 
everything it does. Even the most rule-bound organisation will display some 
flexibility in how less important tasks are handled, and even with the important 
ones, mistakes will happen and will need to be rectified. Likewise, even the most 
flexible and innovative of organisations will have – albeit informal – standard 
practices that with time have shown themselves to simply be the easiest and most 
practical way of doing what needs to be done.1
This inherent mutability means that any organisation is subject to external 
stimuli that may push it either towards a more open behaviour or a more closed 
one. One such stimulus is the organisation finding itself in a crisis, with all the 
perceived uncertainty and time pressure this entails. This thesis aims to test the 
assumption that during crises, an organisation will strongly tend towards a more 
closed behaviour. What standard practices the organisation has, whether they are 
informal or made explicit, will provide some degree of familiarity – and thus of 
non-uncertainty – that the organisation will want to cling to. The same procedures 
will also offer a predictable time schedule for the actions the organisation wants to 
take, which provides a useful heuristic for dealing with the time pressure imposed 
by the crisis. Granted, the stress of the situation may render any such schedule 
thoroughly unrealistic in practice due to a higher tendency to make mistakes 
under pressure, but just the perception of a lack of time creates this sense of a 
crisis, the perception of at least knowing how long a given course of action will 
take makes this known choice preferable to the completely unknowable time 
frame of some newly concocted and in every way untested scheme.
Closed-ness can also be imposed from the outside by an organisation suddenly 
finding itself in a context where adherence to strict protocols is a requirement. 
Within a state bureaucracy, the division of labour between different ministries and 
departments means that, over time, numerous different standards and practices will 
evolve, and the patterns of interaction of one policy area might differ significantly 
from how work is done in a different area. Within the foreign-policy arena, for 
instance, there is the constant pressure of diplomatic niceties and conventions that 
have to be followed. There are usually strictly defined channels that have to be used 
within the political system – namely the foreign office or some similar agency that 
1 The predictability of a completely rigid organisation is easy to envision, but to some extent, 
the same kind of predictability can be seen at the other extreme as well. A completely dynamic 
organisation will never do the same thing twice, and every time anything happens, a new way 
of dealing with it will be devised. Eventually, it will probably run out of new ways in which the 
people in the organisation could do some things (e.g. the way they go to lunch), at which point 
it will no longer be as dynamic as it previously was. Its earlier predictable pattern of never doing 
the same thing twice is thus lost, but is replaced with a new pattern in how this one routine task 
is done.
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has a near monopoly on dealing with sensitive matters on the international arena. 
Beyond this, there is also the general pattern of bureaucratic hierarchies. In the 
example of the international arena, the foreign office becomes a lead agency of 
sort in dealing with other nations and thereby gains an implicit veto power over 
questions that normally do not fall under its purview. Similar hierarchies can, 
and habitually and even by design do crop up everywhere in this large construct 
we refer to as “the state” or “the government”. Specific departments within an 
agency will be held accountable to the agency leadership; the agency leadership 
will be held accountable to departments within a ministry; those departments will 
be held accountable to the ministry leadership who in turn are held accountable 
to the head(s) over government. Layers and layers of regulatory and oversight 
bodies are purposefully built this way, and the whole intent is exactly to enforce 
strict protocols and practices. In short, opportunities for imposing closed-
ness by requiring adherence to formal pattern of behaviour abound. In most 
cases, these formalities are part and parcel of the every-day work of any given 
organisation, so calling it an imposition at that point is somewhat misleading. 
Rather, it is when the normal work-flow gets disrupted and completely new and 
unfamiliar formal arrangements are imposed that the tendency towards closed 
behaviour starts creeping in. Those regular procedures now become a source of 
familiarity and security to fall back on, even though the situation may ask for a 
far more flexible approach than those procedures would allow for. Worse still, 
that flexibility might actually be available during every-day use of the very same 
procedures, but in response to the unfamiliar, the organisation falls back on doing 
things strictly “by the book,” eschewing a more dynamic response that it would 
normally be able to effect without any real friction. What might look like an 
every-day closed-ness turns out to be a surprisingly flexible set of processes and 
procedures, as long as they are not disrupted and suddenly forced to mesh with 
some other process or procedure that an external actor expects the organisation 
to follow when the two actors interact.
The final piece of the puzzle is what these kinds of imposed closed-ness do 
to the organisation itself. As will be expounded on later on, the literature on 
Knowledge Management (KM) implicitly suggests that the effectiveness of any 
information-gathering venture within an organisation depends on the organisa-
tion’s capacity of understanding the limits of its knowledge; on its knowledge of 
the needs and capabilities of other actors in the same field; and on its capability 
of identifying not just the problem at hand, but also what kind of knowledge 
might be relevant to solving that problem. These are, in essence, the three 
knowledge concepts this thesis adopts as a way of re-conceptualising Huber’s 
(1991) ideas of sourcing and grafting: meta-knowledge, empathic knowledge, 
and second-order knowledge (a triplet that will often be referred to as a whole 
in the form of MESO-knowledge). Together, they create the foundation and the 
set of tools an organisation has for dealing with unexpected problems, where the 
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fundamental assumption is that the better it makes use of these tools, the more 
informed decisions the organisation will make.
Figure 1 illustrates the model of how these different factors are supposed 
to interact. Something to note here is the additional coupling that has not yet 
been discussed: the connection between MESO-knowledge and the influence 
of crises. This connection lies somewhat outside the scope of this thesis, but as 
we delve deeper into both crises and knowledge management, this connection 
will become so clear that it would be imprudent to pretend it did not exist. This 
coupling denotes the “identification paradox” that can occur when organisations 
rely on external sources, willingly or forcibly, to provide a framing of a crisis. 
Upcoming sections will explain this problem in more detail once the underlying 
facets of both crises and KM have been discussed. For now, the quick summary 
version it is that a lack of properly applied MESO-knowledge (that is, an inability 
or unwillingness to identify and acquire the knowledge needed to understand a 
new and unexpected situation) can in and of itself be a cause for crises through 
mechanisms reminiscent of Weick’s (1988) notion of ‘enacted sensemaking.’ We 
might misinterpret completely benign information as cause for huge concern and 
start chasing our own shadows trying to solve a problem that does not actually 
exist, or, conversely, we might miss critical details that indicate that yes, this is 
indeed a monumental crisis, and thus fail to act because we cannot interpret 
these weak signals.
Identification paradox Beyond the scope of inquiry
Informed decision-making?
(Worse performance?)
M/E/SO-knowledge
(Decreased use)
Anticipation of process
(Increased surprise)
Bureaucratic organizations
(Increased closed-ness)
Crisis
(Increased stress)
Hypothesis i
Hypothesis ii
Hypothesis iii
Figure 1: A model of the pressure on organisations.
Furthermore, and perhaps more worryingly, this lack of understanding can gen-
erate a self-replicating cycle of not fully comprehending the issue at hand. We do 
not understand the problem so we have to find someone who can explain it to us, 
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but since we do not understand the problem, we are not capable of evaluating the 
value and relevance of the explanations offered to us. So we need someone who 
can clarify the relevance, but since we do not understand the problem, we are 
not capable of evaluating the relevance of these clarifications… and on it goes. If 
left unchecked, this recursive cycle can generate a host of meta-uncertainties – a 
worry about not understanding the explanations that should otherwise soothe 
our worries – that become a far larger issue than the actual crisis that created the 
original niggling seed of doubt. The instinctive “safe” solution to this problem is 
equally recursive: to properly identify the problem we need an expert on the area, 
but in order to identify an expert on the area we need an expert on experts in 
the area, but then again, how can we really trust that expert, and so on. The less 
safe (but probably far more constructive) solution is to simply go by instinct and 
pick whichever solution sounds good from a layman’s perspective and listening 
to the expert that sounds the most like (s)he knows what (s)he is talking about, 
but this requires a determination that is not always present. Insert 1 on the next 
page gives an example of one such case as further illustration.
The main thrust of the model, however, is the relationships between crises and 
organisations, between the imposed (unexpected) formality and organisations, 
between organisations and expert knowledge, and finally between expert knowl-
edge and decision-making. The rest of this chapter will discuss these different 
connections and explain the logic behind the three hypotheses of how we can 
predict the behaviour of an organisation when it is subjected to outside pressure.
2.2 The black box: the organisation itself
At the heart of the model lies the organisation, as conceptualised by March & 
Simon (1958) and Cyert & March (1963): a group of individuals working towards 
a collective goal and producing a collective good or result, often independent 
of their individual goals, where the work is cut up into sub-units and where the 
behaviour of (and within) each sub-unit is co-ordinated towards that collective 
goal. In practice, of course, an organisation may strive towards multiple goals at 
once and the efforts might not always be quite as concerted as the ideal image 
suggests. History is littered with examples of organisations where the sub-units 
work at cross-purpose, and the literature on the topic has become deeply fasci-
nated with these internal conflicts and found them a near-endless resource for 
studies and research, to the point where even scratching on the surface would 
produce an inordinately lengthy list of case studies and theories.
The two key words in this are “goals” and “co-ordination”, both of which 
imply that decision-making and intent are among the defining features of organ-
isational studies. Tenbrunsel et al. (1996) go so far as to describe decisions as “a 
core unit of activity” within these groups. That is not to say that the behaviour 
of or within organisations is always reasoned or rational – only that the struc-
ture itself imposes processes that direct actions towards a particular outcome. 
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Insert I: llustrating 
the dentification 
paradox – the case 
of the music industry
At the tail end of the 20th century, the 
Internet was still relatively new but had 
already quickly given rise to a new means 
of distributing information in almost all 
its various forms and had become the basis 
of both new and revamped businesses. 
Caught in the middle of this technological 
evolution was an almost century-old music 
industry, which over time had been so 
closely associated with its main medium 
of distribution – at first the shellac and 
vinyl records and, later, the CD – that its 
name had become synonymous with the 
“record industry.”
During the last few years, however, 
the exponential growth of the Internet 
as a distribution channel for all kinds of 
media had caught the industry completely 
off guard. None of their preconceived 
notions about how to get the goods to the 
consumer seemed to apply. Duplication 
was trivial and could be done on demand 
at zero cost, as opposed to making large 
batches in specialised facilities to keep 
costs down in hopes that stocks would 
sell out. Distribution was equally  trivial. 
The ease of duplication meant that there 
was no reason to bundle music on albums 
and go through multiple layers of ship-
ping, storage, and retail. Instead, the exact 
right song, or even just a single clip or 
sound bite, could be transported nigh on 
instantly from a central repository and 
directly to the media player inside the 
consumer’s home. Consumers understood 
these advantages very quickly. They could 
get what they wanted, without extraneous 
fluff, without ever leaving the comfort of 
their chair, much less their home. The 
recoding industry, however, did not. It 
tried to cling to its age-old business of 
selling physical records, which left the 
doors wide open for various illegitimate 
enterprises to move in and seize the nas-
cent digital distribution market. Some 
early attempts were made to stamp out 
the most egregious cases of illegal music 
sharing – Napster being perhaps the most 
obvious example – in hopes of getting 
rid of the problem and getting back to 
business as usual.
The problem was that the usual busi-
ness no longer existed – at least not in 
the same sense it had before. By the time 
the case was settled, Napster had long 
since been supplanted by better tools and 
technologies and was no longer a relevant 
threat. Illegal music sharing had become 
so mainstream that the very idea of paying 
for music had started to become slightly 
absurd for a large portion of the techno-
logically savvy. In addition, the rhetoric 
and legal tactics used to the industry to 
stigmatise piracy had only served to high-
light industry’s lack of understanding of 
what the customers wanted. By not mov-
ing quickly enough in face of this shift in 
technology and in customer behaviour, the 
industry had missed the boat on digital 
distribution. It now had to fight an uphill 
battle not only to put the required infra-
structure into place, but also to provide a 
commercially viable competitor to “free 
music” – a market the industry itself had 
unintentionally spawned through its inac-
tion – and to reconnect to an ostracised 
customer base. Years later, the CEO of 
the Universal Music Group explained the 
development fundamentally as a failure of 
knowledge, not only of the subject matter 
at hand but also of whom to turn to:
There’s no one in the record company 
that’s a technologist. That’s a miscon-
ception writers make all the time, that 
the record industry missed this. They 
didn’t. They just didn’t know what to 
do. […] We didn’t know [whom] to 
hire. I wouldn’t be able to recognize 
a good technology person – anyone 
with a good bullshit story would 
have gotten past me. (Doug Morris, 
quoted in Mnookin 2007)
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The organisation may be heavily proscribed in such a way that situation A always 
means the individuals do activity X, which might intuitively seem like the absence 
of decision: the response is nigh-on automatic. Even so, this act is still an arte-
fact of a decision: namely that in these A-type situations, the organisation shall 
always act in accordance with X. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the 
situation where there is an apparent absence of decision on the organisational 
level because there are no explicit, verbalised dictates on what needs to be done. 
Here too, however, is an artefact of decision at play, namely the formulation of 
intent, only instead of a prescribed means of achieving the expressed goal, each 
individual has to take that intent to heart in a more (post)modern manner and 
figure out his or her own means of getting there.
In either case, and as time passes and the environment changes, this chosen 
activity might even come to be seen as counter-productive from an outside per-
spective, and both the near-automated, prescribed behaviour and the complete 
“laissez-faire”, self-governed behaviour might seem almost nonsensical in context. 
Even so, they are still the result of a number of decisions within the organisation 
to set a certain goal, to employ a certain methodology to try to achieve that goal, 
and not the least a decision on how free the individual should be in discovering 
and deciding on his or her own way for achieving the goals (or, for that matter, 
to set goals of their own). Regardless of the locus and freedom of decision, and 
regardless of the logic and rationality of the decisions made, the notion of deci-
sions and of decision-making as a key feature of organisational studies holds true.
The question is, then, how are these decisions made? How is the intent iden-
tified and verbalised and how is the process to reach this objective envisioned 
and communicated? What are the characteristics that signify whether an organi-
sation relies more on internal regulation and artefacts of decisions in driving the 
behaviour of individuals, or whether it relies on an internalised understanding 
on the individual level of the collective goal, which will then, in turn, generate 
the right beneficial behaviour?
2.2.1 The fundamental issue: organisational cognition
What the likes of Cyert, March and Simon had created was the concept of the 
organisation as a cognitive organism, separate from the individuals that made 
up that organisation. In many ways, the organisation can be thought of as an 
individual in and of itself and many of the faculties that we normally associate 
with people can also be associated with organisations. These days, we talk about 
organisational memory, knowledge, learning and perception as reasonably 
clearly defined concepts that share many traits with their human parallels. As 
with people, organisations can suffer from learning disabilities, memory loss, 
and reduced awareness.
The question then becomes, how far can this metaphor be pushed? Do 
organisations suffer from the same kinds of cognitive bias as we can observe 
in individuals, for instance, and if so, do they suffer from them for similar 
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reasons? There are several types of pathological decision-making processes that 
are already of interest in the study of organisations in general or in the study 
of decision-making within an organisational context, such as groupthink (Janis 
1972, 1982; ’t Hart, Stern & Sundelius 1997), over-reliance on analogies (Khong 
1992), and naturalistic decision-making (Zambok & Klein 1990). These authors 
all identify and analyse how both individuals and small decision-making groups 
rely on various heuristics and environmental cues to try to grasp the full scope 
of complex events. However, both the heuristics themselves and the perception 
of cues that they rely on are, in one way or another, simplified models that can 
easily lead the mind astray. In social contexts in particular, the social cues may 
completely override the factual cues from the event itself. For example, a felt 
need for consensus guides the thought more than the facts on the table, for 
instance, and so a decision is made more on the basis of how people feel about 
the decision itself than on whether or not the decision makes sense in view what 
is going on in the world at large. While these all deal with individuals within a 
group or organisational context, the notion that the organisation itself has its 
own form of cognition raises the question of whether the same concepts can be 
applied to this larger organism: can (and do) organisations suffer from a kind 
of groupthink when co-operating with other organisations? Since organisations 
learn and have memories, do their previous experiences colour the decisions and 
policies of an organisation the way analogies the “mental slides” of naturalistic 
decision-making colour the individual’s choice of action?
The aim of this thesis is not to delve too deeply into these questions, but to 
answer some of a similar nature: what are some of the factors that inhibit an 
organisation’s “cognitive functions” and what skills can the organisation evolve 
to deal with these inhibitions? In an attempt to answer such questions, the first 
assertion to be made, then, is that much like how people can be open or closed-
minded, an observation that organisations can also be open or closed to new 
ideas and external influences.
2.2.2 What counts as “open” and “closed”?
It is worth stressing from the very start that it is a conscious decision not to 
include the “-minded” part when discussing the openness and closed-ness of an 
organisation. The connotations of “open-minded” and of “close-minded” are 
not entirely constructive and risk leading the thought towards a more normative 
argument. For the purpose of this thesis, they are simply two different states 
on a sliding scale, and as we shall see, there are good arguments to be made 
for both states. An organisation being closed may very well be the right thing 
for that organisation, given its primary purpose. Instead, “open” and “closed” 
organisations simply function according to different ideals and principles towards 
a different preferred outcome. While an argument will later be made that in 
times of crisis, a certain amount of openness will be helpful to deal with the 
dynamic environment such an event will generate; this does not mean that the 
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organisation’s core ideal should change, but rather that the degree of openness 
or closed-ness can be maintained at a useful level.
The notions of an open or closed organisation borrows heavily from Allison 
& Zelikow’s (1971; 1999) analytical models of decision-making. The open/
closed divide also mimics some of the features of Burns & Stalker’s (1961) con-
ceptualisation of the mechanistic versus the organic organisation, as well as of 
Mintzberg’s (1979) categorisation of machine bureaucracies and ad-hocracies. 
However, the two latter focus more on the separation, delegation, and coordina-
tion of tasks and responsibilities whereas the open/closed split takes more of an 
interest in the actual task processing and problems-solving. Essentially, an open 
organisation is one where the individual actors involved in the problem-solving 
effort are constantly jockeying for control over which course of action should 
eventually be taken, and one where the kinds of solutions available to the group 
as a whole very much rely on which actors are present. In addition, which strategy 
is ultimately chosen depends heavily on to what extent the decision-maker has to 
rely on a consensus-assessment among his or her advisors. This generates an arena 
where dynamism is the overarching theme and where a large degree of flexibility 
is built into the system. Moreover, the process is informal in the sense that there 
are few if any prescribed rules as to which kinds of decisions are acceptable as 
an outcome of the process, and there is no formal set of parameters that must be 
met for a prescribed action to be taken. This parallels Allison’s “type iii” model, 
where the ultimate decision depends on which players are involved, their relative 
power within the system, their ability to formulate a convincing problem image, 
and an implicit “game of politics” that determine how the different views and 
ideas are evaluated (Allison & Zelikow 1999:302ff).
The closed organisation, on the other hand, rather follows an ideal that is best 
described by Allison’s “type ii” model. This is where an organisation’s problem- 
solving relies on more or less strictly prescribed operational procedures and where 
the instinctual response to any given problem is to try to adapt the framing of 
the situation in such a way that it fits with one these already known solutions. 
Here, the outcome is predicated on what types of situations the organisation 
has prepared itself for and what kind of, and to which extent, outlier issues can 
be squeezed into those standard practices. This kind of organisation strives first 
and foremost for a consistency in its decisions. For example, an event that falls 
within the parameters as pre-defined pattern will generate the same response, 
time and time again. The response is based on regulations, as are the methods 
of altering this rigid structure.
The reader may at this point rightly object that this is not what Allison’s 
models are really intended for. Rather, they are modes or perspectives for ana-
lysing the decision-making of a small group. At the same time, however, they 
also represent two different assumptions about how decisions are made that can 
be tested against an actual case to see which yields the “better” explanation; or 
they can be used as delimitations to better filter out the different factors that 
influence a decision. These assumptions, and in particular the differentiations 
31
Chapter 2: The Framework
in terms of which factor influences what, can also be seen as an ideal for how 
an organisation is supposed to function. One organisation might not want to 
be stymied by internal rules and bureaucracy and would rather like to see the 
kind of dynamic competition of ideas described in the type-iii model. Another 
organisation might instead want to minimise the individual factor and exclusively 
rely on written procedure. Whether these two organisations manage to live up 
to their ideals is a completely different question, so just because an organisation 
is open does not mean that a type-ii analysis of it will find nothing.
In more concrete terms, and to return to the key issue of the use of expert 
knowledge, the open organisation will be more inclined to seek out and call 
on expertise that has not already been identified and tried through previous 
experience. Instead, an individual actor is able to present and champion these 
hitherto unknown and untested ideas and make the external knowledge behind 
them a part of the decision-making process. The closed organisation, on the 
other hand, may very well have access to a large battery of external experts, 
but their use and their inclusion is strictly regulated; adding new ones on an 
ad-hoc basis is either outright not allowed, or there are no clear procedures for 
it, making it a much less likely path for the organisation to take. In the former 
case, it could be that the organisation is dealing with topics or information of a 
sensitive nature and only those with the right clearance can be allowed to support 
the effort. In the latter case, it could simply be a matter of inexperience – the 
organisation has always managed well with what it has – or it can be a matter 
of pride, where the organisation believes itself to be so self-sufficient as to never 
really need outside help.
2.2.3 The ideal types of openness and closed-ness
There are, in short, numerous ways in which these characteristics can manifest 
themselves and a multitude of reasons why. This thesis cannot begin to hope to 
catalogue them all, nor is it the goal to do so. Instead, these two ideal types work 
as a simple categorisation of organisations, where most will find themselves on a 
sliding scale between the two extremes, and where the core question of the thesis 
is what influences the organisation’s movement on that scale. The methodology 
section in chapter 3 will delve deeper into the problem of evaluating these two 
extremes, whereas this section is more concerned with defining the terms as clearly 
as possible. It is still worth pointing out that while they are presented here as 
a binary variable – open or closed – the reality will be that there is a gradation 
between them and indeed the entire point of the thesis is that organisations will 
switch preferences depending on the situation. While an organisation may be 
characterised by a high degree of formality on most occasions, certain situations 
may call for strict by-the-book adherence to the rules and regulations, and even 
the most rigid organisation will have its lulls and lapses into a more relaxed state. 
We are perhaps more served by expecting a move towards either extreme, as opposed 
to a full and clear flip-flop between the two. Rather, we might expect that only 
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one or two ideals change – that an otherwise open organisation suddenly favours 
rigidity over flexibility, for instance – and that this can be interpreted as a change 
towards a more closed stance.
Closed Regulation ↔ Rigidity ↔ Consistency
↕ ↕ ↕
Open Informality ↔ Flexibility ↔ Dynamics
Figure 2: The ideal types of open and closed organisations
Conceptually, the two types can be categorised by operating on a guiding 
principle of how the organisation’s work should be directed: through regulation 
or through less formal processes where issues are allowed to be resolved on a case-
by-case basis, each with their own bespoke interpretation of what is “allowed” 
or “suitable” and what is not. These principles generate an instrumental work 
flow where either rigidity or flexibility is the core characteristic: either work has 
to be done by strict adherence to the rules, or the rules are more intended to be 
guidelines to solving the issue at hand. The rationale behind these work flows is 
the preferred outcome they are intended to generate. Either we have a situation 
where the outcome is consistent and predictable – all pegs have to go in a hole 
after all, even the square ones, and the round holes are good enough to fit that 
purpose – or we have one where an exact fit between problem and solution is 
paramount for whatever reason. Continuing the peg-and-hole parable, maybe 
any damage to either element is unacceptable, and the effort to make new holes 
for oddly-shaped pegs are worth it to avoid that larger headache The open/closed 
schema can be seen in Figure 2 above. 
As with all ideal types, these categories and labels do not mean that we should 
expect them to always appear and be adhered to. An open organisation may be 
labelled as having a “dynamic” rather than “consistent” preferred outcome, which 
does not mean that every decision will differ from the last. They, too, will most 
likely also generate a familiar pattern of outcomes, but will simply be far more 
sensitive to letting new and additional parameters go into that decision, and 
are more willing to specifically tailor a decision to a given situation. Likewise, 
it does not mean that a closed organisation will be a single-answer monolith, 
but rather that it will show a preference for fitting everything into a set of 
standardised responses. A closed organisation may also be sensitive to changes 
in the parameters that go into a decision – even a small change may completely 
alter the outcome – but only if the parameter in question is already known and 
accounted for and if there is a ready-made response to such a change. Similarly, 
it is not hard to imagine, at least on a conceptual level, a situation where the 
regulations dictate a flexible response and a dynamic outcome. For instance, the 
health-care sector, for instance, is often heavily regulated towards offering the 
patients individualised and personalised care, which is possible because there are 
so many different diagnoses and treatments for the physicians to choose between.
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So it bears repeating that these are just the extremes with specific features that 
signal a trend towards either end, and that the main interest of this thesis lies 
in how organisations can shift from one to the other. It is also worth reiterating 
that the exact inner nature of the organisation and how decisions are made are 
of a lesser importance here. It is the black box that we can categorise as being 
more or less open or closed as far as what information the organisation chooses 
to accept. How that information is handled internally is beyond the scope of 
this study. Finally, it is worth mentioning that, quite counter-intuitively, the 
analytical “output” of this black box, as studied here, is actually the type of input 
it accepts. We cannot tell what the organisation is doing, but we can study how 
it responds to external pressure of different forms. The output of the black box is 
that response, and the response consists of the use of three organisational “skills” 
that let information flow back into the black box.
2.3 The output of the black box: knowledge and the use of expertise
One of the core concepts for this thesis is the notion of organisational knowledge – an 
idea born out of Cyert & March’s (1963) and Cangelosi & Dill’s (1965) research 
into the behaviour of organisations viewed as singular entities. Extrapolating what 
had previously been considered human and individual qualities such as cognition 
onto organisations, allowed for a new way of exploring and explaining how larger 
social constructs act. A key discovery was that, even though organisations are 
made up of large collections of individuals, there is knowledge embedded in the 
organisation itself that does not exist within any one of those individuals. The 
way this social structure has organised itself to deal with every-day issues is, in 
and of itself, an artefact of how poorly or well previous working procedures have 
turned out. By reshaping itself to better cope with similar situations, the organ-
isation has formed what more or less amounts to a memory of past experiences, 
and it now behaves in a way that is consistent with those memories. The exact 
reason why any given organisation uses certain procedures nowadays might be 
lost on the individuals, but is rather embedded in the organisation itself. It is the 
organisation that holds that particular piece of knowledge, not the individuals, 
and it has often been shaped over a longer period of time than the individual 
has been around.
From this observation sprung a raft of new fields of research, most notably 
into organisational learning (cf. Cangelosi & Dill 1965; Argyris & Schön 
1978, 1996; Huber 1991), the concept of the learning organisation (cf. Argyris 
& Shön 1978, 1996; Senge 1990; Huysman 2000), and more recently the idea 
of knowledge management (cf. Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Alvesson & Kärreman 
2001; Easterby-Smith & Lyles 2003b; McNabb 2007). Organisational learning 
is also an important part of the crisis management literature (cf. Rosenthal, Boin 
& Comfort 2001; Boin et al. 2005, 2017). Knowledge management (KM), in 
particular, takes on the task of examining how knowledge is created and trans-
ferred, not just between individuals, but also between different organisations as 
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well as between the organisational and individual level. This sounds like exactly 
the right thing for explaining how organisations (and individuals within those 
organisations) take on the task of figuring out what they need to know and where 
to learn it. It also ties neatly into the notion that organisations are subject to 
variants of the cognitive processes we see in individuals, which makes KM useful 
as a marker for the kind of changes due to external pressures that we want to 
study: what kind of knowledge do organisations use when the heat is on?
One observation that can be made at this point is that this kind of reshaping 
and adaptation almost immediately creates a tension between the definitions of 
open and closed of the previous section. While they are defined by their rigidity, 
this does not mean that closed organisations cannot accumulate knowledge, but 
that they do so in a rigid way. In the extreme case, their knowledge is stored 
exclusively in the operational practices that regulate organisational behaviour, 
and it takes a concerted effort to change these regulations. Conversely, in a 
totally open organisation, the knowledge is solely stored in informal structures; 
it exists more in the connections and interactions between people rather than in 
the regulations; and the knowledge can far more easily be changed and adapted 
on the fly due to the inherent flexibility of these organisations. This observation 
alone gives us a hint of what we might come to expect of organisations under 
pressure: that organisations under stress will “forget” certain things they already 
know, and instead fall back on one particular kind – or one particular source – 
of knowledge depending on whether they tend towards openness or closed-ness 
under these circumstances. If the organisation tends towards openness, it may 
forget lessons that have been codified in its regulations and standard operational 
procedures, and be prone to “reinvent the wheel,” but it will be capable of quickly 
(re)generating the new knowledge it requires. If the organisation tends towards 
closed-ness, it will instead forget the knowledge encoded in the individuals and 
informal structures, and rely on what is set out in the rulebook. It will also be 
less capable of inventing new methods on the fly. If the rulebook is not up to 
the task, the organisation quickly runs out of ideas and only then, if at all, does 
it try to generate new knowledge.
However, in order to examine these ideas more closely, we need to take a 
rather elaborate detour in order to understand the core concept that is used here: 
we need to understand “knowledge.” Specifically, we need to understand how 
different kinds of knowledge generate different kinds of behavioural artefacts 
that can be observed for the purpose of determining where organisations stand 
on the open/closed spectrum. How is knowledge used in organisations and how 
can this use be observed?
First of all, it is important to separate knowledge from a couple of different 
concepts that are notably similar to the point of often being used as synonyms 
(even in this thesis – a practice that ends here). Even within the knowledge- 
focused literature, there is some confusion over what, exactly, knowledge is, but 
the attempts to ring it in usually come down to a progression between data, 
information, and finally knowledge. At each step of the way, further layers of 
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complexity, refinement, processing, and interpretation are added. Table 1 below 
(Koraeus 2007) lists some of the ways these three concepts are differentiated in 
the literature, and while they all offer slightly different views, there are a  couple 
of common patterns. One is the aforementioned successive embedding of 
more and more context and interpretation. Another is a rather clear distinction 
between data and information, both of which are often described as reasonably 
objective in nature, and knowledge, which is almost universally subjective to the 
 knowledge-holder. Another way of looking at it is that data and information 
are the results of a process – be it fact gathering, sifting, organisation or contex-
tualisation – whereas knowledge is a process in and of itself. This is most clearly 
shown in the foundational definition made by Polanyi (1966), where knowledge 
is tersely defined as the act of knowing: the process of believing, interpreting, 
understanding and – perhaps most importantly – of making use of the available 
information and data. While it is perhaps the best illustration made of the 
difference between knowledge and simple data and information, some authors 
doubt whether this definition has really survived in modern-day texts on the 
matter (Tsoukas 2003; Gourlay 2006).
Table 1: Data, information, and knowledge
Data Information Knowledge
Alawi & Tiwana 
(2003)
Fragmented factoids 
(objective).
Integrated, interlinked, 
summarised, and 
profiled data 
(interpreted).
Reflections on, or 
learning of, information 
by individuals and 
organisations.
Blackler 
(1995), 
Assudani 
(2005)
Abstract phenomena, 
devoid of any context.
A mediated, situated, 
provisional, pragmatic, 
and contested idea.
Collier (2006) Raw facts. Organised data. Data 
processed for a 
purpose but without 
interpretation.
The application of a 
cognitive process on 
information to make 
it useful, enabling 
conclusions to be 
drawn.
McNabb 
(2007)
Facts, concepts, or 
statistics.
Data organised for 
comprehension and 
understanding.
Information used by 
a person and for a 
purpose.
Nonaka & 
Takeuchi 
(1995)
Data given meaning 
through syntax and 
semantics.
Justified true beliefs, 
created by the flow of 
information anchored 
in the beliefs and 
commitments of its 
holder.
Waltz (2003) Measurements and 
observations 
(content).
Data placed in context, 
indexed, and organ‑
ised (context).
Information under‑
stood and explained 
(Meaning).
(cf. Koraeus 2007, 2008)
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Even with this caveat, the most common trait of the various definitions of knowl-
edge, and true even in Polanyi’s definition, is that knowledge is ‘actionable:’ it is 
not just some intellectual object that tells us what do to, but rather the informed 
ability that lets us process the world around us and decide what to do. Blackler 
(1993) frames knowledge, and in particular organisational knowledge, as the 
art of picking the right action or activity to move forward – in other words, 
knowledge is the art of making the right decision.
Given this description, it becomes a trivial matter of defining what consti-
tutes an ‘expert.’ It is simply an agent that holds the knowledge required to fully 
process the various details that has a relevant influence on the topic at hand – in 
other words, these agents are the holders of ‘expertise,’ which is how this kind 
of topic-complete knowledge is usually labelled. An expert is someone who can 
look at the information and data available and turn that into a decision on how 
to act. This, in turn, means that we can understand ‘expert organisations’ as a 
collection of people where the prescribed procedures and arrangements with that 
institution (that is, its organisational knowledge) are that process of knowing; 
the process that generates an activity or action that solves problems. Blackler 
(1993) even goes so far as to say that what an expert organisations really is, is 
an “activity systems” – a term borrowed from Engeström (1987). It is a context 
in which activities are created and actions are defined. It is a system that wrings 
out individual knowledge from the persons inside the organisation, and which 
then processes it further to decide the direction of the organisation as a whole.
But here is the rub: all this tells us is that an organisation can make decisions 
based on what data and information is available to it. But it also tells us that if the 
organisation does not have the right knowledge – on an individual or organisational 
level – to fully process all the relevant details, it will strictly speaking instantly 
lose its expertise, and is no longer able to pick the right activity. It can certainly 
create action plans, but they are detached from the realities of the situation, and 
the organisation will most likely suffer some kind of consequence. In fact, the 
organisational learning literature quite expressly tells us that this happens more 
or less constantly, but that, in the ideal case, the organisation can bridge this 
gap, detect the disconnect, learn and do better next time. But what if there is 
no “next time”, or rather, what if “next time” is far too late? Or what if the gap 
needs to be detected and bridged right here and now?
This is where the need for external expertise (be it individual or organisational) 
comes in, but with it comes the need to be able to identify these knowledge gaps 
on the fly. The question is less of the nature of “how do we solve the problem?” 
and more in line with “how do we expand our knowledge to include a solution?” 
It might seem like a rather small, semantic difference, but given the notion that 
knowledge is, as described above, the ability to process information and figuring 
out the right action, this latter formulation is far more precise in what actually 
needs to happen. This breaks the problem down in two parts: how do we discover 
the locus of this missing knowledge, and how do we incorporate into the body 
of knowledge we already possess? Let us tackle these two questions in reverse 
order, because the former problem turns out to be an extension of the latter.
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2.3.1 Tacit & explicit knowledge
The main crux of knowledge transfer is that, as Polanyi (1966) remarked, knowledge 
can be broken down into two distinctly different parts: tacit and explicit knowledge, 
depending on how well it can be articulated. A somewhat older, but very similar, 
distinction is made by Ryle (1949), who divides knowledge into “knowing how” 
and “knowing that”, respectively. In fact, this particular distinction that has been 
the basis for a number of differently reformulated variants across a number of 
disciplines.2
Tacit knowledge is sometimes referred to as “silent” knowledge, in reference 
to the fact that it can only be verbalised and articulated with great difficulty. It 
comes in the form of some kind of know-how: a skill in arts, crafts, creativity, 
or manual and mechanical skills. A classic example of tacit knowledge is riding a 
bike: it is something you know how to do, but cannot really explain to someone 
and then have him or her ride off into the sunset. Telling someone how their sense 
of balance works and how the hunk of plastic and metal will influence it does 
not actually let them maintain that balance until they have felt it themselves (and 
the pain from a couple of scraped knees). A slightly more complex version, and 
more in line with the topic of this thesis, is tacit knowledge of the idiosyncrasies 
of an organisation: knowing which parts of the request forms to skip, which parts 
can be filled out in short hand, and which parts need to be signed in triplicate 
or it will bounce somewhere along the line; knowing that, since it is Monday, 
Alice will be manning the desk, so you had better hurry, because tomorrow 
Benny will be there instead and with him in charge, you will not get an answer 
to your important question before Christmas. Tacit knowledge can usually only 
be gained through experience, and if one tries to write a comprehensive manual 
of how to do it, it will invariably generate a four-volume monster of checklists 
and contingencies that no one can make either sense or use of anyway.
Explicit knowledge, on the other hand, is superbly easy to write down, to 
the point where it might actually be far easier just to leave it in written form 
and remembering where to find it, rather than memorising it as a whole. It deals 
with “knowing that” something is true, which generally means dealing with facts 
and logical conclusions from these facts. That is not to say that tacit and explicit 
knowledge might not overlap in that they can provide the same answers, but 
2 Cf. Gourlay (2006), Collier (2006), Kakabadse et al. (2003), and compare with the use in Sadra 
& Thagard (2003), who deal with microbiology, and Abelson & Sussman (1986; & Sussman 
1996), who discuss computer science. Abelson, Sussman & Sussman, in particular, present an 
interesting point of comparison due to a parallel with Polanyi’s definition of knowledge as a 
process. In computer science, “knowing that” is often labelled ‘declarative knowledge’ and is 
defined as given data, whereas “knowing how” is labelled ‘imperative knowledge’ and is the 
a process that generates a result. Here, too, it can be difficult to determine from the outside 
whether any particular result came from declarative or imperative knowledge. It is not until we 
analyse the process behind that result (if one exists at all) that we can tell the two apart.
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they will do so in radically different ways. Simple multiplication, for instance, 
can easily be expressed in both forms: you know your multiplication table 
(explicit knowledge), so you know that 5×5=25, or you know that multiplica-
tion is a process of successive addition (tacit knowledge), so you perform the 
calculation 5×5=5+5+5+5+5=25. In both cases, the end result is the same, but 
the ways getting to that result are radically different. The difference between the 
two can similarly be described as the difference between knowing the ingredients 
and step-by-step instructions of a cake recipe, and being able to bake a cake. In 
terms of organisational knowledge, the difference could rather be expressed as 
the difference between having an accounting department (explicit knowledge: 
their roles and practices are documented, and they can easily be moved around 
on the organisational charts) and actually being able to keep the books in order 
(tacit knowledge: only through years of experience have they learned to make 
sense of the Byzantine mess of incoming and outgoing bills and not be charged 
with accounting fraud in the process).
So when it comes to the issue of transferring knowledge, there is a problem: 
only certain pieces of knowledge can be easily exchanged, and quite often, the really 
difficult questions can only be answered through the means of tacit knowledge 
– the kind of knowledge that will not easily lend itself to transfer. This is where 
the knowledge management literature steps in to offer its solutions. It is, in 
essence a field of study that concerns itself with how it is possible to ensure and 
control the flows of knowledge within organisations. In particular, it takes an 
interest in how to short-circuit the transfer of tacit knowledge by converting it 
to explicit knowledge that can be transferred easily, rather than having to spend 
years in apprenticeship.
2.3.2 Managing knowledge transfer: the SECI process
The conversion back and forth between tacit and explicit knowledge was the core 
subject of Nonaka & Takeuchi’s (1995) study that more or less kick-started the 
entire KM field. As mentioned, the idea is to short-circuit the normally very slow 
transfer of tacit knowledge by trying to use explicit (and thus easily transferable) 
knowledge as a conduit for this transfer. However, this is still not a matter of 
composing the aforementioned tomes of mystic lore, but rather a managed social 
interaction between the knowledge-holder and the recipient. As an example, 
the authors used a number of cases where manual tasks had to be automated in 
order to create new technological appliances, which meant that the designers 
and engineers had to absorb key knowledge from the craftsmen currently doing 
the job. This had to be done within the time frame of a normal product cycle: 
a matter months, of which only a part was allotted to the actual design phase.
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What Nonaka & Takeuchi had noted was that companies that were successful at 
this kind of transfer of manual labour skills to automation employed a very specific 
methodology to capture key components of the fundamental skills required for 
the job. The authors conceptualised this in the form of the SECI process – an 
iterative cycle of articulating, discussing, and assimilating knowledge in four 
separate steps. Figure 3 (Koraeus 2008, reproduced from Nonaka & Takeuchi 
1995) illustrates the sequence of these four steps: Socialisation, Externalisation, 
Combination, and Internalisation. This process is a back-and-forth between tacit 
and explicit knowledge, as well as a back-and-forth between group- and individual 
processing of the knowledge that is being exchanged. At each step of the way, the 
individuals involved take away a new aspect of this knowledge from the process, 
and the goal is to come out at the other end with (as near as) full operational 
knowledge about the skill being taught. It should be noted, however, that while 
it is most commonly illustrated as a cycle with no particular beginning or end, 
later publications held that the practical application of the process was better 
formulated as a spiral of diminishing returns that continuously edged closer to 
this “full” knowledge but which was generally halted after a few iterations, when 
the additional gain from going another full cycle became too small (Nonaka & 
Toyama 2003; Nonaka, von Krogh & Voelpel 2006).
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Of course, this model is not without its flaws, and over the decade and a half 
that it has existed, it has received its fair share of criticism. Perhaps the most 
damning of it all comes in part from the original architects: Nonaka, von Krogh 
& Voelpel (2006) express some dismay over the fact that, while it has proven 
useful enough, very little is actually known about the cognitive and social pro-
cesses that make these transformations work. Shariq (1999) offers the rudiments 
of a theory on the nature of these conversions, but also notes along with Cauvel 
& Despres (2002) and Tsoukas (2003) that the conversion is far from perfect. 
Some ideas simply cannot be converted from tacit to explicit or vice versa, and 
some information will be lost in the process. Then again, given the definition of 
knowledge, which holds that it is a subjective skill or art form or process, this 
might not come as a complete surprise. Being subjective also means, almost by 
default, that the exact same knowledge is thoroughly unlikely to exist in two 
different knowledge holders. Even so, its critics do not rob the SECI process, 
much less KM as a whole, of the promise that knowledge – not even that elusive 
tacit knowledge – can be transferred, and that there are shortcuts and heuristics 
for doing so. It simply comes with a couple of caveats, such as a high risk of 
making a less than perfect copy, and that exactly to which extent it can actually 
be managed still remains a largely unanswered question.
So what implications does this have for organisations? To begin with, it com-
pletely rejects any preconception that might exist about the locus of ‘expertise.’ 
We are no longer discussing the classic image of an ivory-tower academic who 
has claimed the title of expert by researching the topic for the last few decades 
and who can refer us to his or her ample collection of treatises on the subject. 
Instead, the expert is someone – anyone – who has the appropriate applicable 
knowledge, which might just as well be a seasoned practitioner, whose knowledge 
is almost entirely of a tacit nature. This means that an organisation that at some 
point might require external expertise to solve its problems will also need methods 
and procedures along the lines of the SECI process in order to be able to extract 
this much-needed knowledge. The only alternative is to spend vast amounts of 
resources – in particular time – on educating members of the organisation to 
the point where they themselves become experts. If the need proves to be con-
stant, or at least commonly reoccurring, this might be part of the organisational 
learning process, and sooner or later, the expertise of the organisation is restored. 
However, if the knowledge need is rare or unique for the one particular situation 
the organisation finds itself in, this approach will not only be prohibitively costly, 
but will most likely not yield any useful results until long after the need for the 
knowledge has disappeared. Instead, SECI-style “instant learning” processes are 
required to get the most out of the knowledge sources that can be found, unless 
the organisation is willing to limit itself to just acquiring explicit knowledge.
This might seem like an acceptable concession, but the problem is that the 
explicit knowledge might not be enough. Certainly, anyone can read, and probably 
even learn by heart, the facts and theory and analytical tools that come from the 
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aforementioned academic treatises, but without the skill to make use of them, they 
are of little value. We essentially come back to the distinction between knowing 
the cake recipe and knowing how to make the cake. In other words, being able 
to absorb knowledge in all its forms is in and of itself a piece of organisational 
knowledge that is critical to maintain, so here is the first partial answer to the 
question posed earlier: how do we expand our knowledge to include a solution? 
The first requirement is to have the capacity to accept all kinds of knowledge, 
and while it may be flawed, the SECI process proves that such a capacity can be 
obtained. The quest for external expertise is not in vain.
What it does not answer, however, is how to provide that capacity with some 
input; how to find the locus of knowledge? Or, for that matter, how to figure 
out exactly what kind of knowledge is needed? What are the holes that need 
to be plugged? For this, we have to turn to the process of knowledge discovery.
2.3.3 Managing knowledge discovery: MESO-knowledge
The KM literature has quite a lot to say on the topic of discovering and incorpo-
rating external knowledge – or ‘sourcing’ and ‘grafting’ knowledge, as Huber 
(1991) labels it. It also mentions a number of tried and tested methodologies 
to discover knowledge gaps, as well as unexpected treasure troves of knowledge 
within the existing organisation, that have been used since long before knowledge 
management was conceptualised (for example, knowledge audits, cf. Alavi & 
Tiwana 2003; Huber 1991; McNabb 2007; Rose 1993).
What this literature does not mention, however is what these audits result in, 
which is a fairly surprising oversight considering that the topic of the research is 
the varying nature and use of knowledge. Digging deeper into what the many 
authors actually are suggesting (cf. Koraeus 2007; 2008), a clear pattern emerges 
that, what is actually going on, is the creation of a very particular kind of knowledge: 
a kind reflexive awareness and understanding not only of the organisation’s own 
capability, but also of how it is situated in a larger expert environment and of 
how other inhabitants of that environment in turn are situated. This, in essence, 
is the hitherto unexplained but often mentioned concept of MESO-knowledge.
The observation starts with what might somewhat cruelly be called the obsession 
the KM literature has with describing the needs, conditions, and requirements of 
so-called knowledge workers, as well as the gains that stand to be made by having 
good ones (cf. Carneiro 2001; Zellner & Fornahl 2002; Wiig 2002; McNabb 
2007). A knowledge worker, in the simplest terms, is a person that adds value 
to data, information or knowledge; they are the ones that perform the successive 
refinement and embedding discussed earlier, and they are the ones that keep track 
of who knows what so that this knowledge can be called upon when needed. A 
consistent track in these descriptions is that knowledge workers need to keep 
track of three main focus areas: the organisation’s own resources and needs; the 
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resources and needs of similar actors within the same general arena, and the 
extended network of both the own organisation and of those similar actors.
The most commonly proposed way of gaining and maintaining this knowledge 
is the establishment of ‘Communities of Practice’ (CoPs), where groups sharing 
common issues and problems can get together to learn from each other and gain 
access to the pooled competences of everyone invited, including some knowledge 
that is only tangentially connected to their every-day operations, but which might 
prove to come in handy some day (Brown & Duguid 1991; Holmqvist 2003; 
Huysman 2000; Lindkvist 2005; McNabb 2007; Zellner & Fornahl 2002). If this 
sounds like the ideal (and possibly idealised) solution the previously mentioned 
“identification paradox” and the problem of not understanding what it is you 
do not understand, it should not come as a great surprise. That is the entire 
purpose of the CoP.
The idea of the identification paradox was described briefly at the head of 
the chapter, but it is perhaps the central problem in the use of external expertise 
and needs to be explained in bit more detail. The identification paradox is what 
occurs when you are faced with something unknown and are unable to come 
to an understanding of what it is because your lack of knowledge means you 
are not even able to identify what it is you need to ask about in order to get 
more knowledge. All you have is your own assumptions and guesses, which may 
lead you to ask the wrong questions to the wrong people and end up with an 
explanation that is anywhere from completely false to true, but not relevant to 
the actual issue. Even if, by lucky guess or pure chance, you manage to ask the 
right person, you might not ask the right questions and thus not get any kind of 
useful answer because you are unaware of and unable to convey the specifics that 
the expert needs in order to tailor their answer to your needs. Communities of 
practice attempt to solve this problem by congregating people who have a common 
area of interest or concern, but who have different perspectives, needs, and levels 
of expertise in the many fields that are connected to this area of interest. It is 
not there to make everyone experts at everything, but to rather to show what 
facets there are of this common issue area, and to familiarise the participants 
to the many fields of expertise that can offer some insight into the panoply of 
questions that might arise.
But what is actually going on here? For one, it is very clearly an arena for the 
aforementioned SECI process, whereby organisations (or at least their repre-
sentatives) can be socialised and combine their ideas and hopefully come away 
with some new knowledge that is of particular relevance to them. But more 
importantly, what they are doing is building a cognitive imprint of themselves. 
They are getting to know what they know and don’t know. It is this particular 
knowledge, knowing what you know, and by extension, knowing what you don’t 
know, that I have chosen to call meta-knowledge – the ‘M’ in MESO. This is the 
first step in the process of discovering, or sourcing, knowledge, not just because 
it gives you a sense of what gaps there might be that need to be filled, but also 
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because it creates a clear picture of what you have to trade with. What can you 
offer others who discover that they have knowledge gaps that also need to be 
bridged? Meta-knowledge can also extend to other organisations, and thus to an 
understanding of their gaps and needs, as well as what they have to offer, which 
lets you predict what issues they might have and how you can help them. In the 
same vein as connecting tacit knowledge with the idea of “knowing how” and 
explicit knowledge with “knowing that”, meta-knowledge can be expressed in 
terms of “knowing why.” It essentially lets you know why some particular piece 
of information or bit of knowledge is needed and/or why something you know 
might be valuable to someone else.
This “someone else” is the object of a second type of knowledge that is being 
generated through the SECI-process. This time, it is a matter of “knowing 
who” – specifically knowing who possesses some particular expertise or who 
is in need of whatever information you have just uncovered. This is the ‘E’ in 
MESO: what I have chosen to call empathic knowledge. It is in essence a form 
of meta-knowledge that covers other people rather than oneself. This is often 
a second step in the sourcing of knowledge. While your meta-knowledge tells 
that something is missing and that you have important information to convey, 
empathic knowledge tells you whom to barter with and what they will want 
(and need) in return. Another critical component to empathic knowledge is the 
understanding of the other party’s knowledge gaps, in particular in the areas you 
know intimately and almost intuitively.
The final part, and the last two letters, in MESO-knowledge is the concept 
I have named second-order knowledge, or deutero-knowledge, in an explicit echo 
of the notion of second-order/deutero-learning described in the organisational 
learning literature. Just as second-order learning is described as “learning how 
to learn” (that is, understanding and embracing the processes by which the 
organisation can adapt to a changing environment) second-order knowledge is 
“knowing how to know more”. It may lack the pithiness of earlier descriptions 
such as “knowing how” vs. “knowing that” and the “knowing why and who” 
of meta-knowledge and empathic knowledge, but it is also an altogether much 
more complex concept. Fundamentally, it is the core concern and ultimate goal 
of the SECI process and, I daresay, of knowledge management as a whole.
Second-order knowledge, then, effectively entails the ability to get out of the 
identification paradox. It is the process of combining and refining pretty much 
all the previous knowledge types to answer the question of where to go next; the 
ability to formulate useful questions on topics where the current knowledge is 
negligible; and the ability to transform the answers into the kind of “actionable 
knowledge” that sits at the heart of Polanyi’s original definition. In other words, 
it means first having an understanding of what gaps there are in the current 
knowledge base (meta-knowledge), then knowing who might be able to provide 
an answer or, if not, who know someone else that might point you in the right 
direction (empathic knowledge), and finally knowing how to explain your gaps 
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in such a way that the respondent can provide answers that are relevant to you 
and that you can understand. To use the analogy of a classic jigsaw puzzle: 
if meta-knowledge and empathic knowledge are the puzzle-solvers ability to 
recognise certain patterns – the role of corner and edge pieces, large patches 
of similarly-coloured tiles and so on – and the strategies for clustering these 
pieces into relevant piles so they can be found quickly later, then second-order 
knowledge is the puzzle-layer’s ability to juggle all these sources of information 
at once and actually solve the puzzle. Just as how differentiating between tacit 
and explicit knowledge lets us separate reading a recipe and making the cake, 
the MESO-knowledge perspective lets us differentiate between the mechanical 
separation and categorisation of puzzle pieces from the process of putting them 
back together to form a coherent picture. In a sense, second-order knowledge is 
the ability to have an open mind full of pieces that may end up fitting together 
in very surprising and unexpected ways.
It is entirely possible for an entity to be very good at one of these things and 
not the other, and the organisational knowledge literature provides numerous 
artefacts of this kind of disconnect in the form of fantasy documents and super-
stitious learning (cf. Clarke 1999; Birkland 2006). There is ample empirical and 
theoretical evidence of organisations that are very good at taking inventory over 
assets and liabilities as far as intellectual capital goes, but who are seemingly 
incapable of actually doing anything with this information. Perhaps more rare is 
the opposite: organisations that are very good at making use of what they have in 
new and interesting ways, but who are, from one day to the next, very unreliable 
in terms of what they seem to have at their disposal. Such an organisation would 
be creative, but would also have to be because old discoveries are never recorded 
and reused, so every attempt at solving a problem would have to go through the 
same process of trial and error.
2.3.4 Benefits of a MESO perspective over other theories
At this point, the reader might ask why this new concept is needed – does 
 deutero-learning not cover the same idea? Only in the sense that we are talking 
about filling capability gaps. What MESO-knowledge lets us do is to formalise 
the different stages and methods for doing so, even outside of a learning context. 
The learning literature generally focuses on the changes (or non-changes) that 
happen in response to events or changes in the environment. It is a reactive 
and often long-winded process. What this thesis tries to conceptualise, on the 
other hand, is a far more proactive, introspective, and very quick process where 
knowledge gaps are continuously identified and addressed as they arise.
MESO-knowledge also lets us take a different view on knowledge manage-
ment as a whole. While KM has its roots in the crucial differences between tacit 
and explicit knowledge and the difficulties in expressing one in the form of the 
other, the field as a whole has effectively overlooked the cogs in the machinery 
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it builds, focusing instead on the input and output of that machinery. The KM 
literature talks about encapsulating, encoding and transferring knowledge, but 
surprisingly little about why anyone would go about doing so. The implicit 
assumption is that you want to know more – especially about things that cannot 
be properly described in words alone – and that the SECI process helps with 
achieving that goal. The questions of why you would want to learn more, about 
what, and how to put the SECI wheel in motion are largely left unanswered. 
The three MESO-knowledge types allow us to answer those questions. We want 
to know more because our meta-knowledge has allowed us to identify a critical 
gap. Or empathic knowledge has identified someone who can help us with this 
problem, and our meta-knowledge has also provided us with a bargaining chip 
to trade against this help. Our empathic knowledge thus also helps us set up 
the social context within which the SECI process can begin to function. Our 
second-order knowledge, finally, is crucial for our ability to both externalise our 
concerns and internalise the answers – specifically to see if they actually fill the 
gaps we have previously identified.
That is not to say that the MESO-knowledge concept in any way competes 
with or obsoletes any of the ideas in the KM literature. Quite the opposite, they 
are all of critical importance for understanding and enabling the actual knowledge 
transfer. Instead, it provides a context for why this is at all important to begin 
with. The main concern here is that, while we can identify gaps in our knowledge, 
those gaps also prevent us from filling them on our own accord without going 
through the time-consuming process of actually becoming subject-matter experts 
ourselves. Instead, the goal is to be able to communicate those supremely tacit 
gaps to the person who is going to help us fill them in.
This perspective also allows us to put a different slant on a number of com-
mon concepts in organisational theory. For instance, the new knowledge types 
provides us with a source and an admittedly still unformed locus for multiple 
advocacy, which is often brought forward as a critical component in group-based 
decision-making processes (cf. Fischer 1990; Friedman & Berthoin Antal 2005; 
George 1997; Gusfield 1979; ’t Hart 1997; Janis 1982; Vertzberger 1990). 
On the one hand, we can conceptualise multiple advocacy as a result of good 
meta-knowledge: as a problem arises, the organisation is able to parse the issue 
from multiple perspectives and offer different interpretations, including that the 
problem does not actually fit any previously known framing. In KM parlance, 
the advocates become knowledge workers who have access to the data, infor-
mation, personal contacts and networks, and also to the prevailing perception 
of the organisation that seems relevant to the issue at hand. While there will 
be overlaps, the meta-knowledge and the empathic knowledge they each have 
will be slightly different and thus yield different solutions when subject to the 
second-order-knowing process.
Reciprocally, that literature offers some insight into where this elusive 
 second-order knowledge might be embedded. Authors such as Thomas Preston 
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(1999; cf. Preston & ’t Hard 1999), who focus on leadership styles, will point 
us towards an interpretation where it is the product of the leader’s individual 
cognition and problem-solving methodology. Questioning obvious and immediate 
answers will spur the kind of deeper search and the re-evaluation of the questions 
themselves that sit at the heart of SO-knowledge. Allison & Zelikow (1972; 
1999), on the other hand, would rather lead us to examine the idea from the 
viewpoint of their type-iii model of group decision-making. Here, the advisors 
involved compete to provide the “best solution,” to a problem. This competition 
becomes the driving force that ensures that gaps are being examined, and that 
all available knowledge networks are squeezed for every last drop of relevant 
knowledge. The organisation’s SO-knowledge would then be embedded in this 
informal competition.
Of course, as always and as the literature on the subject is quick to point out, 
one should not assume that this kind of knowledge-seeking process always takes 
place. As Janis (1972; 1982) points out, the group context is often prone to various 
pathologies that inhibit the investigations of new ideas and solutions. In fact, and 
speaking directly to the main thrust of this thesis, close-mindedness is mentioned 
as his “Type II” category of symptoms of group-think. From a MESO-perspective, 
many of those symptoms can be seen as inadequate meta-knowledge, empathic 
knowledge, or second-order knowledge. The symptom of rationalisation – that 
is, ignoring signals that go counter to previous held beliefs – can be recast as a 
lack of meta-knowledge, since those gaps are not being addressed. Stereotyping is 
a clear case of lacking empathic knowledge: unfounded presumptions about other 
parties’ abilities wants, and needs. Self-censorship and assumptions of unanimity 
are failures of both empathic and second-order knowledge since they entail not 
wanting to question what other people seem to believe. The various forms of 
pressure to conform, both internalised and externalised, are best cast as failures 
of meta knowledge since it entails people actively preventing the group from 
taking a full inventory of the available expertise, and the same goes for Janis’ 
Type-I symptom of overconfidence, where gaps in the group’s capacity to do the 
right thing are outright inconceivable. The same kind of characterisations can be 
made of many of the expanded group pathologies that have been described in 
more recent literature (cf. ’t Hart, Stern & Sundelius 1997; Stern 1997).
It should be noted, though, that we are only really talking about a different 
categorisation of the symptoms rather than a redefinition of their exact nature 
of those symptoms. The various group-think processes happen on an individual 
level whereas MESO-knowledge – or more likely the lack thereof – is an output 
of those processes. In essence, the organisational knowledge angle lets us answer 
the question of “what went wrong?”, whereas the group psychology angle answers 
the question of “why did it go wrong in that particular way?”
At the same time, it is important to note that both the organisational knowledge 
and the political psychology literature converge on this particular problem spot. 
The concept of “mind-guards” (Janis 1982; Stern 1997; Vertzberger 1990) as 
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inhibitors of free inquiry in decision-making processes has become a mainstay 
in the latter field, but has also found its way into the knowledge-management 
literature (cf. Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Riggs Fuller & Aldag 1997). Here, 
however, it has since become recast as an inherent issue with knowledge workers. 
While they are more commonly described as the ones who refine and add value 
to information to turn it into actionable knowledge, a part of the knowledge 
worker’s task is to filter out irrelevant information and only present the worth-
while bits for further consideration. This means they act as gatekeepers for all 
knowledge flowing into the decision-making process (Fox 2000; Huysman 2000; 
Rashman & Hartley 2002; Rynes, Bartunek & Daft 2001; Chua & Lam 2005), 
and this filtering can easily become a systematic error that enforces a uniform 
perception on the world – the end result being very similar to the stereotyping 
and mind-guarding that leads to group-think.
This is why the knowledge management literature often stresses the importance 
of Communities of Practice: to enforce and institutionalise the process of seeking 
alternate outside viewpoints that offer differing opinions on what should and 
should not be filtered (McNabb 2007). Since the MESO-knowledge perspective 
is derived from that literature, it is perhaps not surprising that the use of some 
form of CoPs also forms the basis for the empathic knowledge component and 
act as a prerequisite for having good second-order knowledge. After all, if you 
have nowhere to go with your questions about new and unfamiliar concepts, all 
that is left is fumbling in the dark and hoping to find some dim ray of light to 
provide at least a shred of illumination. These communities provide the arenas 
for exchanging ideas and for gathering all those “others” that you have empathic 
knowledge of. On a purely semantic level, it is important to note that the literature 
calls them Communities of Practice, specifically, since the idea is that they are 
gathered around similar issues of practical and technical expertise. This sets them 
apart from the fairly closely related concept of epistemic communities (Haas 1992; 
Reinalda & Verbeek 1998), which are rather characterised by shared beliefs and 
norms, even though shared policy practices are often a part of the community 
as well. In theory, at least, CoPs can benefit from not being quite as normatively 
uniform since that would offer even more variety of viewpoints, but in practice, 
it is probably more likely that CoPs will arise as sub-groups in pre-existing epis-
temic communities. The exact process of formation of these groups is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, however, so for now, that hypothesis will have to be left 
untested. Suffice to say that without some kind of community focused on similar 
problems of a practical nature, the empathic knowledge – and consequently the 
second-order knowledge – of an organisation is left severely hampered by very 
definition. There are some normative consequences of this that will be discussed 
in the methodology chapter.
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2.4 Towards a hypothesis on organisational behaviour
So knowledge of yourself, of others, and of how to make use of those components 
in some larger network of knowing things is an interesting abstraction. But how 
does it help us understand organisational behaviour under stress? To begin with, 
let us reiterate that point from Janis: that closed-mindedness is a symptom of 
group-think, which raises the question of what happens if close-mindedness is 
an organisation-wide trait. Let us also reiterate the ideal-type characteristics of 
a closed organisation: regulations, rigidity, and consistency. What should be 
abundantly clear by now is that while MESO-knowledge might be subject to 
regulations, its very goal is to escape from rigidity and to provide solutions that 
are specifically suited for the given situation. Rather, the MESO-knowledge 
ideal is more in line with what characterises an open organisation: informality, 
flexibility, and the ability dynamically adjust to unforeseen problems.
That is in and of itself an interesting observation. We now have some kind of 
metrics to look for when studying organisations in order to characterise them 
as open or closed: do they exhibit the skilful use of (at least parts of ) MESO-
knowledge? This knowledge classification has also some value of its own in that 
it takes a broader perspective on the entire knowledge management literature. 
Instead of falling into the same trap of only looking at tacit and explicit knowledge, 
the last section used that very same literature as a basis for asking the more fun-
damental question of why anyone would go through all the trouble of trying 
to transform tacit knowledge into explicit or vice versa. What are the driving 
forces behind the SECI process and the creation of communities of practice? The 
answer is that it that they satisfy an implicit need to enhance an organisation’s 
MESO-knowledge, in whole or in part.
This explanation from curiosity also ties well into the notion of open and 
closed organisations. A closed organisation wants consistency and chasing after 
every whim is not a productive endeavour from this point of view. In fact, trying 
to be creative could under many circumstances be considered directly harmful. 
Airline passengers would probably prefer that the pilots followed the prescribed 
checklist to determine the status and the appropriate settings for the flaps and 
fuel flow rather than wing it every time, perhaps by calling a friend to quiz them 
on favourite cockpit switch setting patterns, even if that friend also happens 
to be a pilot. The engineers at a nuclear power plant are presumably better off 
following the manual for correct emergency shut-down procedures rather than 
consulting their book circle, even though this month’s reading happened to be 
a book on power plant design. Conversely, when the checklist ends and has 
failed to yield the desired result, it might be worth considering new and bold 
solutions. A second or third attempt could perhaps show that one crucial step 
was missed by accident, but as the popular saying goes, trying the same thing 
over and over and expecting a different result is a definition of insanity. In a 
time-critical situation, in particular, something quicker than doing everything 
all over again for a fourth or fifth time might be called for, and as research has 
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shown. Contrary to popular belief, adding more components can actually speed 
up the process of finding a useful solution (cf. Comfort, Ko & Zagorecki 2004). 
So there may be times where experimentation and flights of fancy will yield 
interesting and important results, but there are also times where a strict closed 
behaviour is highly preferable.
But saying that there is a time and a place for both open and closed behaviour 
comes with the suggestion that maybe it is possible to alternate between the two 
states, or at least move away from one extreme and – even ever so slightly – closer 
to the other. More importantly, it also means that MESO usage is perhaps not 
as clear-cut as it has been described up to this point. Openness and closed-ness 
are opposite ends of an ideal-type spectrum and most organisations will find 
themselves on a sliding scale somewhere in-between. If the ability to exhibit 
MESO-knowledge is a function of an organisation’s degree of openness, then 
that ability will itself exist in degrees. Moreover, if the degree of openness in an 
organisation is subject to variations depending on some particular factor, then 
the MESO usage will as a result also vary depending on that factor – a possibility 
that is of crucial importance for the overall outcome of the model described at 
the beginning of this chapter.
Out of necessity, the concepts in this section have to be described before 
we can start addressing the other pieces of the large puzzle this thesis attempts 
to tackle since they are key concepts for the thesis as a whole. While we could 
certainly return to this matter later, we might as well get the important part out 
of the way while the details are still in fresh memory. Thus, beginning at the end 
by looking at the final output of the process, we have arrived at the third of the 
hypotheses posited in the introductory chapter:
Hypothesis iii: The degree to which an organisation is open or closed 
decides how well and how willingly an organisation makes use of external 
knowledge. An organisation that moves towards increased closed-ness 
will thus increasingly lose its ability to apply its MESO-knowledge.
There is one immediate problem with this hypothesis, which is that it means 
that, at least momentarily, we have to separate the measuring of openness and 
closed-ness from the measuring of MESO-knowledge use. Even though the MESO 
perspective proposes to offer a means of detecting open and closed behaviour, 
that particular implication has yet to be proven. Instead, we will initially have to 
rely on the ideal type described earlier in the chapter and contrast that against 
the description of the various knowledge types developed in the previous section. 
The exact indicators for both of these will be part of the topic of chapter 3. 
Meanwhile, we still have to conceptualise the different factors that could make 
an organisation slide up and down the scale of openness and closed-ness.
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2.5 Input #1: the effect of crises on organisations
The first factor that this thesis will take into consideration is the context of a 
crisis. For the purpose of this analysis, the notion of a crisis will be borrowed 
from Boin et al. (2005, 2017), who offer a subjective definition based on a sense 
of urgency; a feeling of uncertainty, either about the nature of the situation or 
about the possible outcomes of the available strategies; and a perceived threat to 
critical values, in particular where there are value conflicts and one thing has to be 
sacrificed to save another. All of these are based on the perception of whomever 
is struck by the crisis. This means that one person’s daily grind may be another 
person’s crisis, so the question will always be whose crisis we are actually talking 
about. In particular, it means that the decision-makers involved may not judge 
an incident as an actual crisis, and their perception may come in direct conflict 
with the perception of the people they are deciding over. It also means that the 
exact same decision makers facing the exact same situation may switch perception 
from one moment to the next, seeing crises where they previously did not or no 
longer thinking of incident as a crisis.
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Figure 4: Components of a crisis
Generally, only one of these three components needs to vanish or be resolved 
in order for the entire crisis to go away. This is because of the inherent conflicts 
and tension between them that only really exist if all three are present. If there is 
no time pressure, it is entirely possible to explore various options and solutions 
and thus resolve any uncertainty or ambiguity in what is going on or in what the 
consequences might be if a particular path is chosen. If there is no uncertainty, 
then the correct decision is already clear and the time pressure is no longer a 
constraint for reaching that decision. If no critical values are at stake, then it not 
really a crisis but rather some minor nuisance – even a “wrong” decision or one 
that arrives a bit too late will have no greater impact.
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At the same time, it is important to note a latent problematic consequence 
of this definition, and that is the decision-maker’s ability to create a crisis out 
of thin air, purely as a consequence of being ill-informed. This means that the 
identification paradox now takes on a whole new aspect that is potentially much 
more problematic than what has previously been discussed. Whereas the earlier 
section described the identification paradox from the perspective of being stuck 
in a mode where the nature of a problem is forever impossible to understand, this 
definition creates the possibility for that paradox to appear from nowhere and 
to generate a full-blown crisis as a result. Or, to tone down the doom slightly, it 
allows for the possibility that a crisis might be made much worse than it otherwise 
should be, simply because it generates confounding questions that eat away at 
the already precious time available. The inability to properly identify the actual 
problem causes in and of itself a confusion about what needs to be done. Is it 
more important to get a clearer picture or to start trying to solve the pieces of the 
puzzle that (seemingly) can be identified? How soon does one need a definitive 
answer to what is really going on? Problem identification thus becomes perceived 
as yet another critical value at stake and has to be resolved in conflict with more 
tangible uncertainties and urgent matters.
This kind of trilateral conflict between different facets of a problem is very 
similar to the dilemmas George (1993) set up for policy- and decision-making. 
Each such decision is a balancing act where trade-offs have to be made between 
the quality of the decision, the management of resources, and the acceptability 
of the proposal. In other words, a (subjectively) excellent proposal is likely 
to take a lot of time and money to develop and is likely to come under fierce 
attack from other actors in the decision- or policy-making sphere. A very quick 
decision will not be of high qualify and will also not receive any time to “sell” it 
to constituents or other policy-makers. A completely consensus-based decision 
will evoke the old joke of camels and committee-based horse designs, and will 
require a lot of time to receive everyone’s input.
Again, if only one of these components becomes a non-issue, the remaining 
dilemmas largely go away as well, although perhaps not as completely as in 
the case of removing one of the legs of a crisis. If, for instance, there is already 
complete consensus, no time needs to be spent on building any more and the 
time saved can be put towards generating a higher-quality decision, or just not 
spent at all, since everyone seems to agree that it is satisfactory in its current state.
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Figure 5: Trade-off dilemmas in evaluation
While each leg of these two trilemmas are subject to closer scrutiny and attempts at 
resolving the conflicts connected to them, the focus of this thesis is of course on 
the use of knowledge, specifically to resolve issues of uncertainty and ambiguity. 
It is, however, worth pointing out that while this section deals with crises in 
particular, the same pattern of conflicting wishes exists on a larger scale and in 
every-day decision-making and policy-making as well. So while it may be outside 
the scope of this thesis, this observation points towards the usefulness of concepts 
such as MESO-knowledge and the identification paradox on a more general level 
and when dealing with a much broader spectrum of issues than is being discussed 
here. The side-board earlier in the chapter, illustrating the identification paradox 
in the example of the music industry, shows how and where this construct can 
be applied to understand long-term policy failures.
For the purpose of this thesis, however, we need something that describes how 
individuals and organisations respond to uncertainty and similar stress factors. 
This may seem like a rather drastic reduction of the crisis definition – only one 
(and maybe a half, if we allow “stress” to include time pressure) component is 
being used. But as previously discussed, the way Boin et al. define crises, it is 
somewhat an all-or-nothing deal. If one part is missing, the rest become irrelevant, 
and since the overarching goal is to establish a connection between outside pressure 
and the use of MESO-knowledge, the (non)existence of knowledge on the input 
end of the equation provides a neat thread to follow through the entire process. 
Moreover, one of the supposed advantages of having this knowledge is that it 
presupposes that some time has already been spent exploring and auditing existing 
knowledge sources, which should speed up that search in the event of a crisis and 
help cut down the time pressure as well.
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2.5.1 Managing uncertainty: the cybernetic approach
One answer to this question is offered by Steinbruner (1974; 2002), who posits 
two modes of dealing with complexity and uncertainty in decision-making. He 
is quick to note that neither complexity nor uncertainty are inherent causes 
for indecision (Steinbruner 1974:89), but rather that they cause individuals to 
adopt coping strategies to eliminate the perception that those problems exist, at 
least in the short run. In fact, these strategies are so pervasive that they are used 
pretty much all the time, even for seemingly simple problems. He contrasts the 
cybernetic approach, which presupposes that there are general patterns and methods 
for reducing complexity into manageable chunks, with the analytical approach, 
which relies on a classic rational-actor model. While one should not read too 
much into the similarities, there are some clear parallels between Steinbruner’s 
analytical approach and Allison’s (1971) Model-I approach to analysing decisions, 
and between the cybernetic approach and Allison’s Model II approach. In the 
latter case, both authors theorise that standardised patterns and routines explain 
how organisations and the individuals within them approach any given problem.
Steinbruner takes a somewhat bolder stance than Allison in his explicit 
rejection of the rational actor approach, though. He posits that complexity and 
uncertainty are too pervasive to ever allow for the full and detailed analysis that 
the rational actor model requires from each decision (Steinbruner 1974:65f ). 
As such, the trade-offs between two different courses of action are impossible to 
determine and there would never be any basis to pick one decision over another. 
Not only are all options not known to the decision-maker, but the outcomes 
of those options are fraught with ambiguities as well. The calculating rationale 
that, “if I do A, then events B and C will take place, so is the combination of A, 
B, and C really worth it?” is impossible because the actions, events, and causal 
relationships cannot be distinctly and clearly dissected to level required.
So far, this all follows the logic of a more modern bounded rationality 
model, but what the cybernetic approach does is offer two different “tracks” for 
describing how the problem of eternally insufficient information is solved. Track 
I offers a model of people generally seeking consistency in their environment 
(Steinbruner 1974:90). This means a preference both in how solutions are picked 
and in how problems are framed. If an old method works, there is little reason to 
change it at a whim and problems are categorised in accordance with familiar 
patterns, much in line with the intuitive “mental slides” heuristic described in 
the naturalistic decision-making framework (cf. Steinbruner 1974:95; Zsambok 
& Klein 1997). Operating within this track means that uncertainty is dealt with 
by returning to what you already know and are familiar with. While both the 
solutions and the problem framing can certainly change, it is a fairly  burdensome 
process – preferably done in increments – where the assumptions that guide 
the problem-solving are slowly changed to be consistent with reality until reality 
stop feeding “inconsistent” input into the decision-making process. The charac-
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teristics of this process very much echo Argyris & Shön’s (1978; 1996) notion 
of second-order learning, where the important change lies in the framing of a 
problem, which in turn generates new problem-solving methods, rather than in 
those methods in and of themselves.
The behaviour expected from this track is one of choosing the “path of least 
inconsistency” (Steinbruner 1974:106). Trade-offs between pre-existing solutions 
are preferably avoided altogether, since they violate the spirit of consistency that 
the decision-maker seeks, but on the other hand, the complex nature of most 
issues prohibits the kind of detailed breakdown that would allow these trade-offs 
to be properly evaluated, so the final course of action will never stray very far from 
a solution that has already been established in the past to begin with. Instead of 
trying to figure out new possible framings for the problem, the decision-making 
process will focus on the details that can be reliably and positively identified, on 
previous experiences, and on a reliance on an intuitive version of Occam’s razor. 
If I observe familiar details, the simple solution is to do what I have always done 
when faced with those details, especially if doing so has produced consistent and 
predictable results in the past.
In other words, out of the chaos of uncertainty, familiar points of reference 
are filtered out and acted upon. This mode allows for quick and “safe” decisions 
based on very little information, and the reliance on memory, simplicity, and 
what is perceived as “real” information causes the decision-maker to skip all the 
cumbersome and time-consuming value judgements on issues that are far too 
complex and/or unfamiliar to be handled in a fully rational manner anyway. 
Track I should by now be immediately familiar as a description of typical closed 
behaviour. Again, the preferred outcome is consistency and the guiding principle 
is an adherence to fairly rigid frames of reference.
This behaviour is contrasted against Track II, which describes people as “naïve 
scientists”, essentially willing to explore new avenues, but who still make use of 
various heuristics to eliminate uncertainty (Steinbruner 1974:51). The expected 
behaviour in this track is one of a recipes-and-blueprints logic. There is a known 
end goal to be achieved, and the general pattern for reaching that goal is known, 
but there are always opportunities open for altering smaller parts, thereby hope-
fully improving the end product. Instead of the slow process of altering core 
assumptions, this exploration relies on short feedback cycles where some detail is 
altered and then some larger portion of the whole scheme is tested to see if there 
was an improved outcome. The process is still not entirely premeditated – the 
complexity and ambiguity of the intricate details are still too large to allow for 
calculations on the outcome, so this kind of continuous adaptation is effectively 
based on small-scale trial and error. The logic behind the exploration is entirely 
instrumental, rather than causal. If it works, it is adopted and if not, it is rejected, 
but neither outcome can be predicted beforehand.
This is much closer to an open behaviour: the guiding principle is a flexi-
bility in the problem-solving process and the outcome is a constant dynamism 
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in evaluating and exploring different problems and solutions. So far so good, 
but here the cybernetic approach delivers a worrying reminder. This track still 
presupposes that heuristics are used to deal with uncertainty – and that what the 
exploration entails is essentially a way of keeping the uncertainty at manageable 
levels above what is already certain. The process effectively creates a smattering 
of pre-existing and tested solutions, but there is no guarantee that these solutions 
will actually be captured, encapsulated, and institutionalised in the organisation 
as a whole unless there is a good reason to do so or there are processes in place 
to harvest these yet-to-be-useful solutions.
The practical effect of this is that Tack-II behaviour can quickly fall back on 
Track-I behaviour if the acceptable level of uncertainty drops low enough. The exact 
level of uncertainty that is allowed in these explorations is never really quantified, 
but it covers everything in what is assumed to be a very complex and chaotic system 
where even small changes can have large – and almost by definition unforeseen – 
consequences. The main difference between the two tracks is that Track I deals 
with known quantities of uncertainty by filtering out what has previously been 
assessed as useless information, whereas Track II allows for additional uncertainty 
from which new filters can be generated (but only if a need for such an updated 
filter can be discovered at the same time).
So what happens if we add crises to the mix? For one, the amount of additional 
uncertainty and ambiguity sky-rockets. Also, unpredictable outcomes become 
far less acceptable – the goal of crisis management is to de-escalate the crisis and 
return to some semblance of a status quo ante, so anything that deviates from 
this end-state is highly undesirable. The combinations of these two facts may 
not matter much to the Track-I mode of decision-making, but it makes a huge 
difference for Track II. Again, while the actual level of acceptable uncertainty is left 
unmentioned in Steinbruner’s theory, the budget allotment for pure exploration 
is cut into by the inherent uncertainty of the crisis itself, and some uncertainties 
as far as the end-result of potential explorations are now nigh on unacceptable. 
This is, in short, not the time to casually try something new the way one would 
in every-day behaviour, but rather to return to a known position which at least 
offers some insurance, if ever so slight, of a predictable outcome. If the Track-I 
behaviour can be characterised as essentially closed and the Track-II behaviour as 
essentially open, the addition of a crisis to an already complex system causes the 
Track-II behaviour to retreat back, partially or in whole, towards a more closed 
Track-I-like behaviour. And so we arrive at a hypothesis for the first link in the 
proposed model of organisational behaviour:
Hypothesis i: Organisations will fall back on well-known problem-solving 
procedures when subjected to stress. Crises will thus push organisations 
towards a more closed behaviour.
Just as was the case with Hypothesis iii described in the previous section, the 
way in which we arrived at this hypothesis – specifically the choice of theory 
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– will have some methodological implications that will be described in more 
detail in chapter 3. Moreover, it would be intellectually dishonest to discard the 
cybernetic paradigm just because it has fulfilled its purpose of driving a point 
without returning to and re-evaluating some of the core assumptions once we 
have a firmer grasp of the impact of knowledge management techniques on the 
crucial factor of uncertainty. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, there 
is an interesting crux of mixing the ability (or lack thereof ) to manipulate the 
amount of available knowledge with a concept that so much hinges on exactly 
how much knowledge is available. Both the crisis definition and the character-
istics of the cybernetic tracks warrants a revisit in Chapter 8 alongside the other 
concluding remarks. 
2.6 Input #2: the anticipation of process.
The second factor that might influence the degree of organisational openness or 
closed-ness that this thesis will study closer is the organisation’s expectations of 
a formal work-order for its every-day business. Far less a subject of theory and 
scholarly writing than the previous links in the chain, this concept is simply 
meant to capture the notion of organisations having a familiar home environment 
within the larger context of society as a whole. Within this environment, the 
organisation has developed organically to match whatever normal and institu-
tional interaction patterns exist and is therefore not caught by surprise by the 
fact that some things have to be done a certain way.
Rather, the surprise comes when an organisation has to step outside of those 
familiar boundaries and work with actors that do not follow the same processes 
and/or that have a different organisational cultures that influence their behaviour. 
An increasingly common example of such a cultural difference and cultural shift 
is between agencies that belong to the societal security sector – everything from 
law enforcement to defence to the modern concept of homeland security. These 
ostensibly public organisations have a long tradition of less than public internal 
processes for both the operational and the analytical work they do, and as more 
and more agencies fall under this umbrella, and more and more societal matters 
become securitised, that culture of secrecy spreads. When such organisations 
have to co-operate with actors that do not share this culture (such as many ordi-
nary public institutions), or actors that have a vastly different kind of security 
mindset (such as private companies that deal with lots of industrial secrets and 
proprietary information), the confusion about how to handle information sharing 
rapidly rises and leakages abound. The concept of strategic surprise (cf. Ansoff 
1975; Handel 1984; Parker & Stern 2002, 2005) while unrelated to the kind of 
procedural surprise discussed here, is sometimes a practical result of these kinds 
of gaps. Information crucial to one party is not delivered in time or in the right 
format or at the right level or detail (or at all) and this causes decision-making 
failure even though everything needed was actually available.
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As with crises, a key component here is uncertainty, which comes in many forms. 
As such, the cybernetic theory should be applicable here as well, but instead of 
repeating the same logic twice, let us take a more self-contained approach and look 
at what reasons there might be for an organisation to close up when faced with 
uncertainties in the problem-solving process. First of all, if rather than an ad-hoc 
arrangement between two organisations who are unfamiliar with each other, there 
are explicitly prescribed ways of doing things, those prescriptions may be full of 
ambiguities that result from assumptions from or implicit knowledge in whichever 
party put them on paper. Even without such ambiguities, if a process has never 
been used, the first time will be slow and lumbering since the steps themselves 
are familiar, as is the intended outcome and the relative importance of each step. 
Of course, at the other extreme, where everything is ad hoc, the ambiguity is 
pretty much complete and every step warrants an explanation. Either way, the 
temptation and safe fall-back is to say that “this is how we always do things.” In 
other words, to fall back to the familiar, the already regulated, and the consistent 
in order to get rid of any perceived ambiguities in the process. Of course, since 
the processes discussed here deal with the co-operation between two or more 
parties, any such attempt at reducing the ambiguity for one actor will increase it 
for the others, who will then respond by trying to drag the interaction back on 
their own terms. While some kind of equilibrium of “fair ambiguity” can certainly 
be reached, the process of getting there requires multiple interactions and a fair 
amount of time, and it is unlikely to be particularly harmonious. However, such 
an equilibrium would in and of itself have crossed the threshold into being an 
anticipated process: the parties involved know how much of their own ways they 
have to give up and how much the other actors give in return. A step away from 
the normal way of operating has already been done and has been worked into 
a pattern of interaction with others – the surprise factor is long gone. This does 
not necessarily mean that the process is fully formalised, but at least it is stable 
enough to allow for some consistency between each occasion it is being used.
Another cause for uncertainty is simple lack of information, not so much in 
the sense that good information is ultimately needed to make a decision, but 
in the sense that the information-sharing itself is unfamiliar and creates new 
questions that need to be answered. What is it the other party needs to get out 
of the process and how does it have to be packaged and presented in order for 
them to make sense of it? Even with modern information technology and a trends 
towards increased standardisation and interoperability, the number of schema 
for information is still almost on part with the number of actors. If nothing else, 
what one actor values as critical information may just be a footnote for another, 
and as information is shared back and forth, such details can easily be filtered 
out over and over again until the material only consists of some fairly banal least 
common denominator of what both parties feel is strictly necessary. This leaves 
the question for both parties of what has been left out and what is genuinely not 
available? Validating the information then becomes an additional requirement 
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that can take up almost as much time as just going straight to the source and 
gathering the information on one’s own. Not filtering the information at all 
would be the immediately obvious solution, but this is not always possible or 
even practical. Information overflow is, as ever, a real concern as is the possibility 
of accidentally spreading private, proprietary, or otherwise sensitive information 
into a channel and losing control over where it ends up. This evokes a somewhat 
different type of closed-ness – more akin to playing one’s cards close to the chest 
than to the original notion of a sort of organisational close-mindedness – but 
the effect is much the same. It causes a regression into a safe and familiar way 
of handling things that, paradoxically, only increases the uncertainty. The use 
of meta-data would be a somewhat more advanced way around the same issue, 
where the (possibly sensitive) information itself is not necessarily shared, but 
instead replaced with something that describes what kind of further information 
is available. The party that holds this information can then release further details 
on request and if nothing else, at least it is possible for the other actors involved 
to get a sense of what has been deliberately left out and what was never there 
to begin with.
In general, trust is yet another source of uncertainty: can the other party be 
trusted both to provide the information needed without withholding crucial 
details, and can it be trusted not to spread information unduly to some third 
party that should be left out of the loop? Here, too, the familiarity with the 
processes involved is intuitively linked to the methodology the organisation will 
choose to use. If the process has been proven to yield good results in the past and 
if the dialogue partner has a proven track-record of keeping both the work and 
the information shared contained, there is a far better basis for playing around 
with the format and perhaps expand the collaboration to new and previously 
untested areas than if there is no established trust and if either party cannot be 
certain of how the other will behave. Trust thus allows for more flexibility and 
informality – more openness – which yields a potential for a dynamic response to 
new situations, whereas a lack of trust means both parties are more likely to rely 
on strictly regulated and fairly rigid patterns of interaction – more closed-ness. 
It is worth making a clear distinction here between a trust in the collaboration 
partner and the work process that makes that collaboration possible, and a trust 
in the actual outcome. It is the former that is the more interesting factor, since 
it implicitly carries with it the trust that the outcome will be the best the other 
party could muster – both accept that, in the end, there are no guarantees and 
mistakes can and will be made, but no one is deliberately trying to sabotage the 
work or just free-ride on the efforts of others. Conversely, a lack of trust rather 
tends to invoke the feeling that without such guarantees, maybe it is better to 
forego any collaboration at all, or at least to strictly regulate what the expected 
outcome is supposed to be. Looking back at the defining ideal-type character-
istics of opened and closed behaviour in Figure 2, the degree of trust is trivially 
mapped to the degree of freedom afforded for either party to deviate from the 
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strict, closed approach. At particularly high degrees, not even a consistent out-
come might be required, although it is likely that this might lower the level of 
trust the next time around.
If we blur the lines between the different causal boxes and concepts of the 
overarching model, and introduce more complex interdependencies as far as 
what causes what, there is another important trust issue at hand that relates 
to how knowledge needs are being handled. Perhaps unsurprisingly given its 
name, trust is a key component in the previously described notion of empathic 
knowledge. Part of being able to leverage that knowledge is the ability for one 
actor to tell another that, no, they have actually misunderstood the issue and 
that there is a much better framing or explanation of what is going on. While 
it may seem like such differences in opinion would be a source of uncertainty, 
I would argue that it rather strengthens the confidence of someone who asks a 
question if the respondent can articulate exactly how and why the question is 
malformed. Trusting the other party to make such corrections in one’s assump-
tions allows an actor to ask more bold or “stupid” questions without the fear 
of being ridiculed or dismissed. This, in turn, allows them to gain a better and 
broader understanding of the issue and allows any ambiguities to be cleared up 
without guesswork. In other words, if there is a familiar process of questions, 
counter-questions, clarifications and – only then – answers, one further source of 
uncertainty is, if not removed, then at least reduced in potency. The informality 
of the exchange increases, as does the flexibility in the kinds of problems that 
can be brought up. Such trust becomes even more important if we muddle the 
concepts further and also mix in the use of second-order knowledge. If someone 
merely acts as a knowledge broker between an organisation and a third party, trust 
in that broker and the processes s/he employs in finding and selecting someone 
who can answer the organisation’s question is paramount. Otherwise, there is 
the sneaking suspicion that the third party will be cherry-picked or have some 
unknown or unwanted agenda, and that the knowledge broker is rather taking 
on the role of a gate-keeper who filters out far more relevant parties to unduly 
promote personal favourites. It then becomes a question of how far that trust and 
that familiarity with the process can extend, both conceptually and in practice: 
should it be assumed that the third party rides on the broker’s coat-tails as far as 
both go, or are we now back to square one with this new collaboration partner 
as far as anticipating processes go?
So much like how we have the identification paradox where MESO-knowledge 
contaminates the causes of crises, there is a similar, if smaller contamination 
where MESO-knowledge affects how an organisation anticipates the process 
of working with other actors. Whereas the identification paradox very directly 
inflates (or deflates) the uncertainty element in a crisis, it rather acts on the trust 
element of process anticipation, and in both cases the relationship is such that it 
reinforces what is already in place. Just like how poor MESO-usage can worsen 
a crisis, which in turn makes an organisation close in on itself and become even 
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worse at using its MESO-knowledge, the same poor MESO-usage can cause 
trust issues, which in turn causes the organisation to close in on itself to the 
same result. Conversely, good usage leads to less crisis-inducing uncertainty an 
more trust, both of which let the organisation stay in an opened mode and keep 
using those MESO-knowledge skills.
However, even if we remove the cross-contamination of MESO-knowledge 
and trust, and indeed even if we remove trust as a whole as an issue, the problem 
with acting through intermediaries remains. Irrespective of whether the process 
has worked to satisfaction in the past, the fact remains that one more link in the 
chain has been added, and with it comes an external actor that implicitly gains 
veto power over the proceedings, This should not be perceived as any kind of 
assumed malice in the intermediary, but rather as a realisation that, for whatever 
reason, the connection can be severed outside of the control of the two parties 
who are talking to each other. The foreign-policy and transnational domain is a 
particularly clear example of this phenomenon in that domestic agencies often 
have to go through the national foreign office to conduct business abroad, and 
even if this is the simplest of rubber-stamp affairs, there is always the chance that 
the stamp is missing that day, or that some other foreign-policy consideration 
currently takes priority within the foreign office. Even though the process itself 
might not have changed, political consideration might suddenly have made it a 
sensitive matter to let an agency talk to its counterpart in a particular nation, at 
which point the closed-behaviour response of demanding a strict adherence to 
the regulations is very close at hand.
This kind of political intrusion may become more common as cross-border 
collaborations on an agency level start to grow inside various international commu-
nities, but such disruptions are still a best-case scenario for how well organisations 
can anticipate processes in the arena. Organisations that do not already have that 
kind of connection have even bigger problems. Foreign policy and collaboration 
is still often seen as a high-level political issue that is to be decided centrally 
within the government, and the policy arena itself is circumscribed with its own 
set of rules and prescriptions as far as what constitutes “correct” behaviour and 
diplomatic finesse. As such, the foreign office can easily take partial ownership 
of any and all matters that have any kind of international aspect to them, even 
though the intended interaction is between two very similar issue-specific agencies 
that may share a similar organisational culture and knowledge-base simply due 
to the subject matter they both are involved with. Even when the similarities 
are small, they will still have a shared connection to a common problem area 
and have at least some common ground to speak from, whereas the generalist 
intermediary – in this case the foreign office – shares none of these characteristics 
and may not have a full understand of what is at stake. In order to ensure that 
this three-part communication does not turn into a game of Chinese whispers, 
a level of rigour needs to be maintained that might not otherwise be present in 
61
Chapter 2: The Framework
the day-to-day operation of either of the organisations involved, which means 
they once again fall back onto a much more closed behaviour.
So far, the anticipation of process has been described in extremes and the 
effect of those extremes has been described as relative movement towards opened 
or closed behaviour, but what could be considered the normal state? Here, the 
thesis takes the very pragmatic, almost trivial approach, that the normal state for 
any organisation is one of no surprises since they are set up to always be able to 
handle that normalcy. From this base state, it can only ever really be surprised to 
different degrees depending on how far it is required to deviate from the processes 
it normally uses. This section has described seven key deviations:
1. The requirement to engage with a different organisational culture.
2. Ambiguities in how the collaborative or co-operative process is meant to work.
3. Uncertainties about the information content and value.
4. Mistrust in the collaboration process.
5. Mistrust in the problem formulation.
6. Mistrust in knowledge brokerage.
7. The requirement to go through a communication layer that lacks the  necessary 
subject-matter knowledge, e.g. a generalist intermediary.
The severity of each of these deviations can obviously vary, and the effects of 
that severity and how it could be measured will be a matter for the methodology 
chapter to discuss in greater detail. For now, it is sufficient to identify that these 
are causes for some kind of “procedural surprise” to occur, and as the preceding 
discussion has demonstrated, they all in one way or another also cause organisa-
tions to close in on themselves. Thus we finally arrive at the last of the hypothesis 
of what happens when an organisation is forced to limit, adapt, or otherwise 
suddenly adjust its regular problem-solving processes due to a need to interact 
with outside actors:
Hypothesis ii: Unless already anticipated and incorporated in how 
the organisation interacts with outside actors, a sudden presence of an 
externally enforced process will thus push organisations towards a more 
closed behaviour.
While the processes have not explicitly been described as ‘external’ so far in this 
section, it is worth including it expressly in the hypothesis to encapsulate the 
fact that all the relevant processes involve the interaction with an external actor 
in some form. While it is conceivable, if a bit odd, that an organisation might 
be surprised by its own internal work-flows, such an event lies beyond the scope 
of this thesis for two reasons: one is the overarching research question of how 
external factors, specifically, cause behavioural changes in the organisation, and 
the other is that the observed effects are externally oriented – that is, how well 
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the organisation is able to make use of all that external knowledge. Keeping the 
inputs and the output on the same level makes it conceptually easier to separate 
these kinds of changes from ones that have internal causes, such as learning and 
deliberate organisational design. Such causes can obviously have external causes 
of their own. For instance, learning is often conceptualised as a response to a 
changing environment, but at that point we are at least one step removed from 
the organisational behaviour, and we are also talking about processes that are far 
slower and more deliberate than what is of interest here.
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In order to test the validity of the three hypotheses set up in Chapter 2, this thesis 
will do a structured focus comparison of two case pairs: the 1993 Waco siege 
and the 1996 Montana Freemen standoff on the one hand, and the 2004 Boxing 
Day tsunami and the 2006 Lebanon evacuation on the other. This chapter will 
describe the how, where, and why of this examination, including a description of 
the general method structured focus comparison and why both the cases and the 
theories used were selected; an operationalisation of all the relevant concepts for 
use in the upcoming analytical sections; a method for falsifying the hypotheses, 
including a discussion on the consequences of the cross-contamination between 
some of the units of analysis; and finally a discussion on the selection and value 
of the empirical sources.
3.1 Structured focused comparison
George & Bennett (2005) use the term ‘structured focus comparisons’ to label one 
particular general method for case studies for the purpose of theory develop-
ment. In essence, it entails asking the same highly specific set of questions to the 
empirical material of two or more cases and comparing the answers this yields. 
The fact that the set of questions does not change between the cases is what 
makes the comparison structured. There is no attempt at tailoring the question 
to the empirical material, but rather follows a structure that is prescribed by the 
theoretical framework. The comparison is focused because the questions asked 
only deal with the specific topic to be studied, perhaps even as a subset of a larger 
theoretical construct. Material that is not germane to the questions is simply left 
by the wayside, or at best noted as interesting details that might warrant further 
studies in the future.
The method requires a specified problem and research objective, which does 
not only consist of a simple question to be answered but also a categorisation 
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of the study into one of the more general research goals described by Lijphart 
(1971). This study falls within the category of a plausibility probe: it attempts 
to demonstrate the validity of a number of theories and hypotheses that have 
not seen any previous rigorous testing. In this case, the reason for the lack of 
such testing is that the hypotheses build on a new reading of existing theories. 
The MESO-knowledge concept is essentially a new cut through a pre-existing 
literature on organisational knowledge, where the author rejects the customary 
focus on tacit and explicit knowledge and instead identifies a secondary pattern 
of knowledge use and of interactions between knowledge holders. As described 
in the previous chapter, the question then becomes what there is to explain this 
usage, which expands the study to also cover a larger issue of organisational 
behaviour. However, as is often the case even in literature that specifically studies 
organisations, it is a fairly impenetrable unit of analysis unless studied very closely 
from the inside, which necessitates a level of detail and of access that would be 
counter-productive for the larger-perspective questions that arises from this new 
conceptualisation of knowledge. Instead, to keep things manageable and to be 
able to speak in more general terms, the organisation is mainly treated as a black 
box with a select few observable characteristics that are hypothesised to influence 
the output and which are themselves influenced by a two specific external stimuli: 
crises and surprising alternations in work processes.
Furthermore, George & Bennett prescribe a set of questions that need to be 
answered for the method to yield useful results. What is the phenomenon to 
be studied? How is the phenomenon to be explained? What theoretical frame-
work(s) will be employed? What aspects of existing theories will be used? Is the 
theory sufficiently specific for the type of study that is being attempted? What 
are the dependent and independent variables, and how will they vary or remain 
constant in the study? What cases will be used and why – how do they fit into 
the overarching goal of the study? (George & Bennett 2004:77ff) While some 
of these questions have already been answered to some extent, in particular the 
question of which theories are being employed, the rest of this chapter will answer 
the remaining questions.
3.1.1 Theory selection & alternative interpretations
The question of what theories and frameworks will be used has effectively been 
answered already through the reasoning that leads up to the hypotheses as described 
in Chapter 2. However, it is still worth clarifying exactly why these particular 
theories are used rather than some plausible alternatives, while also reiterating 
the main research question and overarching goal of the thesis.
The foundation for this study is Koraeus’ (2007) literature overview of the 
knowledge management (KM) field and attempt to (re)integrate it with the 
crisis management (CM) literature, which yielded the core concept of MESO-
knowledge as an alternative perspective on the mechanics involved in the SECI 
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process. The overview also included a couple of brief case studies to determine 
whether these new knowledge types were purely theory-based constructs or if 
there was any empirical evidence to support their usefulness as practical analytical 
tools as well. However, the cases also demonstrated that there was a distinct 
difference in how the MESO-knowledge skills were used, which immediately 
led to the question of why this is the case.
The origins of the concept of MESO-knowledge has to a large extent dictated 
the theories to be used to fully formalise the mechanisms involved. The KM 
literature is an unavoidable component since it is the foundation for MESO-
knowledge and provides a vocabulary and a context in which to describe these 
new knowledge types. The reason to combine this literature with existing CM 
theories was because they have shared roots in March & Simon’s (1958) and 
Cyert & March’s (1963) conceptualisation of the organisation as well as in the 
subsequent literature on organisational learning. The learning literature would be 
an immediate candidate for alternative hypotheses on how organisations change 
in response to a changing environment – after all, that is the core idea behind 
the notion of learning – but it ends up being unsuitable because it deals with 
long-term changes in an organisation’s structure or shared belief systems. What is 
of interest for this study is a far more immediate change in how the organisation 
interacts with other actors. While it might be possible to describe the kinds of 
changes that are the focus in this study in terms of learning, it would require 
doing violence on many of the key assumptions that go into that literature, such 
as how quickly and how deeply organisational change can happen. Organisational 
learning is a fairly reasoned, deliberate, and introspective process, whereas the 
phenomenon described by the framework established in this thesis is intuitive, 
instinctive, and outwards-facing.
While this choice in the target for our analysis might disqualify organisa-
tional learning as a hypothesis, the question still remains why the closely linked 
crisis management field gets to be included. Again, part of this is to maintain 
the genealogy of the original MESO-knowledge conceptualisation, and part of 
it is because the field – for obvious reasons – helps us define and describe the 
context of a crisis as an external factor that might trigger a change in behaviour. 
But that only really shifts the question to why that particular context is chosen. 
Also, if the CM theory is so suitable, why is it that Cybernetic Theory is intro-
duced and given such prominence in describing the connection between crises 
and organisational behaviour? For the first part, crises offer a convenient and 
reasonably self-contained context where an easily identifiable event creates a rapid 
and distinct change in the environment, which if the organisational behaviour 
changes in response to the environment should throw that altered behaviour in 
sharp relief. Crises are quite simply helpful both for finding suitable cases and 
for providing a best-case scenario for mistakes or a worst-case scenario for doing 
well, depending on what kind of assumptions one wants to test.
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As for the second part, CM theory only really defines a specific context – it largely 
leaves it to other theories to describe how that context affects different actors. 
Boin et al. (2005), for instance, focuses on leadership and decision-making and 
posits five key tasks that a decision-maker needs to accomplish in order to achieve 
some vague measure of “good crisis management”. Exactly how the characteristics 
of a crisis affects the decision-maker’s ability to perform these tasks is left for 
other theories to describe. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus lies in the 
application of knowledge, which as described in Section 2.5 translates into an 
attempt at reducing or managing the uncertainties inherent in crises. Cybernetic 
theory offers one approach to this problem, but it is far from the only one to do 
so. Chapter 2 already mentions other strategies and heuristics for coping with 
uncertainty such as naturalistic decision-making or the use of analogies. Indeed, 
Steinbruner himself uses naturalistic decision-making as a starting point for his 
theories – but the advantage cybernetic theory offers is that it posits two different 
modes of operating when trying to deal with these complexities. This provides 
us with a clearly defined range of options for the individual, whereas the other 
theories tend to only offer some vague notion of “good” or “bad” use of their 
particular heuristic, and little to no description of the non-use of those modes of 
thinking. Since the goal here is to be able slot together a complex context that is 
defined by its uncertainty with two distinct modes of organisational behaviour, 
a theory that describes two strategies for coping with complexity and uncertainty 
is exactly what the doctor ordered.
Finally, for the influence of anticipation on behaviour, that particular con-
nection is left without additional theoretical backing. While it also deals with 
uncertainty and complex interdependencies, which would make it a candidate 
for applying even more cybernetic theory, doing so would only really mean that 
the same characteristics are tested for twice with an implied assumption that it 
will somehow yield different results that we would be able to separate into two 
distinctly different causes. It would certainly simplify the study and analysis – 
two answers for the price of one – but this would also be sloppy and dishonest. 
So instead, the core logic that uncertainty can yield a more rigid behaviour is 
retained, but conceptualised and described in new and different terms that let 
us test for it separately.
3.1.2 Case selection
What these decisions about theory give us is a set of distinguishing features 
that we would like to see in our cases. We want variation between crisis and 
non-crisis and we want variation between anticipated and surprising processes 
being forced on the actors involved. Hopefully, we will then see corresponding 
variations in openness and closed-ness and in MESO-knowledge usage, although 
this cannot really be a guiding principle in what cases we pick. The best scenario 
would obviously be if we could isolate each and every one of these variations 
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and leave everything else the same, meaning the same actor in the same political 
context dealing with the exact same kind of problem and still, hopefully, picking 
different hypothesised solutions.
Unfortunately, reality is not that kind, especially when it comes to providing 
useful empirical material. A key problem with both the crisis context and the 
process anticipation is that we are dealing with a normal situation and a deviation 
from that norm, and that normal situations have a nasty habit of not creating any 
empirical artefacts for us to find. Crises make great headlines and become subject to 
numerous in-depth studies; non-crises do neither of those. Likewise, organisations 
fumbling with new processes create disruptions that leave traces behind whereas 
everyone doing what they have always done just forces report-writers to come 
up with something interesting, however unrelated, to put into the yearly review.
As such, one of the crisis pairs picked for this thesis can almost be called 
opportunistic: the FBI’s handling of the Montana Freemen is probably as close 
to an (initially) highly publicised non-crisis as we can hope to get, and it offers 
the extraordinary benefit of already coming with a very similar parallel case that 
in every way epitomises both the theoretical and the intuitive understanding 
of a massive crisis. Crisis research is almost notorious for not having enough 
non-crises as points of contrast to all the often unique cases that can be found 
and studied, and that uniqueness in and of itself has historically created some 
problems for the attempts to generalise any conclusions made. With the Waco 
and Montana cases, we have a pair of events that very distinctly are not unique. 
Many of the actors, even down on an individual basis, are the same, dealing with 
the same kind of problem under similar time frames and with similar causes 
and initial constraints. Where they differ is in how the organisation in question 
chose to behave and how the event played out in the end. Where the Waco siege 
only escalated further and further into becoming more of a crisis, the Montana 
standoff was slowly but surely defused and effectively ceased to be a proper crisis 
long before the actual event saw its final resolution. That is not to say that the 
Montana case is somehow extraordinary in how it turned out, but rather that 
it is a rare case of success that still made waves. Like many agencies in the field, 
the FBI has an internal saying that their failures get all the attention and their 
successes receive none (cf. Kessler 1993), and this is where Montana sticks out 
from the norm and provides enough material to allow for a comparison.
The tsunami and Lebanon evacuation pair ostensibly offers a similar dynamic. 
While the Lebanon evacuation does not particularly qualify as a non-crisis, it 
is still often presented as a case of successful crisis management, and like the 
Montana case, it has a similar parallel case that has become the textbook example 
of unsuccessful management. Again, we have almost the exact same actors being 
involved in two events only a few years apart, where many of the problems were 
the same. At the same time, while the degree of crisis does not differ nearly as much 
as between Waco and Montana, the tsunami and Lebanon cases differ in how the 
actors had chosen to organise their collaborative efforts. So what we have here 
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is instead a difference in anticipation of processes – specifically that everything 
was new and surprising during the tsunami, whereas in the Lebanon case, those 
surprises had been analysed, learned from, and at least to some degree formalised 
into new procedures that clarified the work order for everyone involved. The 
tsunami/Lebanon pair also provides a different organisational context from the 
Waco/Montana pair in that the former involved collaborative efforts between 
domestic actors on an international arena, whereas the latter was a single lead 
actor in a domestic actor performing its single lead-actor role in a domestic case, 
which allows for an analysis of how these contexts in and of themselves may 
influence the process anticipation.
That said, it should be noted that the Waco/Montana pair was part of the 
initial attempt at conceptualising the MESO-knowledge concept and that to some 
extent, the outcome is already known before the analysis even begins, which raises 
the question of whether it is a valid test of the variables or not? However, the aim 
of that initial study was merely to see if there was any analytical value and use to 
the newly invented knowledge types, and if anything, the conclusion that there 
was is what validated an urge to look deeper into these cases to try to see exactly 
how and why these differences in knowledge use came about. The addition of the 
tsunami/Lebanon pair is then an attempt at generalising those findings and see 
if a similar pattern can be found in a case pair that demonstrate the same kind 
of similarities between the events. The imperfection of dealing with a completely 
different set and type of actors in a completely different political context is just 
something that we have to accept when dealing with real-world events that are 
not (and cannot) be replicated in a lab environment. Rather, that difference can 
and should be used as an opportunity to say something about the impact of the 
environment on our variables and on our units of analysis. As luck would have 
it, that kind of comparison is already a part of the larger research question that 
this thesis aims to answer.
What is missing in all of this to make the comparisons complete and to really 
isolate the variables in the hypotheses is a case pair with no crisis involvement 
at all, but with variation in the anticipation of process. Even more ideally, such 
a pair should be easily comparable to a pair where the degree of crisis is instead 
held (reasonably) constantly high – the Swedish cases being the ones that most 
closely resemble that requirement. Unfortunately, as mentioned, non-crises are 
hard to come by in and of themselves; non-crises that exhibit a very particular 
kind of external stress even more so; and ones that happen to involve the main 
actor(s) of an established crisis pair perhaps impossibly so. Until such time that 
this very specific pair of events be discovered, we will simply have to make do 
with what variation we can eke out from the four cases discovered so far and try 
to at least get some sense of what variation there is between them. In addition, 
the four cases selected do offer some other variation that will be worth revisiting 
during the concluding discussions. Notably, we are comparing different policy 
arenas: domestic law enforcement on the one hand, and international politics on 
69
Chapter 3: Methodology
the other, which may have an impact on what kind of problems and solutions are 
presented with the actors that are studied. This distinction also cuts along different 
layers of government – on the one hand a specialised and operation-focused 
agency, and on the other hand a central ministry in charge of a wide array of 
issues on a policy and political level. Again, this difference will most likely create 
variation in what kind of issues have to handled, and which therefore demands 
some further scrutiny. Finally, and as has already been alluded to, we have a 
couple of very classic before/after pairs of events, where learning is very likely to 
have happened from one instance to the next and this is also worth discussing 
in terms of how that may impact how these events were perceived and handled.
3.1.3 Sources & critique
The empirical material for these comparisons comes primarily from official reports 
on the events and on the accompanying efforts to manage them. In the Swedish 
cases, the sources consist of public inquiry reports and after-action reports from the 
government, from many of the involved agencies and, in the case of the  tsunami, 
the official report by the commission set up to analyse the management of the 
crisis. The Lebanon case is further supplemented by media sources to highlight 
a side of the crisis that is not dwelt upon by the official reports, namely the 
criticism raised against the evacuation effort. The handling of the tsunami was 
unquestionably a target for criticism, and indeed all official reports focus on 
improving on the numerous mistakes made. On the other hand, and as the 
empirical presentation and subsequent analysis will demonstrate, the reporting 
on the Lebanon evacuation follows a narrative of almost complete success, this 
in spite of the criticism raised at the time. The discrepancy is noteworthy and, 
since we are trying to evaluate how much of a crisis the event was, also worthy 
of closer scrutiny. In the US cases, the sources consist of official reports from 
the Justice Department, the House Oversight Committee, the Government 
Accountability Office as well as numerous books written by members of the FBI 
teams and of expert groups that were either brought in or left outside as part of 
the crisis management efforts.
In both case pairs, there is a distinct difference in the availability and quality of 
the material between the first, less successful, case and the second, more successful 
one. The difference between Waco and Montana is particularly startling. The former 
was one of the biggest and most traumatic law-enforcement disasters prior to 
9/11, whereas the latter quickly petered out into a nearly forgotten non-story. It 
is telling that when searching through news archives, sites like the (at that time) 
recently established CNN.com websites had very clearly reserved space for daily 
large exposés and daily reporting on the situation in Montana, should it ever 
evolve into a new Waco. Instead, the daily event calendar stops a week or two into 
the stand-off and is only very sporadically updated even though events actually 
do occur. The standoff simply ceases to be the kind of headline-grabbing crisis 
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many were expecting. Its equivalent in the Swedish case pair exhibits similar, if 
not quite as drastic, characteristics. In the Swedish case, there was a far stronger 
vested political interest in showing that the stark criticism levelled against the 
government and the key agencies after the 2004 tsunami had had an effect and 
that the management of this second case was successful. However, that also 
coloured the kind of reporting that was done. The official reports do not offer 
the kind of in-depth and detailed day-to-day accounts of who contacted whom 
that we can find in the tsunami reports, and only shorter paragraphs of mainly 
internal self-critique are levelled in the reports from a handful of the agencies.
The supposedly successful cases are in other words still under-reported, 
much as what one would expect. After all, this is exactly why successful cases for 
study are so hard to find. Since these are two sister cases to two very spectacular 
failures, however, there is still enough material there to start an investigation. 
The Montana case is, unfortunately, most prominently preserved in the form 
of rather self-congratulatory articles, chapters, and entire edited volumes from 
researchers who had been shut out from the efforts at Waco but who were allowed 
to participate in the FBI’s expanded crisis team in Montana. These books, while 
detailed, therefore have a tendency to focus on their particular favourite topic 
and to inflate their personal importance in the proceedings. As general accounts 
of the chronology of events, they are all consistent with each other and with the 
far more sparse official reports, but some of the details and motivations should 
only ever be considered the personal opinions of the authors rather than estab-
lished fact or official policy within the crisis management team. The tone in the 
books dealing with the Waco siege, in particular, tends to be highly critical to the 
point of sometimes being outright hostile against the ATF, the FBI, and the legal 
system in general, in some cases because the authors had personal connections 
to some of the victims of the siege
That is not to say that the other cases are without bias. The first official report 
on the Waco siege was widely regarded as a complete white-wash of the whole 
affair and spawned many additional reports from other committees to try to bring 
more clarity to the matter (cf. Dennis 1993; Danforth 2000; HCoGR 2000). 
Likewise, the political pressure to have a successful resolution to the Lebanon 
crisis has generated an official narrative in the reports that tends to gloss over 
numerous shortcomings in the operational execution of the crisis management 
– details that now only really survive in a scattered media narrative. In general, 
there is an unfortunate imbalance here between both the individual cases and the 
two case pairs as far as the politicisation angle goes. The tsunami as an event was 
“just” a natural disaster, but the Swedish government’s handling of that situation 
quickly escalated into a full-blown and long-lasting political crisis, if nothing 
else because it was the central political leadership that was seen to fumble the 
management of the crisis. This political problem was still around, and still being 
worked on, by the time the Lebanon war broke out, once again involving the 
same central political leadership, and thus making that crisis inherently political 
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as well. As we will see, the actual crisis management in the Lebanon case was 
therefore to a high degree a matter of political messaging, maybe even more so 
than an actual operational problem to be solved. This can be contrasted against 
the FBI cases, where the Waco siege certainly had a political angle to it in that 
it was a case of the federal government possibly overstepping its authority and 
trampling on citizens’ constitutional rights. Also, in the aftermath it became a 
congressional matter where the attorney general came under fire. Even so, the 
FBI itself was and remained an ostensibly non-political agency, and by the time 
Freeman standoff happened, the political establishment kept its distance, at 
most communicating its wish that the bureau did not repeat the same mistakes 
it had made three years earlier. The same issues of “the large government” being 
at odds with “the small citizen” were still at play, and there were political actors 
around to try to take advantage of that perceived clash, but the event itself still 
had nowhere near the same level of politicisation as the Swedish cases, since the 
political level simply was not directly involved.
Fortunately for this thesis, the nature of the questions that will be asked to 
investigate the hypotheses is such that this kind of bias is of little consequence. 
It does not matter to this particular model what the actual practical outcome of 
any of the cases were or who takes the blame (or glory) for that state of affairs 
– only that there is an account that demonstrates the context of the events; the 
interaction patterns (again, not necessarily the outcomes) between the different 
parties; and how the involved parties are situated in a larger societal context. 
Similarly, sources for some of the historical background can without a doubt be 
considered heavily biased – the time line for the Lebanon War is most handily 
found at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While Israel has  unquestionably 
been part of the conflict, and has a clear interest in presenting the war in a pro-Israeli 
perspective, this bias should have no significant impact on the veracity of what 
that source is used for: the large strokes of what key events happened on which 
days, and of how the border dispute had escalated over the preceding years. 
These broad strokes are only needed to put some context to how the Swedish 
government reacted to the escalating conflict. This is not an inquiry into the war 
itself, nor into the conflict at large.
3.2 Operationalisation
To reiterate once more, the aim of this thesis is to create an analytical framework 
for studying the dynamics of organisational permeability to external knowledge. 
It does this by building a causal model for how well an organisation can make 
use of MESO-knowledge, ultimately depending on how it is being buffeted 
around by two specific external factors: crises and the imposition of external 
work processes. The framework sets up three core hypotheses to describe these 
relationships: 
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 i) Organisations will fall back on well known, prescribed, and preferably con-
sistent problem-solving procedures when subjected to the stress of a crisis. 
Crises will thus push organisations towards a more closed behaviour.
ii) Unless already anticipated and incorporated in how the organisation inter-
acts with outside actors, a sudden presence of an externally enforced process 
will thus push organisations towards a more closed behaviour.
iii) The degree to which an organisation is open or closed decides how well and 
how willingly an organisation makes use of external knowledge. An organ-
isation that moves towards increased closed-ness will thus lose its ability to 
apply its MESO-knowledge.
All in all, the hypotheses set up four variables that are to be studied in a struc-
tured manner: whether or not there is a crisis; whether or not the organisation 
has anticipated the work processes involved in handling a specific issue; whether 
the organisation is open or closed; and whether or not it makes use of MESO-
knowledge. Whereas Chapter 2 described the theoretical connections between 
these variables, this section will go into how we should go about finding answers 
to these questions in the empirical material.
3.2.1 Crisis or non-crisis
The crisis definition used in Section 2.5 gives us a basic structure for what we 
should look for in the material. Is the situation characterised by a high degree 
of felt uncertainty? Is there a sense of urgency? Are there any perceived threats 
to critical values? As straight-forward as this may seem, the problem with this 
definition is that it is deliberately subjective, which has two main methodological 
consequences. The first is that we must always define our subject – for whom is it 
(or is it not) a crisis? – and then ensure that we either keep this subject constant 
or that we take particular care to note when we change perspectives. In particular, 
it means that a crisis may evolve in scale, not because the event changes but 
because more and more actors start to perceive the event differently. While the 
chosen cases make the subject reasonably self-evident, it is still good practice to 
explain exactly why this or that particular subject is the one to focus on. The 
second consequence is that we have to use expressions of feelings as our input, 
and this can be notoriously difficult to find in the empirical material.
The best-case scenario is if there are direct statements from the chosen subject 
to the effect that the situation is confusing, that time is of essence, and that the 
stakes are high, but we cannot always expect to find these. Should such expres-
sions be missing, we instead have to look at behavioural cues such as whether or 
not the subject keeps changing their mind about what the actual problem is, or 
intently tries to find out what on earth is going on and refuses to properly define 
the problem until more information is available. Does the subject try to force a 
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timely resolution, or is the approach more measured or even lackadaisical and 
things are allowed to take however much time they need? Are there any particular 
issues that the subject focuses on as requiring special attention or protection, 
or is it more a case of trying to resolve an issue for the sole sake of resolving the 
issue – not because the issue will have any particular follow-on effects?
As discussed in Section 2.5, it is important to note that all three characteristics 
need to be in effect for it to be an actual crisis. Uncertainty and values at stake 
are not a problem if there is all the time in the world to resolve those issues, and 
uncertainty and time pressure do not particularly matter if nothing is at stake – 
a mistake has no tangible consequences anyway. And if there is no uncertainty, 
then time pressure and value conflicts no longer matter because the solution is 
already clear – at most, there might be some issues with implementing it in time.
An interesting conflict that might occur is if statements and behaviour do 
not match: if the subject expressly states that time is of the essence, and then very 
obviously drags its feet or vice versa. In such instances, actual behaviour takes 
precedence over statements on the basis that the statements may be pure rhetoric, 
whereas the actual actions taken will more closely reflect what the subject is 
actually feeling.
With the parameters defined as they are, this becomes a purely binary variable: 
either it is a crisis, or it is not. For the sake of the empirical analysis, such a course 
distinction will not cause any problems, but for the discussion about inferences 
of causality, one issue to resolve is how large an effect this binary state of the 
independent variable will have in the dependent variable at the other end. At the 
same time, and this will be discussed in more detail later on, there is the problem 
of the identification paradox where we might have a feedback loop from what is 
supposed to be a dependent variable – specifically the use of MESO-knowledge – that 
changes the perceptions of one or more of the defining characteristics of the crisis.
3.2.2 Anticipation of process
The second independent variable is also binary: does the subject anticipate the 
processes or not? While this could also be treated as a subjective variable, this 
thesis will not only do so if the case specifically calls for it. Instead, it will be 
determined on the basis of whether or not the studied actor is forced to interact 
with parties or deal with questions that are not part of its regular or formal 
workload. In other words, for every interaction with collaborative partners, is 
this collaboration something that occurs on a regular basis or something that has 
been formally and explicitly regulated in laws or formal instructions or internal 
operational procedure documents? If it is not, then it is labelled as unanticipated 
and the subject is presumed to be surprised.
The exception that might call for specific treatment is if there are explicit 
statements in the material to the effect that, even though the subject should be 
familiar with the processes, they had no idea that any such instructions existed. In 
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other words, they failed to perform as ordered. Conversely, if there is no particular 
reason why the subject should know of a particular process, but claims to have 
pro-actively investigated and settled the matter beforehand, it might warrant a 
closer examination to see if this can be confirmed by other sources and if, indeed, 
they did follow to the letter what should have been an unfamiliar procedure.
This latter possibility would be the process-anticipation version of the 
identification paradox: where the use of MESO-knowledge alters the particular 
circumstances that are supposed to be the driving factor in the model.
While it is conceivable to operationalise this variable as a sliding scale – perhaps 
by seeing how large a portion of the external processes are surprises compared to 
how many are not, or by doing an in-depth analysis of exactly how much time is 
being spent on familiar vs. unfamiliar procedures – doing so in this case would 
create more problems than it solves. For one, it creates an imbalance against the 
binary value of the crisis variable: how much surprise is a full-on crisis worth in 
terms of altering the behaviour of an organisation? It is an apples-and-oranges 
comparison that only serves to muddy the waters. For another, treating it as a 
sliding scale creates a similar kind of signal-to-noise problem as with crises, where 
a small change in anticipation may coincide with a small change in behaviour, 
and we incorrectly interpret that as a strong correlation (of two already very 
difficult-to-measure variables) rather than as just noise on both ends. With a 
binary variable, we at least have the clarify of having a full signal or no signal, 
and can then discuss changes in the behaviour from the perspective of having 
established that there is unquestionably some kind of input, and what this might 
mean for any variation we see in the dependent variable.
3.2.3 Open or closed
The question of whether an organisation is opened or closed is a bit trickier. To 
begin with, as the previous chapter has established, this is really an ideal-type 
kind of definition and in reality it will very clearly be a sliding scale. A first step 
towards using it as a sliding scale is to allow for variations in the three operating 
characteristics described in Section 2.2.3: principle, instrument, and preferred 
outcome. In other words, a completely closed organisation that starts to allow 
for informal interactions rather than rely on strict regulations has made a move 
towards being more open. As the research question and hypotheses for this thesis 
have been formulated, we do not actually need to measure the exact degree of 
openness or closed-ness; we only need to be able to observe relative changes. 
As such, the example of a change towards informal interactions is sufficient for 
our purposes to say that the organisation has altered its behaviour on the open-
closed spectrum.
While this relieves us of the need to measure the exact value of the different 
characteristics, we are still left with a need to be able to observe changes in one 
direction or another for any of them. If all three change in the same direction 
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at once, we could certainly label this as a strong change, but strictly speaking, 
such detail is not necessary for our purposes other than to resolve the eventuality 
that one characteristic changes in one direction and another in the opposite one. 
Should that happen, we will for the time being categorise it as not changing 
the openness or closed-ness, but it will warrant a more detailed examination in 
the comparative discussion. Perhaps such a self-cancelling change is the result 
of one of the independent variables changing in opposite directions and we can 
connect each of the changed characteristics to a specific one of those variables.
As shown in Figure 2 on page 32 the ‘guiding principle’ characteristic can 
vary between the extremes of regulation and informality. In the material, such 
a variation can be signified by demands that some party or other strictly adhere 
to protocol when addressing someone or conversely that the normal rules of 
formality should be skipped for the sake of expedience. The choice of wording 
in this definition is very deliberate as “informal” is a term in common usage to 
describe how interactions happen. However, for it to matter here, it must be used 
to describe interactions that we should otherwise suspect to be (or which are 
expressly described as being) highly formal – again, we are looking for a relative 
change, not a specific state. Another indication that the informality increases 
is if more people are included than normally would, especially in matters that 
might otherwise be considered sensitive. Even if they do not have the required 
security clearance, someone might sit on vital information that is best extracted 
over the phone or over a cup of coffee than in a formal memorandum. Or for 
a change in the other direction, perhaps gag orders are issued to maintain full 
control over the message and only through official, vetted channels.
Next, the ‘instrumental work flow’ characteristic can vary between rigidity and 
flexibility. What they mean in particular is the way in which work is prescribed 
to be done: according to standard operational procedures (SOPs), which would 
signify a rigid organisation, or if things are done on a case-by-case basis, which 
would fall into the more flexible category. Changes between these two can be 
identified through measures such as reminders that a specific SOP exists and 
should be used; if the specific SOP was already in use, the reminder would be 
unnecessary, and the fact that it will now be enforced is a move in the direction 
of more rigidity. A change in the other direction might instead be signified by 
express orders to ignore more obtrusive rules for the time being and to focus on 
getting the job done at any cost. This communicates a willingness to step away 
from normal procedures and to instead adapt the work to suit the situation, which 
pushes the organisation towards the flexibility end of the spectrum.
Finally, the ‘preferred outcome’ characteristic can vary between consistency 
and dynamics. This is perhaps the most difficult one to find referenced directly 
since the preferred outcome would obviously be that everything always follows 
the template of what the organisation wants, even the outcome that also precisely 
matches a dynamic environment. It is highly unlikely that any official statement 
would express a preference for inconsistent information. Even so, the question 
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here is whether interactions with other parties generate output that strictly 
adheres to format, even if something is lost in the translation, or whether the 
information gathered is considered worth the extra effort required to make it fit 
with the organisational needs. Movement along this axis can be signified by such 
actions as setting up exceptionally broad information gathering mechanisms and 
instituting special analysis units to sift through the increased inflow of data, or 
by doing the opposite and streamlining and strictly screening the information 
channels to a select few, trustworthy sources. The act of putting gatekeepers 
into place can be a bit ambiguous here: on the one hand, they are a way to filter 
and sift through that increased volume of information for particularly valuable 
nuggets of information, but on the other hand, they can also act to ensure that 
only “correct” information passes through to the organisation. It cannot be 
determined beforehand what the gatekeepers will do, but their use does indicate 
some kind of movement in either direction and they are thus something that is 
worth looking for.
Individually or put together, these characteristics can yield the result of 
indicating that the organisation is opening up or closing down (or remaining 
the same, if nothing particularly changes). As mentioned, there is the potential 
for a “…but” to be appended in case multiple characteristics change at once in 
opposite directions, in which case a discussion and closer comparison with the 
input variables will have to be done to determine what is actually going on. And 
of course, the expectation from the hypothesis here is that if either a crisis or an 
unanticipated process is forced upon the organisation begin studied, it will move 
towards a more closed behaviour. Should both happen at once, it seems logical 
that the move should be more pronounced than if only one happened, which 
is why it is still valuable to keep track of exactly how these characteristics vary 
from one case to the next. Here, more than with the level of openness and the 
degree of crisis, the choice to make it a binary variable can become  problematic. 
For one, we have three components that may or may not match all the way 
through, which raises the question of how we should classify an organisation that 
exhibits, say, two ‘closed’ characteristics and one ‘open’ or vice versa? There is one, 
method ologically ugly, but pragmatic solution hidden away in the fact that we are 
looking for trends in our subjects: does the organisation tend towards openness 
or closed-ness? With the question formulated like that, we can grudgingly accept 
slightly more indecisive answers along the lines of “it is more open than closed,” 
and tick the ‘open’ box for our evaluation purposes. This still leaves the edge case 
where an organisation scores all three characteristics as being either on the open 
or the closed end of the spectrum in one case, but only two of them in another. 
In both instances, we would classify the organisation the same, yet that slight 
move away from the extreme may still be noteworthy.
This dilemma of choosing between clear answers, with reasonably clear 
indicators behind them, yet still wanting to be able to capture nuance, is simply 
inherent in the ideal type comparison and is not something that we can solve 
here and now. For the moment, we will have to be satisfied with having an 
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analytical tool that gives us those clear answers, and we will have to leave the 
potential for nuance as a matter of closer scrutiny if that analysis yields surprising 
or contradictory results.
3.2.4 MESO-usage
The final variable is the organisation’s use of any or all of the MESO-knowledge 
skills. One potential stumbling block here is that we need to separate the collection 
of knowledge from the actual use of said knowledge. For instance, just because 
an organisation starts to frantically do inventory of its knowledge base does not 
mean it is actually using meta-knowledge – it just means it is trying to collect 
it for potential use later. The usage itself would rather be expressed when, as the 
original Polanyi definition suggests, that knowledge is “actionable”; that is, when 
it generates an activity or a specific guiding decision. In terms of evaluating the 
variable, it is still worth noting when collection takes place since it at least indicates 
an intent – if time is short or if the situation changes, maybe the knowledge cannot 
be put to good use in time. However, that is more a distinction to be used in the 
later discussion, and in particular when we eventually want to bring learning 
back into the mix, but for the purpose of determining whether an organisation 
successfully uses any kind of MESO-knowledge, it does not get a full pass.
For meta-knowledge, the collection process is, as already mentioned, mainly 
a matter of doing an inventory of what knowledge already exists in-house. Do 
they ask around to see if anyone happens to know anything about the issue? 
The actual use of this kind of knowledge is expressed when there are instant 
reorganisations or creations of special working groups across departmental and 
hierarchical boundaries. This must be something that is task-specific and directly 
related to a knowledge need – simply establishing a central command group 
to shorten decision times and speed up information sharing does not qualify. 
Calling in stand-by pools and, even more so, hiring consultants are edge cases. 
On the one hand, the simple fact is that this knowledge does not exist inside the 
organisation and the action falls more into the category of “knowing how to find 
out more” – i.e. second-order knowledge – but on the other hand, it indicates 
a ready awareness of one’s own knowledge limitations, which certainly qualifies 
as meta-knowledge. In the end, it becomes a judgement call: are the external 
experts being called in because it is known that they are the right people for the 
job, or are they called in because it means more can bang away at the problem 
of figuring out what the actual problem is? If it is the former, then it is partly an 
expression of meta-knowledge, with a bit of empathic knowledge mixed in since 
the organisation already “knows who” to ask; if it is the latter, then it is purely 
second-order knowledge at work.
In general, this demonstrates the main methodological problem with MESO-
knowledge. By very definition and design, one knowledge type hooks tightly into 
the next and has its own internal feedback loop. Knowledge about other people’s 
abilities also increases the awareness of one’s own knowledge gaps; people found 
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through the use of second-order knowledge can go on to be the later subjects of 
empathic knowledge, and so on.
Therefore, the collection process for empathic knowledge is pretty much 
indistinguishable from SO-knowledge use, at least in the short term. With a 
longer perspective, only those contacts that are actually retained and maintained 
after use qualify as proper instances of E-knowledge collection. Someone who is 
brought in once and never heard from or bothered about again does not fulfil the 
requirement of trying to understand the knowledge pool and knowledge gaps or 
any kind of reciprocal usefulness there might be between the two parties. Empathic 
knowledge use, though, is a bit more distinct. This expresses itself through the 
decision to consult specific parties regarding specific topics. The reciprocal act 
of telling someone that they have misunderstood an issue and are asking the 
wrong questions is a very clear-cut example of empathic knowledge in action. 
Technically, the same holds for unsolicited inquiries of another confused-looking 
organisation that needs help with a particular issue, but this generally requires 
the asking party to initially be uninvolved with what is going on, and it is are 
therefore unlikely to be the main subject of analysis in most case studies.
Second-order knowledge, finally, can be collected in two main ways: either 
blindly by guessing where someone who knows something might be found and 
following up various leads, or purposefully by asking established contacts. As 
such, it could also be seen as a very specific case of empathic-knowledge use, 
where the question is “whom would you recommend?” And as already mentioned, 
SO-knowledge use is pretty much identical to E-knowledge collection in that it 
involves reaching out to a new party to query on some poorly understood topic. 
A slightly more passive example would be to make a general open call for support 
in various networks and fora in the hope that someone you had not connected 
with before will be able to answer. The use of intermediaries exists as a mix of 
these two strategies, where the party in need of help uses someone else to sift 
through such interest groups and to approach a likely candidate, and only then 
does the first party try to get help from whomever was found in the process.
As with the intermediary open/closed-variable, we are now dealing with a 
sliding scale of use. At one end, we have absolutely no MESO-use whatsoever, 
and at the other end, the knowledge-gathering machine is firing on all cylinders. 
The problem here is that it is not necessarily the case that a “high score” is better 
– if the required knowledge can be found inside the organisation through the 
successful use of meta-knowledge, the most trivial of uses have just happened and 
yet the knowledge problem is solved in full. Conversely, even if an organisation 
is searching high and low, it might still not find what it needs and in spite of 
being highly competent at all three skills, it is still left helpless. Granted, unless 
something completely unprecedented and unthinkable happens, the latter case 
is probably a bit unlikely. Sooner or later, someone can be found that can identify 
the problem, but since one of our independent variables is a time-sensitive crisis, 
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this scenario will probably express itself in the shape of an organisation running 
out of time to solve a critical problem.
At any rate, we now have the dilemma of treating MESO-usage as a binary 
variable and such a setup can be very sensitive to having even feeble attempts 
show up as something much bigger what than they really were, or treating it as a 
sliding scale of some sort and somehow reconcile the issue that less can be more 
and that there is such a thing as overkill. For the purposes of this thesis, and 
when considering that this variable will be coupled with the intervening open/
closed-variable that measures a relative change, the author has decided to go for 
a middle way: to set up a binary distinction between “good usage” and “poor 
usage” (the latter including no usage at all) and to make a qualitative argument 
based on the indicators mentioned above as to where the subject should fall.
The immediate question then becomes, what qualifies as “good” usage and what 
qualifies as “poor”? This will be answered by querying the material on whether 
or not, through the actual use – not just collection – of MESO-knowledge, the 
subject for analysis could acquire knowledge that was critical, not just helpful, 
to solving the issues at hand. If such usage took place and critical knowledge 
found, it will be categorised as good. If either or both is not the case, it will be 
categorised as poor. Again, both are required – simply stumbling over critical 
knowledge by chance does not qualify, nor do fruitless searches, no matter how 
earnest.
3.3 Expected outcomes
Given the case selection, the nature of those cases, and the variables of the model 
used here, we should already now be able to make some predictions of the results 
– hopefully the closer analysis will bear those predictions out.
In the FBI case pair, we match a crisis with surprising processes against a 
non-crisis where the FBI willingly and knowingly adopts new processes along 
the way. This would suggest that we are looking at the agency going from a very 
closed behaviour at Waco to a very open one in Montana, and consequently 
that it will make poor use of MESO-knowledge in the former case and good 
use of it in the latter.
In the Swedish case pair, we likewise have a first case where the organisation in 
question is in a crisis and has to deal with unanticipated processes, but we now 
match that against a second case that is also a crisis, yet where the processes for 
solving it have been established before-hand, and should come as no surprise. 
On the whole, then, we should see a similar shift from a closed behaviour in 
the tsunami case to an open one in the Lebanon evacuation. This time, though, 
the difference should be smaller than in the FBI cases, which may or may not 
rub up against the limitations of the analytical tool. Likewise, we should expect 
better MESO usage in the latter case than in the former, but again to a smaller 
degree than we expect to see in the FBI cases.
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Comparing across the pairs, there is little reason to expect anything of significance 
to come out a comparison between the “failure” cases – Waco and the tsunami 
– since both should present the same full-crisis/no-anticipation characteristics 
and the binary nature of those variables offers no real room for differentiation. 
Comparing the “successful” cases of Montana and Lebanon, however, may yield 
some insight, since we now have a variation in the how much of a crisis the two 
events represent, whereas the anticipation of process should be equally high in 
both. However, here too, the limitation of using binary variables may come back 
to haunt us as, although we would expect slightly more openness and slightly 
better MESO usage in the Montana case than in the Lebanon one, it is uncertain 
whether the analytical tool allows us to capture any such distinction.
Beyond these outcomes linked to the model, we may also expect a number of 
different variations between the cases and pairs, some of which have already been 
discussed. For instance, we should expect that learning has taken place between 
the failure and the success case in each pair, but it is to early to say exactly what 
has been learned and how that may impact the evaluation of our variables. We 
may also expect politicisation to be a bigger factor in the Swedish cases than in 
those involving the FBI since the former involves a central ministry and numerous 
leading politician and the latter does not, but again, we cannot yet determine 
what – if any – consequences this will have for the modelled relationships. Finally, 
we might expect that the difference in subject matter and policy arenas, and 
indeed in the general institutional situatedness of the main actors being studied 
will make a difference in exactly what type of crises and processes they will come 
across, but again, the actual outcome from these empirical differences in terms 
of what the model is out to describe is hard to predict.
3.4 Falsification
So if those are the (many) criteria for answering and fulfilling the hypotheses, 
what is needed to prove them wrong? In short, not much. Should any of the 
expected outcomes prove not to be the case, the link between the variables 
either needs to be saved through closer scrutiny, or it must be considered void. 
It should be mentioned that all the enumerated variables are sufficient, but not 
necessary, for the hypothesised change in the next link in the chain, at least as far 
as the independent and intermediary variables go. In other words, just because 
there is no crisis or no surprises does not mean that the organisation might not 
close up for some other, as of yet unexplored reasons. However, if the opposite 
happens – if we have a crisis or an unanticipated intrusion of new processes 
without a corresponding move towards a more closed behaviour, Hypothesis i 
and ii, respectively, fall.
In both instances, the “sufficient but not necessary” criterion combined 
with how we only study and impose circumstances that create a change in one 
specified direction, means that we can only say something in the case of an 
input failing to have the correct response. We do not yet have any mechanism 
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that would explain how organisations become more open, other than that they 
should be relatively more open under normal circumstances than when under 
duress. Should a case occur which seems to falsify either of these hypotheses, 
finding such a mechanism would be the only possible way of saving the model: 
something would have to exist that can positively cancel out the negative move 
presumably created by the duress. Doing so would also require the much more 
complex work of establishing exactly how much more closed organisations become 
from varying degrees of duress, and exactly how much they open up again from 
whatever new circumstances are introduced.
A similar connection exists between the intermediary open/closed variable 
and its dependent MESO-knowledge variable, with the added complication 
that there is no immediate correlation between quantity of MESO-usage and 
quality of MESO-usage. So on the one hand, this means that Hypothesis iii is 
not necessarily falsified if we simply observe an increase in closed-ness without a 
reduction in MESO-usage. It is entirely conceivable that there is a kind of “usage 
buffer” that is lowered as the organisation closes up and that we are simply not 
observing it when the knowledge is used to its fullest extent. But on the other 
hand, it means that if we see the exact opposite of what the hypothesis predicts – a 
drastic increase in MESO-usage quality that coincides with a drastic reduction 
in openness – not only is the hypothesis very much in question, it would also be 
that much harder to save by introducing new circumstances. Such circumstances 
would not only have to compensate for the reduced supposed buffer, but also 
increase the actual quality beyond its previous bounds at the same time.
3.4.1 The identification paradox, trust feedback, and issues theory critique
A complicating factor in all of this is that we have two feed-back loops between 
the MESO-knowledge use and the crisis and anticipation circumstances. In 
practical terms, this can be both helpful and harmful. On the helpful side, good 
MESO-usage can drastically reduce the uncertainties of a crisis in its early stages 
and keep an organisation from slipping into the more closed behaviour that will 
further put a damper on its efforts, and possibly even diffuse the sense of crisis 
altogether. Likewise, it may help the organisation predict processes that are 
likely to come into play so they can be studied and internalised before the fact, 
thereby drastically reducing the surprise factor. Also, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, properly applied empathic knowledge can smooth out the insecurities 
of being faced with an unfamiliar process by having a second trusted party guide 
the organisation through the ordeal, at which point there is no need for either of 
them to fall back into a regulatory and formal mood of just following the rules to 
the letter. On the more negative side, poor MESO-usage might increase the same 
stress factors. For example, the wrong people are consulted, which generates an 
even more confused picture of what might be going on, or the person who deals 
with the formal contacts between organisations might have done so in quiet for 
years and now, no-one in a decision-making position even knows that there are 
formal rules for so.
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In theoretical terms, these feedback loops complicate matters a bit as far as pro-
viding clear evidence both for and against the hypotheses are concerned. Even 
though things actually proceeded as expected – a crisis made an organisation close 
itself and stop asking question almost entirely – a single lucky shot in the form 
of the exact right question at the exact right time, even though it was the only 
one ever asked, might have been enough to bring enough clarity to transform 
the whole thing into a non-crisis. Instead of having yet another example of a 
case the fits the mould, we have a non-event that no-one ever hears about or 
bothers to investigate. Or it may give off the incorrect appearance that the one 
lucky question was an instance of the organisation remaining open and dynamic 
and in full MESO-usage mode, quite contrary to the predictions of the model, 
which would suggest that the model is false.
The major weakness of the model as it stands is the still somewhat unclear 
and far from fully correlated relationship between the intermediary open/
closed-variable and the dependent MESO-knowledge variable. The tolerances 
between how the two vary are quite possibly loose enough to allow the feedback 
loop to take effect – in both a positive and a negative direction – that the entire 
situation changes contrary to or in spite of the assumed mechanisms. In the 
development of the model, it was been suggested that maybe the intermediary 
variable should be taken out or redefined in terms of the dependent variable; 
that open/closed behaviour for all intents and purposes is the strict equivalent 
of good and bad MESO-knowledge. However, the author feels that this would 
trivialise the point of the thesis; instead, it is better to identify the behaviour 
as separate from the skills an organisation possesses already at this stage rather 
than to, inevitably, (re)introduce it later on. In essence, this model harkens back 
to the initial organisational theory idea of adapting and adopting pieces of the 
model of the individual onto an organisation as a whole: that organisations have 
cognition and learning and knowledge and pathologies in all of them, very much 
apart from, but still analogous to, how individual cognition and learning and 
so on works. In a similar vein, this thesis applies what is effectively a model of 
stress-induced clumsiness onto the organisation. As outside factors create all kinds 
of distractions, the organisation falls back on a kind of primal or rote behaviour 
and loses the ability to use more complex skills.
3.5 Generalisation and limitations
One final question that needs to be considered is how well we can generalise 
from the answers provided by this analysis. Given the low number of cases and 
the gaps in what variations they let us isolate, the immediate answer is unfortu-
nately that even if the hypotheses are not falsified, the degree of generalisability 
is fairly low. The model will have shown some resilience, but it would require 
some pretty strong links between observed cause and effect to allow us to guess 
that it will hold true if we start expanding the selection to include more complex 
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or less starkly different cases. Nevertheless, such an outcome would offer fertile 
ground for trying to refine the model and get rid of some of the methodological 
roughness that comes with this initial version. It may be that, while it would 
not stand up well to a broader case selection while still using its current binary 
variables, we might see the same tendencies if we allow for more finely gradated 
inputs and outcomes. Testing (and perhaps even improving) the generalisability 
from the current model would then be a matter of methodological refinement, 
in particular in terms of being able to differentiate different degrees of crisis and 
different levels of expectation and surprise with new work processes.
One important question that is left almost completely unanswered here is 
whether crisis and anticipation combine, reinforce each other, or potentially even 
cancel each other out. It may be the case that it is the most negative of the two 
types of pressure that determines how the organisation behaves; that, if it got 
caught deep in a crisis, the anticipation of process will not make any difference 
because the crisis alone is enough to effect a closed behaviour, and vice versa. Or 
it may be the exact opposite: that the absence of one type of pressure acts as a 
relief valve of sorts, making the other far less relevant. Perhaps, if every process is 
properly anticipated, an organisation can maintain an open behaviour even when 
face with the most disastrous of crises. Or maybe it is a simple compounding 
effect: one type of pressure is as bad as another, but combined they can close the 
organisation down further than just one on its own will. Given the case selection 
for this study, something may be gleamed on this topic in the comparison between 
the two “successful” cases, but since there are so many other contextual considera-
tions – the aforementioned differences in policy areas, situatedness, politicisation 
and so on – that may pollute the results, we cannot in good conscience make 
any broader general statements from that pair alone.
By contrast, the open/closed spectrum, and the MESO usage, both have 
some built-in degree of freedom between their respective extremes already, 
but both also require less coarse values on the independent variables – crisis 
and anticipation – to really let us say anything about how much more (or less) 
pressure is needed for the organisation to close down. At the same time, if we 
go outside the strict confines of the analytical methodology described here and 
tentatively start assigning different degrees of closed-ness and of MESO usage, 
using their respective sub-characteristics to assign some kind of “score” to both, 
we might already at this stage begin to study the link between those two – that 
is, Hypothesis iii – in more detail. It is still debatable whether we can draw any 
more general conclusions from this study alone, but that one segment of the 
model is at least slightly more ready for further testing than the links between 
crisis and closed-ness, and between anticipation and closed-ness.
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As the millennium was coming to a close, tales of approaching apocalypse (be 
it through societal upheaval, technological breakdown, or divine means) were 
on the rise. In Christian denominations, the concept of millenarianism – the 
notion that after a thousand years of toil and struggle, a new utopian era would 
begin – had gained prominence as an actual new millennium was approaching, 
and as a result, activity in groups subscribing to this belief was on the rise as 
well. One such group was the Branch Davidian of the Seventh-day Adventist 
Church – commonly shortened to just the Branch Davidian – that in 1993 came 
to clash with a number of federal agencies in a case that significantly altered the 
course for law enforcement for many years to come. Some parts of the event 
were still being litigated some 20 years later, and the handling of the case became 
a poster-child for governmental abuse, a never-ending source of theories about 
conspiratorial cover-ups, and even a rallying cry for domestic terrorism.
4.1 Background
In spite of its name, the Waco siege took place in the Elk community, some 14 
kilometres outside of Waco in Texas, and lasted for 51 days. It was the culmination 
of a year-long investigation into allegations raised at the local Branch Davidian 
of illegal weapons modification, drug manufacturing, and endemic child abuse. 
In May 1992, a UPS package addressed to the Davidian compound had come 
undone and been revealed to contain grenade casings, black powder, and weaponry. 
The discovery prompted the UPS to contact the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms (ATF), who started looking into the matter and set up a surveillance 
post in a neighbouring house. While the Branch Davidians had indeed bought 
and sold many guns as a small business to raise money for the sect and although 
all these trades could be traced to legal deals, the investigation led the agency to 
believe that the group was secretly and illegally modifying many of the guns for 
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its own purposes. The gun parts obtained would easily allow for the conversion 
of legal civilian versions of assault rifles into unlicensed fully automatic military 
versions, classified as machine guns under U.S. law. This suspicion was bolstered 
by witness accounts from neighbours about hearing automatic gun fire from the 
Davidian ranch (DoT 1993:17ff, 37ff; Reavis 1998:33ff).
The investigation also came up with infrared surveillance footage that purport-
edly suggested that the Branch Davidians were running a methamphetamine lab 
inside their compound. There was some evidence to support that such activities 
had taken place in the past: a witness report from a member who had left the 
group six years earlier suggested as much, and the group had indeed handed over 
lab equipment to the local sheriff at around the same time, but the vague infra-red 
hot-spot was the only recent hint that a lab still existed (DoT 1993:44ff). The 
evidence was still determined too weak to be included in the search warrant the 
agency later obtained. Even so, the combination of firearms illegally modified 
for automatic firing and of suspected drug manufacturing made the compound 
a perfect target for the on-going War on Drugs. The ATF therefore started 
training for a possibly hostile incursion into the compound and obtained limited 
support from the U.S. Army at nearby Fort Hood and the U.S. Army Special 
Forces out of Fort Bragg (DoT 1993:81, 211ff; Reavis 1998:122ff; HCoGR 
2000:81f ). In mid-1992, reporters at the Waco Tribune-Herald had also started 
their own investigation into the activities and religious underpinnings of the 
Branch Davidian. One of their conclusions was that the group’s leader, Vernon 
Howell – or David Koresh as he now called himself – was building a cult of 
personality that allowed him to engage in polygamy with every female member 
of he group, including girls that were not yet even in their teens. The reporters 
had interviewed former members of the group who claimed that Koresh often 
boasted about having sex with under-aged girls and that he had dictated that 
children not even one year old should be flogged (England & McCormick 1993; 
Hall 1995; Gallagher 2000:99f ).
By February 1993, the Tribune-Herald was ready to publish its scathing 
indictment of the abuse within the group, but was approached by the ATF to 
delay the publication until after the ATF had concluded their own investigation 
and performed a raid on the compound. The ATF agents were vague about exactly 
what was going to happen other than a preliminary date for a raid, which was 
later revised twice (DoT 199367ff; Reavis 1998:39ff). The pre-existing media 
interest in the group, however, contributed to the ATF’s decision to increase its 
preparedness for media involvement, While the agency itself did not initiate 
any further contact, it was clear that local media would take a huge interest in 
the raid, especially since the planned Tribune-Herald article series included a 
plea for the authorities to step in and deal with the matter. Indeed, the rumour 
of the raid had begun to spread and the local television station KWTX became 
particularly interested in capturing the event. Although the ATF had not disclosed 
a final date for the raid, it was clear from its interaction with the newspaper that 
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the agency would prefer it to be before, or at least in close conjunction with, 
the publication of the first part of the article series. The final ATF preparations 
had also left behind clues that were quickly picked up by both the paper and the 
television station: hotel bookings for over 150 agents, emergency medical services 
being put on standby, helicopter transports being booked, and – straight out of 
the book of law enforcement clichés – large orders of coffee and doughnuts had 
been placed. On ATF’s part, as part of the media preparations, a decision was 
taken to equip some of the agents with cameras for the purpose of capturing 
media footage as opposed to document evidence (DoT 1993; Reavis 1998:32f ).
On the morning of February 28, 1993, the 76 ATF agents at Fort Hood 
were ferried to Waco. Roadblocks and observation posts were set up on the roads 
leading into the compound, and a dozen media representatives were starting to 
circle the outskirts of the area. On his way to meet with his colleagues, one of 
the KWTX camera men got lost and had to ask a local postman for directions 
to the compound. It turned out that it was actually within visual range from 
where the two men met, and in their conversation, the camera man revealed that 
he was there to cover some sort of big raid that was going to happen very soon. 
When the postman sped down the road towards the compound, the KWTX 
reporter wondered if maybe he was a member of the Branch Davidians, and this 
was indeed the case (DoT 1993:82ff). Had the Branch Davidians not long since 
found out that they were being investigated by the ATF, this chance encounter 
finally revealed that a big confrontation was only moments away.
4.1.1 The Branch Davidian of the Seventh-day Adventist Church
The Seventh-day Adventist Church (SDA) is a protestant Christian denomination 
that was established in 1863. The “seventh day” refers to the movement’s belief 
that Saturday is the seventh day of creation and thus the day of the Sabbath. It is 
itself an off-shoot of the 1830:s Millerite movement that held that the advent of 
the Second Coming of Christ was near – specifically that it would happen some 
time during 1843–44, finally settling on October 22, 1844. When the promised 
date came and went without a Second Coming in sight, an event later called the 
Great Disappointment, the movement lost its momentum and rapidly began 
losing followers (Bromley & Silver 1995b:44; Pitts 1995:21; Reavis 1998:51ff). 
Among the remaining believers, there was a split between those who believed the 
date itself was wrong and those that believed that error lay in the interpretation 
of what was going to happen. In the latter camp, there soon emerged an idea 
that what the date was referring to was not the actual return of Christ, but the 
beginning of his final phase of heavenly atonement and that the actual cleansing 
of the Earth that many had been expecting was yet to come. It was from this 
belief – that the advent of the Second Coming is drawing ever closer – that the 
Adventist Church was born. The key surviving tenant from the Millerite move-
ment is still that the Second Coming and the scourging of the Earth are real 
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events that will take place at the end of Christ’s millennium-long reign of heaven 
(Seventh-day Adventist Church 2009). This specific belief makes the Adventist 
Church among the most clear examples of a millenarian sect (Bromley & Silver 
1995b:44; Anthony & Robbins 1997:272).
In 1930, an Adventist Sabbath school teacher named Victor Houteff published 
what he called “a call for reformation” where he outlined a number of points where 
the Church had become lax in its interpretation of the Bible (Pitts 1995:24f ). 
Instead of getting the reformation he wanted, Houteff was “dis-fellowshipped”, 
but his ideas had still found some fertile ground within the church. In 1934, 
they had grown strong enough that an official hearing was held to determine 
the reasoning and validity of Houteff’s claims, after which his teachings were 
formally labelled as false. In response, Houteff’s followers established the distinct 
Davidian Seventh-day Adventist Church (DSDA), so named because they were 
dedicated to the goal of restoring the biblical kingdom of David. One of the 
main goals of the new church was to determine the identity of the 144,000 
people mentioned in the Book of Revelations who would survive judgement 
day – 12,000 from each of the twelve Jewish tribes. The DSDA was formally 
organised on March 12, 1934 and began searching for a place to locate their 
headquarters. Just over a year later, they purchased a lot of land outside Waco 
and named it the “Mount Carmel Center” after the place where Elijah built an 
altar to God (Bromley & Silver 1995b:46; Pitts 1995:25). In 1955, Houteff 
died during a campaign to spread the Davidian belief, and after a brief power 
struggle, his widow Florence took control over the Church and began to assert 
her interpretations of her husband’s teachings onto the church followers (cf. Pitts 
1995;26ff; Reavis 1998:58ff).
Before long, however, Florence Houteff made a break with her husband’s 
teachings of preparation and instead made a firm prediction that a 42-month 
period described in the Book of Revelations would take place between 1955 and 
1959, ending on April 22, 1959 (Bromley & Silver 1995b:49). This prediction and 
the focus away from Victor Houtleff’s original teachings was soon challenged by 
other Davidians, in particular by Benjamin Roden, who claimed to have received 
revelations from God that he was the Church’s true leader. When he was rebuffed 
by the Church leadership, he went off to found the Branch Davidian organisation 
as a separate group from the main DSDA (Bromley & Silver 1995b:49ff; Pitts 
1995:32f; Reavis 1998:61f ). As with the Millerite predictions, the date Florence 
Houtleff had predicted came and went, and when the promised events failed to 
materialise, the church fractured (Pitts 1995:30ff). Among those that did not 
outright leave the DSDA, many joined Benjamin Roden and his newly-founded 
Branch Davidian. In 1962, the remaining organisation still led by Houtleff dis-
banded and the assets were sold off. The Branch Davidian took this opportunity 
to acquire some of the Mount Carmel property and (re)established themselves 
there. Benjamin Roden died in 1979 and leadership of ‘The Branch,’ as he had 
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decided to call the organisation, passed to his wife Lois, who started to inject 
a decidedly feminist interpretation into the group’s teachings – a development 
that met with some resistance among Branch members (Pitts 1995:35ff; Reavis 
1998:63ff).
In 1981, Vernon Howell joined the group as a musician during their services. 
A year later, he claimed to have been received the gift of prophecy and, with the 
permission of Lois Roden, started teaching his own visions and interpretations of 
the Bible (Anthony & Robbins 1997:272; Reavis 1998:27ff). Lois’ son George 
Roden, already at odds with his mother’s alteration of the Branch’s tenants, saw 
Howell’s teachings and Lois permissiveness as further erosions of the true path 
and the matter came to a head when George ejected Howell and his followers 
from Mount Carmel at gunpoint. In 1985, the Howell faction set up camp in 
Palestine, Texas, some 150km away from Waco. Howell also travelled to Israel, 
where he claimed to have had a revelation identifying him as the modern king 
Koresh (Cyrus the Great of Persia) and as God’s tool in the re-establishment of 
the kingdom of David. The revelation caused him to change his name to David 
Koresh (Reavis 1998:74ff, 93ff; Gallagher 2000:84, 91f ). A year later, Lois Roden 
died and control over the Branch Davidians formally passed to George Roden 
but his support had waned since Howell’s departure, whereas the newly-renamed 
Koresh who always had Lois’ support had managed to build his congregation. In 
1987, the conflict between the two once again ended in an armed confrontation, 
this time with Roden fleeing the compound with two minor gun-shot wounds 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:14f; Bromley & Silver 1995b:52ff; Reavis 1998:78ff). 
In 1989, George Roden murdered his roommate, who had claimed to be 
the true messiah, and was declared legally insane. Roden was sent to a mental 
hospital and lost ownership over Mount Carmel due to a huge tax debt. Koresh 
and his followers managed to raise the capital required to take ownership over the 
compound. On moving back in, they found evidence of a methamphetamine lab 
operated by the people who had rented the property from Roden since the 1987 
confrontation. The equipment was handed over to the local law enforcement and 
removed. Finally in charge of the Branch Davidian at the original Davidian site, 
Koresh began proselytising his own brand of adventism, proclaiming himself the 
Lamb of God who would interpret the Seven Seals of the Book of Relevation 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:14f; Pitts 1995:37; Reavis 1998:81f ).
Koresh’s beliefs revolved around an intricate reading of the Bible suggesting 
that the apocalypse was near, and that he was the only one who could see and 
understand the signs. The Branch Davidians were among the people who would 
be saved, but were also destined to fight against the forces of evil in the final 
confrontation. In fact, a conflict with the forces of Babylon was one of the signs 
that one of the Seven Seals had been broken, and one of the more common 
associations with these mythical forces was all forms of official government. 
Giving in to these forces would mean not only the damnation of themselves, 
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but of all humanity, as well as the failure of the prophesied 144,000 to earn 
their place in heaven (cf. Scruggs et al. 1993:2; Tabor & Gallagher 1995:52ff; 
Anthony & Robbins 1997:268, 275; Reavis 1998: 102ff; Gallagher 2000:83, 
86ff; Wessinger 2000b:91ff).
One important peculiarity with the Branch Davidian under Koresh was its 
many Jewish influences. The SDA itself provided some of these, such as the 
Saturday Sabbath and an adherence to kosher laws. The DSDA, in turn, added 
a focused on, and a crucial importance of, the Jewish tribes, since descendants 
of these tribes would supposedly be saved during the Second Coming. Koresh 
himself seemed to have introduced even more elements that he picked up during 
his travels in Israel, such as the observance of passover. All in all, the many layers 
of added, splintered, and re-focused beliefs and teachings from the protestant 
roots makes the Branch Davidian belief system similar, but distinctly different 
from “schoolbook” Christianity (Reavis 1998:49f Gallagher 2000:86f ). On top 
of this, Koresh’s own prophecies, readings and Bible interpretations added a 
complex layer of interconnected textual references that were distinctive to the 
hundred-odd people living at the Mount Carmel compound. At the same time, 
Koresh allowed breaches of some of the rules, especially for himself, and the first 
Herald-Tribune article quoted him as saying he was probably the biggest sinner 
of them all. Unlike the other members, Koresh was allowed to drink beer and 
eat meat (cf. England & McCormick 1993; Gallagher 2000:89f ).
Among Koresh’s edicts were also his proclamation that God had given him 
alone the right to have numerous wives, and that for all intents and purposes, 
all female members capable of producing offspring belonged to him. With 
parental consent, children as young as 14 could be legally married at the time – a 
circumstance that was easy to arrange in the close-knit group – and according 
to Koresh’s “House of David doctrine”, he was supposed to father 24 children as 
in his restoration of the mythical kingdom (cf. Scruggs et al. 1993:16; Bromley 
& Silver 1995a, 1995b:63ff; Reavis 1998:112f ). These facts quickly became the 
source of many rumours in the surrounding community, and not only sparked 
the 1993 Waco Tribune-Herald exposé, but also the 1992 investigation by the 
Texas Child Protection Services (TCPS). While many former group members were 
willing to provide stories about child abuse, statutory rape, and indoctrinations 
into forced marriages for the former, the TCPS investigation failed to uncover any 
hard evidence to support the charges, since all the women ostensibly had official 
or common-law husbands in the group . In the aftermath of the 1993 siege, 
one of the bigger sources of contention as far as the government’s involvement 
with the group was whether or not these accusations had any bearing on how 
the case was handled. The witness reports mainly came from former members 
who had a reason to hold a grudge against Koresh and the official investigation 
turned up empty, but on the other hand, it is suspected that the lack of evidence 
was more due to the Branch Davidians covering for Koresh than to the abuse 
not taking place (cf. Scruggs et al. 1993:215ff; Wright 1995b:83ff). While the 
Herald-Tribune’s article called for the authorities to intervene to stop both 
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physical and sexual abuse of under-aged children, the case had already been 
dealt with and the ATF did not have the authority to investigate these kinds of 
allegations. It was therefore never germane to the decision to raid the compound 
(cf. England & McCormick 1993; DoT 1993:157ff; Ellison & Bartowski 1995; 
Wright 1995b:86ff).
The combination of these beliefs made the group – who was already reasonably 
well-armed and who had already seen two gun-related altercations take place on 
its premises – shift its focus even further towards the preparation for outright 
warfare (Anthony & Robbins 1997:272f; Gallagher 2000:89). One member 
was a federally licensed dealer in firearms, and ran a gun business, ‘The Mag 
Bag’, which provided the group both with additional income and with legiti-
mately obtained weaponry (DoT 1993:126ff; Reavis 1998:37f ). It was a Mag 
Bag shipment that eventually alerted the UPS and the ATF to the amount of 
weapon parts being shipped to the group. The weapons bought and sold, includ-
ing assault rifles and .50” calibre rifles, were legal to own as long as they were 
semi-automatic, whereas unreported and unlicensed fully automatic conversions 
would have rendered the same weapons illegal. The fact that weapons existed 
and were in use in large quantities around the compound was therefore never a 
great secret or surprise – only the legal status of some of them were occasionally 
in question. The same neighbour that provided the ATF with a witness report 
of automatic and heavy-calibre gun fire at the compound had previously made 
a similar report to the local sheriff, who had investigated the matter but found 
no evidence of wrong-doing.
During the siege, all of these things became stumbling blocks for the FBI 
efforts. The peculiarities of the Branch Davidian religion made the negotiators 
fail to understand or outright miss many of the religious references Koresh used. 
The potential for continues abuse of the many children trapped in the compound 
was a key issue that had to be resolved. The amount and style of armaments at 
the group’s disposal was a constant threat to anyone nearby. The biggest problem 
by far, however, was that in the minds of the devout Branch Davidians, the ATF 
raid had already amply confirmed Koresh’s interpretation of the government as 
the Babylonian enemy that they could not yield to – the FBI was cut from much 
the same block (Anthony & Robbins 1997:274f; Gallagher 2000:86, 89, 92f ).
4.1.2 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
Established in 1908 as the Bureau of Investigation (BOI) and renamed the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation in 1935, the FBI is among other things the principal 
agency investigating violent federal crimes. It is a curious mix of both centrali-
sation and a distributed work-load, with its headquarters located in Washington 
D.C., many of its specialist functions located in Quantico, Virginia, and 56 field 
offices spread around the country with each holding significant local control over 
the cases they handle (Kessler 1993).
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It should be stressed that the FBI has fundamentally been a crime-fighting agency. 
Its preparations, strategies, tactics, personnel decisions, and scientific preference 
have all focused on the preventing, investigating, and solving crime. While 
terrorism was among the list of crimes it was tasked to deal with, the presumed 
motivations of such actors was still either political or monetary, and commonly 
supported by foreign countries. Domestic terrorism was and motivations outside 
of this spectrum were not issues it had commonly come across, and even then, 
a terrorist is a form of criminal at heart. Millenarianism and a perceived funda-
mentally moral conflict between the law of the land and religious laws was not 
something the FBI had to with on a daily basis during the 1990s. Even so, there 
was a precedent in the form of the 10-day siege at Ruby Ridge in August 1992 
(Pitcavage 2001). Here, a member of the Aryan Nation, Randy Weaver, had been 
involved in an altercation, first with the ATF and then with the U.S. Marshal 
Services (USMS) near his cabin at Ruby Ridge. The FBI Hostage Rescue Team 
(HRT) was called in to deal with the barricade situation as Weaver’s family took 
shelter in the cabin. But a near-complete lack of analysis of what had caused 
the incident, combined with very loose rules of engagement, led to a disastrous 
mismanagement of the situation. The episode ended with one USMS deputy, 
Weaver’s son, and Weaver’s wife dead. In addition, the courts cleared Weaver of 
all wrong-doings at Ruby Ridge, leaving his initial rejection of the court system 
and failure to appear before a judge – the reason the USMS got involved to begin 
with – as his only crime.
Not even a year later, the FBI employed a special Crisis Management Program 
(CMP) that significantly short-cut many of the structures normally seen on the 
organisational chart. The stated purpose of the CMP was to “preserve life, and to 
enforce laws over which the FBI has jurisdiction” (Scruggs et al. 1993:114). In 
such cases, a Special Agent in Charge (SAC) was established, who would answer 
directly to the FBI director and deputy director. The directors would assign spe-
cialist teams to the SAC from the various divisions within the agency, but as the 
title suggests, it is the SAC would be in charge of these teams in the field. The 
allocated resources would be combined into a coherent crisis management team.
In the Waco case, the team consisted of a negotiation team supported by 
the Critical Incident Negotiation Team (CINT), the FBI Hostage Rescue Team, 
and an FBI Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team. In addition, numerous 
logistical support and legal counsel teams were involved, and an investigation 
team was made available for when the situation was resolved (Scruggs et al. 
1993:149ff). The SAC was supported by three assistant SACs to allow for shift 
work and to let one of the assistant SACs consistently be the outwards contact 
and handle daily media briefings. The FBI headquarters also provided liaisons 
with the armed forces to obtain information about the weaponry the agents were 
facing, but also to provide transportation and special equipment. In particular, 
in this case there was a concern that some of the larger-calibre weaponry the 
Branch Davidians possessed would easily defeat any protection that the FBI 
93
Chapter 4: The 1993 Waco Siege
agents and vehicles had (Scruggs et al. 1993:123). The involvement of the armed 
forces could be somewhat problematic since the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 
prohibited the use of military personnel for the purpose of law enforcement (cf. 
Revis 1998:122ff). This was solved by the U.S. Army providing nine unarmed, 
but suitably armoured M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, as well as two M1A1 Abrams 
main battle tanks and five M728 Combat Engineering Vehicles (CEVs, which 
were essentially WWII tanks equipped with demolition tools rather than guns).
The FBI’s involvement at Waco was sparked by the ATF’s initial raid. The 
violent response from the Branch Davidians had left five ATF agents dead and 
twenty wounded, which meant that this was now a case of deadly force being 
used against federal agents as well as a major violent crime – both of which fell 
within the purview of the FBI. However, already from the start, the agency had 
misgivings. One of the assistant deputy directors declared the task of the SAC as 
inherently difficult since the agency entered the case “backwards” – the preserva-
tion of life and enforcement of laws that the CMP is set up for had already been 
unsuccessful once and the agency was there to “salvage a failed tactical effort” 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:118).
To complicate matters further, the initial ATF raid was already a combined 
effort between numerous law enforcement agencies, and with the FBI on the 
scene, they were multiplied even further. In total, some 370 people from eight 
different agencies had to be coordinated: the ATF, the U.S. Customs, the Waco 
Police Department, the McLennan County Sheriff’s Office, the Texas Rangers 
and DPS Patrol from the Texas Department of Public Safety, the U.S. Army 
supporting both the ATF and the FBI, and the Texas National Guard. All this 
on top of the nearly 700 FBI personnel that were directly involved, either locally 
or in nearby field offices (Scruggs et al. 1993:10, 228ff).
On location at Mount Carmel, the FBI set up a team of 25 negotiators, 
initially working in one day shift and one night shift, but later reconfigured for 
three 8-hour shifts (Scruggs et al. 1993:124ff). Their FBI’s main guiding principle 
was one of waiting and of communicating a number of rules of safety to the 
Branch Davidians to ensure that they would not engage in any kind of behaviour 
that would lead to the loss of life. The negotiators also employed a number of 
themes in their communication: appealing to the parents of the children who 
had been released at various stages to come out and join them; assuring that 
no-one who came out of their free will would be harmed or mistreated; demon-
strating a concern for the safety of everyone involved as conditions within the 
compound deteriorated; driving a wedge between the leaders of the group in 
the hopes that, if Koresh would not lead people out, someone else would; and 
flattering Koresh’s sense of importance by implying that he could use the media 
sensation to spread his word. The negotiators also decided on a strategy of “stress 
escalation”, explaining the increasingly harsh measures the FBI would use if the 
Branch Davidians remained defiant, as well as the use of sleep deprivation tactics 
to soften their resolve (Scruggs et al. 1993:126ff).
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The negotiation team and the SAC also had access to a number of accredited 
subject-matter experts that had worked with the agency before, many of which 
were tied to the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC). 
These were all experts in fields that were classically connected to law enforcement: 
behavioural scientists, psycholinguists, threat assessment psychologists, forensic 
psychologists, psychiatrists, and MDs (Scruggs et al. 1993:155ff, 179f ). A few 
non-associated experts on religious matters also approached the agency and 
offered their services, but the focus of the agency was to establish a criminal profile 
of the main actors involved. The experts therefore aided in the formulation of 
negotiation strategies, in establishing profiles on the motives and motivations of 
the group leaders and their followers, and in determining whether or not there 
was a risk for cult-like mass suicide (cf. Hall 1995).
The HRT was a special unit within the FBI that was always on stand by to 
be deployed into highly threatening situations (Scruggs et al. 1993:144ff). At 
Mount Carmel, the HRT provided inner perimeter security by setting up razor 
wires and sniping posts at key locations around the compound, and also observed 
and monitored what was happening inside the compound, using thermal imaging 
and night-vision devices to track activity at night-time and to a limited degree 
inside the confines of the building. The HRT commanders quickly came to the 
conclusion that the visibility from the compound and the flimsiness of the struc-
tures would make a direct assault impossible without putting lives at danger on 
both sides, much as the AFT raid had already proven (Scruggs et al. 1993:144ff).
Finally, the role of the SWAT team was to provide an outer perimeter around 
the compound and ensure that no-one could enter or leave the area without 
being apprehended (Scruggs et al. 1993:18f, 148f). However, there were concerns 
that the distinction between the SWAT team’s “outer” and the HRT’s “inner” 
perimeter was not always clear and that there seemed to be no planning for and 
insufficient coverage in case of a large-scale break-out attempt. Similarly, there 
were some friction between the tactical elements – HRT and SWAT – and the 
negotiation team. While the latter had chosen a more diplomatic approach of 
dialogue and reasoning, the former tended more towards intimidation tactics 
and an openly aggressive stance. The negotiators were also often left out of the 
loop on what the SAC and the tactical commander were planning, which on 
numerous occasions resulted in the Branch Davidians making concessions to 
the negotiators, only to be met by physical retaliation efforts that had been 
planned in advance by the tactical element. Conversely, the HRT observers were 
very careful not share their tips when they had spotted something, such as the 
location of heavier weapons, since this gave them an advantage in being able 
to plan around this placement, whereas the negotiators would point out to the 
Branch Davidians that these weapons had been spotted and that this would be 
seen as dangerous and provoking behaviour on their part.
Some of the mismatches between the negotiated results and the FBI response 
were even a direct result of the negotiators’ own advice on strategy. Not everyone 
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felt that the sleep deprivation tactic was constructive, and the SAC employed 
a number of tactics to step up the stress escalation strategy without warning 
to either the negotiators or the Branch Davidians. (Scruggs et al. 1993:139ff).
Outside of the FBI, the Justice Department (DoJ) took a close interest in the 
case. The ATF raid took place only a month into the new Clinton administration, 
and many high offices had not been manned yet. The new attorney general (AG) 
Janet Reno would not arrive until March 12, and in the mean-time, an acting AG 
had been assigned from the Bush transition team. The acting AG was therefore 
mainly involved in the decision to borrow armoured vehicles from the U.S. Army, 
which at first caused some concern for the White House until it was made clear 
that it was a purely protective measure and not for use in offensive engagements.
The DoJ had no major involvement until early April, when the FBI started 
formulating a plan to bring the siege to an end (Reavis 1998:264f ). It is indica-
tive of the FBI methodology that up until this point, the managing of the crisis 
was handled on the SAC level, and only when the far more elaborate and cross- 
departmental scheme of using military vehicles to inject large amounts of CS 
tear gas into the compound was devised did the situation warrant that the plan 
was cleared with the DoJ and properly signed off by the FBI director. Up until 
that point, the attorney general relied heavily on the observations of her deputy 
assistant AG, who travelled to Waco and Mount Carmel to get a sense of what 
was happening on the ground. The final plan was first devised and proposed by 
the crisis management team to the FBI director. He agreed that it was a good 
plan and that he would take the matter to the attorney general. On April 12, the 
AG was briefed on the CS gas insertion plan, and had to be convinced numerous 
times that action, of any type at all, was needed. Only when the senior FBI officials 
could explain that waiting was no longer an option was she willing to discuss 
the plan itself. In particular, the AG was concerned that the use of gas would 
have an adverse effect on the children still at the compound, and the concept 
of “gassing” everyone inside had some nasty connotations (Reavis 1998:264f ). 
The FBI brought in military personnel to describe the difference between this 
imagery and the use of a non-lethal tear gas. Eventually, the plan was deemed 
safe enough for the attorney general to brief the president and, satisfied that there 
was no other safe option, the order to proceed went down the chain of command 
from AG to FBI director to SAC. The next day, the plan was put into practice.
4.2 Chronology of events
After almost a year of investigation, observation, and planning, the ATF starts to 
get ready to act against the Branch Davidians. However, their activities have not 
gone unnoticed. An observation post at Mount Carmel was established under 
the cover story that the agents are students at a local college, but their age and 
possession of new large vehicles make it a flimsy cover at best. (DoT 1993:33, 51; 
Reavis 1998:67f ) One of the agents is tasked with getting inside the compound 
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to learn more about the layout and the potential presence and location of guards, 
and starts attending bible readings held there by Koresh. On Sunday morning, 
February 28, he makes a last visit to gain some final intelligence about the current 
situation on site. Meanwhile, a member of the Branch Davidians working his 
morning postal route has a chance encounter with a cameraman from the local 
KWTX television station who is looking for “Rodenville” – an old name for the 
Mount Carmel Centre that has lived on ever since the Roden family took over the 
compound. The cameraman has been looking for roadblocks, not knowing that 
the ATF only establishes them at the moment a raid starts specifically to avoid 
early detection, and thinks that since he has not seen any, he must be miles off. 
Yet, in reality, the compound is just a kilometre down the road, visible from the 
intersection where he has stopped (DoT 1993:84f; Reavis 1998:44f ).
Upon learning why the cameraman is out there, the Branch member drives 
off towards Mount Carmel to warn the rest of the congregation. The camera-
man sees nothing out of the ordinary and back-tracks to a nearby store to call 
his news director, and is told to go back to the intersection where he thought 
he had gotten lost and wait to see if something happens. When he returns, the 
roadblock he was expecting has been put into place and he proceeds to set up 
his camera. At the compound, the postman arrives in the middle of a biblical 
discussion between Koresh and the under-cover ATF agent and informs Koresh 
that the agency is about to perform a raid. Fearing that the raid might start early 
or that he might be caught inside if he lingers, the ATF agent excuses himself 
and leaves to report his final findings, but not before Koresh wishes him good 
luck and states that “the time has come” and keeps repeating “they’re coming” 
while spying out of a window (DoT 1993:89; Reavis 1998:71ff).
4.2.1 February 28 – The ATF Raid
The report that the Branch Davidians know of the raid spreads quickly among 
the assembled ATF agents, but the decision is made to go ahead. The agents 
board the trailers that will take them from Waco out to Mount Carmel, and a 
helicopter team departs to make a number of diversionary low-altitude fly-bys 
over the compound. Before they can execute the diversions, however, they take 
fire from within the compound and have to divert to a nearby field for emergency 
inspection of the vehicles (DoT 1993:95f ). The raid has begun and it is already 
too late to warn off the approaching trucks full of agents.
As the first trailer pulls up on the compound driveway, Koresh appears in the 
main doorway to ask what is going on. The first agents out identify themselves 
and state that they have a search and arrest warrant, at which point Koresh slams 
the door shut. Reporters who have followed the trailers to the compound but 
stopped at the main road have just had time to set up their cameras as gun fire 
erupts from within the building. The Branch Davidians are firing out at the agents 
through the closed front door and front windows. Teams moving up to enter 
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the building come under heavy fire and two of the ATF vehicles sustain direct 
hits to their engines, making it impossible for the convoy to leave. One team 
attempting a rooftop insertion into the building receives incoming fire through 
the flimsy outer wall. Two agents are killed instantly, one receives multiple gunshot 
wounds before he can roll himself off the roof, and two more are momentarily 
stuck on the upper floor of the building. A third agent is also shot and killed 
while providing covering fire for the roof insertion team from the ground. The 
fourth and final ATF fatality happens at the front of the compound as an agent 
scrambles for cover from the gunfire (DoT 1993:96ff; Reavis 1998:156ff, 162ff).
Inside the building, one Branch Davidian member frantically calls 911 and 
is transferred to the Waco Police Department. The deputy that responds at first 
fails to communicate with the caller, who soon hangs up, but the deputy calls 
back to the number recorded by the 911 system and finally manages to reach 
the member who placed the original call, and then attempts to put him in touch 
with the AFT. Unfortunately, the ATF liaison has turned his radio off and the 
deputy’s radio call is answered by a different agent. Afraid that future calls into 
the compound will fail, the deputy does not hang up to let the ATF make a call, 
and instead a very literal game of telephone evolves that leads nowhere. Soon after, 
Koresh places a call to the same deputy on a second line, leaving the deputy to 
juggle three different lines of communication (Reavis 1998:167ff). Meanwhile, 
the ATF agents scramble to find a number for a line into the building and after 
many attempts, including having to scream at the Branch Davidians to pick up 
the phone in the middle of the intermittent gunfire, a direct line is established. 
It takes several minutes of negotiation to reach a cease-fire, and some 90 minutes 
after the gunfight started, the shooting finally ends. The agent who managed to 
roll off the roof can finally be retrieved and is still alive in spite of the barrage he 
has sustained, the fall, and the subsequent bleeding. In total, 20 ATF agents are 
wounded from gunfire and another eight have sustained other injuries from trying 
to move around during the fighting. Among the Branch Davidians, three people 
are killed directly by the ATF. Two more are “mercy-killed” by other members 
of the group as their wounds are regarded as too severe to be handled. In addi-
tion, four more Davidians have been shot, but without lethal or life-threatening 
consequences, among them David Koresh (cf. DoT 1993:102ff; Scruggs et al. 
1993:24; Wessigner 2000b:57).
As the ATF recovers and evacuates its dead and wounded, the perimeter they 
intended to set up falters. Three Branch Davidians who were hiding out at the 
nearby Mag Bag warehouse manage to take a car to a house close to the com-
pound as the separate team originally tasked with executing a search warrant at 
Mag Bag aborted their mission as the shoot-out started. In the afternoon, as the 
three try to enter the compound from the rear, they are discovered by an ATF 
team and a second prolonged gunfight ensues. In the end, one of the Branch 
Davidians surrender, one is killed, and the third manages to escape but is later 
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found and arrested. (cf. DoT 1993:111f; Scruggs et al. 1993:25; Reavis 1998: 
190ff; Danforth 2000:2).
During all of this, the negotiations between the ATF and Koresh continue, 
but higher up in the organisation, a decision is made to call in the FBI HRT 
which specialises in these kinds of delicate hostage-barricade situations (Scruggs 
et al. 1993:21ff). The San Antonio field office handles the region Waco belongs 
to, so the SAC is called in from there and arrives in Waco in the early evening 
with a contingent of local FBI agents. The SACs of the Oklahoma City, El 
Paso, and New Orleans offices are also called in to assist. Before control can be 
handed over, however, the negotiation efforts yield their first results: at 9 in the 
evening, two children are released from the compound and, an hour later, two 
more. In return, Koresh is allowed to have his teachings broadcast over radio, 
and CNN conducts a telephone interview with him. After that, the still limited 
negotiation team starts to worry that this free access to the media might hurt 
future negotiation efforts (Scruggs et al. 1993:26, 130; Tabor 1995:263; Reavis 
1998:200ff, 222ff).
4.2.2 Negotiations
On the morning of March 1, the Treasury Department formally decides to let the 
FBI take over the situation, and the FBI SAC takes charge on site. This finally 
allows the full HRT to be called in, along with representatives from CINT. The 
acting attorney general briefs the president on the matter and receives the general 
policy directive to negotiate until the situation is resolved and to advise the president 
if a change from a negotiated to a tactical solution is deemed necessary. The acting 
AG passes this directive on to the FBI director, and from there on to the SAC 
who uses it to establish some preliminary rules of engagement: avoid gunfire if 
at all possible, unless there is a threat of immediate bodily harm (Scruggs et al. 
1993:27f ).
During the first day, a series of conversations are held between the negotiators 
and Koresh, leading to the release of another 10 children. However, the concern 
from the previous evening is acted upon and all other lines in or out of the com-
pound are cut off – Koresh can now only communicate through the negotiation 
team. When he discovers this during the early evening, Koresh becomes agitated 
and starts to make implicit threats against the lives of the remaining children 
(Tabor 1995:264; Reavis 1998:144ff, 215ff). His agitation is compounded by 
the sight of the FBI’s borrowed armoured vehicles moving in on the compound 
to set up a more secure inner perimeter. It takes two hours, but the negotiators 
finally manage to calm Koresh down and he promises to let more children leave. 
Two are released at 8.27pm, and two more at 11.05pm (Scruggs et al. 1993:29f ).
As the final message of the day, Koresh makes it clear to the negotiators that 
suicide is not something they are planning since his followers have to be alive 
to spread his message to the world. He also promises that everyone inside is 
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willing to come out if a taped recording of tone of his speeches is played nation-
wide. The FBI starts preparing for the mass exodus and contacts the Christian 
Broadcast Network (CBN) to arrange for the tape to be played. During the 
night, as a demonstration of good faith, two more children are let out (Scruggs 
et al. 1993:30f ).
To aid their efforts, the negotiators call on the services of an old FBI consultant 
– a UCLA professor of forensic psychiatry. He arrives in Waco the next day and 
begins to sift through the vast documentation on Koresh and the Branch Davidians 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:160f ). Also on the next day, the agency has prepared expe-
dient legal processing and medical care of the people coming out, and a deadline 
is set for 1pm. Early in the morning, the Branch Davidians call to confirm that 
the tape is ready and that four more people were coming out – two children and 
two elderly women, one of which will bring the tape – and this happens a few 
minutes later. On inspecting the tape, the FBI determines that it does not contain 
an agreed-upon passage stating Koresh’s intent to surrender, so one is recorded 
over the phone. The tape is then delivered to the CBN and another station, 
KRLD, that also agreed to broadcast the message. Meanwhile, Koresh begins 
discussing the number of people who will actually come out so that the reception 
can be properly scaled, and a few minutes before the deadline, a headcount of 
43 men, 47 women, and 20 children is delivered to the negotiators (Scruggs et al. 
1993:31ff). Half an hour later, already past the deadline, Koresh calls to ask 
for a stretcher to be delivered to the front door, which the negotiators agree to, 
and yet another half an hour later, the stretcher is brought into the compound.
Although the deadline has come and gone, and while the tape is being broad-
cast, the two parties are still discussing the logistics of the surrender, and the 
Branch Davidians have now decided that they will come out in groups of two 
or three, organised by Koresh’s second in command, to facilitate the reception 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:34ff). Two hours past the deadline, the vehicles the FBI has 
called in to handle the mass of people are in place, but the word from inside the 
compound is that everyone is taking their time to say goodbye to Koresh. Two 
more hours pass, and now Koresh is said to lead the congregation in prayer. Yet 
another hour later, the group’s second in command calls the negotiators to start 
preaching to them, but is soon interrupted by an increasingly impatient negotia-
tor and is asked to proceed with the agreed-upon exit from the compound. He 
soon calls back with a message from Koresh that God has told him to wait for 
a sign. The negotiations continue from 6pm to midnight, but without results 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:36f; Reavis 1998:218ff). The previously consulted forensic 
psychiatrist renders the judgement that it is highly unlikely that Koresh will leave 
the compound willingly and that it is more likely than not that he has a suicidal 
streak that can easily manifest itself as a suicide pact within the congregation if 
he manages to manipulate them well enough (cf. Hall 1995). Moreover, Koresh’s 
political beliefs as a pro-gun extremist might clash with the continued presence 
of the ATF – the agency specifically established to control and curtail pro-gun 
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extremism. While the ATF is on the scene, Koresh’s conception of a monolithic 
government body will mean that the FBI will be painted by the same brush and 
that he will never negotiate in good faith with – much less surrender to – any 
associated agency. Further research suggested that not only can Koresh not leave, 
but he will also resist anyone else leaving. Such a loss to a manipulating per-
sonality would mean losing power, and is an unacceptable outcome in Koresh’s 
belief that this was a fight between the forces of good and the ATF “devil.” (cf. 
Scruggs et al. 1993:160ff; Anthony & Robbins 1997:275). The following day, 
the psychiatrist leaves the negotiators with a number of action points that might 
help their efforts, such as flattering Koresh’s ego by acknowledging his world 
view and suggesting that he would win the confrontation even if it was fought 
in a court of law.
On March 3, in spite of the disappointing previous day, the attempts to 
enact the agreed-upon plan continue. A news broadcast reports that the two 
women that had previously left had been charged with attempted murder, 
which caused some confusion with the negotiators and consternation with the 
Branch Davidians. Looking into the matter, the FBI finds out that the report is 
correct, but it contacts the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) to explain how this 
will hamper their efforts (Scruggs et al. 1993:36ff). A deal is made where the 
two women will instead merely be held as material witnesses, and this outcome 
is communicated to the Branch Davidians. During the day, the negotiators 
are also advised by a psychiatrists from the University of Louisville on how to 
interpret Koresh’s reneged promises – can they be used as an argument in future 
negotiations and does it say anything about his intentions to surrender at all? 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:159)
Beyond that, the day is characterised by further preaching by Koresh to 
the negotiators. It is worth noting that the first official report by Scruggs et al. 
describes both this conversation and the one the previous evening as “rambling” 
and “making little sense”, with some conversations being labelled as “bible babble” 
(cf. Scruggs et al. 1993:36, 39ff, 38, 39, 70; Tabor 1995:266ff; Reavis 1998:220). 
Nevertheless, in exchange for letting him preach to them, Koresh agrees to send 
out one boy and his puppies in the late afternoon. The only other break is when 
a nurse among the Branch Davidians is allowed to report on the status of the 
wounded inside the compound as well as the state and nature of their wounds.
4.2.3 Stalemate
March 4 proceeds in a similar manner, Koresh’s preaching is supplemented by 
an attorney within the congregation who launches into a rant about how God’s 
laws and U.S. law are in conflict and how the nation is in a state of decay. Early 
in the morning, another child is released, and after nearly a full day of preaching, 
Koresh promises to send out one more the following morning, which occurs 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:41, 43, 49).
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That small victory aside, the FBI has a bad day. The FBI is informed that one 
of the girls released on March 2 had carried a note to her sister stating that, by 
the time the note reaches her, the girls’ parents will be dead. The agency further 
learns that one avenue of increasing the pressure on the group, cutting off its 
water supply, is essentially useless since the compound has its own water supply 
that cannot be controlled from the outside. Finally, Koresh’s preachings take a 
darker turn as he explains how he has been preparing to do battle against the 
U.S. government since 1985 (Scruggs et al. 1993:42ff).
The negotiators receive another brief from the UCLA psychiatrist, stating 
that a rational approach will most likely not work against Koresh. Rather, the 
negotiators need to appeal to his narcissism and delusions of grandeur (Scruggs 
et al. 1993:166f ). 
The day after is characterised by constantly failed bargaining. On numerous 
occasions, various people inside the compound ask for favours or concessions 
from the FBI, who in turn respond that they can have what they want if they let 
more people out (Scruggs et al. 1993:53ff). In each instance, the trade is rejected 
by the Branch Davidians. Koresh also introduces a new element in his preaching, 
stating outright that he is Christ. March 7 passes in a very similar pattern with 
an offer of favours including milk for the children and access to the media, and 
once again the trade against people leaving the compound is rejected (Scruggs 
et al. 1993:57ff). Koresh now offers a new deal for surrender: if the FBI can find 
a negotiator that can prove him wrong about the Seven Seals, he will come out. 
Outside the compound, the FBI is approached by a team of religious scholars who 
offer their services in trying to decode Koresh’s ramblings, but they are turned 
away (Tabor 1995:273; Reavis 1998:253f ). The next day’s efforts are a bit more 
constructive as the Branch Davidians are allowed to briefly venture outside to 
bury one of their dead and receive six gallons of milk. They also send out a video 
tape showing Koresh’s wounds and in return receive a number of pre-recorded 
messages from family members over the phone (Scruggs et al. 1993:59f; Tabor 
1995:265f; Reavis 1998:225f ).
On March 9, the FBI turns up the pressure. The negotiators actively try to 
drive a wedge between Koresh and his right-hand man, with little to no result. 
In the middle of the night, the power to the compound is also cut, which causes 
Koresh to refuse all further negotiation until it has been restored (Scruggs et al. 
1993:60ff, 129; Reavis 1998:260ff). In the mid-morning, the power is restored 
so the Branch Davidians can watch an FBI news conference about the siege, and 
later in the day, the agency responds in kind to the previous day’s video from 
inside the compound, this one showing the released children playing and being 
happy. The Branch Davidians respond by saying that it mainly looks like the 
children are allowed to misbehave. One of the women also calls to complain 
about her wounded finger and is asked to come out to seek medical attention, 
but refuses to do so (Scruggs et al. 1993:62; Reavis 1998:228f ). An FBI forensic 
psychologist is brought in to review the video tapes released from inside the 
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compound and to comment on Koresh’s psychological make-up. The conclusion 
is that Koresh is very similar to a con-artist with a strong narcissistic streak. This 
view is largely shared by a retired RCMP psychologist, who also calls Koresh’s 
mode of behaviour “self-directed, manipulative, and [indicative of ] a hedonist” 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:170f ).
The next day follows the same pattern: the electricity is cut during the night 
due to the stalemate and is restored in time for the FBI news conference. A new 
video tape is sent into the compound, this time containing pleas from family 
members on the outside begging the Branch Davidians to come out (Scruggs et al. 
1993:62). Two attorneys claiming to represent the Davidian leaders present 
themselves to the FBI, but since no-one on the inside has requested representation, 
the attorneys are not allowed to contact anyone in the compound (Scruggs et al. 
1993:68; Reavis 1998:251ff). On March 11, a glimmer of hope is seen as the 
FBI received word that at least three people will come out the next day, including 
the wife of the man who was shot while returning from Mag Bag and who had 
already sent out her children on March 1. Another brief spot of hope is a mention 
that Koresh is listening to a radio show about a “‘shooting star’ called the ‘guitar 
nebula’” (Scruggs et al. 1993:64; Reavis 1998:262f ), and that Koresh sees this 
as a sign. The negotiators hope that he will take this as the sign he mentioned 
on March 2, but Koresh soon dismisses that notion.
As promised, one of the women comes out the next day morning, as does one 
of the men later in the evening (Scruggs et al. 1993:64ff). Two more people will 
supposedly also leave, but they fail to appear and instead promise to leave the next 
day along with another woman. The released woman hints to the negotiators that 
more people want to leave but that Koresh has a hold over them. Her reunion 
with her son is also videotaped and the tape is sent inside the compound in the 
hope that it will inspire more defections. Beyond that, the day is characterised by 
unresponsiveness on the Branch Davidian’s part, which they blame on technical 
problems with their telephones that the FBI technicians are unable to confirm. A 
physician is also called in to diagnose the wounded people inside over the phone, 
and as with previous discussions on the topic, his suggestion is that the people 
come out to receive treatment, which they decline. The day ends with the SAC 
deciding to once again cut the power to the compound to establish that the FBI 
is in control over the Branch Davidians’ earthly lives, which causes some concern 
among the negotiators (Scruggs et al. 1993:67). Some of them believe that the 
Davidians will perceive this as being actively punished for cooperating with the 
FBI and letting people leave.
March 12 also marks the first day in office for the new attorney general, 
Janet Reno, who gets briefed on the events so far and then decides to send her 
deputy assistant to Waco to gain a sense of what is happening on the ground 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:65).
The following day, March 13, the cutting of the power is used as further 
evidence by the Branch Davidians that the government is really just out to get 
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them, and that although they had considered letting some people leave, they 
have now instead decided to remain defiant (cf. Anthony & Robbins 1997:270, 
275; Reavis 1998:261ff). The FBI respond the next day by remaining largely 
passive in the communication with the group and instead wait for the Branch 
Davidians to call them (Scruggs et al. 1993:68f ). The two exceptions are when 
the two people who had left on March 12 are allowed to call into the compound 
and explain how they have been treated fairly, but their message is rebuked as a 
betrayal by the Koresh. The pressure tactic for the night is to flood the compound 
with light to disrupt the Branch Davidians’ sleep.
During the next couple of days, the contact between the two parties is 
sporadic. On the 15th, negotiators meet with two Branch Davidians face to 
face in the compound yard in a positive atmosphere, but attempts to recreate 
similar meetings during the 16th and 17th are refused by either Koresh or his 
second in command (Scruggs et al. 1993:70ff). Instead, Koresh asks to be put 
in contact with a religious scholar he had heard on the radio before the FBI cut 
the power to the compound. This was an interview with one of the scholars that 
had contacted the bureau a week earlier, and just as then any direct contact is 
denied. However, the FBI allows a tape recording of the interview to be brought 
into the compound (Scruggs et al. 1993:186; Tabor 1995:274). The FBI once 
again tries to communicate the benefits of giving up by sending in pre-recorded 
messages from relatives, and the same messages are later played over loudspeakers 
to ensure that no-one inside can withhold or censor what the group members 
heard. A similar tactic is used on the 18th as the phone conversations are uni-
versally hostile to any idea of accepting offers from the agency, at which point 
the same offers are repeated over loudspeakers (Scruggs et al. 1993:73; Reavis 
1998:227ff). In the meantime, the negotiators receive a memorandum from an 
FBI-affiliated expert in post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD), who has studied 
the children that have been released up until this point. The interviews suggested 
that the young girls had been subjected to unusual sexual practices, and that the 
children believe their parents are already dead. The interviewed children talked 
about wires and explosives and the memorandum concludes that there might 
exist a final plan for how the confrontation will end.
Over the next couple of days, the FBI sees a couple of smaller triumphs. On 
the 19th, a package of legal documents arrives that address some of the concerns 
the group had expressed during previous conversations (Scruggs et al. 1993:74f ). 
The USAO sends a letter promising not to seek forfeiture on the compound. The 
attorneys of Koresh and two other leading members send letters and informa-
tion about the ATF warrants, and the CBN and a theologians send letters and 
recordings discussing various religious topics. In response, the Branch Davidians 
promise to send several people out, probably during the following day, but two 
men leave already the same evening. The next day, the promise that lots of people 
would come out very soon is repeated (Scruggs et al. 1993:75ff). On the 21st, a 
total of seven people come out while Koresh spends most of the day in another 
of his rambling discussions on religion.
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As with the power cut on March 12, there is a sharp disconnect between the 
large number of people leaving the compound and the response from FBI’s 
tactical element. For example, the FBI decides that they need to clear one side 
of the compound from obstructions, and proceeds to bulldoze the area. Once 
again, there are concerns among the negotiators that this gives the perception of 
punishing the group for letting so many people leave (Scruggs et al. 1993:77ff). 
Nevertheless, they call into the compound to explain what is about to happen and 
why, and they the hope that the Branch Davidians will accept the reasoning. As 
the day progresses, the negotiators urge the group to send out more people, but 
get the response that Koresh is sleeping and that nothing can be done without 
his permission. They receive positive signals from many of the people inside who 
wish to communicate to their relatives that they will see each other soon. In the 
evening, a decision is made to play loud music over the loudspeakers throughout 
the night. In response, the Branch Davidians state that due to the sound terror, 
no-one will come out. A little later, the loudspeaker malfunctions and remains 
silent through the night (Scruggs et al. 1993:79).
The following week, matters remain largely at a stand-still. During the 
nights, loud music is played and the compound is bathed in bright light. The 
assault is also made more personal by calling Koresh a liar and a coward during 
news conferences. The argumentation from the Branch Davidian side centres 
on religion and the flaws of the human justice system, whereas the FBI makes 
increasingly strong demands that groups the size of 10–20 should come out at 
once (Scruggs et al. 1993:79ff). While promises to that effect are made, they are 
never fulfilled. The period is also fraught with technical issues. On March 23, 
one person leaves, and is the only person to do so for a long time (Scruggs et al. 
1993:81). On two occasions, the phone lines go down and new ones have to be 
established – one of the breakdowns are blamed on the FBI’s use of armoured 
vehicles to clear out the area next to the main structures of the compound, and 
that in doing so, they have accidentally cut the direct line lying on the ground 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:84ff).
As March draws to a close, the only real change is that the attorneys of Koresh 
and his second in command get more directly involved in the case. On March 
29, the attorneys are allowed to call directly into the compound for a discussion 
with their respective clients (Scruggs et al. 1993:91ff). The outcome is a planned 
face-to-face meeting the next day, which becomes a cause for concern among 
some of the law-enforcement agencies involved. Their fear is that the attorneys 
will provide tips on how to ruin evidence critical to the investigation, but the 
SAC is more concerned with keeping the negotiation process alive and allows 
the meeting. It takes a while to figure out the logistics of not providing the 
Branch Davidians with a potential hostage, while at the same time conforming 
to Koresh’s wishes to not let anyone leave the compound. Over the course of five 
meetings in three days, the attorneys become increasingly frustrated with the 
process; they explain to the negotiators that for every demand fulfilled, Koresh 
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will just come up with a new one, and that he refuses to discuss any kind of sur-
render (cf. Scruggs et al. 1993:91ff; Reavis 1998:255f ). The UCLA psychiatrist 
once again contacts the negotiation team and echoes the fear from two weeks 
earlier that the inconsistent messaging between the HRT and the negotiation 
team, and even within the negotiation team itself, might be the reason behind 
Koresh’s increased obstinacy.
A second psychiatrist is also consulted, who comes to the conclusion that 
there are no signs of psychosis in Koresh’s behaviour – he is acting in a rational 
manner, but his rationale rests on a basis of faith rather than fact and his beliefs are 
not merely delusional (Scruggs et al. 1993:166f). At the same time, the psychiatrist 
describes the belief as thoroughly self-serving, which in relation to the risk for 
suicide suggests that Koresh would ultimately be more willing to sacrifice others 
rather than himself. The previously consulted PTSD-expert offers a second 
memorandum regarding the family structures inside the group. He concludes 
that the children have a confused idea of what a family is, with Koresh as the 
only clear “father”. They also express a deeply engrained siege mentality, where 
the compound is the only place that can offer them safety from the evil world 
outside. An analysis of the video tapes sent from the compound yields a similar 
conclusion, with the addition that the Koreshian father figure is also a source of 
deep-seated fear (Scruggs et al. 1993:172f ).
4.2.4 Planning the end
On April 1, Koresh’s attorney finally reports a promising break-through. Koresh 
has promised to lead his people out of the compound after they have observed 
passover, which means either April 2 or April 10, since there is some confusion 
over exactly which dates for passover the Branch Davidians use (Scruggs et al. 
1993:94f ). At the same time, the attorneys have advised their clients to only 
contact the FBI to discuss the matter of surrender – everything else should be 
handled through them. The SAC disregards this and tries to maintain contact 
with the people inside the compound. The question of which dates apply for 
passover is answered the next day when the second in command calls the nego-
tiators to explain that Koresh is currently to weak to move and that they will not 
leave until passover is over regardless. On April 3, a Saturday, the attorneys once 
again try to extract a definitive date from their clients but are told that, since 
it is the Sabbath, only spiritual matters can be discussed – a conversation the 
attorneys decline. Instead, the meeting takes place on the 4th, and is described 
as “very productive” (Scruggs et al. 1993:96f), but still incapable of producing an 
exact answer for when passover will happen. Later during the day, however, one 
person leaves the compound. A final minor input from the religious-scholarly 
community is made when a number of taped radio discussions on the topic of 
the Davidian world view is passed to Koresh. These debates are between the 
scholars that he had earlier heard and requested to be put in contact with, and 
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their radio appearances have in part been made for just this type of occasion 
(Tabor 1995:274ff).
Between April 5 and April 7, very little happens as the Branch Davidian 
claim to be observing passover, and they only phone out to complain when the 
agency once again play loud music and distracting noises over the loudspeakers 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:97f ). On the 7th, an incident occurs when someone exits 
the compound and mills around the courtyard. The HRT responds by throwing 
two flashbang3 grenades at the individual, who retreats inside. Koresh calls the 
negotiators to inform them that passover will last another 7 days, ending on the 
14th4, but does not confirm that the end of passover will necessarily mean that 
the Branch Davidians will come out (Scruggs et al. 1993:98). 
During April 8, there is no communication between the two parties except 
for a brief phone call to the second in command among the Davidians, who 
confirms that everyone will eventually come out but also that there will soon be 
a surprising turn of events. The next day, he calls ahead to say that he is going 
to hand over a letter from Koresh and does so in the late afternoon. Later in the 
evening, the second in command appears outside the compound a second time, 
this time unannounced, and becomes the target of a another flashbang grenade 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:99ff). He returns inside and calls the negotiators to berate 
them over the incident. At the same time, a second man enters the compound 
courtyard and is also flashbanged. After this incident, the Branch Davidians leave 
their phone off the hook and no further contact can be made. The day after, a 
second and third letter from Koresh is delivered to the agency, but it turns out 
that the third one is just a copy of the first letter from the day before. Meanwhile, 
the HRT begins to install concertina wire around the compound to limit the 
movement in and out of the area (Scruggs et al. 1993:102ff). Yet another flashbang 
incident takes place on the morning of April 11, but the day at the compound is 
otherwise uneventful, as is the next day. The letters are studied by a psycholinguist 
at Syracuse University, who concludes that they exhibit a rampant paranoia, and 
also a strong self-aggrandising streak making it less plausible that Koresh would 
consider suicide. Instead, his self-described martyrdom is to come, if at all, at the 
hands of an enemy, and he is just waiting for the assault that will allow that to 
happen (cf. Scruggs et al. 1993:100, 174ff; Tabor 1995:276f ).
Away from Mount Carmel, however, other things are brewing. At this point, 
it has become clear to the SAC that strategy of waiting is not paying off. The 
compound is well-supplied, with its own water supply and large stores of fuel 
3 A flashbang or stun grenade is a non-lethal device that emits a bright flash and a loud bang in 
order to disorient a person. The light temporarily blind the person and the noise deafens them 
and causes a temporary loss of balance as the fluids within the ear are displaced.
4 In 1993, the Jewish passover began on April 6 and lasted until April 12. In the diaspora, passover 
is occasionally observed for 8 days, which would have it end on April 13.
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and food, so starving the Branch Davidians out will hardly work (cf. Anthony 
& Robbins 1997:276; Reavis 1998:265). At the same time, as the ATF raid 
demonstrated, a frontal assault would simply be too dangerous for all parties 
involved. Instead, a plan starts to take shape to use CS gas5 to debilitate and drive 
the congregation out in the open (Scruggs et al. 1993:101ff, 261ff). Inquiries are 
made with the armed forces and with law enforcement agencies elsewhere that 
have experience with the gas to see if it would be suitable for this purpose. The 
plan is to use the CEVs that the FBI has borrowed from the U.S. Army to tear 
holes in the compound walls and to inject large clouds of CS until the Branch 
Davidians simply cannot stand it any more. Information about the pieces of the 
puzzle are assembled and the plan starts to take shape on April 9 and the plan is 
presented to attorney general Reno on April 12 (Scruggs et al. 1993:263ff). Her 
answer is not immediate, and the question of why no other option longer exists 
takes up most of the debates of the day. In addition, questions about the safety 
of the gas are raised. How will it affect pregnant women and children? What 
are the long-term effects? What are the odds of the Branch Davidians injuring 
themselves and how are these odds affected by the use of the gas? A suggestion 
is made to bring in military expertise for a future meeting to answer some of the 
more technical questions (Reavis 1998:264ff).
Tuesday, April 13 sees the first communication directly from Koresh in a 
long while, as he preaches to the negotiators for five hour straight (Scruggs et al. 
1993:104). The only concrete information the negotiators can extract is that he 
is still waiting for different orders from God. His attorney also tries to contact 
him but is rebuffed on the grounds that it is Sabbath. The next day is the passover 
ends, and the attorneys contact their clients to see what this means for the con-
tinuation of the siege. They report back that Koresh is working on a manuscript 
describing his interpretation of the Seven Seals and that he will not leave until 
the work is finished. He estimates that it will take 14 days to complete all seven 
parts, and has given the attorneys a final letter to convey that makes the same 
point (Scruggs et al. 1993:105). Beyond that conversation, no progress is made 
in the negotiations, and activity during the next few days is still very low. The 
talk of a manuscript is seen by the FBI as yet another delaying tactic, and a sign 
that the negotiations are not being productive (Tabor 1995:276).
Another flashbang incident occurs on April 15, and only sporadic conver-
sations take place between the negotiators and the Branch Davidians (Scruggs 
et al. 1993:106). On the 16th, Koresh claims to have finished the part of his 
manuscript that deals with the First Seal (Scruggs et al. 1993:107). The 17th 
5 CS gas is a cyanocarbon-based aerosol “tear gas” used for riot control. It derives its name from the 
initials of its inventors, Ben Corson and Roger Stoughton and was developed as a less debili-
tating, shorter-lasting, less toxic, and generally more controllable alternative to the previously 
avialable CN and CR riot gasses..
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sees one last person leave who had managed to sneak into the compound three 
weeks earlier. The Louiseville University psychiatrist is brought back in to render 
a judgement on whether Koresh, based on witness reports, might suffer from any 
kind of nervous disorder that might affect the negotiation process. He answers the 
query the next day by saying that, based on the “very fragmentary information” 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:160), it is indeed a possibility, and that such an affliction 
would make it difficult to create any kind of continuity in the communication 
and would also make the person highly unsuitable to have around any kind of 
weaponry.
Meanwhile, in Washington D.C., further meetings are held between the DoJ 
and the FBI. Medical and military experts are brought in to answer the attorney 
general’s questions, as well as questions about whether the gas is flammable and 
might cause a fire. Slowly but surely, the AG’s initial mental image of a “gassing” 
of the compound is replaced by a more technical understanding of the use of 
CS gas (Scruggs et al. 1993:107, 274ff; Reavis 1998:264f ). In fact, technically, 
it is not a gas at all, but an irritant powder suspended in an aerosol liquid. Nor 
is the event itself intended to be nearly as dramatic as the first impressions may 
suggest. Instead, it is a slow process that can require several days of increasing 
pressure to finally drive the congregation out of the compound. The question 
is also raised whether the FBI is needed at the scene at all, to which the agency 
representatives respond that the Branch Davidians have already proven to be highly 
dangerous and that local law enforcement will most likely not have the technical 
and tactical abilities, nor the equipment required to contain the group (Scruggs 
et al. 1993:267ff). A drastic solution such as walling the place up is downright 
infeasible, and an army cordon is not allowed under the Posse Comitatus Act. 
The HRT is really the only available option, but it cannot stay locked up with 
this one case forever. A similar question is raised during a meeting the next 
day, and the FBI representatives point out that long-term endurance is already 
becoming an issue, so the matter needs to reach a conclusion in the near future.
April 16 sees a rumour spread that the attorney general has disapproved the 
plan the FBI has presented, but this turns out to be a slight misunderstanding 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:107f). She is simply not fully convinced yet and has not made 
any decision in either direction. Instead, she asks for supplementary material on 
the negotiation progress and on the state of the people inside the compound. 
The execution of the plan is also deferred at least until after the week-end, to 
ensure a greater access to emergency medical services should something go wrong. 
Saturday, April 17 is spent reviewing the analyses and recommendations by external 
experts on what has and has not worked in the negotiation process (Scruggs et al. 
1993:07f ). The UCLA psychiatrist reiterates his belief that the ATF presence 
has had a deleterious effect on the team’s efforts, that the agency has engaged in 
mixed messaging towards the Branch Davidians, and that a negotiation is no 
longer likely to resolve the situation (Scruggs et al. 1993:175f ). A report from 
a threat assessment consultant and an FBI profiler states that it is likely from 
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the communication received that Koresh is setting a trap for the agency, and 
that he will not come out willingly. It also states that there is a distinct threat of 
a break-out attempt, in which the FBI agents could be faced with adults with 
lethal intent carrying a child in one arm and a weapon in the other (Scruggs et al. 
1993:176f; Tabor 1995:277).
The FBI rules of engagement and the chain of command are also debated. 
The AG wants to be sure that the FBI will back off if children are being used as 
human shields, and the FBI wants to make it clear that on-scene command is 
handled exclusively by the SAC. The AG certainly has the authority to dismantle 
the operation entirely, but cannot control matters on the ground. With these 
points clarified, the attorney general approves the plan and a date is set for the 
following Monday – April 19 – and the order is handed on down to the SAC in 
Waco (Scruggs et al. 1993:107f ).
On April 18, the FBI starts preparing for its final raid on the compound 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:108f ). Arrest warrants are obtained for almost every adult 
person still in the compound, charging some with crimes and holding the rest as 
material witnesses. The vehicles that remain around the compound are removed, 
which compels Koresh to call the negotiators and complain about how his per-
sonal possessions are being towed away. The negotiators try to use this as a final 
bargaining chip but are met with no success. In Washington D.C., the attorney 
general briefs the president about the plan to end the siege, thereby fulfilling 
the acting AG’s promise from March 1 to advise the president of any significant 
changes in strategy.
4.2.5 April 19 – The FBI raid
At 6am, the plan to insert CS gas into the compound is put into motion. The 
two borrowed CEVs start moving towards the main building to inject the gas 
through long nozzles mounted on booms at the front of the vehicles. Meanwhile, 
a negotiator calls into the compound to inform what is about to happen: that gas 
will be continuously inserted into every part of the compound, that the FBI will 
stay outside, and that everyone has been ordered not to fire their guns. When 
the Branch Davidian who answers the phone hangs up, the message is relayed 
over loudspeakers to anyone within earshot. The Branch Davidians are advised 
to come out with their hands up and to surrender to the awaiting authorities 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:110, 286ff; Reavis 1998:267f ).
As soon as the CEVs get close to the buildings, they start taking fire from 
within the compound. This gives the FBI free reign to insert the gas, and aside 
from using the CEVs, the HRT fire CS gas grenades – so-called “ferret round” 
– through windows using hand-held M79 grenade launchers. Over the course 
of the morning, the CEVs take several trips to fill up on more CS gas, each refill 
taking roughly an hour. During the lulls, the negotiators keeps repeating that 
the Branch Davidians should surrender and come out, and that no-one will be 
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harmed. At 6.41, a telephone is thrown out the front door, possibly as a signal 
of willingness to communicate, but the lines have been cut and a connection 
can not be established. Three hours later, the telephone is retrieved back into 
the compound (Scruggs et al. 1993:111, 289ff).
At 12.07, after six hours of near-continuous gassing, three fires are observed 
within the compound. They quickly flare up and catch on the wooden structure 
of the joined buildings. The holes ripped open in the walls by the CEVs to pump 
in gas also allow for more air to flow through the structure, further fuelling the 
flames (Scruggs et al. 1993:111, 295ff; Reavis 1998:270, 274f ). Five minutes 
later, three full-scale fires are raging around the compound and the negotiators 
broadcast a final plea to Koresh to let people out of the building before it is too 
late. At 12.16 a man is observed trying to escape the building through a second-story 
window. Agents rush in to help, but he tries to wave them off, refusing their help. 
A few minutes later, he finally yields, jumps down and is surrounded. In the next 
ten minutes, another seven people attempt to flee the fire – one tries to run back 
inside when she sees the FBI vehicles, but is intercepted and dragged to safety 
by an HRT agent. One of the people escaping the flames is carrying the first 
chapter of Koresh’s manuscript (Scruggs et al. 1993:112, 298ff; Tabor 1995:278). 
Around 12.25, agents report hearing deliberate “systematic” gunfire – people 
firing weapons rather than loose rounds cooking off in the heat (Scruggs et al. 
1993:112). No-one outside of the compound reports receiving fire at this time, 
however, so it is believed to be the sound of the remaining Branch Davidians 
shooting each other and/or themselves. 
Fire trucks arrive at the scene at 12.34, but the risk of coming under fire is 
deemed to great to allow them close to the building (Scruggs et al. 1993:112). 
Not until 12.41 does the fire fighting start. At 13.10, the ninth and last person 
to escape the inferno emerges from the building. In the end, 75 people die inside 
from burns, smoke inhalations, gunshot wounds, knife wounds, and blunt trauma 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:314ff; Reavis 1998:275f ).
4.3 Aftermath
The exact cause of the fires that ended the siege remains hotly contested and has 
been the source of endless conspiracy theories and accusations of governmental 
abuse. The same holds true for the reasons why so few of the Branch Davidians 
escaped from the fire – here, too, outlandish suggestions exist about how some 
agents were firing on fleeing group members and forced them back into the 
building. While none of the sources on the matter can be considered unbiased, 
most of the forensic evidence – especially regarding the spread of the fire and 
the fact that it springs up at three different points at almost the exact same time 
– as well as witness reports from the survivors point towards its being started by 
the Branch Davidians themselves (cf. Scruggs et al. 1993:300ff, 330ff; Reavis 
1998:139ff, 146ff, 273f; HCoGR 2000:5ff). However, from a crisis management 
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perspective, it is interesting to note that the attempts at seeking closure with the 
episode were continuously thwarted by repeated revelations of the FBI failing to 
report the use of equipment that could have contributed to the fire. In almost all 
cases, the probability of the equipment having any significant effect is vanishingly 
small, especially compared to the official scenario, but it is enough of a seed of 
doubt to allow the guesswork to run wild. This failure at the very tail end of the 
crisis management greatly increased the life-span of the crisis.
Another revelation in the wake of the fire was that CS gas does not react 
well to fire. The aerosol part that makes it a gas is itself lightly toxic, but above 
all, it is broken down into carbon monoxide in the body – a gas that in and of 
itself will lead to carbon monoxide poisoning, and which is already a deadly 
threat during fires. The tear agent, on the other hand, comes in the form of a 
dry powder – hence the need to mix it with an aerosol part – of the  cyanocarbon 
family. In other words, it contains a cyanide variant that, when burned, it can 
produce hydrogen cyanide (HCN). Hydrogen cyanide, in turn, is perhaps more 
famous for its use in gas chambers, as a pesticide, and as the reactive agent in 
Zykon B. The only saving grace is that a fire that would reduce the CS into 
HCN would most likely also destroy the HCN itself. Nevertheless, some of the 
bodies recovered from inside the Mount Carmel compound showed injuries 
and bodily contortions that are consistent with cyanide poisoning (Scruggs et al. 
1993:314ff). It is unclear whether this side-effect was known by the planners of 
the FBI raid, and it is even more unclear whether it was a contributing factor to 
the outcome – all deaths were attributable to other injuries, and it is uncertain 
what amounts of the gas were present at the time the fire started since almost an 
hour had passed since the last insertion.
As for the initial cause of the crisis, the subsequent crime scene investigation 
revealed that, if the February 28 barrage had not already answered the question, 
it was now beyond any doubt that the Branch Davidians had possessed numerous 
illegal firearms. In total, 305 firearms were found at the scene, of which over 
30 were assault rifles converted for automatic firing. Nearly 2 million rounds of 
ammunition had been cooked off in the fire and a further search uncovered a 
veritable arsenal of Kevlar helmets and vests, pistols, rifles, shotguns, gas masks, 
chemical protection gear, and even fragmentation hand grenades and rockets 
(Scruggs et al. 1993:308ff).
4.4 Analysis
The Waco siege is a watershed moment in U.S. law enforcement, not just for 
the FBI, but for almost all of the agencies involved – perhaps even more so 
for some of the non-law-enforcement agencies. The involvement of the Texas 
National Guard was sensitive in and of itself, even though it is technically 
allowed as long as it participates under the authority of the state governor, but 
the involvement of the U.S. Army as a support function to the FBI was a matter 
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that could potentially be in breach of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. In the 
aftermath, this become a sore point among critics, and no matter how well the 
FBI and the army had taken care to ensure that the latter would not be in breach 
of the act, the symbolism of the FBI using army facilities and army vehicles in 
the training and execution of the final assault was lost on no-one. For local and 
state agencies, the siege was a large and long-lasting drain on resources, and also 
became a publicity problem as their presence was increasingly entangled in the 
federal agencies’ handling of the situation. Nevertheless, their public image and 
legitimacy was less at stake, partly because they were mostly doing their regular 
job in the background – keeping the roads clear and ensuring that no outsiders 
interfered with the on-going law enforcement process – but mostly because they 
were not part of that group of federal agencies that had descended on the Davidian 
farm. For some on-lookers, this was a literal David-and-Goliath struggle, and 
the means and methods employed by the federal agencies only further reinforced 
this perception – a notion that spurred future clashes between those agencies 
and anti-government groups in the following years. It is not a coincidence that 
the 1995 Oklahoma bombing was targeted against the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City, nor that the bombing happened on the two-year 
anniversary of the fiery end to the Waco siege, or that another very similar siege 
between the FBI and an anti-government group would start in Montana, almost 
to the day three years after the Waco siege started. The Davidians were far from 
alone in their perception of the ATF, FBI, and U.S. Army as the proverbial 
overwhelming forces of Babylon, who wanted to stamp out the efforts of the 
put-upon Christian underdog. It is in this perception that both this and the later 
Montana stand-off has their roots, and why they both caused so much problem 
for the agencies involved (cf. Gallagher 2000:93f; Pitcavage 2001:966). 
Between all these agencies, groups, outside participants, and all their respec-
tive perceptions and issue areas, the Waco siege offers almost every imaginable 
form of crisis to the point where it requires some finesse to even begin to explain 
exactly which Waco crisis one might be talking about. The ATF’s bungled raid 
that set the stage for the siege is an operational crisis in and of itself; the FBI’s 
final assault is another one of a fairly similar nature. The legal and political after-
math, with its various twists and turns, new revelations and incriminations, and 
accountability debates ranging from lowly FBI agents all the way up to the Justice 
Department and the White House, is a classic case of a lingering crisis for almost 
the entirety of the federal law enforcement. The consequences it had in terms 
of the aforementioned Oklahoma bombing and Montana standoff also marks 
it as a long-shadow crisis, reverberating well past the turn of the millennium. 
The siege itself can also be seen as the culmination of a creeping crisis where the 
FBI, in particular, but also the federal government in general, had continuously 
failed to notice or respond to the growing millennialist movement. Ruby Ridge 
in 1992 was an early example of this crisis bubbling over into direct confrontation, 
and the Montana Freeman standoff can reasonably be considered at least the 
beginning of the end.
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With all that in mind, it is important to re-emphasise exactly what is being studied 
here: the FBI’s negotiation effort, picking up where the failed ATF raid left off 
and ending with the bureau’s own attempt at a raid on the compound once it 
was deemed futile to try to continue those negotiations. In particular, it is the 
dynamics between the negotiation team, the Special Agent in Charge (SAC), 
and the various subject-matter experts that guided and advised on the overall 
strategy for the siege that are of interest. This excludes a closely related, but equally 
interesting dynamic that happened just above the FBI, at the ministerial level, 
involving the FBI director, the attorney general, and representatives for other 
federal agencies. Here, too, attempts were made to gather the intelligence and 
knowledge needed to make an informed decision about how to proceed, what 
resources were needed, and how to coordinate the use of those resources so as to 
minimise the danger and harm to everyone involved – including the Davidians. 
Ultimately, it was at this level that the fateful decision to go ahead with the gas 
insertion raid was made, and the attorney general in particular found herself in 
the spotlight in the ensuing accountability process. Her attempts at sourcing and 
grasping knowledge could be an entire chapter of the saga in and of themselves, 
but the main interest here is how the FBI dealt with the same problem – it was 
FBI’s efforts at acquiring knowledge about its opponents and about what tactics 
might work against them that informed the attorney general’s decisions, as well 
as the decision made by the SAC on site.
At the same time, it is important to dispel a common misconception about 
the FBI efforts at Waco. In particular when discussing the case in relation to the 
1996 Freemen standoff, it is often said that what made Waco such a disaster was 
the bureau’s unwillingness to engage with religious scholars. As the time line below 
shows, this is not entirely accurate. Indeed, Drs. Arnold and Tabor were among the 
first scholars to engage with the FBI, and also made efforts to directly reach David 
Koresh during the siege; their participation is sporadic, but consistent throughout 
the crisis (cf. Scruggs 1993:186; Reavis 1998:253ff). So the engagement was 
there, and the problem was rather one of assumed relevancy or simply not having 
the SAC’s ear. In addition, there were dissenting opinions within the FBI effort 
itself, with the negotiators – though frustrated – believing that some progress is 
being made, whereas the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) favoured a tactical option 
to forcefully bring the siege to an end. Over the course of the crisis, these two 
sides of the bureau were often at odds, at times even working at cross-purpose, 
with the HRT’s intimidation tactics directly contradicting or undermining the 
confidence-building efforts made by the negotiators. As time passed, the SAC 
also increasingly favoured the HRT approach, which meant that any later-stage 
progress made by the negotiators was not valued all that highly. That is not to 
say that the negotiators were all that successful to begin with. Docherty (2001) 
describes the effort as being fundamentally confused in terms of what actually 
motivated the Davidians, and that the logic behind the negotiations missed the 
point from the very start. The negotiators used a standard tit-for-tat goal-oriented 
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rationale. For example, if the Davidians released a “hostage,” they would earn 
some concession that would alleviate their stressful situation – more food or water 
or perhaps a phone call to someone on the outside. The problem was that there 
were no hostages, and that the Davidians’ rational was value-oriented, rather than 
one of attaining short-term goals for themselves. Surrendering a member of the 
group to the apparent Babylonian horde waiting outside meant one more soul 
damned and lost, and no temporary relief or luxury could ever out-weigh such 
a loss of the moral values that bound the group together. At the same time, any 
attempt on their part to explain this value mismatch was dismissed by the FBI as 
“bible babble” or as Koresh trying to maintain the grasp over his cult followers.
This is perhaps where a religious analysis, interpretation, and mediation 
between the Davidians and the FBI might have helped: to explain the shared 
Davidian value system to the FBI, and how it had a long history in the sect and 
it was not just something tied to Koresh as an individual. And conversely, to try 
to explain to the Davidians how the FBI’s goals did not in practice threaten or 
contradict the core values of the group. However, any such message was thwarted 
by the negotiators’ starting assumption that the Davidians were just like any 
other group they would come up against and that the goal-based concessions 
they would offer a regular hostage-taker – release a hostage and you might receive 
reduced sentencing, for instance – would work against them. This assumption 
was then further reinforced by a set of scholars who did not need to explain their 
perspective to them; who already thought in the same sociological, psychological, 
and criminological terms that the negotiators were used to, and who subscribed 
to the same goal-based logic. More than that, these familiar scholars were cer-
tain that their analytical frameworks were more than sufficient to untangle the 
rationale behind the Davidians’ behaviour, and that religion would not be a 
factor that markedly altered that rationale. Thus the conclusion was that, while 
some of the biblical allusions and religiously coloured language might need to 
be explained by a theologist, their contribution would not really be needed to 
understand the underlying logic of the Davidians’ statements.
It is also important to note that the FBI was not exactly idle in trying to find 
different angles to understand, convince, and pressure the Davidians. As the time 
line shows, multiple efforts were taking place at once, at least early on, and at 
least to begin with, family members were occasionally allowed to directly inter-
act with those still inside the compound (cf. Scruggs et al. 1993:194ff; Reavis 
1998:230ff). At the same time, the time line demonstrates the reluctance on the 
FBI’s part to involve anyone they had not picked themselves. The religious scholars 
had already started their analysis before approaching the FBI on March 7, and were 
rebuffed (cf. Tabor 1995:264ff, 273; Reavis 1998:253f; Wessinger 2000c:22f ). 
They continued to offer support and became indirectly involved through the 
Davidians’ attorneys and through the April 1 radio show, but were never allowed 
to take an active role in the negotiations. By the time they were requested by the 
Davidians, and other experts suggested that they might offer some insight into 
the matter, the end of the siege was already being planned.
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Figure 6: Timeframe for events and interactions during the Waco siege
Similarly, the attorneys themselves were kept away from the proceedings for several 
weeks. The first introductions were made on March 10, but no real contact was 
made with their clients until two weeks later, and they were not part of the 
negotiation effort outside of a week-long period in late March and early April 
(cf. Scruggs et al. 1993:91ff; Reavis 1998:251ff, 255f ).
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Table 2: Expert interactions during the Waco siege
Date Expert Role Duration
March 1 Dr. Park Dietz and 
Pete Smerick
Analysis of Koresh’s mental health; 
Evaluation of negotiation efforts thus far. 
3 days
Bruce D. Perry, M.D. 
Ph.D.
Analysis of the mental and physical health 
of the released children; Analysis of group 
dynamics based on children’s testimony. 
2–3 weeks
March 2 Dr. Phillip Arnold and 
Dr. James Tabor
Analysis of Koresh’s statements; Framing 
the siege as a religious dispute rather than 
a hostage situation. 
5 days
March 4–8 Pete Smerick and 
Mark Young
Analysis of Koresh’s mental health; 
Implementation of negotiation tactics 
1 day per 
memo
March 15 Dr. Roger Bell Analysis of Koresh’s mental health; 
Implementation of negotiation tactics. 
1 day
March 19 Dr. Phillip Arnold and 
Dr. James Tabor
Analysis of Koresh’s statements; Building 
confidence among the Davidians. 
3 days
March 27 Dr. Bill Austin Building confidence among the Davidians 
and Framing that religion is not an issue.
1 day
March 28 Dr Bruce D. Perry 
and Joyce Sparks
Analysis of the mental and physical health 
of the children still on the compound and 
the potential risks for them. 
4 days
March 29 Dr. Phillip Arnold and 
Dr. James Tabor
Analysis of Koresh’s statements; Building 
confidence among the Davidians. 
3 days
March 30 Dr. Robert Wallace 
and Dr. John 
Fredericks
Knowledge brokerage and Framing by 
suggesting the use of eschatologists rather 
than theologists 
<1 day
April 9 Dr Antjony J. Pinzotto Analysis of Koresh’s personal motivations. 1 day
Dr. Joseph L 
Krofcheck and SSA 
Clinton R. Van Zant
Analysis of Koresh’s letter to judge his 
motivations and level of threat towards law 
enforcement agents. 
3 days
April 14 Dr. Murray S. Miron Analysis of Koresh’s letters to determine 
his intentions; Analysis of the chances for 
successful negotiations. 
1 day
April 17 Dr. Park Dietz Evaluation of negotiation efforts so far; 
Analysis of chances for negotiations to 
succeed. 
<1 day
unknown Rev. Trevor Delafield Analysis and framing of religious 
references. 
unknown
(Scruggs et al. 1993:155–193)
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4.4.1 Organisational context
The first thing to note with the expert line-up is that, with the exception of the 
religious scholars, these are all individuals who had worked with the FBI before, 
and who were already part of the system of advisors the bureau had in place. This 
choice of (close-to-)in-house expertise is at the same time both cause and effect 
in how the siege developed. It cannot be stressed enough that, while the whole 
episode is essentially one very extended law enforcement enterprise, it was really 
the execution of an ATF warrant. It was the ATF’s attempt to search the premises 
that ended in disaster on February 28, and once the April 19 conflagration had 
burned itself out, a lot of what was pulled out of the ashes was their evidence 
in that investigation. The FBI was essentially handed a crisis in progress but 
proceeded to turn it into a crisis of their own making – one that became just as 
chaotic as the ATF shoot-out. The role of the FBI in all of this was to handle 
the crime of assaulting federal officers and to coordinate the federal, state, and 
local agencies. The FBI also had the expertise needed to handle negotiation and 
tactical insertions in a hostage-barricade situation, which seemed rather applicable 
to what was going on at Mt. Carmel. 
We should therefore perhaps not be surprised to see the bureau use a stand-
ardised setup of both internal and external teams. This was not something the 
FBI itself had planned for over many months, but rather a task thrust upon the 
bureau due to its role and formal responsibilities in the overall system of federal 
law enforcement. As such, generic components meant to fulfil those roles and 
responsibilities were employed rather than something bespoke for the situation at 
hand. Only over time could it have been clarified that these were not your usual 
hostage takers or hostages – “could have been” being the operative modus here, 
since that insight never really came. It would be wildly inaccurate to suggest that 
Waco was a run-of-the-mill job for the bureau, but the task never the less fell 
within a very clear category of what the FBI does, and with that categorisation 
come equally clear standard procedures and tactics to be employed. Lacking 
options, if nothing else than because of the suddenness of the situation, the FBI 
followed those procedures.
It is also important to note the internal structure of the FBI effort included an 
SAC as the on-site head decision-maker, who was aided by three separate teams: 
the CINT negotiators, the HRT tactical team, and the subject-matter experts who 
were attached in one way or another to the FBI Academy. These teams should 
ostensibly be pursuing the same goal under the leadership of the SAC, but on the 
ground at Mt. Carmel, the reality turned out to be rather different. While each 
team certainly had the same goal (bringing an end to the siege) their methods 
for getting there varied wildly, and were not coordinated partly due to the fact 
that these were indeed separate teams, and partly because the SAC favoured 
a quick resolution, as did the more action-oriented HRT. Consequently, the 
negotiation effort was often considered slow and inefficient by both the SAC and 
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the HRT, and the CINT was occasionally left out of strategy planning sessions. 
The official reports unanimously point to this friction as the main cause of the 
contradictory and at times even self-defeating strategies employed by the two 
teams, where concessions to the negotiation efforts were seemingly punished by 
the HRT’s scare tactics, or conversely when “rewards” for those concessions made 
the disruptions easier to endure. In spite of this scattered approach, however, it 
bears mentioning that both teams essentially operated on the same underlying 
logic. Both, in their own way, were attempting to demonstrate to the Davidians 
that Koresh was not in control of the situation, and that everyone at Mt. Carmel 
could decide on their own whether they should stay or go.
This logic was largely supplied by the third team: the FBI’s in-house stable 
of forensic psychologists, psychiatrists, and behavioural scientists tied to the 
National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC). A handful of 
them were present on the scene on a couple of occasions, but most of them 
offered their advice from a distance, based on recordings, transcripts, and 
other material provided by the CINT. It is not hard to see the potential for this 
self-reinforcing cycle to go wrong: the negotiators, operating on their regular 
assumptions regarding the logic and rationality of the Davidians – one they may 
very well have learned from the FBI Academy experts – steer the discussions in 
a certain direction and get certain answers from it. These answers are fed back 
to the experts who, since they are FBI Academy experts, mainly offer a forensic 
and criminological analytical perspective on those answers, and base their strategy 
recommendations on the same – or at least very similar – assumptions of logic 
and rationality. The strategy then guides the negotiators further down the path 
they were already on, with little reason to consider any alternative interpretations or 
basic  assumptions about their opponent. It is a head-on collision between Miles’ 
Law and groupthink, and it is not all that surprising that the strange outside voice 
of  theological analysis could not penetrate this closed loop. At the same time, the 
official reports make an important observation that those experts who actually 
came to Waco to observe the FBI effort all noted that the dynamic between the 
FBI and the Davidians deviated from their expectations – if anything, the FBI’s 
strategy seemed to strengthen the Davidians’ resolve and Koresh’s hold over his 
followers. Still, this did not overly change their advice. The framing of Koresh as a 
conman who could be exposed and deposed from within remained, and thus the 
strategy of trying to weaken him in the eyes of the rest of the Davidians remained 
at the centre of the FBI effort. The organisational ouroboros never examined 
its own assumptions, and even dismissed the notion that any such examination 
should be necessary. Before long “all” avenues – that is, all attempts based on 
this problem framing and this assumption of rationality – had been exhausted, 
leaving a forceful conclusion the only apparent option.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the FBI’s situation in the overall law enforce-
ment system. The issue of their inheriting the crisis from ATF has already been 
touched upon, but remains relevant in understanding exactly what problem the 
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bureau was facing and how it went about addressing that problem. By the time 
the FBI came on the scene, the situation at Mt. Carmel was already something 
of a disaster, and part of that was due to the lack of coordination between 
law-enforcement agencies. It was therefore natural – even beyond any standard 
operational procedure – for the FBI to try to centralise the on-site operational 
management as well as the longer-term strategic planning to its own chain of 
command. The FBI left various peripheral matters to be handled by local and 
state agencies, who undoubtedly were more suited to do so because of their 
local knowledge, and the ATF was put on hold until matters could be resolved 
in a way that allowed the initial search-and-seize operation to continue. One 
should not underestimate the felt need to “do it better than those other guys,” 
especially since the ATF had already failed. It bears stressing that this transfer 
of jurisdiction was not just one of local and state to federal, or from one federal 
agency to another, but a transfer between the Treasury Department to the Justice 
Department. In other words, there was room and opportunity for every type of 
inter-departmental one-upmanship, up to and including the political level in 
Washington D.C. The final strategic decision-making was a straight line from 
the SAC to an already contentious FBI director, and a newly appointed attorney 
general,6 which created a rather curious mix of high outside political pressure, yet 
pressure that was internal to the established chain of command. In spite of the 
AG’s attempts at getting a detailed understanding of the situation and potential 
outcomes, it was still a rather closed group with a homogeneous perception of 
what the problem was, framed by the same experts and observers that informed 
the on-site efforts. Arguably, the individuals at this level of decision-making 
could only have achieved their position by being firmly entrenched within that 
same law enforcement logic and rationality, and with even less reason to try to 
include any outside opinions – after all, it was outsiders that had created the whole 
situation to begin with. Any such connections would rather have happened on 
the SAC level, but as mentioned, that level was also focused on letting the FBI 
deal with its specific areas of expertise, and with trying (and ultimately failing) 
to find a balance between HRT and CINT efforts.
6 At the time of the Waco siege, Director William S. Sessions was under investigation for misuse 
of FBI resources, using agency airplanes for personal travel, and using agency funding for home 
improvement. Attorney General Janet Reno had been appointed just before the siege started 
and entered office on March 11, less than two weeks into the crisis. Sessions was dismissed in 
late July 1993, barely half-way through his 10-year tenure at the post. (cf. NYT 1993-01-19; 
01-22).
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4.4.2 The nature of the crisis
This organisational tangle is critical in understanding exactly what the actual crisis 
was from an FBI perspective. The FBI, and indeed the entire DoJ, were handed 
a situation where ATF agents that had executed a warrant under the jurisdiction 
of the Treasury Department had violently clashed with an obviously armed and 
dangerous assailant, leaving numerous dead and wounded on both sides. The 
attack on federal agents was a problem in and of itself, securing the evidence 
sought under the warrant is another. The presence of apparent hostages, notably 
a large number of children, was a third. The barricaded, prepared, and largely 
self-sufficient position of the opposition presented a fourth obstacle, at least in 
terms of what tactical options were available, and as the failure of the initial ATF 
raid had shown, it was a pretty formidable one to boot.
Each individual issue is one that the bureau is clearly equipped to handle – 
there is no doubt that this is exactly the kind of situation where it is supposed 
to step in and contribute considerable resources in terms of equipment, man-
power, and expertise. That is not to say that such an event should be considered 
a normal occurrence and therefore be a non-crisis by default, but rather that the 
bureau is expected to be a professional crisis manager specifically when facing 
this kind of situation.
Uncertainty
From one point of view, the whole 51-day siege is startlingly simple. It was just 
a matter of revisiting and repeating the same single decision on a daily basis, up 
until the point where the gas insertion plan was executed. In essence, it was a 
matter of deciding whether it was worth continuing the negotiations or if a more 
forceful tactical option had to be used instead. In a sense, then, the uncertainty 
of the siege itself ended somewhere late March or early April, when the SAC 
determined that the negotiations so far had not been productive. The Davidians 
were given a last chance after they had communicate via a team of lawyers that 
they would come out after passover – that is, by April 14 at the latest – and as the 
day came and went, the plans for the final raid were presented, debated, and 
eventually approved all the way up to the Justice Department level.
Before this, however, there were numerous instances where the uncertainty and 
ambiguity of the situation was palpable. Taking over from the ATF, securing the 
area surrounding the compound, and coordinating the various law enforcement 
agencies were mostly standard procedures, but the attempts to actually deal with 
the situation yielded some baffling results. As noted almost unanimously in the 
official reports and surviving narratives, the Davidians’ defied all expectations 
of a hostage-barricade situation. Koresh fit the standard image of a charismatic 
con-man reasonably well, but neither he nor his followers responded to any of 
the arguments or any of the pressure put on the group to try to split them up. 
Their apparent irrationality made it very difficult for the FBI to predict what the 
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group would do or how they would respond to various negotiation or pressure 
tactics. While it slowly became clear that these were not hostages in any con-
ventional sense, nor that was there a strict leader that kept everyone locked up, 
this insight did not particularly answer the question of why the Davidians so 
adamantly refused to leave. Nor did it help explain why the parents in the group 
would rather prefer to see their children suffer the hostile conditions inside the 
compound than see them safely released and cared for outside the FBI perimeter. 
This preference for wretched conditions made no sense and rendered many of 
the bargaining chips the negotiators had to play with practically worthless with 
no obvious viable replacement in sight. The notion that they were, from the 
Davidians’ perspective, asking God’s chosen people to surrender to the forces 
of evil did not come naturally to the FBI negotiators, especially since they were 
in the habit of seeing themselves as a force for good. And yet, this was the core 
misconception upon which all other uncertainties and ambiguities in the case 
are built. One side looked at the situation as a mythical struggle between good 
and evil (themselves being on the side of good), and the other side looked at the 
situation as a rather modern struggle between the forces of good against – if not 
outright evil – then at least a somewhat odd bunch of criminals. Neither side 
was able to understand the other, and neither side was able to properly verbalise 
their perspective.
Hence, ambiguity and miscommunication were present in almost every dis-
cussion that took place between the Davidians and the CINT. The Davidians’ 
attempts to explain that these were the “final days” were interpreted as largely 
incoherent “bible babble.” The FBI’s attempts to appeal to empathy for suffering 
family members or to “expose” the Davidian leadership as frauds were interpreted 
as, quite literally, bargaining with the devil (a devil that was obviously duplicitous, 
since trusting the CINT on numerous occasions resulted in being punished by 
the HRT). In a sense, some of this ambiguity may actually have come from the 
near familiarity the negotiators had with the topic at hand. Many were Christians 
themselves and had more than a passing knowledge of the texts that Koresh 
were preaching to them about, but passing familiarity was not enough to spot 
the meaning of his interpretations and chain of logic, and how they differed 
from more conventional interpretations of the texts. In using textual references 
and allusions, Koresh added another layer of ambiguity in the communication 
that did not just make it difficult for the FBI agents to understand him, but 
also made it difficult for them to understand exactly what and why they did not 
understand. So while religious scholars would later be able to decipher much of 
what Koresh had said, and could demonstrate that it explained the behaviour of 
the group fairly well, this near-understanding just made that behaviour appear all 
the more uncertain and unpredictable to the FBI. It sounded like the Davidians 
were going to do one thing, but then they would often go off and do something 
drastically different.
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It is also in this fundamental miscommunication that the seeds for the final 
catastrophic outcome can be found. The notion of a conventional hostage taker 
may have been dispelled fairly early on, to be replaced by a potentially even more 
menacing imagery of the close-knit cult held sway by a handful of leaders, and 
this quickly led to the worry that these cultists may choose suicide over surren-
dering. However, even then the assumption was made that if the situation would 
become unbearable enough, few would actually choose that ultimate end. The 
CS gas strategy was picked exactly to try to resolve that uncertainty. The intent 
was to trigger a primal fight-or-flight response, but without anyone to actually 
fight, flight would be the only available option – there would hopefully be no 
room to maintain the mental fortitude needed to go through with some kind of 
suicide scheme. Unfortunately, much like the ones that preceded it, this whole 
strategy failed to take into account the core belief system and rationality that 
had driven the Davidians this far. Not only did enough of them have sufficient 
equipment to protect themselves against the gas, but many of those who did not 
were willing to die at the hands of their brethren – the gas may have prevented 
mass-suicide, but it did not prevent mass-murder. This is perhaps less an uncertain 
outcome as an unexpected one, but it was known already at an early stage that 
the group possessed some protective equipment. But again, the assumption was 
that, ultimately, everyone inside the compound would act individually; those 
few with protection may be harder to get out, but those without would flee. 
Instead, the group cohesion from believing that a very literal army of evil was 
at their doorstep made everyone stay – of the few that actually did try to flee 
the flames when the building caught fire, more than one tried to run back into 
the gas and the heat as FBI agents ran up to them and tried to drag them away.
Similarly, the outcome of the gas reacting with fire might be more unexpected 
than uncertain. The effect was not well-known, and no-one expected the com-
pound to catch fire anyway, especially not as a result of the Davidians apparently 
setting their own shelter on fire. Even so, the decision was made to add a volatile 
compound to the mix, and in very large quantities. Even without the fire, this 
alone should be considered an added source of uncertainty – doubly so when 
the method for insertion involved tearing down walls and ceiling panels, which 
further added the risk of creating air pockets or just trapping people under col-
lapsing materials. As a riot control agent, CS gas was perhaps more chosen for 
its availability and familiarity than for its suitability in this particular situation. 
Either way, it was an attempt to trade one uncertainty for another. Hopefully, 
it would have a debilitating and pacifying effect, reducing the risk of harm for 
the agents that would eventually clear the building, but it would also ensure 
that the Davidians’ exit would happen under wholly unordered circumstances. 
The building catching fire, causing the CS gas to turn into poison, and the 
Davidians trapping themselves in a small shelter with no escape route were not 
part of that bargain.
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On a macro level the Waco siege is replete with uncertainty due to the ambiguities 
and confusion of the negotiation effort, and the technical details that the CS gas 
insertion plan represented. Although the uncertainty did not spike into mass con-
fusion at any point, it was also never fully resolved, sitting instead as a near-constant 
blanket over the proceedings, and causing continuous misunderstandings and 
miscommunication on both sides. The subject-matter experts at hand did not 
particularly help in resolving these issues, as they stuck to their regular perceptions 
of the problem and modes of interpretation, even going so far as to denying that 
there may be some other interpretation that could resolve the ambiguities they 
were facing.
Time pressure
The Waco siege is exactly what it says on the tin: a siege. It is not a sudden, flash 
in the pan event that quickly runs its course. Not even the initial ATF raid really 
qualifies, since it was months in the making, and even the gunfight dragged on 
for over an hour. Even so, there were time pressures at play in the siege that 
contributed to deciding the final outcome.
First of all, there was the issue of trying to allow ATF to finish what it had 
come to Mt. Carmel to do to begin with, that is, to investigate suspicions of 
manufacturing of drugs and of illegal weapons modifications. The longer the 
siege dragged on, the greater the chances that any evidence would be gone by 
the time the ATF could be allowed inside. Less time critical, but of a similar 
nature, the ATF warrant called for the arrest and interrogation of key individuals 
among the Davidians, and with some of them wounded in the initial raid and 
living in squalor during the siege, there was a distinct need to ensure that they 
did not succumb to the conditions of the siege. Beyond those individuals and 
the demands of the ATF investigation, there was also the fact that a large number 
of individuals were trapped inside the Mt. Carmel compound, among them 
several children, who would unduly suffer if the situation dragged on. Finally, 
there was the practical matter of monetary concerns and allocation of resources. 
The siege had bound up several hundreds of agents and officers between the 
different agencies – many of them in specialist roles – as well as emergency 
equipment owned by the agencies involved or on loan. It was also an around-
the-clock operation, which further drove up costs and manpower requirements. 
Beyond these efficiency and investigative concerns, there was also the matter of 
image, which we will return to when looking at the critical values at stake: the 
FBI should be seen as an effective agency, and letting a situation like this drag 
on forever would tarnish that image.
So even though the siege lasted almost two months, there was still a significant 
time pressure on the FBI decision makers. It is rather telling that some of the more 
drastic measures that were taken during the siege happened closely following long 
passages of time where there are no meaningful interaction with the Davidians. 
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It appears very much as if frustration builds in the lulls, and when something 
finally happens, the tension boils over. It would be convenient to suggest that it 
was these frustrated acts, mainly from the HRT, actually convinced the Davidians 
to respond, but the timing of events does not bear this out. Instead, there was 
commonly a period of silence, followed by some drawn-out negotiation where 
both sides make some minor concessions, and only then the bureau would enact 
some new repressive measures. Indeed, this pattern is a common source of criti-
cism in the official reports, as the timing of such measures made it seem like the 
Davidians were being punished for complying with the negotiators.
It is tempting to employ terms from the crisis management literature such 
as “creeping crisis” or “long-shadow crisis,” but neither really applies here (cf. 
‘t Hart & Boin 2001; Naraghi 2009). Those terms describe a slow onset or 
termination of a crisis, but Waco was simply a crisis that took a long time to 
transpire. Granted, Waco was also a creeping crisis, in how the ATF investigation 
ended up in a shoot-out, as well as a long-shadow crisis, in how the legal and 
political aftermath continued for almost a decade, but those parts are beyond 
the scope of what is being studied here. Instead, the way Waco was handled is 
better classified as an attempt to force an early termination of the crisis because 
the SAC had seemingly run out of viable options. There was a mounting pressure 
to regain some kind of control over the situation as opposed to just remaining 
reactive to the apparently unpredictable whims of Koresh and the other leaders 
who were negotiating with the bureau. Some of this could arguably be linked 
to the many false starts – or false stops, as the case might be – where a break-
through seemed close at hand, but where Koresh, in particular, injected some 
new condition for the group’s leaving at the very last moment, thus delaying 
the promised surrender just one more week. Before long, the accumulation of 
all those delays started pointing to this being an almost interminable crisis, with 
equally interminable demands being asked by the Davidians. Having no end in 
sight was not an acceptable state of affairs for the FBI, and thus the decision was 
made that the bureau would determine the end-date itself.
Whether it was too soon or too late, or whether it would not have made any 
real difference, are purely matters of speculation. There is evidence to support 
either interpretation, but what is clear is that everything about the siege ended 
up being costly in terms of time. Conversing with Koresh was time-consuming 
due to his apparent need to explain his point of view in biblical terms and these 
efforts were wasted on the negotiators who ultimately did not understand the 
point he was making. Likewise, getting those conversations and other commu-
nications from the Davidians to the bureau’s in-house experts, and receiving 
an interpretation and analysis back from those experts, added additional time 
on top of what was already spent on the conversations. With analyses taking 
anywhere from a day to a week to complete, additional lag time was introduced 
in the way the negotiators and the SAC could respond to what the Davidians 
were saying and doing. The long round-trip between the negotiation effort, data 
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collection, analysis, response, and formulating a strategy for the next negotia-
tion undoubtedly added to the stress of trying to find a working solution to the 
deadlock as quickly as possible.
Critical values at stake
As mentioned, this inefficiency in the negotiation, aside from the issue of the 
effort having rather paltry effects on the perseverance and resolve of the Davidians, 
is perhaps the most obvious issue that grated on the FBI. Its supposed expertise 
in exactly this kind of situation was being put to the test, and it was seemingly 
failing. In the aftermath of the crisis, this professional pride was highlighted as 
one of the explanations why the FBI effort was so fractured. Both the CINT and 
the HRT wanted to do things their way, and both obviously knew best. Similarly, 
the in-house experts were professionals of long standing, with heaps of experience 
from previous cases to guide them in their judgement, so obviously there was no 
need to add some new inexperienced theoreticians from an untested field to the 
mix. With all this competence already in place, it was all the more infuriating that 
so much time was spent achieving so little, all of which most likely increased the 
allure of a promised swift resolution with the CS gas injection plan. The longer 
the siege was allowed to drag on, the more it made the law enforcement agencies 
involved seem incapable of doing their job. Conversely, a swift and efficient raid 
would demonstrate just how capable those agencies were, when put to the test.
Aside from the slightly nebulous value of professional pride, there was also 
the more concrete matter of safeguarding lives and upholding the law. While 
certainly inextricably linked to the profession, it is never the less a separate issue 
and an area where the Waco siege presented a clear threat to those values, not just 
symbolically, but in very real and practical terms. First, there was the undeniable 
fact that the Davidians had fired on federal agents, killing and wounding several of 
them, and thus displayed a callous disregard for both lives and the law. Secondly, 
and as previously mentioned, there was the risk of losing evidence that was critical 
to the ATF investigation, and possibly even having key suspects evade capture. 
If the evidence was lost, or the suspects not apprehended, it could prove diffi-
cult to establish the legitimacy of the raid that got the entire siege started. The 
suspicion would remain, of course, but the proof would be gone. At the same 
time, there was a value conflict inherent in the situation since both first- and 
second-amendment rights were at play in the crisis. The federal government was 
pursuing a religious group on charges of skirting the right to bear arms. Thirdly, 
there was the issue of innocent live being at risk, in particular the children being 
kept inside the compound. Not only was there the lingering suspicion that they 
were being abused by the adult members of the group, but there was also the 
matter of the rapidly deteriorating living conditions, as well as the risk of getting 
caught in the cross-fire should the situation once again turn hostile.
126
Stressing Knowledge
Again, the aftermath of the crisis tells us more of what was at stake than the crisis 
itself, because it was on these points that the most pointed criticism was levelled 
against how the FBI had handled the situation. The official reports focus on 
how the FBI had bungled much of the evidence collection, to the point where 
accusations were made that FBI agents had deliberately destroyed evidence to 
hide their own culpability in the final fire. As for the constitutional questions, 
while some evidence could be secured to support the notion that the Davidians 
had indeed illegally modified some firearms, could the FBI really be excused for 
being this insensitive to, and even uncomprehending of, the religious beliefs of 
an adventist group? The use of CS gas, and its poisonous effects when subjected 
to flames, became another key issue in the accountability process: was it known 
at the time that the bureau was deploying a potentially lethal chemical agent 
against the Davidians? And while it was understandable that the FBI wanted 
to protect its agents against the kind of gunfire that had repelled the ATF two 
months earlier, was it really necessary to employ armoured military vehicles 
in the gas insertion process? Likewise, was it really that important to keep the 
fire-fighters at a safe distance while the fire raged, or should they have been 
allowed to actually attempt to put the fire out as it started?
In short, the values at stake were pretty much what one might expect from any 
kind of hostage-barricade situation, but with the additional complication that it 
turned into a long drawn-out siege that defied and symbolically threatened the 
law-enforcement capabilities of some of the nation’s premier law enforcement 
agencies.
All in all, then, in spite of its unconventional setup, the Waco siege definitely 
represented a full-on crisis for the FBI. The bureau was up against an opponent 
that they did not fully understand and who confounded its regular efforts at 
understanding them, creating an uncertainty in both strategy and outcome, as well 
as suffering from ambiguities in how the team could even begin to understand 
the situation at hand. The long duration might suggest that the FBI agents had 
time on their hand to resolve these issues, but too much of it was spent on a long-
winded process of modifying their strategies – but never really trying anything 
new – based on expert feedback, as well as on a frustrating stop-start interaction 
with the Davidians. Meanwhile, pressure to find a solution was mounting as the 
costs of the siege kept rising and as the group became something of a symbol of 
the “little guy” opposing the big, oppressive government, especially among the 
increasingly popular right-wing – often deeply religious and millennialist – 
 militia groups around the country. The Ruby Ridge incident had happened half 
a year earlier, but the lessons had not been identified or learned yet, and thus the 
siege was still a strange new beast, as were the complexities of, and peculiar mix 
of, values at stake. Unfortunately, one of those values that had to be protected 
directly contravened a potential solution to the uncertainty that arose from this 
new situation; that is, not allowing new, untested, “unprofessional” (meaning, 
with no ties to the conventional criminological core of the profession). In turn, 
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this meant that there was no-one around to interpret the “bible babble” the 
Davidians insisted on using in their communications, or to explain the group 
cohesion that the professionals failed to comprehend.
4.4.3 Anticipation of due process
To some extent, the processes involved in handing the Waco siege should have 
been entirely familiar and anticipated by the FBI, and indeed, they largely were 
as evident in the way the bureau interacted with other governmental bodies. Per 
standard procedure, the FBI took over once the federal agents from the ATF had 
been attacked, and the bureau coordinated the state, local, and federal agencies 
on the scene, eventually including support elements from the National Guard 
and the U.S. Army. The bureau also communicated “upwards” in the hierarchy 
in the proscribed manner, seeking council from the DoJ. Ultimately with the 
FBI director having meetings with the attorney general and representatives from 
other departments of the government that had become involved in the crisis. 
What was not anticipated was how the FBI worked internally, and how it had 
to interact with other parties at the scene.
Most notably, there was the conflict between the HRT and CINT teams, 
each favouring their own brand of solution to the siege and vying for the SAC’s 
ear, with the HRT eventually winning out. As much as the FBI had a clear and 
working approach to coordinating a large number of different agencies, there was 
no clear procedure for coordinating the FBI itself. This internal conflict and lack 
of coordination then came to colour other interactions as well. It was the HRT 
assault scheme that the SAC reported as the most viable option to the director, 
and then to the attorney general, and which required additional support from 
the armed forces. On the other hand, the CINT’s reliance on tried and tested 
NCAVC experts can to a large extent explain why those efforts so often stranded. 
While the bureau was approached by a number of outside experts – most notably 
lawyers and religious scholars – there were no routines in place, or even much in 
the way of general preparedness, for integrating that expertise in the negotiation 
effort. Quite the opposite. This was an FBI matter, and external influences should 
be kept to a minimum. It should nevertheless once again be noted that the FBI 
did approach some religious scholars, but only really in an attempt to find some 
supplementary support to the experts already in place – experts who then judged 
such support unnecessary. The efforts made by the external interested parties were 
more seen as an unwelcome intrusion into, and disruption of, the bureau’s own 
efforts rather than something that could potentially be integrated into that work.
The lack of coordination between the HRT and CINT has been repeated to 
death at this point, but still bears another special mention from the perspective 
of anticipation of process. The fact that the two teams so often worked at 
cross-purpose serves to highlight exactly how little of the FBI’s internal process 
could actually be anticipated by either of them. Traditionally, the SAC should 
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have ensured that proper coordination took place, but this did not happen. 
Instead, negotiators were often left out of the loop, and advise from the NCAVC 
experts were at times intercepted and used to argue that negotiations would not 
work. Without a proper arena to explain what they were doing, the negotiators 
had no good way of keeping the either the SAC or the HRT informed of what 
they were planning to do, nor could he negotiators work the HRT’s pressure 
tactics into the overall negotiation effort. While a process for keeping everyone 
informed formally existed, it was not followed in practice, and thus we cannot 
really consider it anticipated – the fact that neither team could anticipate what 
the other was up to comes as no surprise with this set-up in mind. Curiously 
enough, the two teams also differed in their approach to ad-hoc solutions, and 
this made it even more difficult to anticipate either side. The CINT stayed well 
away from any kind of ad-hoc inclusion of external expertise, whereas the HRT 
sought out new equipment and tactics from the armed forces, inventing the CS 
gas insertion strategy almost on the fly. The HRT also freely adopted pressure 
tactics that had been used in other prolonged stand-offs, such as the use of loud 
music and noises to weaken the resolve of a barricaded opponent – an idea most 
closely borrowed from the 1989 capture of Manuel Noriega in Panama. As an 
additional layer of potential confusion, the entire set-up with CINT, HRT, and 
NCAVC personnel being coordinated by a SAC was itself something of an ad-hoc 
setup. The teams were picked and assembled as needed, based on their areas of 
expertise rather than on any kind of standard procedure, much less on any notion 
of interoperability. The entire core crisis management team was therefore pretty 
much impossible to identify or anticipate on a macro level.
All in all, the anticipation of due process can only be considered very low. Of 
the key deviations listed in Section 2.6, the FBI team on the ground exhibited 
almost every one except number 7: there was no need to go through a generalist 
intermediary layer to communicate. Communication, when it happened, was 
direct and among agents with the same law-enforcement background. Based on 
this, there were arguably also some similarities in organisational culture since all 
teams were part of the same FBI “family,” which may conceivably rule out devia-
tion number 1, but even then, the action-oriented HRT differed from the slow 
and methodical CINT, and both differed from the scholarly-minded NCAVC 
experts. Beyond that, the nature of how the crisis management group was set up, 
and the way different teams were afforded different levels of attention from the 
SAC, meant that there were ambiguities and uncertainties in the co-operative 
process and in the value of the information being shared. In addition, there was 
mistrust in the collaborative process and in the problem formulations offered by 
the different teams, and the knowledge brokerage was not so much mistrusted 
as completely absent.
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4.4.4 Organisational closed-ness
At its heart, the FBI is a law enforcement agency, so it should come as no surprise 
that its daily business is one of enforcing regulations. It is meant to guarantee that 
due process is followed, hopefully with a high degree of consistency to ensure that 
no mistakes are made – that no-one is wrongfully accused or unduly acquitted. 
The reality may be different, but since the notion of organisational closed-ness 
deals with an ideal type, these lofty goals work as an initial guideline to suggest 
where the organisation falls on the open–closed spectrum.
Guiding principle
The FBI as it appears at Waco is very clearly one that adheres to regulation as 
one of its guiding principles. Arguably, this has held true almost since the bureau 
was founded, with agents being moulded in such a standardised form that the 
“g-man” has become an iconic representation of the agency as a whole. As an 
organisation, the bureau’s activities are controlled and regulated in almost every 
detail, with clearly delineated areas of expertise and a reasonably clear jurisdiction. 
Even down to an individual level, processes and procedures for performing the 
duties of the bureau are plentiful. As the case demonstrates, there is also a clear 
differentiation between the types of missions the modern FBI is tasked with, and 
between the competences that go into those tasks, to the point where the iconic 
image has long since ceased to be accurate. Hostage rescue is a very different 
specialisation from negotiation or from academic research, for instance in the 
areas of criminology or psychiatry. There is a common ground between all of 
them, but once we start looking into the specific branches of the HRT, CINT 
or NCAVC, we see strict regimentation of problems to be solved and methods 
to solve them.
The gathering of these three at Waco is a direct reflection of how the FBI 
perceived the problem: as one with hostages and where a heavily armed assault 
might be needed to free them, as one with a central leadership that could be argued 
with or that can be undermined by communicating with other members of the 
group, and as one where psychological profiling might be needed to understand 
the different persons involved. Each problem had a bespoke solution, and each 
solution had a specific team suited for the task. Again, the work was regulated 
and distribution among different core competences.
The pattern holds just as true if we look at the bureau and role in the overall 
law enforcement system, which is just as strictly categorised. Here, the Waco case 
provides a good example. According to procedures, the underlying ATF warrant 
should have been handled by the ATF when the siege ended, and the FBI would 
simply there to prosecute the matter of the armed assault on federal agents and 
to coordinate the myriad of agencies from all levels of the government. In short, 
the FBI should only occupy the scene of the crime while it is dealing with “its” 
crime, and then hand the crime scene back to the ATF. At least that is the proce-
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dure on paper. In practice, the FBI ended up handing over a very different scene 
than the one the ATF had retreated from two months earlier. Nevertheless, it 
is the fundamental principle behind the procedure that is of interest to us, and 
that one still falls within the bounds of regulation and formality. Indeed, it was 
in large part this strict adherence to regulation that limited the interaction and 
integration of external expertise into the negotiation process. There could be no 
guarantees that the external experts would stick to protocol or to the established 
practices, so the matter was best left to the FBI’s own professional cadre. In spite 
of the previous allusions to ad hoc solutions on the part of the HRT, this particular 
characteristic was still at play there too. The HRT may have borrowed training 
facilities and equipment from the U.S. Army and the National Guard, but only 
the FBI’s own personnel could ultimately be trusted with the actual execution 
of the plan. Part of that can undoubtedly be traced back to the Posse Comitatus 
Act, which simply prohibits the U.S. Army from acting directly in such matters. 
At the same time, it is telling that it must specifically be the FBI, rather than any 
of the myriad of other law enforcement agencies on the scene, that go through 
the training to drive the CEVs and deploy the CS gas.
Instrumental work flow
A very similar pattern emerges when looking at the instrumental work flow of 
the FBI. Given the broad range of tasks that fall under the bureau’s jurisdiction, 
one might be tempted to assume that flexibility is a necessity to get the job done, 
and that this would be reflected in the agency’s work flow. To some extent, this 
bears out when we look at the setup used for the Waco siege. A mix of teams was 
assembled to deal with this complex issue, and the setup would change when 
facing a different situation. However, there still remains the fundamental problem 
that none of the teams were particularly well-adapted to this kind of mixing 
and matching. Each one of them had rigidly defined roles and specialisations, 
and were largely limited to fulfilling those specific functions. It was an ad hoc 
aggregation of disparate parts, not a considered or pre-planned design to meet 
a variety of different scenarios.
More than that, this collection of parts was, quite unsurprisingly, still rigidly 
adhering to the rules and guidelines for how to conduct the business of running 
a joint FBI operation, and this is the crucial characteristic in determining the 
work flow. The organisation as a whole may have included different units and 
departments, and the basic means and methods for combining those into a 
unified whole, but that is not sufficient to classify the work flow as flexible. The 
actual work was strictly regimented and separated between the different units, 
and standard operating procedures prescribed it should be done. A hierarchy 
existed where the SAC was exactly what the title implies: in charge, irrespective 
of how better suited any of the other teams might have been in determining the 
effectiveness of the effort put in. The Waco case demonstrates something of a 
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departure from the standard procedures in that the coordination and co-operation 
was not always done according to the plans, but if anything, this actually further 
highlights how the SAC maintained control of the scene. At times, the CINT 
was left out of meetings, because it was chafing against that hierarchy and was 
offering dissenting opinions and advice.
It is also telling how rigidly the FBI adhered to its preconceived notions of the 
Davidians as, at first a band of criminals, and later as a cult, with Koresh taking 
the traditional role of a charismatic conman who had tricked everyone else in 
the group. Over time, the FBI agents had to abandon the image of the siege as 
a regular hostage-barricade situation, as it became clear that those who chose to 
leave the compound did not consider themselves hostages. They could, and did, 
leave of their own free will, and had the conditions and threat level inside the 
compound not been as bad as they were, they would gladly go back in. At any 
rate, they reasoned, it was the FBI that was to blame for those conditions, not the 
Davidians still trapped inside. But even then, the FBI consistently stuck with the 
assumption that this was a fragile and easily fractured group, and tailored both 
the negotiation and the pressure strategies to suit this perception. As highlighted 
by the critical reports after the fact, a key reason why those efforts failed was 
because the assumption simply did not match the reality of the situation. The 
Davidians were a close-knit and immensely cohesive group with strongly held 
and shared core beliefs:. They had no reason to disbelieve Koresh’s role in the 
group as a spiritual leader and chief interpreter of the biblical word that bound 
the group together. If anything, the FBI’s persistent and by-the-book attempts 
at discrediting him only served to prove his predictions and sermons right in the 
eyes of the other group members. No real effort was made to alter that strategy to 
match the specifics of the case, although there is something of a chicken-and-egg 
problem of separating cause from consequence here. Was this failure due to a 
closed work flow that demanded adherence to the regular problem framing and 
solution strategies, or were the framing and strategies chosen because the specifics 
of the case simply were not understood? There is an identification paradox at 
play here that may influence the categorisation of the FBI’s efforts that cannot 
be easily disentangled.
Either way, though, the rigidity in the work flow is there, and even if the FBI 
agents could not figure out the details of the case, it was clear to them that the 
divide-and-conquer strategy did not get as much traction as it usually did. In 
spite of this, they stuck to the plan and did not try to find a new solution to that 
particular problem. In fact, the few external subject-matter experts that suggested 
a different framing were dismissed as not being relevant to understanding the 
situation. Instead, the familiar expertise provided by the extended NCAVC team 
won out – yet another case of sticking to the standard procedures and rigidly 
defined problem space. While part of this can certainly be explained from the 
standpoint of not wanting to endanger individuals who have no experience with 
these kinds of hostile situations, or not allowing outsiders without authorisation to 
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pierce through the communication black-out the FBI imposed on the Davidians, 
those explanations still fall well within the scope of the kind of adherence to 
SOP:s that points towards a rigid work flow. It is standard procedure for the 
FBI to fully control the bubble around a barricaded group; any gap supposedly 
diminishes the effectiveness of that control, and thus lessens the pressure the 
bureau tries to put on its opponent.
Really, the one exception to this adherence to procedures was the HRT’s 
invention of a plan to use massive amounts of CS gas to pacify the Davidians, 
and to use CEV:s to insert that gas into the compound. At the same time, this is 
just a scaled-up version of the use of regular tear gas and of riot control vehicles 
with water cannons – both of which had been in use in law enforcement circles 
for decades. The scale and insertion methodology was simply an adaptation to 
the fact that they were dealing with a large, but relatively flimsy, wooden house 
as opposed to an open town square. The HRT was also the FBI’s equivalent to 
the, by now commonplace, police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team 
(somewhat confusingly, FBI also had a separate SWAT team that took on a slightly 
different role) so their adaptation and use of this special equipment falls well within 
how this team is meant to operate. As exceptions go, then, it is a fairly weak one.
Preferred outcome
The discussion so far may have seemed to suggest that the FBI prefers its out-
comes to be consistent. Not only is that part of the whole point of the many 
operating procedures in place, but it is also almost inherent in their role as a 
law enforcement agency: that enforcement should not in a civilised society be 
capricious and unpredictable. However, the preferred outcome is not just about 
those procedures – if it were, it would mainly just be a repetition and direct 
consequence of the work flow – but about the application of those procedures 
to solve an apparent problem. It is here that the previously discussed apparent 
flexibility of the FBI as a whole comes into play. It is readily apparent, even just 
from the teams involved in the Waco case, that the bureau recognises and is 
equipped to solve a wide variety of problems, each needing its own particular 
strategies, competences, and methodologies. In addition, the bureau is founded 
on the principle of making informed decisions. In its formative years, much was 
made of the FBI’s reliance on scientific methods to secure evidence and solve 
crime, and as its roles and responsibilities have expanded, it has in part become 
an explicit intelligence agency. The entire organisation is purposefully designed 
to gather information to adapt to and handle complex and dynamic environ-
ments. To really confuse the terms and make a mess of the analytical tool we 
are employing, the FBI’s rigid procedures are intended to consistently generate 
suitable preconditions to dynamically respond to complex problems. In short, if 
we clearly separate the procedures from the outcomes, the organisation as a whole 
should be a prime candidate for having a ‘dynamics’ as its preferred outcome.
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Two things mar this picture, however: one is the individual teams and departments 
in and of themselves, and the other is the approach chosen for the Waco siege. The 
FBI as a unitary actor may indeed prefer dynamics, but this does not necessarily 
hold true for its many departments. The Waco case amply demonstrates that the 
bureau is far from unitary. Each of the teams involved demonstrated a strong 
preference for solving the siege their way. The parable of having a hammer and 
only seeing nails readily comes to mind when discussing both the HRT and the 
embedded subject-matter experts. The former played their part in using force-
ful and repressive measures at every turn, with little or no regard for how this 
would affect the negotiation efforts. The latter insisted on using criminological 
and psychiatric analytical frameworks to analyse the goals and rationality of 
the Davidians, eschewing other approaches as wholly unnecessary. As for the 
negotiators, they tried their best to solve the siege through negotiation, but they 
were limited in their own preconceptions of the Davidian group dynamics and 
of their understanding of what the Davidians were trying to communicate in 
their own roundabout, allegorical way. All three were stuck with trying to force 
a problem framing onto the situation that was consistent with their own area 
of expertise. Consequently, although the FBI as a whole may be considered as 
preferring dynamic outcomes, the efforts at Mt. Carmel were very much about 
trying to fit this square-peg (a tightly knit religious group) into the round-hole 
framing of a conventional, largely individualistic criminal gang.
It is also telling that even though the FBI was equipped, and most likely 
preferred, a dynamic outcome, it had no regular procedure in place to ensure 
that these team-ups would work. But it is up for debate whether the use of com-
pletely ad-hoc structures to combine these teams is an argument for or against 
the dynamic preference. On the one hand, this ad-hoc:ery is not the least bit 
consistent with the principle of consistent outcomes, but on the other hand, it 
is more conducive to chaotic and unpredictable outcomes, rather than strictly 
dynamic ones.
In the end, however, while this represents an interesting discrepancy between 
the parts and the whole of the FBI, it makes no real difference for the purposes 
of this analysis. With regulation as its guiding principle and rigidity as its instru-
mental work flow, the bureau already tends towards a closed behaviour irrespective 
of how we classify the preferred outcome. The fact that the individual parts of 
the organisation tend more towards consistency, in spite of the whole tending 
towards dynamics, only further cements this categorisation of the FBI at Waco 
as being a closed organisation.
4.4.5 MESO usage
So far, little has been said on the topic of knowledge usage beyond the persistent 
message that there was poor communication between the different FBI teams on 
the scene. The reasons for this are as simple as they are blunt: very little in the 
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way of external expertise was used. It helps to recall that the crisis management 
team was not a regular structure and that each of the elements were pulled in 
due to a perceived need for those competences, not because they were set up 
to work together or had any previous interactions to fall back on. At the same 
time, this was a high-profile event that attracted a lot of outside attention from 
both professionals and amateurs among the public.
It also bears reiterating that there was still some internal consistency in these 
teams. They were all – quite literally in the case of the NCAVC – of the FBI school 
of thought, and had at least some basic training in common, as well as a reasonably 
consistent perception of what kind of opponent the Davidians represented. As 
time went on, and as the different teams had different interactions of varying 
length and intensity, that perception may have diverged, but the self-image of 
the FBI as an organisation that fights crime – that ultimately the opposition is 
essentially criminal – remained throughout the crisis. This may have helped a little 
in creating cohesion in the FBI effort, which in turn may have created a shared 
platform for knowledge exchange, but as mentioned on numerous occasions, the 
differing cultures and approaches to problem solving drastically hampered the 
team’s ability to coordinate and maintain any kind of knowledge arena.
Meta-knowledge
The flip-side of this arrangement was a significant monoculture in what kind 
of knowledge was available to the different teams, and to the bureau’s credit, it 
identified a number of areas where the special agents would not be sufficiently 
knowledgeable on their own. In particular, it was recognised that expertise in 
psychology, psychotherapy and psycholinguistics would be needed to assess the 
mental state and rationale of Koresh and of the Davidians as a group. The suppo-
sition was that some internal disagreement between the group leadership and 
its rank and file could be found and exploited, as was often the case with other 
criminal groups. There was also a perceived need for medical knowledge to assess 
the health effects and risks of the wounds that a couple of the Davidians had 
sustained – including Koresh. In addition, as conditions deteriorated, the risks 
for the children inside the compound, in particular, had to be determined and 
their state monitored to decide whether more direct action was needed sooner 
than planned. As the final CS gas assault plan was coming together, medical 
knowledge would also be needed to determine any health risks from exposure to 
the gas. Finally, and somewhat contrary to the prevailing narrative of the crisis, 
the FBI did indeed identify that some kind of expertise on the topic of religion, 
theology and cults would be needed in order to make sense of the innumerable 
biblical references and allusions that the Davidians used in their communication 
with the outside world.
All in all, this was a pretty fair assessment of the gaps in the FBI team’s 
knowledge, and a solid ground upon which to build good meta-knowledge usage. 
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The problem is that, while these needs were acknowledged, there were not treated 
equally. The knowledge that was already familiar and related to the bureau’s 
every-day work was heavily favoured over truly new and strange knowledge, 
like anything related to religious matters. This familiarity is evidenced by exactly 
whom was approached to fill those gaps. The psychologists, psychotherapists and 
medical doctors involved had all worked with the FBI before – some were already 
directly attached to the FBI Academy or even specifically to the NCAVC. As 
meta-knowledge is not just a matter of doing the initial knowledge inventory, but 
of taking action based on that inventory, these measures only go half-way. Going 
back to the basic definitions of the terms, the information of what’s missing is 
still just information, and it needs to be actionable in order to qualify as actual 
knowledge. The fact that the FBI chose not to look very far – a matter that will 
be discussed more in the section on empathic knowledge – somewhat diminishes 
the value of the meta-knowledge usage in this case, as does the evaluation that 
very little new and unfamiliar expertise was actually needed.
It is clear that the focus lay on finding expertise that fit with the pre-existing 
problem framing, rather than on figuring out whether that framing was accurate 
and if there was some underlying knowledge gap that could lead the whole effort 
wrong. While an attempt was made to establish whether a religious perspective 
could be a worth-while addition, this attempt was perfunctory at best, and ulti-
mately shut down by the experts that had already been found and who judged 
themselves entirely capable to handle such a seemingly trifling detail too. As previously 
mentioned, what we have here is a fairly standard identification paradox. The 
FBI agents were not knowledgeable enough about the problem they were facing 
to identify exactly what kind of problem it actually was. Consequently,they were 
incapable of properly evaluating the answers they received when they asked the 
available experts for advice on the matter.
Empathic knowledge
As a direct consequence of the meta-knowledge gaps, there is little in the way of 
empathic knowledge usage during the Waco siege. As mentioned, the FBI did 
not look very far afield to find the experts that were included in the effort, and 
we might even question to what extent they should be considered “external” to 
the bureau to begin with. They were approached because they had established 
credentials with the FBI already, having worked at the FBI Academy, at NCAVC, 
or through some other consulting work for the bureau. For the most part, their 
fields of expertise were ones that had been part of the agency tool kit for many 
decades – psychological profiling being perhaps the most obvious example. As 
such, none of these consultations really fulfil the qualification of the FBI trying 
to figure out who knows the answer to some otherwise unintelligible question. All 
the questions the bureau might have had, had already been formulated in such a 
way that they could be understood with the knowledge that was readily available.
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Similarly, any interactions between the three FBI teams on the scene do not really 
qualify as empathic knowledge usage either, in part because it was all internal to 
the bureau and did not cover the identified knowledge gaps anyway, but mostly 
because the friction between those teams meant that very little knowledge was 
exchanged between them to begin with. Ideally, the HRT scare tactics would 
be informed by any agreements the negotiators had made with the Davidians, 
and both those efforts would be informed by the profiling and assessments 
made by the NCAVC team and their associated scholars. Instead, the scholars 
mainly just confirmed the framing that the negotiators had already assumed, 
and the CINT and HRT efforts were continuously at odds with each other. All 
three had the same essential framing of the situation, all of them informed by 
the same FBI schooling, and all of them finding that there were not really any 
critical questions left unanswered.
That is not to say that there were no opportunities to realise that such questions 
did indeed exist. The FBI was approached by numerous groups and individuals 
who offered up their assistance and expertise in service of the agency. Since they 
all lacked previous credentials, and the FBI lacked the know-how to assess their 
trustworthiness and usefulness, all such requests were routed to the established 
group of experts. Invariably, the answer was that the offers were not worth the 
bother either because the source was questionable, or because the expertise was 
not deemed relevant to the problem at hand. Notably, a small team of religious 
scholars approached the FBI to help interpret Koresh’s biblical allusions “live” 
during the conversations between CINT and Koresh, but they were turned away 
per the standard procedure for such negotiations. They also tried to communicate 
with the Davidians indirectly through a local radio station, and through their 
lawyers, but whatever they gleamed through those exchanges remained on the 
outside of the FBI effort. The indirect communication at least had the effect 
of making the Davidians aware of the team, and consequently the Davidians 
asked the FBI negotiators to get in touch with them as these were seemingly 
people who understood the group’s religiously coloured language, and who might 
help the FBI understand it too. The negotiators allowed the communication to 
continue in a limited fashion, but made no real effort to include it in their own 
approach to the negotiations.
This can only really be seen a direct rejection of an empathic knowledge use 
case. The negotiators were more or less directly told that these scholars had 
knowledge that would help the FBI understand the situation, but based on 
their own assessment and backed by the experts they already had at hand, they 
concluded that this knowledge was unnecessary and unhelpful.
Second-order knowledge
That episode can also be seen as a rejection of a second-order knowledge usage: 
it was a recommendation regarding where to go to find out more, but it fell on 
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deaf ears. It is somewhat ironic that the Davidians themselves almost acted as 
knowledge brokers for the FBI in the bureau’s attempts at understanding the 
Davidians. At the same time, it is perhaps not surprising that this offer was refused 
by the FBI, seeing as how it came from their opponent in the conflict, and also 
seeing as how they had already been rejected for other reasons as described earlier. 
As mentioned, the prevailing opinion was that there were no unanswered – or 
at least no unanswerable – questions, and consequently, there was no apparent 
need to engage in anything that might be classified as empathic or second-order 
knowledge usage. This state of affair was further solidified by the fact that the 
individuals who might have had the outside connections to introduce and 
explore new problem framings and new approaches were all too wedded to the 
prevailing perception of the Davidians as traditional criminals and Koresh as a 
consummate con-man to make any use of those connections. Rather than acting 
as knowledge brokers, the scholars that had been approached came to take on 
the role of mind-guards in the groupthink-like dynamic that evolved within and 
between the FBI and the subject-matter experts.
In a sense, we find a second layer of identification paradoxes here: part of 
what gave rise to this dynamic was the fact that the scholars themselves had the 
same problem as the FBI agents had in identifying how well (or how poorly) 
they understood the rationale behind the Davidians’ behaviour. They used their 
own analytical frameworks to judge competing frameworks that they were not 
at all knowledgeable of. The most obvious instance is how psychologists and 
sociologists were making interpretations of the religious content of Koresh’s 
communications, and rather than stating that this was beyond their respective 
fields to analyse or opine on, they interpreted it as inconsequential, if nothing 
else because their respective analytical tool kits were not fit for that particular 
purpose. Unfortunately, the established narratives of the cult leader and con-
man were close enough to let these experts conclude that a theological analysis 
would not yield any useful insights, and thus their recommendation was that 
the FBI should not waste any time pursuing that line of inquiry. In addition, 
it is impossible to determine after the fact whether it actually would have made 
any difference, at least without resorting to hypotheticals and counter-factual 
reasoning. What can be said, however, is that these recommendations ensured 
that the strategy was never put to the test, and that Koresh’s theologically based 
logic and rationale was never challenged. 
All in all, then, the MESO-usage record of the Waco siege is pretty poor. There 
were some solid foundations to be found in the initial knowledge inventory, but 
the bureau did not act upon that awareness. Consequently, there were significant 
gaps in the organisational meta-knowledge. The most glaring, and potentially 
most critical missing pieces were deemed largely irrelevant to the task at hand, 
and there was no perceived need to figure out who else might fill in that missing 
knowledge. The one instance of finding out that some other party had relevant 
knowledge was rejected out of hand. Similarly, there was no felt need to look 
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further afield to find answers to any unresolved questions, simply because there 
apparently were no such questions. Again, the recommendation to approach a 
third party to highlight those questions was rejected.
In purely organisational terms, the way the teams are generally set up, and 
the way the FBI Academy and the NCAVC are habitually called in to help with 
tricky cases, both bear some superficial resemblance to a Community of Practice 
(CoP) that might, under other circumstances, help in identifying those needs 
and finding solutions to them. In practice, however, the relationship between 
the different units is rather one of competition than of collaboration, and the 
academy is – perhaps unsurprisingly – a bit too similar in outlook, framing, and 
subject-matter familiarity to what is already present on the scene to really be able 
to offer that fresh perspectives that really informs the CoP and the second-order 
knowledge it is meant to provide.
4.4.6 Conclusions from Waco
As one might expect from one of the most disastrous incidents in the FBI’s 
modern history, the Waco siege does not paint a pretty picture of how the agency 
behaved or how it solved the problems it was faced with. In the aftermath, it 
was determined that the strategic missteps and misunderstandings of what the 
agency would be dealing with had been a long time coming, and that the agency 
culture was in desperate need of reform. It would take a while to get there – some 
three years to be exact, as we shall see in the next chapter. Nevertheless, this still 
is pretty quick when talking about an organisation of the size and complexity 
of the FBI. The changes were initiated and started being implemented almost 
immediately after the siege was concluded with the firing of the bureau director, 
only half-way through his term.
In terms of looking at the analytical questions, the siege can be summed up 
by the following:
• It was unquestionably a crisis for the principal actor.
• The processes being used were not anticipated for the most part.
• The principal actor could not maintain an open mode of operation and, 
indeed, it is debatable whether there was an open mode to begin with.
• The principal actor demonstrated very few and very weak uses of MESO-
knowledge, even going so far as to actively counteract some uses.
• At least one, possibly two, negative reinforcement cycle(s) that increased the 
degree of crisis can be observed.
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While there are some interesting variations in how the degree of closed-ness 
should be judged between the organisation as a whole and the different units 
within that organisation, these results are trivially transposed onto the binary 
states of the analytical model:
• Degree of crisis: high.
• Degree of anticipation of process: low.
• Degree of closed-ness: high.
• Degree of MESO-usage: low
All in all, this is the most clear-cut case that will be dealt with in this study. Had 
the variables been measured in more continuous steps, the high “scores” had been 
very high, and the low ones very low, to the point where Waco could essentially 
be considered the ideal case for the ideal type model.
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Millennialist movements come in all shapes and sizes, with the only really common 
aspects being a belief in the fast approaching apocalypse and some kind of ground-
ing in Christian myth and religion. That is not to say that other faiths do not have 
their fair share of apocalyptic or even millenarian variants.7 However, in the 1990s, 
the conveniently close connection between the rapid changes in the world, the 
myth of the thousand-year golden age, and the new millennium just around the 
corner made Christian millennialists particular reason to stir. The FBI had, perhaps 
unknowingly, gotten its first tastes of this in the clash at Ruby Ridge in 1992, and 
more clearly in the Waco siege in 1993. These became the catalysts for making the 
connection between apocalyptic millennialism and right-wing militias. A connection 
made even stronger when in 1995, militia-sympathiser Timothy McVeigh cited the 
government’s handling of those two cases as his main motivation for his bombing 
in Oklahoma City. This string of events, along with the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas 
attack against the Tokyo subway proved that apocalyptic cults had become a very 
credible threat against society and one that had to be dealt with quickly. For the 
FBI, in particular, the events in the U.S. represented a string of fumbled operations 
and a clear sign that there was a significant knowledge gap that needed to be filled, 
especially since the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta could potentially offer a 
world stage for anyone attempting a similar attack.
7 “Millenarianism” and “millennialism” are two closely related concept that both describe the 
belief in the coming of massive worldly upheavals, The key difference is that “millenarianism” 
references the thousands of things that will change and is as such not tied to any particular 
religion, whereas “millennialism” specifically relates to and references the thousand-year reign 
and second coming of Christ.
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5.1 Background
In the spring of 1996, three years almost to the day after the Waco siege had 
started, and with the Olympic games only a few months away, the FBI once 
again found themselves besieging a well-entrenched opponent; this time in the 
farm country outside Jordan, Montana. The similarities between the Montana 
standoff and the Waco siege became immediately obvious. While the underlying 
logic may have differed, the militia movement saw the FBI as representatives of 
an illegitimate government infiltrated by the forces of evil. Again, the opposition 
was heavily armed and consisted of a large number of families – men, women, 
and children – which precluded any kind of immediate frontal assault. Also, it 
quickly became evident that the militia and the FBI did not exactly speak the 
same language even though the words and references were all the same.
5.1.1 The Roundup and Jordan Freemen
The Montana Freemen, as the group was commonly known, were a collective 
of families that had gathered in what they called the “Justus Township” – a play 
on the word “justice” and on “just us”, signifying both their isolation from 
society at large and their continued struggle against what they perceived as a 
corrupted legal system (Rosenfeld 2000:325). The group itself traces its roots 
back to a banking boom in the 1970s, when farmers were given ready access to 
large loans to increase their land ownership. It was a banking boom more than 
a farming boom, though, since these increased holdings did not readily translate 
into increased income and by end of the decade the federal interest rates were 
drastically increased in an attempt to fight inflation (Wessinger 2000b:161). 
As a result, many small farmers were now burdened with unproductive land 
and increasing debts. Some were able to down-size and re-establish themselves. 
Yet, many had no option but to sell, often to multinational or outright foreign 
conglomerate. Others tried to fight it out.
To understand the effects of this, we have to go back to the 1920s Christian 
Identity (CI) movement. Borrowing heavily on the even older British Israelite 
belief, the Identity Christians believe that the “Aryans” are one of lost Israelite 
tribes spoken of in the Bible and that they are lost because they took up residence 
in north-western Europe rather than in the holy land. Furthermore, this lost tribe 
is considered the only remaining “people of God” and that the Jewish people 
in particular, but extended to all Semitic people in general, have no connection 
to the original Israelites but are rather satanic invaders who took over the land. 
Thus, they believe the apocalyptic struggle between good and evil will be between 
the Aryans and the Jews; a belief that also supports the notion that Christ was a 
descendant of the true Israelites and was killed by the Jews as part of this struggle 
(Barkun 1997a:248, b; Ellwood 2000).
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Over the years, these core beliefs seeped into a huge number of essentially racist 
beliefs and ideologies and the various groups that subscribe to them, from Nazis 
to the Aryan Nation to Ku Klux Klan (KKK). In the 1960s, these beliefs formed 
the basis for the Posse Comitatus movement – a loose organisation with the intent 
to safeguard the individual’s right against the government, as these rights were 
believed to be under attack from the forces of evil and in particular from Jews. 
This basic idea was later formalised as the “Zionist Occupation Government” 
(ZOG): an assumed conspiracy among Jewish bankers and lawyers to infiltrate 
the U.S. government and slowly but surely strip the ordinary citizens of their 
Common Law rights,8 thereby laying the groundwork for the eventual, inevitable 
invasion of the satanic hordes. This idea parallels and feeds from the more general 
“New World Order” (NWO) conspiracy theory, where some evil agent – the 
exact nature of which depends on the individual theory – is attempting to set 
up a totalitarian world-spanning state to enslave all of humanity. The supposed 
counters to the ZOG conspiracy range from the outright militant Christian 
Reconstruction – forcefully turning the U.S. into a Christian theocracy – to the 
obstructionist Christian Constitutionalist and Common Law movements, which 
refuse to yield any “god-given” individual rights and instead take a more legalistic 
approach to the ZOG’s incursions. Even the name of the movement itself – Posse 
Comitatus9 – refers back to the common-law principle of the individual’s right 
and responsibility to form militias in order to help enforce the law of the land 
(cf. Barkin 1997a:249, 251; Ellwood 2000; Kaplan 2000; Rosenfeld 2000:343; 
Shupe 1998). Over time, a number of these groups came to calling themselves 
Freemen to highlight their struggle against the oppressive government, and their 
view of themselves as sovereign individuals, subject only to the laws of God and 
the Common Law doctrines that followed from them.
This focus on god-given rights and Common Law, and the belief in a Jewish 
conspiracy working to strip both away, fed neatly into the farming collapse in 
the early 1980s. From the CI perspective, the Jewish bankers were obviously 
running the whole thing, handing out loans, then altering the terms, and then 
using the equally “Jewish-controlled” legal system to enforce enclosures and 
bypass the individual’s rights to own property. (cf. Barkun 1997a253ff; Rosenfeld 
2000:328; Pitcavage 2001:965f ). In 1981, the Clark family living near Jordan 
8 The “Common Law” referred to here is a central belief in the movements rooted in CI and 
British Israelite beliefs. While it shares, and initially took, its name with the law system that 
spread throughout the British empire, it is a distinctly religious law, based on the Bible. As 
such, it will be denoted with capital letters to distinguish itself from the common law of the 
common-law system in place in the U.S.
9 Latin for “power of the county/community”. The term is perhaps most commonly known 
through the U.S. Posse Comitatus Act – a federal statute that prohibits the use of the federal 
armed forces to enforce domestic policies.
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in Garfield County. Montana, took a stand against this perceived incursion and 
stopped paying back the federal loan the family had taken in order to purchase 
a 960 hectare wheat farm.
Just over a decade later and some 150km away, in 1992, the Skurdal family 
bought a farm outside of Roundup in Musselshell County and almost immediately 
took an aggressive obstructionist stance against the local and state legislature. 
A wave of Common Law documents started flowing into the county attorney’s 
office declaring the Roundup farm a sovereign nation at war with the invasion 
force of the county. A legal back-and-forth ensued but ended with the attorney 
resigning and with the Montana Supreme Court issuing a ban on Skurdal’s access 
to the legal system along with a fine for mass filing spurious legal documents. 
The court also determined that the Skurdals had not payed federal tax, which 
eventually resulted in the farm being formally seized by the government and put 
up for sale, even though, in practice, no attempt was made to vacate the Skurdals 
from the property. At this time, the Skurdals were joined in their struggle by 
LeRoy Schweitzer, an esteemed Common Law expert in CI circuits, and later 
by the Petersen family.
Together, they escalated the paper conflict by not only ignoring the court order, 
but also teaching others how to use Common Law documents to fight the legal 
system and by issuing home-made drafts and counterfeit liens to property in the 
area. Using these drafts, they were able to take advantage of delays and unreliable 
processes in the banking system to withdraw money that they then used to buy 
vehicles and pay various legal fees (Wessinger 2000b:163ff, Pitcavage 1996). The 
shared perception of these Roundup Freemen was that the legal system was set 
up against them, and their own run-ins with the law seemed to confirm this. 
Thus, striking back by clogging up that system and using its own flaws against 
it was simply fair and just retribution. Further confirmation of the evils of the 
government came with the 1992 shootings at Ruby Ridge and the 1993 Waco 
siege. In the former, one of the main characters was Randy Weaver – an Identity 
Christian and a militia man – and in the latter, the Branch Davidians represented 
yet another form of Christian militia that claimed to be under attack from the 
forces of Babylon. The Davidians’ interpretation of the siege was fully in line 
with the world view of the Christian Identity movement (Wessinger 2000b:165).
In early 1994, the Roundup Freemen and similar groups in the region took 
control over the Garfield County courthouse to formally set up their own local 
government. Presiding over the matter and acting as judge was the head of the 
nearby Clark family. Over the last decade, the Clarks’ initial $700,000 loan had 
accrued an unpaid debt that was approaching $2 million. Consequently, the 
Clark farm had been foreclosed and sold by the bank, and was to be put up for 
auction later the same year. Having appropriated the role of judge, Richard Clark 
now ruled the judged who had passed sentence on the family to be in contempt 
of the Freemen’s Common Law court, and posted a $1 million bounty on the 
sheriff who was to handle the farm auction (Pitcavage 1996). 
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In response, the Garfield County attorney indicted the Freemen for imperson-
ating public officials, engaging in criminal syndicalism, and advocating political 
terrorism (Pitcavage 1996). However, the forcefulness of these charges, as with 
the bank rulings, was often somewhat diminished by the lack of any means to 
execute them. The local police force was low on manpower and lacked both train-
ing and equipment to take on the militia men. Occasionally, short-term arrests 
were made for immediate infractions such as trespassing on private property and 
threats against county officials. In a slightly ironic twist, the Freemen’s attempts 
at acquiring more and heavier firearms than the rifles and shotguns they already 
had fell through as they tried to use one of their counterfeit money orders to 
pay for it, and the weapons dealer took enough precautions before delivery for 
the deception to be discovered.
In early 1995, after one of the local Freemen in Roundup was finally success-
fully convicted for posting the $1 million bounty and threatening to hang the 
sheriff if he was brought in, the matter was escalated further. The Freemen started 
making plans to kidnap the sheriff themselves and try him in an ad hoc Common 
Law court, but their planning efforts caused enough commotion to tip off the 
FBI. The district judge and the sheriff’s office were notified, who in turn stepped 
up their vigilance against the Freemen. Not a day later, two of the Freemen were 
stopped for driving a truck without license plates, and when searched, the truck 
was found to contain maps over the judge’s and the sheriff’s offices and homes, 
a number of unlicensed concealed weapons, numerous handcuffs, camera and 
radio equipment, and nearly $90,000 in gold, silver, and cash. This was obviously 
a part of the kidnapping crew they had just been informed about. A scant few 
hours later, three more Freemen walked into the jail where the first presumptive 
kidnappers were being held and demanded to be given the items found in the 
truck. When the three newcomers accidentally exposed the concealed weapons 
they carried, they too were put under arrest. Two more Freemen were waiting 
in a locked car outside, and when deputies approached to inspect the vehicles 
and their passengers, these two were also found to be carrying illegal weapons 
and were arrested (Wessinger 2000b:164; Pitcavage 1996).
In the end, the majority of arrests and indictments of that day failed in court 
due to the procedures used to search the people and vehicles. However, there was 
no longer any doubt that the Roundup Freemen presented a credible and active 
threat to the local government officials. The non-Freemen population was also 
becoming increasingly restless over the fact that nothing seemed to happen, although 
there were some early suspicions that the FBI were now actively monitoring the 
situation due to the many unfamiliar vehicles and individuals that started to 
appear in the area (Pitcavage 1996). The Oklahoma bombing on April 19, 1995 
caused even further frictions. On the one hand, it demonstrated the threat of the 
militia movement and increased the intolerance against the militias, but it also 
helped in the militias’ recruitment. The Skurdal family alone had taken in half 
a dozen new Freemen and were quickly running low on space in the Roundup 
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farm. In September 1995, the Roundup Freemen had outgrown their means 
and relocated to Jordan, joining the group that had gathered on the Clark farm. 
The farm was renamed the “Justus Township” and declared sovereign territory 
(Wessinger 2000b:195).
The reaction of the Freemen’s neighbours was hostile. They started making 
their own plans for acts of sabotage against the Clark farm – cutting telephone 
lines the roads leading to the farm – to which the Freemen responded by pro-
claiming that they would start travelling in armed packs to ensure their own 
safety. Their rhetoric against the government and legal system was also ratcheted 
up, threatening to shoot on sight anyone who interfered with their activities 
and posting even more bounty posters for the capture of public officials. Their 
activities had drawn a fair amount of media attention, and the Freemen leveraged 
their new-found fame by demanding payments to appear in interviews, and 
confiscated tens of thousands of dollars worth of equipment from a TV crew 
that had come to make a report on them. Other money-making schemes were 
the seminars on Schweitzer’s interpretation of Common Law and workshops on 
how to obstruct the U.S. legal system. These seminars had high entrance fees but 
still attracted hundreds of attendants, to the point where a full 30-person staff 
had to be employed to keep them organised (Pitcavage 1996).
The Freemen’s brazen attitude and quick growth had also made them at odds 
with the Militias of Montana (M.O.M.) movement, which was an attempt to 
organise a more formal militia in the state as a direct response to the Ruby Ridge 
incident. One of the six individuals arrested in early 1995 had been one of the 
founders of M.O.M., although at the time, his co-founder of the movement 
issued a statement that M.O.M. had no relationship with the Freemen. By 
1996, the Freemen’s success had started to leech away members from M.O.M. 
and thus started to threaten the cohesion and unity that M.O.M. was founded 
to create. In particular, the remaining leadership found the head figures of the 
Freemen – Schweitzer, Skurdal, and Clark – too aggressive and confrontational 
in their attitude, and too strict and absolutist in their beliefs, to be a reliable 
party for co-operation (Pitcavage 1996).
On March 25, 1996, LeRoy Schweitzer and Daniel Petersen were travelling 
outside the farm to inspect a radio tower that had been installed to secure a 
means of communication with the outside world, should the neighbours go 
through with their sabotage plans. On arriving, the two were apprehended by 
FBI agents on numerous charges of conspiracy and threat against government 
officials and functions. The federal justice system and law enforcement had now 
become directly involved. While initially shocked by the legal antics the Freemen 
had been using for years and now displayed during the arraignment hearing, it 
became clear that the federal authorities would not be as easily shouted down as 
the local officials. The remaining Freemen quickly hunkered down at the Clark 
farm to face off against the FBI and the local community rejoiced that some 
forceful action was finally about to be taken. Meanwhile, the media that had 
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already found an attention-grabbing subject in the militia movement in general, 
and the Freemen in particular, started preparing for yet another Waco-style siege 
between the FBI and an armed opponent.
5.1.2 The FBI after Waco
The disastrous handling of the Waco siege was a wake-up call for the FBI. 
Together with Ruby Ridge, it highlighted a development in society that had 
received precious little attention up until this point. Both events also acted as a 
trigger for a distinctly U.S. brand of domestic terrorism. The militia movement 
was already reasonably well established and known, but the combination of basic 
millennial beliefs combined with these apparent misuses of government powers 
against individual rights caused an almost immediate and perceptible upswing 
in engagement and activity among these groups. Waco had further highlighted 
deficiencies in the agency’s problem-solving procedures as well as in its crime 
laboratories. Crucial evidence from the Mt. Carmel fire had been misplaced or 
outright lost and therefore presented an incomplete picture of the events for the 
first round of congressional hearings (Reavis 1998:278ff; HCoGR 2000:2, 5ff). 
While some was later recovered and yet did not significantly alter the picture of 
what had happened, the negligence reflected poorly on what was supposed to 
be the nation’s premier forensic authority. It also further fuelled the accusations 
of a cover-up and similar conspiracy theories, all of which fit perfectly into the 
narrative of the NWO and ZOG beliefs of many right-wing groups.
Even before Waco, FBI Director Sessions was being investigated for improper 
use of agency means – yet another deficiency in the bureau’s procedures – and 
shortly after the siege, his position became untenable. Half-way through his 
tenure, he was forced to resign and was replaced by Director Freeh. This was a 
conflux of a number of events: the proven procedural deficiencies, the operational 
fiasco, the ouster of the head of the agency, a new attorney general in need of 
washing out the failure of her first large operation on the job, an obvious threat 
to society on the rise, and a high-profile international event – the 1996 Atlanta 
Olympics, a prime target for terrorism – was only years away. In combination, 
it created an environment of deep reform within the agency. This new threat 
needed to be analysed and methods for responding to it needed to be created.
A major source of criticism for the handling of Waco was the religious scholars 
who felt that they had not been let into the process to the extent where their 
expertise could be put to any use (cf. Tabor 1995; Tabor & Gallagher 1995; 
Reavis 1998:253f). While a handful had been approached for minor consultations 
about the history and nature of the Davidian cult, the general sense was that they 
had possessed the knowledge needed to decode David Koresh’s rhetoric and the 
rationale for his actions, and that this knowledge could have significantly helped the 
negotiators. This, then, became the first gap that the FBI needed to fill. In 1994, 
two events of importance took place. First, the bureau established the Critical 
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Incident Response Group (CIRG), with the mission to act as a liaison between 
tactical elements, negotiators, and outside expertise on any given topic and in 
almost any kind of crisis situation. It was intended to be a knowledge nexus for 
both for competences that existed within the FBI, but which were fragmented 
across numerous divisions and geographic locales, and for competences that were 
too esoteric to the core mission of the agency but which could still be of crucial 
importance for a particular incident (Barkun 2002; Romano 1998).
In order to fulfil this mission, CIRG instituted the Special Advisory Commission 
that would be tasked with building a network of scholars that went beyond the 
standard FBI fare of psychiatry and criminology. The commission started its work 
in earnest in the second half of 1995 and delivered its final recommendations 
to the FBI in February 1996. The idea it presented was to have a core group of 
multidisciplinary scholars and a number of staff positions that who would act as 
liaisons with the FBI’s operational personnel in the field. In a parallel move, and 
to fulfil the particular need for religious expertise that Waco had highlighted, 
the Justice Department approached the American Academy of Religion (AAR) 
in 1994 to see if it could help educate the FBI and other federal agencies about 
the inner workings of religious groups such as the Davidians. The same year 
also saw a conference on the topic of the Waco siege that brought together law 
enforcement officials and academics to discuss various aspects of that crisis. From 
this conference grew the Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG) which became 
a more permanent institution for establishing, strengthening, and maintaining 
these kinds of contacts. The mission of CIAG was to bring together scholars 
and public officials, many in a decision-making role with crisis management 
responsibilities, and to also include a number of former or active FBI officials. 
Beyond just being a discussion forum, CIAG also offered the opportunity for, 
in particular the FBI, to “get a feel for” the other participants and to see if there 
were any potentially useful contacts among them for consultation in the future.
In April, 1995, the Federal Building in Oklahoma became the target of 
militia-connected domestic terrorism as a bomb blast killed 167 people and 
injured at another 684 (Shariat et al. 1998). The main perpetrators listed Ruby 
Ridge and Waco as their motivation and claimed that the attack was a direct 
revenge for how the FBI had handled the two incidents. If there was any doubt 
about the danger of the growing militia movements, the attack swept them away. 
In an annual FBI meeting later in 1995, this time dedicated to the Oklahoma 
bombing, the first contact between the AAR and the FBI was made. The AAR 
representatives were soon tied to CIRG’s Special Advisory Commission and later, 
through the contact person’s shared membership, to CIAG as well (Barkun 2002; 
Wessinger 2000b:179ff).
What would later be called “Project Megiddo” was born out of these efforts 
– an extensive FBI effort to map out and analyse the many aspects of the millenni-
alist movements, their individual peculiarities and belief systems, and the threat 
they posed to society and to law enforcement. The name of the project speaks 
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directly to the origins of this investigation. The field of Megiddo in Israel is 
perhaps better known under the name Armageddon – the site of the apocalyptic 
battle between good and evil in the Book of Revelations. Overlooking the field 
is Mount Carmel, from which the Branch Davidians took the name for their 
compound outside Waco. The final Project Megiddo report did not come out 
until 1999 (Barkun 2002; FBI 2002), but the lessons that had gone into it and 
the scholarly contacts that helped in creating it, got their first test trial in the 
spring of 1996 as the FBI indicted the leaders of the Montana Freemen (Barkun 
2002; Lamy 1997:110ff; Romano 1998).
The recent report from the Special Advisory Committee and the newly formed 
connection to AAR immediately became key components in the strategy to solve 
the crisis. From the outside, the perception that this would be another Waco was 
wide-spread.10 Inside the agency, the course is clear: it must absolutely not become 
a repeat of the events three years earlier. Instead of coming in with armoured 
vehicles, sniper teams and a perimeter patrolled by agents in camouflage clothing 
and black uniforms, regular vehicles and the regular casual office dress code became 
the norm. Instead of a siege, it turned into the “Freemen Standoff”, lasting 81 
days during which not a single shot was fired. There were no rifts between the 
tactical and negotiation efforts, and no attempts at intimidation or psychological 
warfare. When negotiations broke down, a critical new component of the effort 
was employed: the use of third-party intermediaries that did not come with the 
stigma – from the Freemen’s point of view – of being part of the FBI or any 
other branch of the government. In fact, many of these go-between negotiators 
were themselves part of the militia movement and adherents to some form of 
Chrisian Identity beliefs (Romano 1998; Rosenfeld 2000:334).
Even though the religious experts who had ben turned away during the Waco 
siege were now included and contributed with their analysis of the motivations of 
the Freemen, by June, a type of expertise that proved crucial to the negotiation 
efforts came from a completely new direction. The FBI established contact with 
the CAUSE Foundation – a group that described itself as “an international civil 
rights legal foundation that defends the rights of the unpopular, the powerless, 
and the politically incorrect.” This description was in contrast to the Southern 
Poverty Law Center who listed CAUSE as a right-wing hate group (AP News 
1996-06-11a; Rosenfeld 2000:334). Originally named “The Patriots’ Defence 
Foundation” (PDF), their current name is an acronym for the territories ruled by 
10 A curious artefact left behind from these early days of the Internet was a special edition section 
on the CNN website. Now removed, it was apparently pre-emptively set up to offer a full com-
pilation of daily reports and features from the expected siege. While it remained active during 
the entire standoff, the reports became less frequent and less detailed as time went on, as the 
crisis never reached the levels of drama many initially had guessed. This is also reflected in the 
chronology and in the source material (CNN 1996).
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the “true Israelite” tribes of Christian Identity beliefs: Canada, Australia, United 
States, South Africa, and Europe. CAUSE members had previously acted as 
attorneys and legal counselors for Waco survivors and for the head of the KKK, 
and they were well-versed in both Common Law and the formally established 
U.S. legal system. This unique legal knowledge let them act as interpreters of 
sorts between the demands of the FBI and the demands of the Freemen (cf. AP 
1996-06-11a; SPLC; Stormfromt 1994).
5.2 Chronology of events
An immediate key difference between Waco and Montana is that in acting against 
the Freemen, FBI was the initiating party. The conflict between the militia and 
the legal system was certainly a pre-existing fact at that point, but the agency was 
not handed a crisis started by someone else. Instead, the bureau started its own 
on-going investigation mid-1995. The first federal indictment came in May 1995 
in response to the uncovered plot to kidnap a Garfield County sheriff, which charged 
five of the Freemen leaders with conspiracy to impede government functions; 
conspiracy to prevent official duties with force, intimidation or threats; threats to 
assault, kidnap or murder a district judge; and threatening mail correspondence 
with the same judge (Pitcavage 1996). A second indictment was handed down 
in December 1995, adding seven more suspects and a charge of 51 counts of 
conspiracy to defraud, and interference with commerce. As a direct result, FBI 
had significantly more control over the situation from the very start and took 
the approach that this must not become another Waco. In fact, it should not 
even be allowed to become a proper crisis.
On Monday March 25, 1996, a nearly year-long investigation reaches its 
conclusion. Having identified that the Clark farm is too much of an encamp-
ment and that the combination of open terrain, almost two dozen heavily 
armed militia members, and the presence of children does not offer any good 
opportunity for a tactical assault, the FBI instead opts for trickery to get their 
arrests. The same terrain that offers little cover for an assault offers excellent 
opportunity for surveillance and eavesdropping, and the FBI start installing 
such equipment months before the first arrest. The FBI takes advantage of the 
escalating conflict between the Freemen and the locals in the area to have an 
undercover agent take on a job to install a radio tower a distance away from the 
Justus Township as a back-up means of communication for the group. As the 
work nears completion, two of the indicted Freemen leaders are asked to visit the 
site for a final inspection. They arrive together with a third man and all three are 
promptly arrested without any complication, the third man on a separate charge 
of aiding in smuggling weapons and money for the Freemen. At the same time, 
some 100 agents take up positions around the Clark farm, urging the remaining 
10 suspects to surrender and offering everyone else free passage (CNN 1996-
03-26; Pitcavage 1996; Wessinger 2000b:167ff). There are no real negotiations 
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between the parties. The Freemen have no interest in dealing with the FBI, who 
they consider an illegitimate agency representing an equally illegitimate federal 
government. Nor do they crave media attention after a year of having reporters 
trying to get the group’s view on the legal escalation with local and state law 
enforcement. From the very start, this makes the interaction with them very 
different from the preaching outreach practiced by the Davidians three years 
earlier (Wessinger 2000b:181).
The next day, an attempt is made to hold an arraignment hearing, but the two 
Freemen attempt to drown out the judge with their shouting, citing Common 
Law reasons why the court and the charges are illegitimate and why the hearing 
should be held in their own country, meaning in the Justus Township. Meanwhile, 
the FBI agents are holding a light perimeter outside the Clark farm that mainly 
consists of a few observation posts and inspection points along the roads. The 
phone lines are cut and the roads leading directly to the farm are blocked to 
keep away visitors, but also to keep the media out. The bureau cites previous 
incidents where reporters have been ransomed and robbed as reason to keep 
the media at a safe distance from the Freemen rather than cut the Freemen off 
from having access to the media. The CIRG is activated and tasked with keeping 
negotiation efforts going. On site, it is explained to the militia members that 
only the ten members named in the two indictment from the previous years will 
be arrested – everyone else is free to leave. Six of the Freemen take up this offer 
and are indeed allowed to pass through the perimeter without incident and leave 
the farm (CNN 1996-03-28; Pitcavage 1996).
The response from the outside world is varied. A local bank hangs up a sign 
welcoming the FBI to town, and other residents of the area go so far as to say they 
want to see helicopter gunships and blood (AP 1996-03-27). Militia organisations 
from across the country speak up against what appears to be another assault on 
individual rights, citing incidents such as Waco and Ruby Ridge as templates 
for what will happen, but as their geographic distance to Montana decreases, 
the organisations become more and more in favour of the operation since they 
view the Freemen as competitors. A Militia of Montana representative merely 
indicates that M.O.M. will send someone to monitor the situation and say that 
they praise the FBI’s handling of the situation. The Tri-State Militia (a loose 
umbrella organisation located one state over, in South Dakota) states that the 
Freemen’s record of defrauding honest American citizens and institutions are a 
disgrace for an organisation calling itself “patriotic” (Pitcavage 1996). Another 
right-wing organisation that takes notice is the controversial CAUSE Foundation 
– a group of lawyers specialising in the legal defence of militia and hate-group 
members, especially in cases against the federal government. The foundation had 
already had some contact with the FBI in this capacity in 1993, when it offered 
to act as a mediator at Waco. After that siege, the foundation took some of the 
surviving Davidians as clients in the suits and counter-suits between them and 
the FBI. However, as far as negotiation efforts go, the bureau declines any help 
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from CAUSE, just as they did at Waco (Rosenfeld 2000:334, 339; Wessinger 
2000b:191).
Not until Thursday, March 28, can a proper hearing be held. This time, the 
accused Freemen are simply held in a separate room connected via video link, and 
their attempts at drowning out the proceedings result in the link being muted 
until they stop (CNN 1996-03-28). Outside of the court room, the renowned 
Christian Patriot Bo Gritz, who was instrumental in getting Randy Weaver to 
surrender in the Ruby Ridge incident, starts discussing the need for some form 
of intervention to bring the matter to a close. Other militia groups talk about 
creating a relief mission to bring groceries into the compound (Pitcavage 1996). 
The next day, bail hearings are held and the two Freemen take a more subdued 
approach. They still claim the court is illegitimate and refuse any counsel, with 
Schweitzer declaring that he is on a hunger strike until a grand jury is convened 
(CNN 1996-03-29, 30; Pitcavage 1996).
During the week-end, Schweitzer’s six-day strike comes to an end and he is 
taken to hospital. At the same time, one of the ten remaining suspects (one of 
the Clark family members), turns out to not be among those holed up on the 
farm as he turns himself in to the FBI from a community 150km away from 
Garfield County. As for the ones on the farm, the FBI states firmly that it will 
calmly wait until everyone comes out of their own free will (CNN 1996-03-30). 
A first offer of outside help is also made from a somewhat unexpected source: 
Randy Weaver. The bureau declines his and indeed anyone else’s help, but stays 
true to its commitment not to turn the situation into a siege. A couple of family 
members to the Freemen on the farm are allowed to briefly enter and visit their 
relatives in the hope that this will soften their resolve (CNN 1996-03-31, 04-02a; 
Pitcavage 1996).
Monday, April 1, sees the arraignment of Clark, who is initially passively 
uncooperative to the point of not even stating his name. The outside militia 
support is still indecisive as a rally being held the following day to support the 
Freemen has a turnout of only a handful, and the M.O.M. proclaims that militia 
followers from other states should stay away – Montana does not need their help 
(CNN 1996-04-02a). Very little is said about the negotiation efforts, but the 
first contact is made between the AAR and the FBI, suggesting that the agency 
should consult with religious expertise to form a better understanding of the 
Freemen’s motivations (Wessinger 2000b:181).
5.2.1 The Ohs negotiations
During the following days, Clark’s hearings continued, with the militia member 
still being uncooperative. At the farm, however, another member of the Clark 
family indicates that the Freemen will potentially be interested in entering 
some earnest negotiations if they can talk to someone “higher up” than the FBI 
(CNN 1996-04-03, 04). Seizing on the offer, the FBI lets four state represent-
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atives, meet with the Freemen in an open area on the farm (CNN 1996-04-04, 
Wessinger 2000b:181). This represents the first break in the negotiations since, 
as mentioned and up until this point, the Freemen have resisted all efforts from 
the FBI since the militia considers the agency as illegitimate as the rest of the 
legal system. The Freemen state that they will only surrender if their case can be 
heard in a Common Law-style grand jury of peers. The day also sees the entry 
of yet another Ruby Ridge alumnus. While Clark has continuously refused legal 
counsel in court, his relatives arranges for him to be represented by the same 
lawyer who got Randy Weaver acquitted, and he is also suggested as a mediator 
between the Freemen and the FBI although he says he will not take on this role 
unless asked by the agency (CNN 1996-04-02b, 04).
The negotiations continue on April 5, this time in the more private setting of 
a mobile home set up between the main farm building and the FBI road block. 
One of the state representatives involved, Karl Ohs, has a personal connection to 
a few of the Freemen inside, and this connection seems to pay off. The following 
day, a woman not on the indictment list leaves the farm with her daughter (CNN 
1996-04-05, 06; Wessinger 2000b:181f ). After this small victory, the week-end 
sees little in the way of further negotiations. Instead, the FBI’s already strained 
relationship with the militia movement takes a hit as news is being spread that 
a spokesperson for the Tri-State Militia, who had offered criticism against the 
Freemen and praise for the FBI early on, was a paid informant for the agency 
(Tulsa World 1996-04-07).
With the standoff entering its third week, the Freemen still refuse to negotiate 
with the supposedly illegitimate FBI since the agency will undoubtedly put them 
before a regular judge rather than the Common Law jury the Freemen demand. 
Instead, they opt to talk to a journalist who is eventually allowed in to do an 
interview. His first attempt on the 9th comes to an abrupt halt as the Freemen 
chase him off their property, but he is allowed back in the next day when he is 
able to produce an interview from a year before that proves he has a friendly 
outlook towards the group (CNN 1996-04-09, 10). Nevertheless, the next day, 
two of the Freemen indicted for fraud decide to surrender to the FBI: the husband 
and mother-in-law to the woman who left the compound five days earlier. In 
this case, it is a combination of Ohs’ efforts and the family members on the 
outside that convinces the two to come out (CNN 1996-04-11, 12; Wessinger 
2000b:181). In response to their continued demand for a Common-Law trial 
by jury, Ohs also puts forward the suggestion of a “legislative forum” where the 
Freemen can explain their point of view to the world and air their grievances. 
(CNN 1996-04-15).
With ten in total having left the farm, of which two are being processed by 
the legal system, the rest of the week sees little progress, but that does not mean 
that everything is quiet. April 15 sees the only death of the standoff when an 
FBI agent driving an SUV along a dirt roads near the farm loses control over 
the vehicle, which skids off the road and rolls down an embankment, throwing 
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the driver out in the process. The same road stretch had seen a similar accident 
a few weeks earlier when a news crew rolled off the road, only without the lethal 
outcome (Pitcavage 1996).
At the FBI roadblock, a few outside sympathisers attempt to enter the farm to 
either deliver various goods or to try to act as negotiators, but none are allowed 
in. The bureau has more luck in other parts of the country, where a member 
of the Freemen organisation is stopped for driving an unlicensed car and then 
found to be carrying bomb parts (CNN 1996-04-17). On April 18, almost 
two weeks after his last visit, Ohs returns to continue his negotiations with the 
Freemen with no immediate results. The FBI, however, is able to show some 
minor judicial progress and at the same time improve its work environment 
as it moves into the house previously occupied by the two Freemen arrested a 
week earlier. The house was part of the 1994 foreclosure auction, and with the 
property now empty, the new owner allows the FBI to use it as a staging area in 
direct connection to the Justus Township.
At the same time, a bomb is found and there are concerns that various 
militias, in Montana and in other parts of the country, will stage new attacks 
to commemorate the anniversary of the ’93 Waco siege and the ’95 Oklahoma 
bombing, both of which took place on April 19. The Oklahoma bombing had 
already set the pattern as the date when it took place was deliberately chosen as 
a reminder of the fiery end to the Waco siege. Consequently, the security around 
the Montana operation and around FBI installations elsewhere is tightened 
(CNN 1996-04-18). Previously, the leader of one of nation’s largest militia 
groups – the Michigan Militia – had made several attempts at gaining access to 
the Clark farm, and had suggested a “relief mission” to be executed on April 19, 
but when he finally arrives, he does nothing more than rail at the agents at the 
FBI roadblock and preach to the congregated media until they grow bored and 
leave (Pitcavage 1996). The only real manifestation that happens in the 19th is 
that militia sympathisers in various parts of the country fly the U.S. flag upside-
down – a shared symbol and rallying cry meant to demonstrate the corruption 
of the nation and its government.
5.2.2 The Gritz negotiations
Another week passes with little change and no incident. On April 24 and 25, 
Ohs returns for more talks along with the state chief prosecutor, leaving only with 
a 19-page statement from the Freemen on why the U.S. laws do not apply. Bo 
Gritz and Randy Weaver also make good on their proclamation from a month 
earlier as they arrive to offer their services as mediators between the FBI and 
the Freemen. While they are not immediately let in, the FBI nevertheless spend 
significant time talking to the two Christian Patriot activists (CNN 1996-04-25; 
Rosenfeld 2000:332). Gritz is allowed to see the Freemen the next day, on April 27, 
trying to impress on the militia members the severity of the situation and recalling 
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the disasters at Ruby Ridge and Waco. He reports back that there is supposedly 
22 people on the farm, although he only saw 16. Soon thereafter, one of them 
decides to hand himself in to the FBI. Not part of the original group, he had 
slipped past the FBI roadblock at an early stage of the standoff to lend support 
to the Freemen. He is arrested on that charge as well as on an unrelated charge 
of threatening state officials in Oklahoma the previous year (CNN 1996-04-28, 29; 
Wessinger 2000b:182).
Gritz’ negotiation efforts continue on the 28th, filling up almost the entire 
day. He reports that the Freemen are willing to surrender if it can be proven that 
they and the Justus Township are indeed subject to U.S. laws rather than the 
Common Law that the group used to establish the settlement. The distinction 
between the two remains the crux of the matter. He brings out a 26-page document 
and a video tape detailing the Freemen’s legal argument on the matter for the FBI 
to consider. The discussions continue the next day, with the Freemen adding the 
demand that they want to be given free passage to the state capital in Helena in 
order to present the matters before the governor and state legislature. The idea 
had previously been proposed during the discussions with Ohs, but the details of 
which could not be ironed out between the different parties. One of the families 
inside also receives a separate offer: if the family come out, the child custody 
charges against the mother may be dropped, letting the family retain some of its 
current cohesion (CNN 1996-04-28, 29; Wessinger 2000b:182).
On Tuesday, April 30, Ohs returns along with an special prosecutor for the 
state attorney general’s office in a separate consultation with the group. The idea 
of a meeting with the legislature has re-emerged and that becomes the focus of 
the discussions. Before they leave, they also make the offer that, if the Freemen 
surrender to the FBI within the next 24 hours, the state of Montana will drop 
its charges against the militia members. Gritz then instead enters the compound 
to take over the mediation effort, but one participant expresses concern that the 
negotiators are trying too hard to drive a wedge between moderate and hard-liner 
Freemen and that this is instead creating mistrust against their efforts. This is 
somewhat contradicted by Gritz, who states at least one of the militia members 
is willing to come out in exchange for a promise that her children will not be 
taken away from her. Gritz also reports that, while the Freemen seem elated over 
the offer made by the Ohs group, it still means the Freemen would have to sur-
render to the very federal authorities and judicial system they dismiss as wholly 
illegitimate (AP News 1996-05-01; CNN 1996-05-01; Wessinger 2000b:182). 
The state legislature does not express any elation over the idea of a legal forum 
before the Freemen have fully surrendered to the judicial system, and after a final 
session on May 1, Gritz gives up on trying to negotiate any kind of deal with the 
Freemen. The offer from the previous day about dropped state charges in exchange 
for surrender seems to have been interpreted by them as if the charges had effec-
tively already been dropped. Gritz reports back that this apparent smaller victory 
has, if anything strengthened the militia’s belief in their cause. The Freemen tell 
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him that “Yahweh has placed an invisible barrier around our sanctuary that no 
more enemies can penetrate” and he, in turn says that “I don’t see any way they’re 
going to deny this oath to God.” (AP News 1996-05-01; Rosenfeld 2000:327). 
Gritz draws an immediate comparison with the Davidians’ expressing the same 
idea at Waco, and, for much the same reasons, sees little chance of the standoff 
ending without the FBI actively going in to arrest the Freemen. He then departs 
from Montana and leaves the rest of the negotiation in the hands of Ohs and the 
state special prosecutor (AP News 1996-05-01; CNN 1996-05-02). In spite of 
this explicit statement, and contrary to Gritz’ interpretation, the is FBI is still 
mostly of the perception that the religious overtones are mainly a cover story – an 
attempt on the Freemen’s part to throw a thin veil of legitimacy over their actions, 
even if only in their own eyes. The AAR scholars, on the other hand, see this as 
evidence of what they call an “ultimate concern:” an issue that is so critical and 
overwhelming that all other matters are secondary. According to them, the key 
to solving the standoff is to figure out the core nature of this concern and find a 
way to mollify or even completely neutralise that anxiety (Rosenfeld 2000:327f, 
330ff; Wessinger 2000b:5ff, 190)
5.2.3 Renewed tension
The break-down in the negotiation effort is confirmed on May 2. An offer to meet 
with the FBI directly is presented, but the Freemen instead opt to talk directly 
to the media. The Freemen deliver a letter and a video tape declaring that the 
bureau has no jurisdiction over them; in fact, it is not even a valid government 
agency to begin with. Furthermore, the group will not accept any leniency from 
the state legislature. Again, they reiterate that only a Common Law court of peers 
is acceptable or able to render any verdict over them (Wessinger 2000b:183). 
Instead, the next couple of days are spent in a slow escalation of preparation on 
both sides. The Freemen start stockpiling fire wood and set up an observation post 
on a ridge overlooking the area, whereas the FBI increases its aerial reconnaissance. 
Previously, family members had been permitted to visit for a few hours, but 
this week, the FBI does not allow any family members to enter the farm (CNN 
1996-05-07).
Outside of Montana, a group of religious scholars connected to the American 
Academy of Religion start discussing internally on what they might be able to 
offer the FBI in way of expert advice, and they contact the FBI Academy on 
May 6 (Wessinger 2000b:183). The bureau responds the next day by sending 
over a number of questions on what the appropriate course of action might 
be at this point, and the scholars in turn suggest the inclusion of a handful 
of religious experts into the negotiation planning. The religious scholars also 
send over some preliminary informational material and analysis on the topic of 
millennialist beliefs. By May 9, a direct formal contact between the experts and 
the negotiation efforts is established by way of the CIRG. While the negotiators 
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convey the perception that the Freemen do not seem particularly religious, the 
scholars point to the statement of “Yahweh’s barrier” and the use of Common 
Law liens as patterns of an essentially religious – or even magical – belief: that 
by mere belief, things will come true (Wessinger 2000b:184f ). 
The same day, negotiations are once again attempted. This day, Karl Ohs 
returns for another short consultation with the Freemen but without being able 
to report back much in the way of progress towards a solution to the standoff 
(CNN 1996-05-09). Meanwhile, the communication between the FBI and the 
religious scholars continue. The latter try to press the importance of the religious 
symbolism and almost ritual nature of the Freemen’s activities so far, showing 
parallels with nativist movements of the last century, with the Davidians, Aum 
Shinrikyu and the Solar Temple. They also suggest that efforts such as the ones 
attempted by Gritz will most likely prove the most fruitful; that is, the use of 
intermediaries that can “speak the Freemen’s language” as well as the language 
of the federal system. (Wessinger 2000b:183ff).
A few days later, on May 14, the stand-off has surpassed the length of the 
Waco siege and a debate is brewing over the virtue of waiting and the need for 
swift(er) resolution. On the one hand, Waco showed that even 51 days could be 
too soon, but on the other, the costs are mounting and the symbolic damage from 
a small group being able to refuse to submit to the legal system keeps increasing 
(CNN 1996-05-15). Even previous negotiators such as Gritz and the state special 
prosecutor are advancing the idea of a raid to end the stand-off (Wessinger 
2000b:186). The day sees another visit from Ohs as well as news that Colorado 
State Senator Charles Duke will be joining the negotiation effort in a couple of 
days on the request of the Freemen. Like Gritz, Duke is a staunch supporter of 
the right-wing militia movement and an opponent of the federal government, at 
least in its current form. Labelling himself as a zealot and revolutionary, he is a 
leadership figure in the burgeoning Tenth Amendment, or “Tenther” movement. 
Its followers interpret the cited amendment to the U.S. constitution as meaning 
that the federal government has next to no rights over the nation’s citizens. The 
year before, he made headlines by laying the blame for the Oklahoma bombing 
squarely at the feet of the federal government and its incursions into state and 
individual rights (ADL 1996-05-21; Colorado Springs Independent 2007-10-04).
Duke’s mediation begins on May 15. The senator clearly states that he is 
merely trying to bring the standoff to an end, as is the FBI, but this does not 
mean that he is working for the bureau. Even though he was invited on the 
Freemen’s behest, Duke says he only sympathises with the Freemen’s goals but 
not with the methods they have used and which have landed them in the current 
situation. The hope is that Duke’s position as both an anti-government militia 
activist and as an elected official in a legislative state body will let him bridge 
the gap between the two parties. There is some initial strength to this argument 
as Duke’s efforts lead to the first face-to-face meeting between the Freemen and 
the FBI two days later. Over the next days, the two parties meet for one or two 
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hours every day and a laundry list of issues related to both the Freemen’s griev-
ances and the FBI’s demands is put together. While Duke later states that there 
are some points of agreement and headway is being made towards a resolution, 
bureau officials deny that any deals have been made (CNN 1996-05-18, 19; 
Wessinger 2000b:186).
The talks also start to focus on the remaining families on the farm. The FBI 
expresses some concern for the well-being of the children that have been hidden 
away so far during the stand-off, especially after some initial reports of the Freemen 
rationing food and water, and the FBI is finally allowed to meet with some of 
them. Their lack of visibility has so far created some uncertainty about the exact 
number of people holed up on the farm. The official FBI estimates have said the 
number is somewhere around 18, whereas negotiators such as Gritz and Duke, 
who have been allowed access to the Freemen’s houses, have put the number at 
22 (including the man who left after Gritz’ first visit). The hope is now that some 
of these families can be persuaded to leave the Justus Township since no federal 
or local charges exist against them (AP News 1996-05-20; CNN 1996-05-20). 
Duke expresses some concern that the Freemen are not likely to want to exchange 
the relative safety and familiarity of the township for whatever uncertain future 
awaits them outside, especially for the ones who are facing federal prosecution. 
Nevertheless, he is still happy to have been able to finally make the two parties 
meet and to both offer concessions in the negotiation process. He intimates that 
now that the official talks have started, he will exit the proceedings on May 22 
(CNN 1996-05-20; Wessinger 2000b:186f ).
On May 21, however, his cautious optimism proves premature. The FBI 
receives a list of demands from the Freemen and as the negotiations continue, 
it keeps being expanded to the point where Duke declares the entire effort an 
exercise in lunacy. One late demand is that the President declares a constitutional 
emergency to address the Freemen’s concerns. After a last agitated discussion, 
Duke and the FBI agents quickly leave the negotiation table and the Freemen 
begin to send out armed patrols around the township border. Having previously 
made a name for himself with his anti-federal stance and his sympathy for the 
Freemen’s cause, Duke states unequivocally that the FBI has done everything in 
its power to reach a peaceful solution and that the Freemen are not the patriots 
they claim to be and that. Rather, they are frauds who have no interest in any real 
resolution and “they need to feel some pain.” In addition to the armed guards, 
the Freemen respond to the break-down by flying the militia movement’s symbol 
of an upside-down U.S. flag to signal the supposed plight of the nation (CNN 
1996-05-21, 22; Wessinger 2000b:186f ).
The break-down sparks worries that the stand-off will take a more  aggressive 
turn, and the AAR scholars urge the FBI to not let perceptions of a regular 
 hostage-barricade situation drive its strategy. They posit that any effort that 
does not take the Freemen’s core belief system into account is bound to either 
just fail outright or drive the group towards a stronger cohesion as their views on 
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the oppressive and ZOG-influenced government are given further confirmation 
(Wessinger 2000b:187f ). One of the scholars suggests that experts in Common 
Law might be able to address some of the concerns of the remaining Freemen 
(Wessinger 2000b:191).
For the FBI’s part, the break-down causes the agency to start preparing new 
measures. Two portable generators are brought to the area so that the power grid 
feeding the Justus Township can be cut off without affecting some of the neigh-
bouring farms that sit on the same grid. The bureau also posts armed guards to 
block off more access roads leading in and out of the area (CNN 1996-05-23, 
24, 29). Karl Ohs is brought back to try to get the negotiations back on track 
and spends a couple of hours discussing with the Freemen. Yet no real change 
in the attitudes of either party is made and the next few days offer nothing but 
tense waiting. The FBI also tries to establish a direct contact between the AAR 
representatives and the Freemen, but since the militia members refuse to answer 
the Bureau’s calls, the attempt proves futile (Wessinger 2000b:189). The only 
development is an increase in tension between FBI and the media roughly a week 
later, after a small journalist crew sneaks through the perimeter to try to arrange 
an interview with the Freemen. This leads FBI to evict all journalists from their 
encampment overlooking the farm (CNN 1996-05-29). 
On May 28, acting on the suggestion of the religious scholars and on the 
offer given two months earlier, the FBI contacts the CAUSE Foundation to 
act as intermediaries and “interpreters” of the legal issues involved (Rosenfeld 
2000:339). The Foundation legal team has the intersection between Common 
Law and actual U.S. jurisprudence as one of its specialities, and was founded 
specifically to provide “civil rights representation for white majority, primarily 
involving overzealous government” (cf. AP 1996-06-11a; SPLC; Stormfromt 
1994).
5.2.4 Increased pressure
The news of the AAR’s involvement breaks on May 30, and the media quickly 
make the connection between the scholars’ presence in Montana and their criti-
cism against being shut out of the proceedings at Waco (CNN 1996-05-31). 
The next day, the spectre of Waco makes itself further known by the arrival of 
armoured vehicles and helicopters to the operation area. However, unlike the 
Combat Engineering Vehicles (essentially military armoured personnel carriers 
converted for demolition tasks) that were used in Texas, these are emergency 
service rescue vehicles that have been armour-plated to offer protection for EMTs 
and wounded individuals. The FBI describes the vehicles as entirely defensive 
(CNN 1996-05-31, 06-02).
Having established that the Freemen do indeed exhibit a strong millennialist 
pattern, and even making some headway into building an understanding with 
the negotiators of what this actually means, the AAR scholars continue to analyse 
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the situation. They still consider the militia members as “ultimately concerned” 
in some way, but the question remains about what. An initial hypothesis would 
link the concern to the core beliefs of the entire Christian Identity or Christian 
Patriot movement, but the repeated break-down in negotiations at the hands of 
CI/CP-evangelists, such as Gritz and Duke, suggests that something other than 
individual freedom or the fight against the ZOG is at play. Ohs will later state 
that Gritz and Duke were too occupied with scoring political points within their 
respective movements and against the federal government to really be able to 
address the Freemen’s specific concerns (Wessinger 2000b:189). Rather, the issue 
seems more grounded in the Justus Township itself. It was the establishment of 
this shared space that had brought the group together, but their decade-and-a-half 
long struggle to keep the farm that had generated a large amount of animosity 
within the local community (Rosenfeld 2000:332; Wessinger 2000b:190).
After nearly two weeks of preparation, the power to the Clark farm is cut 
on June 3. The surrounding farms rely on their own emergency power or on the 
extra generators the FBI had previously brought in, as do the FBI posts surround-
ing the farm. While most in the area assume that the Freemen, too, will have 
some means of generating emergency power, it is unclear for how long they 
can stand to be disconnected from the main power grid. The bureau also starts 
doing helicopter fly-bys of the township, ostensibly more for surveillance than 
the kinds of sound warfare used in Waco (CNN 1996-06-03). Two days later, 
federal agents meet with the Freemen for the first time since the break-down 
two weeks earlier. They carry with them a formal offer from the state of Utah 
to the mother of the family targeted by the Duke negotiations proposed over a 
month earlier. The offer states that if the family comes out, the custody charges 
against the mother will immediately be dropped and her children will be put 
in the care of her sister, who is also allowed to come in and visit the family. The 
FBI also relays communication from the leader of the sect the woman belongs 
to, stating that she should do what is right and leave the Freemen. The next day, 
on June 6 and after these mass urgings, the family of four decides to come out. 
This reduces the number of people left to less than half the initial number at the 
beginning of the stand-off (CNN 1996-06-06, 07; Wessinger 2000b:190). It is 
also the first time in over a month that any of the ensconced Freemen has been 
persuaded to leave the farm. As before, the key to success seems to be specific 
individual concerns rather than any specific shared issue – hence the long and 
complex lists of demands that have been generated at every other occasion. Here, 
a message from God, courtesy of the sect leader, and an assurance that the family 
will not be split up assuages the concerns of those who choose to leave (Rosenfeld 
2000:335; Wessinger 2000b:190).
Their departure sparks further negotiations between the remaining Freemen 
and the FBI. Some consternation is made from the fact that the deal proposed 
to the family is altered after the fact: the Utah judge presiding over the custody 
case changes who will receive custody of the children and only affords the mother 
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very limited visitation rights. She comments that “They see me get screwed 
and they know they’re going to get screwed” and predicts that as a result of her 
treatment, the stand-off will end in bloodshed. (CNN 1996-06-07; Wessinger 
2000b:190). Even the FBI expresses concern that the altered deal from the Utah 
judge will create bad faith among the Freemen, but nevertheless, the negotiations 
continue over the next couple of days. The exit of the family and the continued 
negotiations also means the bureau decides to hold back on some of the isola-
tion tactics that have been prepared in case the break-down continues, such as 
jamming equipment to stop radio and cell-phone reception and to cutting off 
the Freemen’s satellite TV feed (CNN 1996-06-08).
5.2.5 Legal aid
On June 10, a week after the power was cut and two weeks after the initial contact 
was made, three lawyers from the CAUSE Foundation are finally allowed to meet 
with the Freemen to discuss the merits of both their and the FBI’s complaints. 
On the suggestion of the lawyers, and after much convincing of a very sceptical 
FBI team, the member of the Clark family who is the formal owner of the farm 
– Edwin Clark – is allowed to fly with the FBI to the jail where Schweitzer is 
being held. Schweitzer is consulted over a possible deal for surrender and its legal 
implications, and with his approval in hand, the entire group returns to Jordan 
to continue negotiations (AP News 1996-06-11b; CNN 1996-06-11, LA Times 
1996-06-15; Wessinger 2000b:191f ). June 12 comes to a hectic start. During 
the morning, a number of meetings are held over the proposals by the CAUSE 
Foundation and Ohs is brought back in to offer further mediation and some 
continuity in what has been discussed so far.
The following negotiation efforts are concentrated on Edwin Clark. His formal 
ownership of the land that is the Justus Township is a fact that is recognised 
by the rest of the Freemen, and his surrender would be a strong signal to the 
remaining group even though he is not one of the formal leaders of the actual 
militia. The AAR scholars suggest that the fate of the farm is the root of Edwin’s 
personal “ultimate concern” and that alleviating this will open the gates to evacu-
ating the entire Township. Ohs also later reports that one of the crucial changes 
over these last few days is that Edwin Clark becomes increasingly assertive over 
his this unique position (Rosenfeld 2000:336; Wessinger 2000b:192). Even so, 
the immediate result of all this activity is that the youngest person still inside, 
a teenage girl, is allowed to leave the farm. This means only 16 adults are now 
left, half of which are subject to the original federal charges against the group 
(CNN 1996-06-12).
The next day, after yet another frenzied morning, the FBI moves a convoy 
of vehicles to the entrance of the farm. Aside from trucks and transports for 
the FBI agents, it also includes a number of moving vans and mini-buses. Soon 
thereafter, a truck carrying packing crates is driven up to the farm to allow 
162
Stressing Knowledge
the Freemen to secure masses of documents that they feel are instrumental in 
proving their case against the government. This is part of the deal put together 
by the CAUSE lawyers; the Freemen will be allowed to retain control over their 
legal defence, not just in the upcoming trials against them, but also in their 
overarching suit against a supposedly corrupt and infiltrated government. This 
eases the concern of many of the militia leaders that they would lose all control 
over their own fates if they surrendered to the federal legal system. Instead, their 
personal freedom and agency in engaging the government head-on are retained 
(Rosenfeld 2000:339f; Wessinger 2000b:193ff). In a signal that the struggle is 
over for now, the Freemen lower the upended flag they had flown weeks earlier to 
demonstrate their duress. With their own evidence safe, the remaining Freemen 
load themselves into a motor home and are escorted off the farm by its owner 
Edwin Clark, who will now take the fight to the courts. Once outside, they all 
surrender peacefully to the agents waiting there (CNN 1996-06-13; Rosenfeld 
2000:336f; Wessinger 2000b:192f ). After a record 81 days, the standoff comes 
to an end. The FBI agents move in to secure evidence of their own in order to 
files charges, new and old, against 14 of the Freemen.
5.3 Aftermath
The immediate aftermath of the standoff was a palpable sense of relief among 
the local community, more courtroom antics from the arrested Freemen, and a 
good round of praise from law enforcement community and FBI Director Freeh 
(CNN 1996-06-15, 19). Still, the slow and careful nature of the stand-off was 
not without criticism. The fact that the Freemen occupied land that had been 
foreclosed and sold at auctions to other farmers meant that, as the deadlock 
crossed over into and surpassed the sowing season, the sizeable investments those 
farmers made would not pay off this year. Similarly, some of the neighbouring 
farms saw their activity curtailed by the FBI presence, leading to similar if 
smaller-scale issues. Even the very peaceful end of the stand-off received some 
criticism, as the remaining Freemen were allowed to escort themselves out in an 
orderly fashion, and not even hand-cuffed, all to let the militia members exit the 
scene with some dignity preserved (Wessinger 2000b:192).
The stand-off has also occupied a huge amount of federal agents. Official 
reports later put the number at 740 people, not including some remote support 
functions, who had been rotated in and out of the operation. At any given time, 
roughly 100 agents were on location. In total, the 81 days amount to 41 staff 
years worth of work for the bureau and cost some $7.5 million (GAO 1996). 
This amassing of manpower at times put a drain on efforts elsewhere. The spring 
of 1996 also saw a series of arson attacks against black churches in the southwest 
of the U.S., and the FBI received criticism for spending so much time and per-
sonnel on what was perceived as a much smaller and simpler problem up north.
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Also, while ultimately the fears were never realised, the spectre of Waco loomed 
heavily over the entire operation. As the bureau started using pressuring tactics 
reminiscent of that siege, and moved heavier equipment into the area, a petition 
for “reasonable force” started to spread in the local communities, somewhat 
tempering earlier voices that had been raised in favour of a more direct approach 
(Wessinger 2000b:190). With the chosen strategy proven a success, however, the 
CIRG passed its first major trial by (lack of ) fire, as did the networking strategy 
used to connect with AAR and which triggered the creation of CIAG. These 
efforts, and the by now well-proven need for them, fueled the creation and 
finalisation of Project Megiddo and further efforts to learn about millennialist 
movements (Barkun 2002; FBI 2002). The use of third-party intermediaries 
and the difference they and external expertise made for the negotiation process 
received a significant amount of attention, and became incorporated as more 
formalised procedures within the FBI (Noesner 1999; Romano 1998).
Neither 1996 nor the militia movements had come to an end with the 
apprehension of the Freemen, however. In July, portions of the Washington 
State Militia was disassembled as a number of key members were arrested while 
planning to plant bombs in numerous locations around the state. A similar fate 
awaited The Mountaineer Militia operating in West Virginia, as well as members 
of the CI movement The Phineas Priesthood, both groups being pre-empted in 
their plans to acquire explosives and funds for future deeds. Earlier in the year, 
The Priesthood had already used a pipe bomb attack in one part of Spokane, 
WA to create a distraction and cover for a bank robbery in another part of 
town. The October arrest was for the preparation of a similar attack. An official 
FBI brief the following year on terrorist threats against the U.S. focused almost 
exclusively on domestic, right-wing, and often millennialist-fuelled terrorism, 
with left-wing and international terrorism receiving a scant single page (out of 
28) in total (FBI 1997).
Still, the main fear of 1996 was however realised. On July 27, a pipe bomb 
exploded in the middle of Centennial Olympic Park during the Atlanta Olympic 
Games, killing one person outright and causing a fatal heart-attack in a second. 
While a main suspect was identified in early 1997, he remained a fugitive for 
six years before he could finally be arrested, at which point the motive behind 
the attack was revealed to be fuelled by a right-wing NWO-based conspiracy 
belief. This ran in parallel with the investigation of the mysterious explosion 
that brought down TWA Flight 800 on July 19, killing all 230 on board. While 
the trail ultimately led nowhere, an initial FBI analysis suggested that traces of 
high explosives found on parts of the wreckage might be linked to the explosion, 
which would suggest a terrorist act or a stray missile hit. The threat of terrorism 
and a new groundswell of conspiracy theories remained the focus for much of 
the bureau’s efforts for years to come.
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5.4 Analysis
An immediate observation and comment on the material is well worth making. 
The chronology contains very little mention of the actions of the FBI; instead, 
it is a story of third-party mediators. Part of this is due to the success of the 
operation, which means there were no congressional hearings or major reports 
scrutinising every last detail, so the public historical record is one that is largely 
available through news reports as well as articles and books from the outside par-
ticipants. Even so, that fact is itself telling. Dispite so many outside consultations 
and the information they provide, the closed structure that signified the FBI at 
Waco seems to have vanished only three years later. Aside from the much gentler 
approach, the effect is not immediately obvious, and that gentle touch can in 
some sense be explained by the fact that the stand-off did not start with the active 
hostilities. The FBI did not take over a shooting war between the besieged and 
another federal agency, like in Waco, but rather had the opportunity to control 
the situation from the very start. From there, the escalation, if the word can even 
be used, is one of trying out different negotiators with different backgrounds 
and, one would imagine, different types of legitimacy in the eyes of the Freemen.
There are also some very quick results: six people come out on the first day 
and four more, including two suspects, after mediation in the second week alone. 
This represents almost a third of the entrenched militia members. When there 
are no more results, the strategy chosen is not one of more pressure, but one of 
widening the parameters for what kind of mediation the FBI might allow. It 
takes a full month for them to start allowing people who are (essentially) Freemen 
sympathisers to try to talk the group down, and it is around the same time that 
the religious expertise gets involved. The latter is likely triggered by the religiously 
coloured argumentation that Bo Gritz reports back. Even though the arguments 
originate from someone in the Freeman camp who the FBI has pinned as a 
charlatan, they have apparently learned to not let first impressions from, or just 
experiences from, crime-fighting be the final say in how such statements should 
be interpreted. If nothing else, the concept of being “ultimately concerned” offers 
a fruitful lens to the approach of the last month of negotiations, albeit in a wider 
and looser sense than the academics themselves might use it. Some key clusters 
of individuals are identified at a fairly early stage and targeted with their own 
unique argumentation and bargaining. It is an altogether far more varied and 
flexible approach that is being displayed, with multiple avenues of persuasion 
being employed at once. During the entire stand-off, outside family members 
are allowed to visit almost freely in the hope that they will assert their own kind 
of influence on their relatives.
As Figure 7 shows, the FBI itself might have been a constant presence, but 
only in the sense that it was in charge of the proceedings. In terms of actual 
presence on the farm, many of the mediators have the FBI beat, and the real 
face-to-face negotiation did not start until mid-May when Duke finally convinces 
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Figure 7: Montana negotiation events and results
The contribution of the AAR scholars, the 
line is separated into two sections: a dashed 
section signifying the initial period when they 
only had some initial contact with the FBI 
academy, and a solid section from the time 
they were fully attached to the CIRG effort.
The “First contact” point signifies the first 
time the party approached or was approached 
by the FBI for inclusion in the negotiation 
effort.
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the Freemen to sit down with the bureau officials. Before then, the only govern-
mental presence was the state legislators, among them Ohs, who were brought 
in specifically because the Freemen refused to concede any legitimacy on the 
FBI. The state representatives were at the same time not part of the supposedly 
infiltrated and corrupted federal system, but rather closer to the “common man”, 
and yet were deemed by the Freemen to be above the bureau in overall hierarchy 
of the legal system. It is a stroke of good luck since Ohs’ familiarity with some 
of the Freemen families allows him to strike a rapport with the group, and he 
becomes a somewhat regular fixture in the first half of the stand-off. Indeed, it 
very much seems like it is these personal connections – with family members, 
with Ohs, and at the very end with religious leaders – that generate almost every 
defection from the Freemen camp. Even the final group of 16 are finally swayed 
by the connections of a single person, only this time it is the formal owner of 
the Justus Township and his connection to the family farm. While it may be 
debated exactly how much the advice of the religious scholars weighed in on the 
negotiation efforts, it cannot be deined that their conclusion that the conflict 
revolved around a number of the deeply personal concerns was proven accurate. 
In addressing – if not outright solving – these concerns, the negotiators and 
mediators finally managed to create the sense that surrendering would not be 
the end of the world, literal or otherwise, for the Freemen.
A curious thing to note is that, for all their criticism after Waco and all the 
work later put into project Megiddo, the AAR’s and religion scholars’ contri-
bution is fairly subdued. While there certainly were very early contacts and 
although they were involved during the entire second half of the standoff, they 
were actually less involved in the on-site negotiation than what they managed to 
inject into the Waco proceedings. There was an attempt to establish a contact 
for discussion in late May after the negotiations had broken down, but at that 
time, the Freemen refused to answer any calls made by the negotiators and the 
attempt was soon abandoned. As a result, and as the figure shows, the scholars 
took on more of a consulting role rather than any kind of direct involvement or 
interaction with the freemen.
Another thing to note, especially since it is not part of the main analytical 
thrust, is the role of the media. As mentioned, there are quite a few long since 
archived artefacts of the media reporting of the standoff that points towards the 
news agencies anticipating a new Waco-style siege. This is also an oft-reported 
concern, both among the local inhabitants and of the various sympathiser move-
ments expressing their support for the Freemen. It becomes very clear in the 
density of the material itself that the reports grow increasingly disinterested as 
time passes, with the first couple of weeks seeing multiple daily reports (of nothing 
really happening) and later weeks offering more summary reports every two or 
three days, even at times when the negotiation was in full swing. Part of this can 
certainly be explained by the lack of spectacle. The standoff itself consisted of 
agents in simple FBI jackets maintaining road blocks some distance away from the 
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Justus Township, as opposed to the armed siege with uniformed and camouflaged 
paramilitary troops and vehicles closely encircling the Mount Carmel compound 
at Waco.In addition, although it proved fairly easy for reporters to gain access 
to the Freemen, only a handful had any motivation to do so. By the time the 
standoff had started, there had already been a small media frenzy over the antics 
of the militia and this had soured the relationship between the two. Having 
seen some crews scammed or robbed by the Freemen, other reporters were not 
inclined to waste much time on them, and reporters were threatened or harassed 
unless they could show that they had previously offered a sympathetic view on 
the Freemen’s cause. Over time, the reporting turned more towards conveying 
the view of the locals and their wish for the standoff to end. Where there had 
initially been protest campaigns to stop the FBI from enacting another Waco, 
the narrative slowly turned to one of protesting that the FBI was being too slow 
and lenient and that the bureau should end the standoff with force, if necessary.
5.4.1 Organisational context
Perhaps the greatest benefit the FBI had, which allowed it to dictate the pace to 
such a degree, was that this was very much the bureau’s own operation. There was 
only the local and state police to coordinate with on jurisdictional matters, all of 
which is subject to long established procedures and, perhaps more importantly, 
all of which sort under the Department of Justice, same as the FBI. The state 
judicial system was involved, not just in prosecuting its own cases, but also in 
being a target for the threats the Freemen had made – threats that in turn made 
them a target for the initial FBI investigation. It was all neatly held within the 
family of the DoJ, and any other potential jurisdictional friction was probably 
greatly alleviated by the fact that the local agencies had asked the FBI to step in 
and investigate the matter earlier in the case. The FBI’s arrival could therefore 
scarcely be seen as an intrusion, but rather more as responding – if a bit slowly 
– to a call for help.
The situation was also contained in the sense that the FBI was the instigating 
party to the standoff. The FBI had been on a path of escalating intelligence 
gathering for almost a year and had spent that time building a picture of the 
Freemen and their township; installing surveillance equipment; and generally 
getting a feel for the area. Given the nature and location of the Clark farm and 
the nature and beliefs of the militia, expressed loud and clear to anyone who 
wanted to listen, some sort of standoff would be a likely scenario in the wake of 
the arrests. This is further demonstrated – and even precipitated – by the fact 
that parallel to the actual arrests of Schweitzer and Skurdal, some 100 agents 
descend on the township. They block the roads and cut the phone lines, but 
they do not enter the farm itself, opting instead to urge the Freemen to come 
out. The anticipated drama of the early days is almost entirely relegated to the 
arraignment hearings where the arrested Freemen loudly and vocally resist any 
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kind of due processing. This lack of aggression and the absence of any symbolic 
invasion sets the tone for the rest of the standoff.
There are numerous other historical factors related to the organisation of the 
FBI that allow it to adopt this strategy. Attorney General Reno is no longer new 
at the job at this stage, but her initiation by way of the Waco disaster and the 
self-recrimination that follows demonstrates both a motivation and a mindset to 
explore more options and try every means of letting a matter come to a peaceful 
end. Likewise, FBI Director Freeh had his own legacy from Waco to deal with: 
he was appointed in the immediate aftermath of the crisis and therefore had 
no involvement in how it was handled, but was instead in charge of the heavily 
criticised investigation of what had gone wrong. Allegations of tampering with 
evidence had been raised against the bureau with some going so far as to suggest 
a deliberate attempt at a cover-up. The first official report was so poorly received 
that half a dozen new DoJ and senate reports were initiated over the following 
years to address all the gaps and uncertainties created by the first report. Many 
years later, tensions between Freeh and Reno on the matter of Waco comes to a 
boil when Reno sens U.S. Marshals to retrieve documents related to the Waco 
investigation for safe-keeping away from the hands of the FBI (New York Times 
1999-09-02). In the spring of 1996, however, the need to conduct a flawless 
operation outweighed any rising conflict between the two, especially since Freeh 
had to prove that his agency would not make the same mistake twice.
Internally, as mentioned, the Critical Incident Response Group had been 
established to overcome the kind of inter-departmental conflict that marred the 
negotiations with the Branch Davidians. Acting as a nexus for all conceivable 
strategies that might be employed against a problem, CIRG thus also had become 
a natural point of contact for the inclusion of external expertise and other less 
conventional or unforeseen support functions. In short, the core mission of the 
CIRG was to provide expert support for the Special Agent in Charge in the field. 
Established in 1994, it was still a fairly new and untested structure for these larger 
types of operations in 1996. Similarly, the small research group CIAG (Critical 
Incident Analysis Group), also established in 1994, had yet to find its future 
home at the University of Virginia or its formal and natural connection to CIRG 
by overlaps in key personnel. Even so, by 1996 it had already begun creating a 
network of scholars to act as a “plug-in” for the CIRG expert support structure. 
Both these groups offered new organisational structures and procedures to allow 
for a more dynamic and case-specific problem solving within bureau operations.
One last contextual factor that we will have reason to return to shortly is that 
there were no other, secondary concerns or charges for the FBI to worry about. 
The bureau was in Montana to pursue a set of federal charges against the leaders 
of the militia, nothing else. While the state and local legal authorities had their 
own prosecutions to deal with, they were all self-contained and not contingent 
on anything the FBI was doing. The only dependency was with having the 
suspects arrested and detained, which the local agencies were ill-equipped to do 
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without fear of retribution from the militia. However, should the suspects be 
captured – and the militia incapacitated – by the FBI, the local and state charges 
could simply be processed in turn. Unlike at Waco, where there were concerns 
of continual child abuse and of destruction of evidence of drug manufacturing 
and illegal weapons modifications, the only real concern was with disrupting the 
sowing season for the farmers in the area and with not letting the owner who 
had bought the foreclosed property make full use of his land.
5.4.2 The nature of the crisis
The first question we need to ask, then, is: was this a crisis? As the previous 
section may have indicated already, the answer turns out to be no, but it needs 
more elaboration than what has already been given. While the FBI is, perhaps 
very plainly and obviously, the key actor to be analysed, there are a number of 
potential subjects at play in this case for whom the standoff might have been a 
crisis: the local and state law enforcement authorities, the FBI and its director, 
and the Department of Justice and he attorney general. The FBI is only obvious 
in that it was the organisation that sat at the centre of the Waco crisis, making 
a focused comparison poissble; thus the FBI more or less has to become our key 
target of analysis. As it turns out, though, the nature of the crisis for the other 
actors becomes contingent on how the FBI handles the situation so if the bureau 
can manage its crisis well, it will also largely be resolved for the others. Conversely, 
if the FBI bungles its crisis management, this will trigger a crisis for the others.
The best way to disentangle potential actors and see this dependency is by 
looking at the crisis definition criteria in the opposite order to what is often 
customary and start with the threats to critical values.
Critical values at stake
For the state and local agencies, the primary value at stake at this point is one of 
legitimacy and of restoring law and order. In a sense, this has already been put 
into question by allowing the Freemen to wreak as much havoc as they have, 
up to and including challenging the judicial and law enforcement system itself. 
The question now becomes, how can the system deal with a group that expertly 
throws bucketfuls of spanners into the works, that ignores all legal threats, and 
that out-numbers and outguns the local police force tasked with enforcing those 
threats. One way of solving the problem would be to let the other farmers loose 
on the Freemen and have the different groups duke it out as best they can. There 
is only one tiny flaw with the plan: it would completely rob the judicial system of 
any legitimacy, essentially affirming the entire Posse Comitatus movement’s view 
on how the world should be run. A better solution would be to follow procedure 
and escalate the matter to a part of the legal system that is better equipped to 
handle these kinds of problems – namely the FBI. If the bureau can deal with 
the situation, the system obviously works and its legitimacy is proven.
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The federal governmental level also has a similar legitimacy problem on its hands. 
The federal government is not supposed to be in the business of repressing and 
persecuting the people, but at the same time, the law of the land has to be upheld. 
There is already a sizeable legitimacy gap since the last crisis of this kind, or even 
well before that, and this gap has proven to be fertile ground from which people 
holding the state in contempt can recruit like-minded and supporters even as 
they express that contempt in increasingly violent ways. Further repression will 
just fuel that particular fire; ignoring the threat will make the government seem 
illegitimate from a completely different perspective since it is no longer keeping 
the people safe. The only way out of the dilemma is to enforce without excessive 
force, and the ones who are doing the enforcing in this case is the FBI. So again, 
the outcome of the potential federal governmental legitimacy crisis relies on 
whether or not the bureau can resolve the matter with a gentle hand.
As for the FBI itself, it sits at a cross-roads between these two issues. On the 
one hand, it must be able to perform its job in the escalating hierarchy of law 
enforcement, or it is obviously not a worth-while part of the system. In practice, 
it has absolutely no problems doing so given the manpower, training, and equip-
ment the bureau has at its disposal. However, as demonstrated three years earlier, 
there is a distinct difference between just bringing an end to a crisis and actually 
resolving it, because on the other hand, the FBI is supposed to be an agency of 
due process, not indiscriminate repression. At the same time, it has an image 
to uphold, both internally and externally, as being a very sharp instrument, It 
is supposed to be the line you do not want to cross as a criminal, consisting of 
tough and extremely competent agents who always get the job done. The FBI 
does not waver or appear soft.
The agency also still has to redeem itself from the Waco débâcle and the sharply 
criticised investigation that followed, both putting the professionalism and quality 
of its agents into question. A clear demonstration that the new structures and 
procedures solves those problems will go a long way towards cleaning up that 
image, and will demonstrate that the FBI is capable of adapting to meet new 
challenges and solve new problems at short notice. This, in turn, means it has to 
actually resolve a number of old internal conflicts between different groups and 
departments – CIRG has to produce real results to not be dismissed as a pretty 
but pointless paper construct. There are also plenty of detractors waiting for 
the new FBI to slip up, and again, CIRG is the key to including many of those 
detractors so as to make them personally invested in the outcome and thereby 
prematurely deflate a lot of the nearly automatic criticism that their exclusion 
would generate.
In the end, the FBI solves this value conflict by taking a careful and measured 
approach to addressing the problems at hand, at times erring more on the side of 
caution than action to the point where it start to draw some criticism from the 
local community for not acting forcefully enough. The FBI is also criticised for 
how it is balancing the much more concrete value conflict, namely the allocation 
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of personnel. The Montana operation involves a staggering amount of both agents 
and support personnel, leaving other parts of the country understaffed, which 
detractors suggest adversely affected the bureau’s ability to investigate a rash of 
arson attacks in the south. Likewise, huge sums of money are spent on the travel 
and overtime accumulated by the agents in the field. This allocation of resources 
that raises some scattered questions. At the same time, the nature of the strategy 
means that the costs are not as spectacular as for the Waco siege since there is no 
need for a tightly controlled 24/7 armed cordon of the area, nor of night-time 
harassment measures. Regardless, it is evident that money and manpower were 
ranked a lot lower by the FBI than the value of resolving the situation peacefully. 
Even in some of the earliest official statements, it is made clear that the stand-off 
is likely to last for some time and that the FBI emphatically will be patient and 
let it run its course.
Time in its many form is, in essence, the resource most deliberately and 
consistently sacrificed in order to achieve other goals and save other values at 
stake, be it man-hours or time for analysis or time to let the Freemen mull over 
discussions and negotiations. Another, far more ephemeral value that the bureau 
is willing to sacrifice in Montana is a complete control over the proceedings, and 
with it the image that the FBI is entirely in charge of everything that happens 
on-site. This is also a very deliberate trade-off that comes inherent with the nature 
of CIRG. The whole point is the realisation that bureau staff might not always be 
the most knowledgeable in dealing with matters, even on an very hands-on and 
operational level. Allowing third-party mediators to be the outwards face of the 
agency towards the opposition means that, not only are these mediators exposed 
to risks that may be outside the FBI’s control, they also run the risk of creating 
a mixed or muddied message between the negotiators and the other parties. 
However, the potential gains are judged to outweigh these risks. In Montana, 
it certainly paid off as it introduced a layer of translation between a group of 
people steeped in Christian Identity rhetoric and imagery (further coloured by an 
almost century-old conspiracy theory, as well as in their own brand of Common 
Law practices) and a formal negotiation team that could not possibly contain 
expertise in all these areas. Even if the translation might at times be garbled or 
contain miscommunications, it is better than no mutual understanding at all – a 
lesson hard learned from Waco. A small measure of control (and self-image) was 
therefore sacrificed for a large increase in the available information on which the 
continued effort can be based.
So while many values were at stake for the different actors, the deliberate choice 
to dismiss time as a highly valued commodity let the FBI disentangle the remaining 
conflicts in a structured manner, thereby significantly reducing the degree to which 
the Montana standoff can be called a crisis. Consequently, the critical values at 
the local and governmental levels were preserved as well, dissipating any potential 
crisis there as well as far as the actual standoff is concerned.
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Uncertainty
As mentioned in Section 2.5, if one of the three components of a crisis can be 
resolved, the other two cease to be a problem. In Montana, the FBI  deliberately 
chose to diffuse the crisis by making time an almost complete non-issue. 
Consequently, the FBI had (relatively speaking) all the time in the world to 
untangle any uncertainties they encountered. However, that description vastly 
over-simplifies what allowed them to make that trade-off. There were numerous 
points of uncertainty and ambiguity in dealing with the Freemen, chief among 
which was the fact that they resorted to an unusually legalistic rhetoric when 
discussing their grievances and that the foundation for those arguments was 
different from the legal framework the FBI operated within. Only one state in 
the U.S. – Louisiana – does not operate on a common-law legal system like the 
rest of the U.S., but that system is still something radically different from the 
biblically based Common Law practices preached by the Freemen and similar 
Christian Identity groups. The very basis of how both the FBI and the Freemen 
operated can be described as an ambiguous term with at least two different, but 
still somewhat overlapping meanings.
Of course, there were also numerous uncertainties with the FBI’s task that 
are best described as almost rote or routine since they are inherent in the job of 
dealing with a human opponent, especially in a negotiation setting. What are 
the motives of the opposition? What are the factions within the group? How, if 
at all, can these factions be pitted against each other to break the group cohesion 
apart? How will the group respond to various means and methods of persuasion? 
Being inherent in the FBI’s daily work, the bureau already has lots of expertise 
in answering these questions, so in and of themselves, they might be less cause 
for a crisis than one might otherwise assume. This kind of “normal crisis” is 
inherent in almost all emergency professions to the point where it is commonly 
not even considered a proper crisis when they occur. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, there is an entire literature on the cognitive heuristics of emergency 
managers and how these heuristics guide their problem solving. It is when these 
rote uncertainties are amplified by other factors that matters start to slip towards 
a crisis: when the heuristics fail because the motivations and responses do not 
follow the logic the emergency manager (or in this case, a negotiator) is used to.
The mission of CIRG – indeed the very purpose for which it was created – is 
to provide subject-matter expertise to law-enforcement field commanders. The 
FBI has a long tradition of employing this type of expertise and has gathered an 
impressive collection of professionals in a wide variety of forensic sciences. Part 
of the reason arrangements like CIRG and CIAG were created was the realisation 
that the in-house expertise will not always sufficient, or even appropriate, to meet 
all the knowledge needs the commander might have and that not every field of 
expert knowledge can be represented and contained within the agency itself. The 
problem of amplified normal uncertainties is thereby in theory solved by being 
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able to bring in the expertise needed to adjust the expectations and intuitions 
from a normal incident.
In Montana, the theory was put to the test with highly successful results. 
Intermediaries (such as Ohs, Gritz, and Duke) might not have had the personal 
successes they had hoped for in terms of bringing the standoff to an end, but 
they nevertheless provided the FBI with more information and insight into 
the situation at the farm than they would have otherwise gotten. The CAUSE 
Foundation is an almost textbook example of the kind of interpretation expertise 
needed to resolve the ambiguities between the two opposing legal systems at play. 
The variety of intermediaries also allowed the negotiation efforts to identify and 
divergent agendas within the militia group: individual families had different 
concerns than the core leadership, and the formal leaders proved to be willing 
to defer to the actual owner of the property.
At the same time, these solutions created a new set of uncertainties. What is the 
agenda of the mediators? Can they be trusted to accurately represent and convey 
FBI’s communication to the militia members and to give a useful and accurate 
account for their response? Can their safety be guaranteed, or does this method 
run the risk of turning the largely peaceful standoff into an actual hostage situa-
tion? Can they provide any real influence or added value, or is it a waste of time? 
Once again, it proves to be a trade-off. Family members of those holed up on the 
farm could assert a great deal of influence without any real risk, but were perhaps 
less viable as a conduit for direct communication. Right-wing sympathisers such 
as Gritz, Duke, and the CAUSE foundation could likewise enjoy a reasonably 
low risk since, at least nominally, they were “on the Freemen’s side”, but as such 
their motives and willingness to co-operate fully with the bureau might be (and 
indeed was) questioned. Ohs’ previous connections and role as a representative 
of the state of Montana – a role far more readily accepted by the Freemen than 
that of the supposedly illegitimate FBI – allows him to build trust over a long 
period of time, and thus strike a balance between the benefits and drawbacks 
of the other mediators.
The last prominent tool employed by the CIRG to combat uncertainty was 
the connection to AAR and the team of religious scholars. Much of the literature 
on the case paint them as instrumental in introducing and preserving the per-
spective of individual concerns that had to be addressed to bring closure to the 
standoff, but as mentioned in earlier chapters, this particular characterisation 
should probably be viewed with some suspicion since this literature is written 
by some of the very same scholars. Thus, there is a strong risk of bias in how 
their contribution is valued. Nevertheless, the fact that they were included at all 
is telling in and of itself. It demonstrates a willingness from CIRG to consider 
this angle as well, rather than dismiss the Freemen’s talk of divine protection as 
mere posturing or superstition. The scholars also spend considerable time trying 
to figure out what the crux of the matter is from the Freemeen’s perspective. 
Their analysis ultimately provides conclusions that prove to be very accurate, and 
174
Stressing Knowledge
which also becomes the key issue resolved by the CAUSE lawyers, namely that 
the Justus Township itself is at risk and has become the central symbol that the 
Freemen want to preserve. The CAUSE lawyers convince the Freemen is that 
this symbol can – and even should – be better defended in the court room than 
by some ultimately futile effort of occupation, and so the final conundrum of 
giving the Freemen reason to surrender without giving up their cause is resolved.
Time pressure
When talking about both the Ohs effort and the work done by the scholars, we 
once again stumble over that operative word: time. Again, from the very start, and 
continuously throughout the standoff, the FBI was very clear that it would take 
as much time as necessary to see a peaceful resolution. In other words, the FBI 
consciously and deliberately chose to not let this become a crisis by removing time 
as a factor, by using time as a release valve for any potential value conflicts, and 
by spending time on resolving any uncertainty and ambiguity they encountered. 
If there was any time pressure at specific points in time, it was never enough to 
cause the type of systematic stress that characterises a crisis.
There was certainly some outside pressure to bring the standoff to a quick 
end, both from other parts of the country where the continued allocation of 
manpower was questioned, and from local actors since the disruptions to their 
normal life went on through the entire spring. Was it really necessary to spend 
quite so much time keeping a mere dozen or so people contained when the agents 
involved could perhaps do more good in actual investigative work elsewhere? 
Could they not just overpower the Freemen and let the local farmers get on 
with the business of cultivating the surrounding land? The land owner who had 
purchased the foreclosed property that the Freemen were occupying had initially 
hoped that he would have enough time to at least get a short season in 1996, 
but as the resolution slipped towards mid-June, this became a lost opportunity. 
From the bureau’s own point of view, there was perhaps the pressure of keeping a 
costly operation running for months on end, but at the same time, the set-up of 
the operation meant that costs were not as high as one might expect. Again, the 
good-will and legitimacy costs of (potentially catastrophically) acting too soon 
outweighed the monetary cost of time, and this was an attitude that was strongly 
supported higher up in the governmental hierarchy, by the Justice Department 
and the atorney general.
It is worth noting that, in the discussion of the uncertainty of the case, the 
points made only ever applied to the FBI effort. Part of this is because, as mentioned 
earlier, the potential for a crisis for the other to subjects was contingent on how 
the FBI managed its part, and that uncertainty or ambiguity was not much of a 
factor unless the FBI failed. Beyond that, there are only really two main points 
of uncertainty for both the local and the governmental level: what is the value of 
continuing with the slow approach as opposed to a swift resolution, and what is at 
risk with either of the two strategies? Thus the uncertainty is really just a question 
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of time, and that particular question had already been resolutely answered by 
the FBI at the very start of the standoff. The fact that it was entirely the FBI’s 
case, with a minimal number of other agencies to coordinate or co-operate with, 
gave the bureau much more flexibility in setting the terms. All it had to do was 
arrest the people under federal indictment, and there were little to no worry 
about destruction of evidence or of further harm to some perceived “hostage” 
in any sense of the term. The state and the local authorities had already prepared 
charges and they, too, had no need to actually enter the premises as quickly as 
possible beyond some sense of getting it over with in order to be able to start 
the legal proceedings.
Another factor that contributed strongly to alleviating the time pressure is the 
strategy employed by the FBI. While the two parties were certainly in contact 
throughout the stand-off, there was very little in the way of actual discussion or 
negotiation going on until almost two months had passed. Instead, they relied on 
family members and sympathisers to slowly weaken the resolve of the Freemen, 
and their influence pretty much had to be allowed to simmer over time to do its 
work. Families to the ensconced Freemen were allowed to come and go almost at 
their leisure, and every week-end saw one visit or another. This strategy of peer 
pressure scores some initial success in that four people leave within the span of 
a week, and it then takes a while to notice that it does seem to yield any more 
results. It is at this point that the FBI switches gears more towards using right-
wing sympathisers and to let those arguments stew for a while as well.
This is not to say that old-fashioned pressure techniques were left unused. 
As early as mid-May, the FBI agents signalled loudly and clearly that they were 
preparing to introduce some discomfort into the township by cutting the power 
to the farm and by visibly increasing the amount of intrusive air surveillance. 
It is hard to tell how far they were willing to push this tactic, since the standoff 
ended before more escalation was needed. These first measures seem to be largely 
symbolic since it was no secret that the Freemen had their own means of generat-
ing emergency power; indeed, it is pretty much a requirement for all farmers in 
the region. Rather, it was a means of sending an unambiguous message to the 
Freemen in the wake of the negotiations breakdown that followed Duke’s last 
visit. The FBI and its mediator may have been rebuffed, but they were still not 
going leave any time soon. The message and change of pace apparently worked, 
too, since more direct communications started at this point, partly aided by 
visiting families and communication with other trusted parties. Above all, from 
an analytical standpoint, it means that the initial stance of not letting time be a 
factor was still holding strong by early June.
By now, the result should be clear: the so-called “standoff” in Montana is 
called that for a reason. It was not a siege, unlike Waco, and it was actively 
and deliberately kept away from being a full-scale crisis by knocking out the 
third pillar – time – that supports that kind of condition. With time no longer 
an important factor, the FBI could resolve ambiguities and uncertainties by 
involving subject-matter expertise on a deeper level and employ a wide array 
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of strategies to probe for a way forward in the proceedings. The FBI could also 
identify, evaluate, and balance out or resolve value conflicts by holding firm on 
the conviction that time and quick resolution was not one of the values it had to 
preserve. At the same time, one of the reasons that it was possible for the FBI to 
take this stance is that its agents had already spent a fair amount of time trying 
to hone in on what problems they would be facing and how best to deal with 
them. In reality, the time investment required to handle the Freemen standoff is 
far larger than the standoff itself, and it started in 1994 with the creation of the 
CIRG. By the time the actual (non)crisis happened, the bureau did not have the 
additional time pressure of trying to figure out procedures for dealing with the 
issues at hand – that work had already been done – and “all” that was required 
in Montana was the actual work of dealing with them.
5.4.3 Anticipation of due process
The question of whether or not the FBI was familiar with the processes that 
were in place in Montana is a somewhat tangled one. On the one hand, and as 
discussed in the previous sections, this was almost entirely FBI’s own operation. It 
had to co-operate and coordinate with local and state law enforcement agencies, 
but this is part of the general jurisdictional puzzle the bureau has to deal with no 
matter where it goes, and is therefore very much part of the standard procedures. 
One might therefore expect this to be a case where no adjustments are needed 
for the FBI: everything is as it always is, and is well-contained within established 
procedures for dealing with exactly this kind of problem.
However, while no other agencies can butt in to demand or enforce new 
standards, the bureau itself has changed to allow for a new type of outside 
interference. In fact, outside interference has in a sense become an ingrained 
and internalised feature of the post-Waco FBI. The Critical Incident Response 
Group presents an interesting analytical conundrum. It is part of the new FBI 
process for dealing with critical incidents, but on the other, it is still a very new 
and largely untested construct which may in and of itself create some system 
stress as it rolls into action. Also, while the CIRG may on the one hand indeed 
be an integrated part of the critical incident procedures, one of its key missions 
is, on the other hand, to provide a conduit for outside expertise to take part in 
or at least influence the operational management of a crisis. In Montana, this 
kind of influence is pushed to its limits as third-party mediators are brought in 
to handle a large portion of the initial contacts with the Freemen. How much 
of the process can be anticipated when the people enacting it are not even part 
of the FBI, much less have any familiarity with its methods or practices?
What should have been a trivial and clear-cut answer – a single actor engaging 
in its core competence without any unforeseen changes in the larger organisa-
tional context – now becomes more of a judgement call. The question is whether 
or not the establishment of the CIRG in and of itself qualifies as enough fore-
knowledge of the processes that will be used to outweigh the uncertainties and 
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disruptions of the established processes that the CIRG will inherently bring. For 
the sake of this analysis, it is actually not that difficult a question to answer. The 
operationalisation offered in Chapter 3 asks whether or not the organisation has 
formal and regulated instructions for collaborative interactions without outside 
parties and, more generally, whether the subject should be familiar with the 
processes involved. The answer to this is very clearly yes. In Montana, the FBI 
itself had formally regulated the inclusion of outside expertise and third-party 
mediators into its operations, and the processes involved should have been, and 
were, familiar to the decision-makers. The CIRG is that process, and its formal 
mission is the rule structure that regulates these interactions. If there was any 
lack of anticipation or unfamiliarity with the processes, it would have been in 
the third parties, but they are not the subject of this analysis.
Still, that type of answer feels like it sits somewhere between a cop-out and a 
case of begging the question – it just lazily leans back on and lets the operation-
alisation spit out the answer. After all, there is still that apparent conflict between 
the inherent uncertainty of how the third parties will handle their task or of how 
well the external expertise will be able to provide useful answers, and the very 
clear anticipatory measure that the CIRG itself represents. Not to pre-empt the 
discussion of MESO usage further down, this conflict looks like a direct result 
of the kind of feedback issues that were discussed in Chapter 3: the knowledge 
management the CIRG is set up to handle means that the processes are subject 
to some dynamism during the course of the crisis. The process itself anticipates 
that the process will, at least in part, not be rigidly defined and may have to be 
altered in various ways. “Expecting the unexpected” may be a cliché, but that 
does not take away from its applicability or usefulness when it perfectly describes 
what happens. So rather than lazily adhering to the strict letter of the operation-
alisation as the only argument, we can see that there actually is not that much 
of a conflict between anticipation of process and an inherently unforeseeable 
part of the process. Instead, it is more of a case of being aware of the boundaries 
of that predictability and making everyone aware that the standard procedures 
might not – in fact, most likely will not – be able to deal with all eventualities. It 
is an almost text-book example of meta-knowledge. It is also a matter of having 
enough gateways and attachment points into the existing procedures where these 
new external parts can slot in, and of having enough confidence in the integrity 
of the system to allow for ad hoc solutions without worrying that everything will 
come crashing down. It comes as no shock to anyone that strange new pieces 
are grafted onto the organisation, and there are people in place to deal with and 
to bridge the seams that will appear in the process, to the point where the line 
members of the organisation might hardly even notice the addition.
In short, “expecting the unexpected” may be a good candidate for the 
 process-anticipation version of the identification paradox discussed in previous 
chapters, and analytically, it allows us to see exactly how and why a process can 
still be considered as fully within the realm of what was anticipated. It deserves 
and will receive further attention and deliberation in later chapters.
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So not only did the FBI anticipate the processes that would be used in Montana, 
simply due to the fact that there were no real outside influences that it had to 
adjust to. In creating the CIRG and starting to tie a closer connection to the 
fledgling CIAG, the FBI also took the next step in the anticipatory process and 
started to map the boundaries of what could be foreseen and how to manage the 
very foreseeable cases when unexpected outside groups had to be incorporated 
into the management of a crisis. The interest in and eventual close collaboration 
with CIAG can even be seen as taking yet another step further. By trying to turn 
those unexpected groups into something more predictable and maybe even start 
to map out what issues and work methods the bureau could conceivable expect 
to deal with in the future.
Of the seven deviations from due process listed on page 61, the CIRG was 
explicitly created to handle four. The CIRG removes any ambiguities in how 
collaborations with outside actors will work, and it centralises and creates a 
trusted party for that collaboration as well as for the problem formulation and 
knowledge brokerage between experts and decision-makers. Its mere existence 
also removes two of the deviations outright by signalling that these events are now 
part of what is to be expected: that the bureau will be required to engage with 
numerous different organisational cultures and the requirement to go through 
some kind of intermediate communications layer. In fact, it is the CIRG’s job 
to manage those issues. That leaves the seventh deviation: the uncertainty of the 
value of the information that comes from outside sources. At the time of the 
Montana standoff, this too was something that CIRG had to manage, but it 
would also quickly become the key component of the collaboration with CIAG: 
the analysis group would act as both a detector and a filter for “useful” expertise 
that could be enrolled to aid the FBI. That is not to say that the deviations were 
eliminated, only that there now was a function within the bureau to specifically 
make sure that they caused as little problem as possible. The internal workings of 
the bureau would therefore not be disrupted. The stress of matching two (or more) 
potentially very different cultures, languages, and methodologies surrounding a 
problem was compartmentalised and not allowed to spill over into other areas. 
As rigid and rule-bound as the bureau might have to be in order to follow its 
own regulations, there is a layer of organisational lubricant that still lets it be 
very flexible and dynamic to outside actors.
5.4.4 Organisational closed-ness
As mentioned on numerous occasions, the FBI is at its heart a law enforcement 
agency. Its entire purpose is to enforce rules and regulations, and it has historically 
cultivated a strict image of being a straight-laced and at times almost deliberately 
dull and bureaucratic. It is very tempting to just look at the keyword descriptions 
for a closed organisation: ‘regulation’, ‘rigidity’, and ‘consistency.’ Then check off 
each one on the list, and call it done. Indeed, some of these can even be consid-
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ered highly cherished core principles of both rule of law and due process, both 
of which may be considered cornerstones of Western civilization. At the same 
time, it is a fairly trivial observation that the broad mission of the FBI and the 
wide array of cases it is tasked with solving both mean that this is an organisation 
that cannot employ a one-size-fits-all approach to its problem solving. For the 
most part, and in a larger perspective, this observation is correct. The FBI was 
a very well-furnished toolbox, equipped to solve almost anything, but it was 
also the case that each division – each tool – existed somewhat separately from 
the rest. Turning the analogy on its head, there is also the saying that if all you 
have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. As the clashes with millennialist 
groups in the early ‘90s showed, there was still a tendency for the different parts 
of the bureau to have a somewhat fixated view of their own role and the nature 
of the problems the organisation would be likely to come across. Even across the 
FBI as a whole, there was a core assumption that the opposition would consist 
mainly of criminals, with the odd foreign agent or terrorist thrown into the mix.
Instrumental work flow
Following Waco and the Oklahoma bombing, this assumption had to be altered 
and more nuance introduced. The varied nature of the problems the bureau had to 
deal with also had to be reflected in how the organisation as a whole approached 
its problem-solving. Chapter 8 will go into a more detailed comparison between 
the cases, but already here, it is worth pointing to differences in how the FBI 
chose to frame the standoff against the Freemen compared to the approach 
used at Waco since this offers a solid foundation to discuss how to categorise 
the bureau in terms of openness or closed-ness. Perhaps more importantly, it 
will highlight why some of these characteristics remain the same, in spite of the 
different strategies used.
The FBI seems to have framed the entire Freemen standoff very differently, 
not just from how it framed Waco, but also from the kinds of situations it is 
more accustomed to meet in its law-enforcement capacity:
• The opposition is not (necessarily) a band of criminals trying one final scam.
• The rhetoric in use has a meaning, and is not just posturing.
• The group is more likely to rally around scare tactics than break apart, same 
goes for any kind of siege posturing.
• It is not a hostage rescue scenario, in spite of the presence of innocent third 
parties.
• It is also not a uniform group with a single goal.
• There are many layers of leaders over a number of overlapping group structures.
All in all, it is a remarkably open, assumption-free, and complex view of the 
problems facing the bureau. It is also not a constant framing. While some of 
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these may be attributed to learning from Waco, others are conclusions that are 
reached over the course of the standoff. The meaningfulness of the rhetoric, for 
instance, is something that the scholars have to forcefully impart on the negotiators, 
but the team has at least learned to look into such clues rather than dismiss them 
out of hand. When Gritz reports back the mention of “Yahweh’s barrier” from a 
source the agents consider a professional charlatan, it is not assumed to be just 
another trick in his book but rather something that might need some expert 
attention and interpretation. This willingness to reinterpret the situation, as well 
as the methods used both to get at the information and to turn it into actionable 
knowledge, all point to the bureau having a more flexible work flow during the 
standoff than was previously the norm.
Here, it is important to note a key distinction in the framing since it explains 
the choice of strategy on the FBI’s part. From the bureau’s perspective, it was 
still trying to apprehend a group of criminals, and that group had at this point 
definitely made a career out of some of the crimes they had committed – most 
notably the fraudulent liens and the tax evasion the Freemen habitually used 
to finance many of their deals. None of this made the Freemen textbook career 
criminals, however, and for all intents and purposes the Freemen themselves 
did not even consider themselves subject to the laws they were supposed to 
have broken. This perception is important because it informs how the people 
on the farm chose to respond to the FBI’s actions. For instance, since they all 
saw themselves as (Common-)Law abiding and sovereign citizens, the people on 
the farm had no particular reason not to stand with their peers. They certainly 
were not hostages of any kind – after all, how could they be held against their 
will by their equally sovereign peers? If anything, they were being held captive 
by the illegitimate FBI and needed to be rescued from it, not from each other. 
This perception is demonstrated by their use of militia symbolism and signals 
such as the upturned U.S. flag, as well as by how other sympathiser movements 
across the country read these signals and – to varying degrees – came to the 
Freemen’s aid. So while they may indeed have been perceived pursued by the 
FBI as criminals, they would not respond to the bureau’s actions the way the 
ordinary criminal group would.
The FBI identified this at a very early stage, quite possibly before the first arrests 
were even made, and framed the problem accordingly. The tactic of waiting and 
using “friendly” parties to influence the Freemen is chosen as opposed to some 
strategy of repression and show of force that might work to subdue regular group 
of extortionists and fraudsters. This tactic in turn required the bureau to be far 
more flexible in whom they chose to include in the process. They may have those 
more repressive tactics and criminal psychology down pat, but neither will help 
much in creating the kind of influence the situation called for – for that, friends, 
family, and militia sympathisers are needed. Flexibility in the framing therefore 
precipitates flexibility in the negotiation strategy, which in turn requires flexibility 
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in the overall work flow. Entities such as the CIRG and CIAG had recently been 
created or adopted to provide exactly that kind of flexibility.
If there is anything speaking against this characterisation of the new FBI as 
a much more flexible institution, it is – perhaps to the chagrin of us researchers 
– its long tradition of heavy reliance on scientific methods. While we might not 
want to put it in quite those terms, the notion that there is a right way and a 
wrong way of doing things definitely falls within the ‘rigidity’ characterisation 
of a work flow. Even so, Montana exhibits some flexibility in this area as well, 
not in the sense that the scientific methods are compromised, but rather that a 
wider array of scientific fields are included in the problem-solving effort. Again, 
institutions like CIRG and CIAG were purposefully designed to allow a much 
more flexible and dynamic inclusion of expertise without requiring the FBI to 
have experts in every field imaginable in-house.
Guiding principle
While the work flow may be geared more towards a flexible response, it is hard 
to argue that the underlying principle that is supposed to be served by this flex-
ibility is anything other than one of regulation. By virtue of being a public law 
enforcement agency, its activities are still heavily regulated and its entire purpose 
is in a sense to ensure that regulations are followed. It is certainly true that the 
bureau has a chequered history of abuses and of flouting the rules, but it would 
be cynical to elevate those episodes to the level of calling it a guiding principle 
for the FBI as a whole. Session’s ouster halfway through his tenure as FBI director 
illustrates both sides: even (or maybe especially?) at the highest level, proper 
procedures were not followed, but at the same time, that failure resulted in a 
premature termination. At the end of the day, not following procedures – especially 
in the field – vastly increases the chances of having a painstakingly planned and 
executed operation end in the suspect being let loose on a technicality by the 
court. It quickly becomes far too high a cost – not just in time, money, and 
manpower, but in legitimacy and regulatory trust – to let such mistakes become 
commonplace. Another point in favour of the ‘regulation’ characterisation is 
the bureau’s history of heavy regimentation and specialisation within different 
departments. There is a number of clearly defined areas of expertise that must 
exist within the bureau, and the overlap between them is slim to none.
At the same time, CIRG is meant to keep that kind of monoculture from 
spreading to the operational end. All the areas of expertise required for an oper-
ation are supposed to be available to the Special Agent in Charge, which would 
seem to nullify some of this regulated regimentation. Also, per the operationali-
sation in Section 3.2.3, the difference between the two extremes of the ‘principle’ 
spectrum is heavily dictated by the extent to which people outside of the formal 
hierarchy are allowed to take part in the decision-making process. In Montana, 
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the heavy reliance of third-party mediators as direct proxies for the negotiation 
team would therefore strongly suggest that the FBI should sit more towards the 
‘informality’ end of the spectrum. 
Once again, we have an apparent conflict between the strict wording of the 
operationalisation and the intuitive characterisation based on the nature of what 
the actor is doing. This time, though, it is the intuitive sense that wins out. While 
it is true that outsiders are allowed a place on the inside, we must not forget that 
the regulations have very recently changed at this point in the bureau’s history. The 
guiding principle is still very much one of adherence to regulations, but those 
regulations have been altered to redefine what actually counts as an outsider 
and to broaden the scope of which interactions one should expect. Nothing is 
being skipped for the sake of expedience. Instead, a more generally applicable 
methodology has been thought out beforehand, along with formal procedures 
for how sensitive material can be shared with these not-quite-outsiders.
It can certainly be debated that this change in formal procedures in and of 
itself represents a more open behaviour – that we are seeing a move towards the 
‘informality’ end of the spectrum – and is as such a point worth returning to 
in the case comparison. For the individual evaluation of this one case, however, 
we are looking at a single point in time and trying to assign it a binary value. 
All things considered, the guiding principle is (still) best characterised as one 
of regulation.
Preferred outcome
A similar initial conflict between the intuitive and the analytical answer may be 
seen with the last characteristic of the open/closed distinction. Intuitively, a law 
enforcement agency like the FBI would want a consistent outcome. After all, 
the concepts of due process and rule of law suggest that justice should not be 
applied or pursued arbitrarily depending on who is being indicted or on what 
charge. However, that is not the type of outcome that we are interested in for this 
question. Rather, the “outcome” in question is the process by which a problem 
is being solved. By this definition, and when we consider the nature of the work 
the FBI does, the preferred outcome simply cannot be anything other than a 
dynamic one. Not all crimes are the same, nor are all operations. Each requires 
its own methods for investigation and strategies for apprehending the suspect.
There is an argument to be made that the bureau still has a number of 
templates for different types of crimes and that each case will be squeezed, to 
a lesser or greater degree of success, into one of them. Terminology and legal 
definitions such as “violent crime”, “kidnapping”, “hostage taking” or “corporate 
fraud” exist within the agency and to some extent dictates which part of the FBI 
is tasked with handling the case. Likewise, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
it can be argued that Waco was a clear case of the FBI trying (and failing) to fit 
an operation into a preconceived model, not just of how to solve the case, but 
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also of what kind of case it was to begin with. However, even then, there is a 
strong sense that every case is unique and will require a tailor-made solution. 
The question is more how much tailoring is taking place, mixed with the simple 
fact that multiple law enforcement agencies exist and that the investigation of 
crimes is split across a myriad of jurisdictional axes: location and geographical 
spread, the severity and scope of the crime, the type and nature of perpetrator, 
the nature of the victim, the specific criminal code or offense, and so on.
While Waco may have teetered on the edge between a ‘dynamic’ and a ‘con-
sistent’ preferred outcome, the FBI as a whole still ended up on the ‘dynamic’ 
half of the spectrum. In Montana, the teetering is gone and the bureau is firmly 
planted at the dynamic end. The existence of CIRG and CIAG points towards 
an ingrained willingness on a policy level to pursue multiple possible problem 
images and solutions at once; the use of multiple intermediaries and numerous 
expert groups from different scientific fields demonstrates that this multi-pronged 
approach is also used in practice in the field. The inclusion of external expertise, 
while regulated, is very clearly allowed even on an ad hoc basis, and there are clear 
procedures to make it happen. The two critical incident groups also demonstrate 
a willingness to spend a bit more effort on making information fit the organ-
isation rather than limit the information flow to only include what is already 
pre-moulded to fit the existing format.
At the same time, as mentioned in the discussion on time pressure, some of that 
willingness is most likely due to the fact that part of the effort can be expended 
ahead of time by pre-emptively building the connections and communities – not 
to mention pre-screen the participants – from which information can be drawn. 
Whether this initial investment yields more usage because of some sunk cost 
fallacy or because they in practice reduce the effort required in times of crisis is 
an interesting question that, unfortunately, lies beyond the scope of this thesis, 
partly because it requires a level of detail in the empirical material that is simply 
not available, and partly because it does not actually matter for the conclusion 
made here. What matters is that we can observe a willingness to spend time on 
getting better information rather than requiring that all input adheres to some 
standard format.
Finally, it is worth looking at the CIRG’s role as a gatekeeper. This is an area 
where we see perhaps the most distinct difference compared to Waco, where the 
in-house subject matter experts took on a gate-keeping role that enforced a kind 
of orthodox problem image. By contrast, in the Freemen case, the CIRG rather 
took on the alternate gate-keeping role of sifting through the information flow 
for valuable nuggets that could be passed to the on-site commanders, irrespective 
of the origins and conclusions of that information. Pretty much every indicator 
of preferred outcome points towards a dynamic problem definition and search 
for solutions. 
All in all, then the nature of the FBI in Montana leans heavily towards being 
an open organisation. The preferred outcome (dynamics) and the instrumental work 
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flow (flexibility) are both open characteristics; the guiding principle (regulation) 
is characteristic of closed-ness – a ⅔ majority in favour of characterising the 
organisation as a whole as open. Even without the cheap tactic of vote counting, 
though, it is still fair to say that the FBI is more open than closed in the Montana 
case. When we look closer at the reasons why the guiding principle is more 
indicative of closed-ness, we note that the reason the FBI can still be considered 
to rely on regulation is because the regulations have changed. The policy subsystem 
has learned from previous mistakes that a more open approach is required to 
solve these kinds of issues, and that openness is now part of the rule system the 
FBI has to abide by. The FBI only remains the same in relation to the policy 
subsystem, and the system as a whole has started to lean more towards openness.
5.4.5 MESO usage
Many of the questions related to MESO usage have already been answered or at 
least touched upon in previous sections but still bear repeating to demonstrate 
what is going on from a knowledge perspective and using the terminology created 
for this purpose. It is also worth revisiting the actual chronology of consultations 
to look at the factors that made the case (somewhat) famous despite the fact 
that it is largely unknown due to being a non-crisis. Its claim to fame was the 
use of unconventional third-party intermediaries and outside scientific expertise 
but the question is how warranted this reputation is. If nothing else, it is worth 
evaluating these interactions as they relate to the characterisation of “flexibility” 
that this thesis has just bestowed on the FBI’s efforts in Montana, and to the 
issue of the identification paradox discussed in previous chapters.
An immediate methodological quandary lies in what to include in the actual 
case? Many of the MESO uses illustrated by the Montana episode did not actually 
happen during the standoff but in the period leading up to it, thereby providing 
the groundwork for other, in some sense less significant, uses during the event 
itself. It hardly sounds fair to evaluate the use of MESO-knowledge in crises by 
looking at how said knowledge was used outside of the critical phase. While 
prevention and preparedness are certainly considered crucial parts of the overall 
crisis management puzzle, they are really only enablers of good crisis management 
and, almost by definition, are not active components of the management once 
the crisis starts. On the other hand, as was established in a previous section, what 
we have here is a non-crisis,largely because those preventive measures worked so 
well. The fact that it continued to not escalate into a full-blown crisis can also be 
attributed to the continued use of the same measures. As such, it would probably 
just make the discussion disjointed and unclear if we tried to strictly separate the 
preventive and prepared measures from the practical effects they had during the 
standoff. In a sense, it is the confounding influence of the identification paradox 
feedback loop we are seeing here. The proper use of MESO-knowledge helps to 
prevent an escalation, which in turn allows for further use of MESO-knowledge. 
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It is not quite a chicken-or-egg kind of problem since we have a clear chronology 
and a definite start of the cycle, but it is nevertheless a self-reinforcing cycle where 
we should account for all parts of the sequence.
Meta-knowledge
The most clear example of meta knowledge usage has already been identified. 
The fact that the CIRG was instituted demonstrates a reflexive realisation that 
the FBI’s own procedures had limited applicability, as did the fields of knowledge 
that the bureau hosted in its in-house scientific expertise. With those limitations 
in mind, a solution was created to allow reasonably painless grafting of new 
knowledge from sources with potentially vastly different procedures. The bureau 
also grafted a loose, initially small, and highly informal pre-existing community 
of practice onto its own knowledge base in the form of CIAG, and took measures 
to cultivate and grow this community over time to include more and more 
members in more and more fields. It is hard to put a hard boundary between 
the meta-knowledge of understanding the bureau’s own limitations and needs, 
and the empathic knowledge base that comes with these kinds of research net-
works. The FBI’s continued participation can be seen as a continual knowledge 
inventory – figuring out what there is to know on a given topic and whether or 
not it is something the bureau should take a more active interest in – but also 
as an effort to build empathic knowledge and keep tabs on who possesses the 
knowledge that, at least for the moment, is not deemed immediately critical.
A better example of meta-knowledge, and one that sits in sharp contrast to 
how the same issue was handled three years earlier, is the decision to include a 
group of religious scholars as part of the analytical effort in response to Bo Gritz’ 
report of the Freemen describing “Yahweh’s barrier” protecting them from the 
agents outside. At this stage, the FBI still considered it as a dubious claim made 
by a know fraudster, but the bureau had the wherewithal to note that this type 
of religious symbolism was outside of its immediate area of expertise and that 
others may be better suited to analyse the Freemen’s statements. Indeed, the same 
report had caught the attention of the scholarly group that mainly had followed 
the events passively up until this point, but which now sprung into action. The 
FBI needed a second opinion and the scholars had an opinion to offer, so it was 
a match made in heaven.
Long before this, though, similar realisation about the bureau’s own com-
petence – and, more relevantly, its limits – came during just the first couple of 
days. Very early on, it became clear that the Freemen did not consider the FBI 
a legitimate agency, but rather some kind of perverted enforcer of a supposedly 
deeply invaded and thoroughly compromised federal government. Rather than 
trying to assert its role as the pre-eminent federal law enforcement agency, the 
bureau concluded that this image meant they lacked a key competence that was 
required for the negotiation efforts, namely the ability to not be part of that 
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federal system. Since the only way for the FBI negotiators to be seen as worth 
talking to was for them to not be FBI negotiators, and thus the use of third-party 
intermediaries became the only viable option. Here, it is worth going back to 
Chapter 2 and reminding ourselves of what the definition of knowledge is, as 
posited by Polanyi: it is ‘actionable’ – the process and ability to make use of the 
information we have at hand. The FBI negotiators themselves did not have this 
ability due to how they were being viewed, but others were not limited in the 
same way, and a piece of knowledge the FBI did have was how to put these other 
individuals in a position where they could do some good.
This early realisation is the key insight that unlocks many, if not all, other 
pieces in the process of understanding and substantially communicating with 
the Freemen. It is a very similar insight that eventually leads to the FBI allowing 
communication between one of the families on the farm and the head of the 
sect they belong to. The FBI might not hold a perceived position of authority, 
but others do, and those can assert a very strong and direct influence on the 
people on the farm. Similarly, the FBI almost completely lacks any insight into 
or understanding of the Common Law system embraced by the CI movement, 
but the CAUSE Fundation is deeply familiar with both it and the actual law of 
the land, allowing it to take on a translator role that proves to be much needed 
for everyone to start understanding each other.
Empathic knowledge
The uses of empathic knowledge during the standoff are both less readily apparent 
and less neat than the above examples. One has already been mentioned and is 
deeply intermingled with some pre-emptive meta-knowledge usage, which is the 
creation of CIRG and, to an even higher degree, the close collaboration with and 
cultivation of CIAG. The purpose of both these efforts is to create the ability to 
quickly incorporate knowledge from sources that have been identified ahead of 
time, but which are not deemed central enough to become a core competence 
within the bureau.
From this foundation, the standoff provides numerous examples of empathic 
knowledge use when the FBI’s own knowledge proves insufficient. Again, the 
insights about how the bureau was perceived led to the empathic knowledge use 
of recognising the ability of mediators such as Gritz and Duke to speak to the 
Freemen on their own terms, and of CAUSE to discuss the key legal concerns 
using a legal framework that the Freemen both understood and saw as legitimate. 
Likewise, the inclusion of the religious-symbolical analysis in the negotiation 
effort is a case of understanding that another party’s knowledge and understanding 
of the matter is better than the FBI’s own. Many of these were identified at an 
early stage, only to be incorporated and used at some later point in the standoff. 
For instance, CAUSE and its predecessors were already well known within the 
FBI from numerous previous cases, and they were among the first to offer their 
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services to the bureau when the standoff started. Even so, it took some 53 days 
between the initial contact and the point where they were called in to aid the 
FBI – a period longer than the entirety of the Waco siege. Similarly, it took almost 
four weeks between Gritz’ first offer to help and his inclusion, and seven weeks 
between the first contact with AAR and the inclusion of the religious scholars. 
In other words, the knowledge of what other parties had to offer existed at a very 
early stage, even in the instances where these parties had not taken part in the 
preparatory work in building communities of practice and similar knowledge 
networks. Still, this empathic knowledge eventually led to actions being taken 
to include a third party in the negotiation efforts in one capacity or another.
In fact, with the meta-knowledge examples in hand and almost universally 
being acted upon, it is perhaps more interesting to look at the instances where 
empathic and meta-knowledge did not go hand in hand. As mentioned, the 
FBI understood its relationship – or lack thereof – to the Freemen very early 
on, and the empathic knowledge work with the aforementioned intermediaries 
demonstrate that the gap and the ability for others to fill it was also well under-
stood. Nevertheless, all offers were initially rejected, and even during prolonged 
breakdowns in the communication between the Freemen and the FBI, none of 
them besides the ones already mentioned were acted upon. Perhaps they lacked 
the previous experience and proven record of Gritz and CAUSE, or the stature in 
their respective communities of Ohs and Duke, but it certainly seems like some 
of the militia representatives that arrived in Montana were dismissed outright 
and never considered viable candidates to begin with.
It is in other words worth noting that, while the Freemen standoff is often 
considered a prime example of the use of third party expertise (at least among 
those who know of the non-crisis at all), that use – and with it the use of empathic 
knowledge – is still limited to only about half a dozen different parties: the family 
members, Ohs, Gritz, Duke, CAUSE, and the religious experts. It is a lot only 
when compared to how few – usually zero – were allowed this close in before 
this event, and perhaps we should not expect much more in what is effectively 
a pilot or trial case of a very new set of procedures. The fact that this grafting 
of external knowledge is almost all that remains of the public record, with little 
to no mention of what internal expertise the FBI made use of, is itself telling in 
terms of what a break it was with previous methodologies.
At the same time, and to no-one’s real surprise, it is clear when looking at 
the chronology of events that one of the success factors in Montana was the use 
of intermediaries. In spite of a couple of temporary breakdowns, they kept the 
process going well enough that other, more repressive measures only needed to 
be introduced towards the very end, and even then, the introduction was slow. 
Put into the terminology minted in previous chapters as a new way of cutting 
the knowledge management literature, the FBI could make use of empathic 
knowledge to keep both the uncertainty and any potential value conflicts at bay, 
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thereby creating a self-reinforcing feedback loop that kept the standing from 
escalating into a full-blown crisis.
Second-order knowledge
The problem of putting a clear boundary around what should and what should 
not be included as part of the crisis becomes readily apparent when it comes to 
looking for second-order knowledge. Section 3.2.4 suggests a number of indica-
tors for second-order knowledge but also warns about difficulties to distinguish 
these in practice from the more obvious use of empathic knowledge. While the 
establishment of CIRG and CIAG could potentially be seen as deliberate efforts 
to build second-order knowledge, that effort takes place during the two years 
that precede the standoff, and very little in the way of using that knowledge 
shows up in the actual case.
There are only two real candidates here: the suggestion from the AAR that the 
FBI should make contact with religious experts to help with analysis, which is 
nullified by the experts taking the first step more than a month later; and the 
suggestion to bring in Duke as a trustworthy representative of the militia cause, 
which is nullified by the fact that it is more a request from the Freemen than 
a result of any kind of knowledge use on the FBI’s part. Some of the narrative 
regarding the identification of the Justus Township as the Freemen’s and how 
this feeds into the CAUSE Foundation’s focus on resolving that one issue could 
conceivably qualify as well, but this narrative comes almost exclusively from a 
potentially biased source and is therefore a less than stellar example to draw any 
conclusions from.
Granted, given the existing examples of MESO-usage, it is perhaps not a 
problem that we cannot find any clear case of second-order knowledge in action 
– there is already ample evidence that the FBI was employing these skills and 
that it had laid down the groundwork for future second-order knowledge usage 
by introducing a community of practice like CIAG or a knowledge brokerage 
function like CIRG into the organisation. So for the purpose of putting a value 
on the MESO-usage variable, we are already looking at a reasonably high score. 
However, this problem raises some questions both about value of the knowledge 
distinction itself – what use is the distinction if it is this hard to demonstrate – 
and about the methodology used to detect it. It may also raise some questions 
about the case selection. Could we potentially find a case where this use is more 
obvious? Such questions warrant a revisit once the other cases have been covered, 
at which point we can start to try to discern a pattern in how – if at all – this 
knowledge concept appears in the empirical material.
On a more positive note, it is worth reiterating the point from the previous 
section on how these policy changes and how the organisational restructuring 
allowed the FBI to start to expect the unexpected. There is the barest glimpse of 
second-order knowledge in the fact that the bureau knows that it can, must, and 
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will rely on knowledge it may not even be aware of beforehand, and consequently 
procedures are put into place to accommodate the grafting of this yet unknown 
knowledge onto the CIRG’s efforts to support operations in the field. Perhaps 
this knowledge would come more to the fore-front if we studied yet another case 
from later in the history of the bureau.
For the time being, though, we can conclude that the Montana Freemen stand-
off provides numerous examples of meta-knowledge and empathic knowledge in use. 
The preparatory work and organisational changes took place  immediately before 
the standoff point towards a willingness and ability to also employ  second-order 
knowledge, even though none is really apparent in the case itself. In addition, 
common knowledge management tools such as the establishment of communities 
of practice and knowledge brokerage are in use during the events. We should also 
take note of the fact that the use of empathic knowledge continuously allowed the 
FBI to take its time to find more solutions, suppressing the potential escalation 
of the crisis.
5.4.6 Conclusions from Montana
To sum up, this chapter has shown a very different FBI from the one that appeared 
in Chapter 4. Indeed, the entire case turned out radically different in spite of some 
very central shared characteristics. Rather than being bewildered by a seemingly 
obvious, but subtly different opponent, the FBI took a lot of time to understand 
what was going on and how to best resolve the grievances that kept the Freemen 
from surrendering. By taking its time, the FBI managed to steadfastly define 
the event as a non-crisis – a decision that was made possible by a confluence of 
fortunate contextual elements. The FBI had full control over the case from start 
to finish. It had the confidence of the Justice Department which also dependent 
on a positive outcome as the bureau itself. The FBI had newly instituted processes 
and mechanisms to maximise its use of both internal and external knowledge to 
resolve ambiguities and uncertainties, and it was able to clearly prioritise some 
key values over others. In particular, time and money had almost no priority at 
all and could be used as a valve to deflate the crisis trilemma.
In terms of answering the analytical questions, then, the standoff in Montana 
can be summarised as follows:
• Montana was not a crisis for the principal actor.
• The processes being used were anticipated.
• The principal actor could maintain an essentially open mode of operation.
• The principal actor demonstrated multiple instances and moderate to heavy use 
of all types of MESO-knowledge.
• A reinforcement cycle that reduced the degree of crisis and helped anticipate 
the processes in use can be observed.
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For the most part, these answers can be directly translated into the binary varia-
bles we need for our case comparison. The one possible exception is the MESO 
usage, where only two of the three knowledge types are readily apparent in how 
the FBI dealt with the (non)crisis. Even so, two out of three should be good 
enough, especially when considering how prevalent the observed characteristics 
are. In addition, while it strictly speaking means looking outside of the event 
itself, second-order knowledge usage is still apparent in how the bureau chose to 
implement and design functions such as CIRG and CIAG in order to ensure that 
there is a way to find that additional knowledge, should the meta- and empirical 
knowledge use prove insufficient.
The same process also resolves a potential issue with the classification of the 
FBI as an open organisation. The bureau still very much operates with regulation 
as its guiding principle, but at the time of the standoff, that regulation had itself 
been altered to inherently include a much more open work-flow. This observa-
tion is important because it provides an example of an analogue to the already 
established identification paradox – an interference between MESO-usage (or, 
more accurately, the lack thereof ) and the occurrence of crises. The difference 
is that, in this case, it is a more positive interference between MESO-usage and 
the anticipation of due process. In addition, the case provides an example of the 
positive flip-side of the paradox, where good MESO-usage helps suppressing 
the descent into a crisis.
Thus, we arrive at the following variable values for Montana:
• Degree of crisis: low.
• Degree of anticipation of process: high.
• Degree of closed-ness: low.
• Degree of MESO usage: more high than low.
As noted in almost every instance, the values are really not quite as clear-cut 
as this binary division would suggest, but this is what we arrive at given the 
methodology chosen for this study. The finer details are still worth revisiting in 
the case comparison in Chapter 8.
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Winters are cold in northern Europe, in spite of the Gulf Stream, and the northern 
latitudes make them dark as well. As a result, the time around Christmas and 
the new year in Sweden sees a wave of people fleeing the country for sunnier 
and warmer climes. Ever since the charter boom of the 1980:s, Thailand has 
become a mainstay of these migrations, seeing hundreds of thousands of Swedes 
visiting on a yearly basis – by the early 2000:s, the number was some 200,000 
and strongly trending upwards (Vagabond 2013). This is how, on Boxing Day 
2004, Sweden becomes the nation outside of the direct disaster area that is hit the 
hardest by the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. While utterly dwarfed by 
the tens or even hundreds of thousands of casualties seen in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, 
India, and other countries directly hit by the earthquake and the tsunami waves, 
the 543 Swedish losses are not just the highest among the nations hit indirectly 
in absolute terms, but also in relation to the size of the country’s population.11
In a testament to how disasters never strike when you are ready for them, 
Sweden is also a nation that is largely shut down on Boxing Day beyond being 
the first day of the post-Christmas sales. Critical services are certainly still up 
and running, but for the most part, office workers and managers at public 
agencies follow the same vacation patterns as everyone else, even at the highest 
levels of government. It is up to each agency to decide whether or not on-call 
staff is required, and for most of them, the national shut-down means that little 
of importance will happen over Christmas. At the Swedish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the number of Swedes abroad at this time means that the department 
dealing with consular matters – usually tourists getting hurt or losing passports 
11 At the time, Sweden had just surpassed 9 million inhabitants, which means there were 60 deaths 
per million. The runner-up in this category is Finland with 179 deaths and 5.4 million, or 33 
deaths per million. In absolute terms, Germany is second to Sweden with 539 deaths.
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or money or other essential travel items – needs at least a skeleton staff, although 
most of those matters can be handled by some local consulate or embassy. The 
rest of the ministry as well as the foreign minister herself, dealing mainly with 
higher policy matters of international relations, are normally not desperately 
needed. The effect of the tsunami on Swedish nationals in the region will soon 
change this state of affairs and demand a significant re-working of the Swedish 
crisis management system, in particular on the matter of preparedness, and also 
demand a distinct clarification of the respective responsibilities of the individual 
and the government should something go wrong (cf. UD 2001; Fi 2005a:74ff; 
UD 2007). Beyond the strictly legalistic results, the ensuing crisis also redefines 
the assumed relationship between the government and the people.
6.1 Background
The executive branch of the Swedish government is curiously devoid of executive 
power. This may seem like an odd detail to start with in a story about a disaster 
in Southeast Asia, but the hierarchical setup and separation in governance 
between central-ministerial and agency level is the crux of the matter in many 
of the conflicts that arise during the management of the crisis. While the prime 
minister appoints a cabinet of ministers, this cabinet can only ever influence the 
Government Offices (Regeringskansliet, or ‘RK’)12 and its various ministries and 
not the public agencies that sort under or report to the various ministries. These 
ministers are only either heads of the ministry or appointed to head a particular 
issue area that is deemed to sort under the general responsibility of a given ministry. 
The ministers have politically appointed state secretaries directly subordinate to 
them who act as the chef administrators for their respective ministries. The state 
secretaries, in turn, have as their direct subordinates a number of non-political 
senior officials and heads of departments that handle the day-to-day business 
(Regeringsformen 1974:Ch.6–7; KU 2006:47ff).
This is where the power of the cabinet ends, and their work is largely limited to 
policy-making and proposing changes to laws. The actual execution of these policies 
is left to a number of government agencies, each sorting under a specific ministry 
but acting independently of them. The ministries only have two instruments of 
control over “their” agencies: the yearly budget and the ‘instructions’ – laws that 
12 As a general rule in this chapter, the organisations and the departments within them will be 
referred to by their Swedish abbreviations. This is partly due to convenience: the source documents 
universally use these abbreviations and it is easier for both the author and the reader to keep 
track of them if the same term is used in both places. Partly, it is due to uncertainty – anyone 
familiar with the organisations will readily recognise these abbreviations and will not have to 
suffer (along with the author) any confusion or doubt as to whether the correct translation of 
a given abbreviation is being used.
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direct and regulate the responsibilities and tasks of the agencies – both of which 
have to go through the same parliamentary process of legislating as every other law 
of the land. Ministers and other officials in the Government Offices are strictly 
prohibited, not just by administrative tradition, but by constitutional law, to try 
to direct or influence the daily operation of an agency or to inject themselves 
into the decision-making of a case handled on an agency level. This pattern of 
strict division between policy-making and agency operation also applies to the 
equivalent bodies at the regional and local level (cf. Regeringsformen 1974:Ch.9, 
12, 14; Fi 2005a:54ff; KU 2006:55f, 65ff).
In practice this means that, while every government agency is headed by a 
director general who is appointed by the cabinet, and whose responsibility it is 
to ensure that the agency enacts the policies as best they can; even they cannot be 
directed by the government – only report back how well the agency has followed 
their instructions and made use of their budget. Should an agency “misbehave” 
from a political or policy standpoint, the only means available to the government 
for correcting it are to alter the laws to better encapsulate the policy and leave it 
to the justice system to pursue and prosecute the officials who break those laws, 
or to enact punitive budget cuts next fiscal year (both measures, as mentioned, 
being subject to the approval of the parliament). Anything more, and it is the 
government officials themselves who becomes the object of legal action.
Although there have been a number of high-profile instances where accu-
sations have been levelled against government officials of breaking this hard 
rule (often also implicitly accusing the minister or state secretary at the top of 
the hierarchy), the tradition has largely become the reverse (cf. Fi 2005a:60ff; 
Brändström 2016:50ff). Rather than chafing against this restriction and trying 
to work around it, officials can often lean on the legal framework as a reason to 
distance themselves from operational matters more than is strictly necessary. In 
a world of legalistic politics, discretion often really is the better part of valour: 
being seen as distant and aloof is a political PR problem and generally easier to 
deal with than being too involved, which could quickly turn into a draw-out 
legal process. At the same time, the government agencies are universally required 
to report their activities to their respective ministries, and the ministries often 
ultimately have the power to approve or veto any activity that falls under their 
domain unless that power has explicitly been delegated to the agency. Two cases 
in particular stand out where this holds true. The first is whenever an activity 
falls outside of the general instruction to an agency, yet clearly falls within the 
agency’s specialist competence, which usually means that it requires additional 
funds beyond what is in the yearly budget. The second is whenever an agency 
becomes a representative of the Swedish government or nation, rather than just 
of the agency itself – in such instances, the Government Offices generally want 
to retain some control over what kind of image of Sweden is being projected.
The Swedish entry into the EU a decade earlier had disrupted this state of 
affairs somewhat since, in a single stroke, agencies and offices at all levels of 
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government, from local to national, were not just allowed but actively encouraged 
and even bound to make international connections. Previously, and except from 
some fairly rare circumstances, the international arena had been the unique 
(and occasionally tightly guarded) purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
In 2004, it is more or less expected that ostensibly national agencies will have 
international connections, if nothing else with their sister agencies in other EU 
countries. Even so, a number of agencies and offices have long-held traditions 
of operations across national borders for various reasons, in particular in matters 
that relate to disaster relief. It is within this group that we find the main dramatis 
personæ (or should that be ordinationes?) of the Tsunami crisis.
6.1.1 The Swedish Government Offices (RK)
Regeringskansliet (RK) is the collection of administrative bodies that support the 
government’s policy process. Always subject to change to match the division and 
organisation of policy areas the government envisions, in 2004 it consisted of 
the 10 ministries, the Prime Minister’s Office, and ever-present functions such 
as the Administrative Office and the Representation to the EU. Of the 4,600 
employed at the Government Offices, only some 200 are politically appointed, 
the rest being public servants employed the same way as at any other office (Fi 
2005a:135; Regeringskansliet 2004:6, 10ff; KU 2006:53f ). In essence, RK and 
its many ministries are yet another set of government agencies among many 
others, the main difference being that they are headed by the members of the 
cabinet – the prime minister being the head of RK itself.
As mentioned, every agency will have some international aspect to it, if nothing 
else through the connection to the EU. Even so, two in particular inherently deal 
with international matters as part of their main responsibilities: the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet, or ‘UD’) and the Ministry of Defence 
(Försvarsdepartementet, or ‘FÖ’).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD)
UD traces its roots back to the late 1700:s and remains a high-profile and 
high-prestige organisation within the Government Offices. It is the central node 
for diplomatic relations with other nations and for managing the Swedish foreign 
policy in its most direct forms. It formally heads the Swedish representation 
in foreign countries, through embassies, consulates, and permanent offices in 
international organisations such as the EU and UN; each mission being its own 
governmental agency (Fi 2005a:135f). The ministry also handles some matters of 
economic statecraft, such as promoting Swedish trade and managing foreign aid. 
In many ways, UD is the ministry tasked with managing not just the projection of 
the Swedish government’s wishes, but also of the overall image of Sweden abroad. 
Aside from its formal ability both to assign long-term budgetary means and to 
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draw on short-term funds for emergencies, both of which give the ministry some 
fairly strong de facto vetoing power over issues that fall within its purview, there is 
also a historical administrative tradition that informally assigns that same power 
over almost any activity done by a governmental agency abroad(cf. Fi 2005a:137f). 
It is simply not good form to go out and – even vaguely – represent Sweden in 
some form without the nod of approval from the ministry.
While most of the departments within the ministry serve to communicate with 
foreign nations, one focuses more on individuals, and on Swedes in particular: 
the Department for Consular Affairs and Civil Law (Konsulära och civilrättsliga 
enheten, or simply ‘UD-KC’). UD-KC is the central point of contact within the 
at the main office that individuals in need can turn to if if something happens to 
them abroad and they need to receive some kind of assistance from the Swedish 
government (Fi 2005a:83ff, 136). Abroad, the individuals themselves are usually 
in contact with personnel at an embassy or consulate, who may refer them to 
UD-KC for advice, information, or coordination with other agencies in Sweden. 
When the individual is in Sweden, the situation is generally reversed: they are 
in contact with an administrator at UD-KC, who relegates the matter to the 
appropriate mission where contacts are made with the local agencies that need 
to be involved. Being this close to any kind of operative level, and dealing with 
individuals rather than states, makes the 15-person strong UD-KC something 
of an odd bird within the ministry’s organisation.
The Swedes being a travel-happy people,13 this particular area of responsibility 
means that UD-KC has a fair amount of experience with managing crises on 
an individual level and with providing temporary assistance for Swedes abroad 
when things go awry (Fi 2005a:74ff, 83ff). This entails everything from lost 
passports, tickets, and money to legal aid. With such a wide area of responsibility 
and so many people that could potentially fall within that category, it is at times 
said that “abroad” is Sweden’s biggest county, referencing and comparing the 
administrative division of responsibility that applies to country’s inhabitants in 
their every-day life. While the technical accuracy of this claim is debatable, the 
implication is that the various foreign missions are collectively responsible for the 
well-being of as many people as even the most populous of the nation’s admin-
istrative regions. At the same time, the scale of this responsibility should not be 
exaggerated. UD-KC staffs some 15 individuals, and this is generally sufficient 
to deal with the daily flow of issues. A 2001 government report on the need for 
clarified rules on the assistance to Swedish nationals abroad claims that some SEK 
13 As a point of reference, a survey study over the years 2002–2004 suggests that, in any given 
month, some 15–20% of Swedes have booked some kind of trip abroad, meaning that, on 
average over a full year, the number of trips is roughly two times the total number of citizens of 
the country, a pattern that holds true a decade later (cf. ETOUR 2004; UD 2001; Andersson 
2013).
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2.2 million (roughly €260,000) was paid in economic assistance the year before, 
half of which was designated to Swedes permanently residing abroad rather than 
temporary travellers. Spread over the nearly 20 million Swedish trips abroad, 
it seems like a fairly limited problem (cf. UD 2001; GP 2005-01-11). Even so, 
and rather prophetically, the report highlights that Swedes often over-estimate 
what the government – UD in particular – can do for them in the case of large-
scale crisis, either due to the local laws or the Swedish division of responsibility 
between various agencies. In short, UD of 2004 has both an internal and an 
external image of being a reasonably reliable helping hand for Swedes abroad, 
and of having a good grasp of crisis management, not just as it relates to the 
various emergencies that occur every day on the international arena but also on 
an individual level. Indeed, UD, and perhaps RK in general, often claims that 
crisis management is what it does all day, every day (cf. KU 2006:36).
The Ministry of Defence (FÖ)
Through a process that winds its way through two world wars and the ensuing cold 
war, all while Sweden has maintained a policy of neutrality and non-alignment, 
in 2004 Försvarsdepartementet was the ministry tasked with overseeing both the 
civil and the military security of the nation (Fi 2005a:137). The civil security 
sector came under the ministry’s purview through the contingency planning in 
case of war. Over the years, that task expanded in stages, from mainly dealing 
with matters such as maintaining bomb shelters and planning for black-outs 
in case of air raids, to also include the larger scope of stockpiling and ensuring 
access to critical resources for the civil sector in times of crisis, and later to include 
almost all forms of civil protection. During the 1990s, the end of the cold war 
and the Swedish entry into the EU mean that the neutrality policy was quietly 
dismantled and that the focus of the Swedish defence sector in general turned 
more towards both civil and military crisis management within the EU, rather 
than towards defending a nation wedged between two super powers at war. The 
national military capacity, in particular, was drastically down-sized and tuned more 
towards participation in international UN or EU missions (cf. Regeringskansliet 
1999:7, 16; 2002:33f; and 2004:30f ).
As with many other nations, a significant shift happened as a result of the 
9/11 terror attacks, when civil protection and intelligence gathering became hot 
topics over night – two areas where FÖ was the lead organisation within the 
Government Offices. The national civil protection area had become somewhat 
neglected in terms of planning and reform over the last decade, but now appeared 
on the agenda once again (Regeringskansliet 2004; Statskontoret 2005:39; KU 
2006:51). In 2002, the old Agency for Civil Emergency Planning was replaced 
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by the rather unfortunately named Swedish Emergency Management Agency.14 
In spite of its name, SEMA did not manage emergencies, but was rather meant 
to act as a planning and oversight office and a national co-ordinator between 
more operationally focused agencies such as the police and rescue services, as 
well as a centralised conduit of information between these agencies and the 
Government Offices. Within the organisation of the ministry, this contact was 
done through the department of civil affairs (FÖ/CIV), and also fed through the 
function for intelligence and preparedness (FÖ/UNDBER) as it was the ministry’s 
own information clearing house (Fi 2005a:137, 292f ).
As much as the classic task of national defence in and of itself has had a clear 
component of international developments, this component was further reinforced 
at the turn of the millennium by the Swedish policy focus on participation in 
peace-keeping missions under the EU/UN flag. In addition, many of the com-
petences that exist within the civil crisis management sector are in demand across 
the globe, and many of the national agencies have developed emergency response 
units that can be sent out at a moment’s notice. We will come back to a couple 
of notable examples in the section on national agencies below. Consequently, 
even such an ostensibly inwards-looking department within the ministry as 
FÖ/CIV needs to maintain an international focus in order to keep track of any 
international developments that might require the attention of the civil agencies 
that sort under FÖ.
6.1.2 The national agencies
In a still on-going trend of reorganisation and centralisation, the number of 
national agencies that report to the Government Offices has nearly been halved 
since the mid-1990s. In 2004, there were 574 such agencies, half of which 
received a yearly “letter of adjustment” allocating the agency’s budget and over-
arching goals for that year (Regeringskansliet 2004:137; 2005:142; Statskontoret 
2014:45). In most cases, the reduction came in the form of smaller, local agencies 
being combined into a central organisation that handled the same issues only 
on a nationally co-ordinated level. In a handful of instances, it was a matter of 
rationalisations where a policy area had been differentiated into a number of 
closely linked agencies, each dealing with some specific facet of the issue, and 
that this split had now been deemed inefficient.
There are in practice three main roles for these agencies to fill: acting as the 
operational, business-end of the government, applying and enacting the laws 
of the land; acting as oversight and controller agencies for a policy sector or 
14 The English name for the agency was chosen in part to evoke a parallel with FEMA in the U.S., 
whereas the Swedish name Krisberedskapsmyndigheten (KBM) – literally “the Agency for Crisis 
Preparedness” – was a more accurate reflection of the actual responsibilities of the agency.
198
Stressing Knowledge
subsystem; and acting as an expert authority on an issue area, either as support 
for other agencies or for the government itself. Some agencies may only fulfil 
one of these roles, others may do two or all three of them, with the expert role 
being almost universally applicable since it is needed as a foundation for the 
other two. Viewed from this perspective, RK is itself a controlling agency that 
largely borrows its subject-matter expertise from its subordinate agencies, either 
by having individual liaisons from these agencies in place at the Government 
Offices or by requesting research reports or expert judgements on a given matter. 
The exact nature of this relationship varies wildly between the different minis-
tries and agencies, some having a tradition of very close bonds and others being 
much more distant.
Aside from the strict legal prohibition for government officials to try to direct 
or interfere with the day-to-day work of the agencies, these three roles give the 
agencies another layer of independence. They generally know better than any-
one how an issue within their field of expertise could or should be handled. In 
addition, agencies with a strong operative division tend to have professional ties 
and competences that further solidifies their ability to act on their own volition. 
Three such agencies that will come to play a central role in the tsunami crisis 
are the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, the National Criminal Police, and the 
National Board of Health and Welfare. Not coincidentally, all three deal with 
highly professionalised areas of civil protection, and all three maintain pools of 
emergency personnel that can be called in and sent out to crisis areas around 
the world.
The Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA)
The SRSA was only in part what the name suggests: it was the central agency 
for rescue services, delivering among other things training for fire fighters and 
other emergency service personnel, but it was also a central agency in numerous 
civil defence and civil protection areas (Fi 2005a:137f ). It dealt with protection 
against hazardous materials; it provided communications and IT service support 
for foreign missions; it was the central agency for learning and after-action 
reports after crises; and it provided both on-site expert support and IT-based 
crisis decision support for emergency managers. Its clientele ranged from local 
municipal agencies to the national government, to supranational organisations 
and other nations in need.
In particular, SRSA was a well-established and renowned brand name in the 
international community for the services it had provided throughout the years in 
the area of post-disaster reconstruction (Koraeus 2009). The agency maintained a 
pool of specialists in the fields of search and rescue, with a special focus on earth-
quakes, and civil mine action – that is, the mapping and clearing of mines and 
education of mine safety among locals. It also had a large team of ICT technicians 
that specialised in setting up and maintaining in-field infrastructure to support 
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other missions with any kind of telecommunication need. While not everyone 
was fully trained and certified, much less ready to leave at a moment’s notice, 
in 2004, its resource pool counted well over 1,500 people (Koraeus 2009). In 
order to maintain this level of readiness, the agency had been forced to become 
reasonably good at prognosticating exactly what competences might be needed 
in the resource pool in the near future, so the right expertise could be attached 
and trained long before they were actually needed.
The reputation of the SRSA was such that its teams are often requested 
directly in connection to disasters. Events in Sweden or within the EU were 
generally channelled via FÖ, since they were the co-ordinating ministry for civil 
emergencies in that geographical area. Requests from further afield, especially 
from UN organs such as OCHA, generally went through UD, since it was the 
point of contact for the UN and since it was the lead ministry for foreign aid. 
Almost all international SRSA missions, and a lot of the aforementioned plan-
ning for the future, was also done in conjunction with the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), which reports to UD (Fi 2005a:138). 
Such SRSA missions were effectively funded through the foreign aid budget that 
was managed by SIDA, which meant that the mandate and reporting structure 
was somewhat odd: UD ultimately had the budgetary responsibility for these 
missions, but FÖ provided the mandate for them to actually go anywhere and 
was also the recipient for SRSA’s reports on their activities (cf. KU 2006:136ff). 
Beyond that, and as part of their general instruction, SRSA could somewhat 
independently send out observation teams to disaster areas, either to study the 
management of the disaster as part of the agency’s larger knowledge gathering 
mission or to evaluate the local needs if and when a call to support the disaster 
management efforts was anticipated.
At any rate, SRSA was a prominent provider of operational expertise and 
manpower, as well as an agency that was experienced in operating on the boundary 
between the two policy fields that were signified by the ministerial division between 
FÖ and UD. At the same time, it was almost fiercely and proudly independent, 
resting on the narrative of doing “good deeds” and projecting the image of Sweden 
as a care-giving nation on the international arena (Koraeus 2009).
The Swedish National Police Board (RPS) and the National Bureau of Investigation 
(RKP)
The third major agency actor in the tsunami crisis was the Swedish National 
Bureau of Investigation (Rikskriminalpolisen, or ‘RKP’), which was technically not 
a separate agency but a division within the National Police Board (Rikspolisstyrelsen, 
or ‘RPS’). In 2004, the Swedish police was a heavily decentralised affair, with 
each county police force being its own agency and with RPS being a central 
planning and policy office that co-ordinated between all these local forces and 
which reported directly to yet a third ministry: the Ministry of Justice. RPS also 
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maintained a number of police competences that were either too technical and 
specialised to work properly if divided into local agencies, or where the issue 
area was of national rather than local interest and a division would have been 
unsuited for that reason. These competences included the Swedish Security 
Service (the national civil intelligence and governmental protection agency) the 
National Police Academy, the National Laboratory of Forensic Science, and the 
National Criminal Police. Of these, the two main operative divisions are the 
Security Services and the National Criminal Police, but the RPS also had numer-
ous relatively minor support functions that were more aimed towards operative 
matters in support of the nation’s many police local agencies. In particular, RPS 
needed to be able to provide ICT and administrative support to the police, and 
it had the capability and competence to maintain large data collection efforts 
that worked across agency borders. One specific implementation of this was the 
so-called ID Commission, which was tasked with collecting and sifting through 
large amounts of (often incomplete and fractured) data in order to establish 
the identity of individuals, either for forensic purposes or in support of larger 
criminal investigations (Fi 2005a:138).
RKP’s particular focus was with organised or other larger-scale crime, cross-border 
criminality and international co-operation, and with crisis management and 
co-ordination in case of large extraordinary events. While the National Police 
Board as a whole somewhat mirrored the wide variety of roles of the SRSA, 
ranging from pure research and analysis, to oversight, to operational matters, the 
National Criminal Police was very much at the operative end of the spectrum 
and was highly professionalised. This was a police force that operated both on the 
national and the international level. While it had a wide array of competences 
and areas of expertise, those were mainly employed in service of RPS or used to 
support the local police forces, and less a service offered to outside agencies or to 
the Government Offices. Even so, of the national agencies presented here, RKP 
was perhaps the one with the clearest international focus, largely due to its areas 
of responsibility. It was the point of contact for agencies such as Interpol and 
Europol; it was heavily involved with the police and border control co-operation 
within the Schengen area through Frontex; and it managed most, if not all, of 
the international regular police work – that is, anything not handled by Security 
Service. It was mainly these international contacts that would occasionally call for 
RKP to make an appearance in the Government Offices outside of the Ministry 
of Justice, for instance to take part in some UD-sponsored mission or to support 
a more complicated counsular matter (Fi 2005a:138). In the decade since the 
Swedish entry into the EU, most of this international work had been normal-
ised and become a routine part of both the agency’s and the nation’s integration 
into the larger EU security framework. As such, it was no longer really a matter 
of foreign policy or of projecting any kind of image of Sweden; rather, it was 
simply police work done within a geographically expanded area of interest that 
had become relevant for the Swedish police.
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This largely held true for the Ministry of Justice and its subordinate agencies 
in general. As a rule, they dealt with domestic matters rather than any of the 
international projections of policy one might see from the Defence or Foreign 
Affairs Ministries. It was simply the case that, over time, “domestic matters” 
had come to include numerous interactions with other EU member states and 
institutions, especially in the Schengen region. To some extent this held true even 
before the EU entry, if perhaps on a smaller scale, since similar schemes were set 
up in the Nordic region to simplify travel, business, and all manners of official 
affairs between the bordering nations.
6.2 Chronology of events
Since the purpose of this study is to evaluate the how the Swedish Government 
Offices, and UD in particular, handled the fallout of the boxing-day tsunami, this 
chronology will largely focus on what happened in Sweden and even then only on 
issues pertaining to information sharing and knowledge needs at the Government 
Offices. The full scope of the disaster itself, even from just a Swedish perspective, 
covered a dozen countries across seven time zones. Unless otherwise noted, times 
and dates are given in Central European Time – the time zone used in Sweden.
On Sunday, December 26, 2004, at a minute to eight in the morning local 
time, the Indo-Australian tectonic plate is forced in under the Burma plate along 
a fault-line that stretches from the Bay of Bengal to the southern tip of Sumatra 
(Fi 2005a:101; USGS 2005). The movement creates a 10-minute earthquake 
with its epicentre between the island of Simeulue and mainland Sumatra in the 
Aceh province of Indonesia. The earthquake has a moment magnitude of 9.3 
and reaches an intensity of IX – defined as cracked ground and buildings being 
shifted off their foundations – in nearby Banda Aceh,15 and it is soon felt all 
around the north-eastern corner of the Indian Ocean. The quake triggers a row 
of tsunami waves that radiate out from the Sumatra coast and the straits between 
northern Sumatra and the Adaman and Nicobar islands. Moving mainly in an 
east-westerly direction, the waves force themselves into the Malacca strait, thereby 
15 There are two main scales in use when describing the severity of earthquakes: the moment 
magnitude (Mw) scale and the Mercallli intensity (MM) scale. The former is a mathematical 
measure of the magnitude of – i.e. energy released by – an earthquake. It is a generalisation of 
(and often incorrectly reported as) the older Richter scale that was developed for measuring 
moderate earthquakes in California, but which proved too dependent on the geological specifics 
of that locale and as such was unsuited for accurate measurements of very weak and very strong 
quakes. The latter is an observational measure of the intensity – i.e. effects on nature and on 
man-made objects – and is an expansion of the earlier Rossi-Forel scale, only exanded to a wider 
array of outcomes and more precisely defined. Magnitude is generally reported as a decimal 
number on the continuum between 0.0 and 10.0, whereas intensity is described in discrete 
steps denominated by a Latin number, with the Mercalli scale using steps I through XII.
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hitting northern Sumatra both from the Indian Ocean side and from the Malacca 
side. Crossing the deeper Indian Ocean at great speed, the waves hit Sri Lanka 
after an hour and a half, the front then continuing up the coast of eastern India. 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar are hit roughly two hours after the initial 
quake. In the west, the wave continues past India, hitting the Maldives after three 
and a half hour, and Somalia after seven hours (Fi 2005a:102; NOAA 2008).
The quake is felt strongly enough for employees at the Swedish embassy in 
Bangkok to become worried (Hansén 2005:24). Two hours later, just after the 
waves have struck the shores, they receive a call from the popular destination 
Phuket describing the immediate aftermath of the tsunami. An attempt is made 
to contact the ambassador, but he is coincidentally stuck on a plane taking off 
for Phuket and cannot be reached. Instead, they decide to report back to UD 
in Stockholm and reach the on-duty officer for consular affairs in her home (Fi 
2005a:140). An immediate estimate is made that some 10,000–20,000 Swedes 
are in the region, perhaps as many as 30,000, giving an hint of the scale of the 
potential disaster they have at their hands (Hansén 2005:24f ).
Back in Sweden, the quake takes place at 01:59 in the morning, and the news 
spread slowly. The news agency TT, a news clearing house shared by the larger 
national newspapers and which is almost universally monitored and used as a 
source by other Swedish media, makes its first report about the quake at 03:35, 
just as the waves hit Sri Lanka. The first notice of the waves that wash over the 
Thai beaches come at 04:10, when local travel agent offices in Thailand begin 
reporting back to their Swedish headquarters, describing scenes of hotels having 
entire floors washed away and debris filling every surface on land. These reports 
trigger the respective crisis management groups within the affected travel agencies. 
The call from the Swedish embassy to UD comes in at 04:40, and from previous 
experience, the staff on call estimates that the ministry is about to be inundated 
by as much as half a million calls from the next of kin to those directly affected 
(Fi 2005a:127, 143; Hansén 2005:25). The on-duty officer contacts the UD 
press office to pass the news on and to suggest that extraordinary measures will 
be needed to get the information out and stem the inevitable tide of incoming 
calls. In particular, the UD staff responding to calls will have to forego the 
standard procedures for taking notes on incoming calls since this will slow down 
the response rate at a time when maintaining a high rate is absolutely critical 
(Hansén 2005:25, 51).
Sure enough, at 04:50, the first external call arrives at UD from a journalist 
asking about the situation in Phuket, and the press office provides the informa-
tion they have just been handed from the embassy. This is enough to prompt the 
newspaper in question to stop the presses and prepare for a special edition. Soon 
thereafter, calls start coming in from Swedes, both at home and in Thailand to 
ask for information on friends and family visiting the coastal areas. The public 
also contacts various emergency services, including RPS. Meanwhile, the on-duty 
officer contacts the head of UD-KC to discuss the need for reinforcements, both 
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at the embassy and at the Stockholm offices. She then calls back to UD to com-
municate a decision not to take any detailed notes on incoming reports from 
the public on missing Swedes – the existing routines for doing so will not be 
able to cope with the expected flood of calls, and will just unnecessarily degrade 
the response time and create further confusion and anxiety. Half an hour later, 
at 05:30, the amount of calls from the public have started to increase and the 
duty officer at UD is quickly swamped and requests that additional personnel 
be called in to handle the matter (Fi 2005a:106, 124f; Hansén 2005:26ff). The 
on-duty officer receives yet another call from the Bangkok embassy that passes on 
early reports of at least 1,000 Swedes being affected by the tsunami. The embassy 
also provides a similar report to UD-ASO, the UD Department for Asia and the 
Pacific Region. By now, the Swedish ambassador is off his plane, the flight to 
Phuket having been cancelled, and he finally receives the message sent to him 
an hour earlier. In response, he calls the Swedish honorary consul in Phuket to 
get an update, and based on this reports decides to put the Bangkok embassy at 
full alert. This order is relayed only minutes after the embassy’s report has been 
sent back home to UD (Hansén 2005:30f ).
Around 05:40, the news media start to highlight the tsunami and its effects 
(Fi 2005a:125f ). The earlier contact with UD is publish on a news website, and 
TT sends out a report of buildings being levelled and people swept away by the 
waves. One of the department heads at SRSA takes note of the news but judges 
the event to be too remote to allow for an effective search and rescue operation 
using SRSA personnel (KU 2006:136f). These early reports prompts a seismologist 
at Uppsala Unversity to start making inquiries, and he is also contacted directly 
by the media to comment on the matter (Fi 2005a:125f ). The same idea has 
occurred to the on-duty officer at UD-KC, but she only reaches the Geo Centre 
institution at the university, which – perhaps unsurprisingly – is not staffed at 
this time. Further searches put her in contact with a researcher connected to the 
Swedish Defence Research Agency who briefs her on the nature and immediate 
risks of earthquakes and tsunamis (Hansén 2005:27; Fi 2005a:125). In the 
meantime, she receives a call from the ambassador in Bangkok, who gives his 
view on the current situation, and also reports that he will attempt to travel to 
Phuket by car – a trip that is estimated to take 10 hours. The media also starts 
to track down contacts at the travel agencies that serve the region, who estimate 
that there are 10,000–15,000 Swedes in Thailand alone. Some of the travel 
agencies also contact UD to notify them that many of their customers have been 
hit by the disaster and may need immediate evacuation, but that the chartered 
flights will not be sufficient to carry them all. In addition, those flights will not 
be suited to bring home the many wounded that are being reported by the local 
offices (Daléus 2005:94)
RKP receives its first formal report on the disaster at 06:33, and the head officer 
on duty decides to activate the National Police Board’s ID Commission and to 
contact the agency’s division for violent crime. An event of this magnitude will 
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require its expertise in collecting and culling the identities of the thousands of 
individuals affected by the disaster, and the violent crime division has the systems 
in place to manage the amount of data required for the task (Hansén 2005:28, 
50). At roughly the same time, a first brief goes out from the on-duty analyst 
at FÖ/UNDBER, citing an estimate of 20,000 individuals affected and a high 
probability that there will be many deceased and wounded that might require 
the use of the National Air Medevac service (Fi 2005a:144; Hansén 2005:28). 
The Swedish Armed Forces in general had received scattered and piecemeal 
information about the disaster almost since the very start as a number of officers 
on vacation in the region have reported back to their regiments. The morning 
news at 07:00 contains the first interviews and eye-witness reports from people 
in the affected areas, and the scope and nature of the disaster becomes generally 
known (Fi 2005a:125f; Hansén 2005:27). At 07:20, the telephone exchange at 
the Government Offices opens and starts taking calls, most trying to reach UD.
6.2.1 Day one – waking up to a crisis
The phone system at both RK and UD is almost immediately overloaded by the 
mass of incoming calls. In addition to routing those connections, the exchange 
is also continuously tasked with setting up small conference calls between key 
individuals within the various ministries, most of which are on Christmas vaca-
tion or doing on-call duty from their homes. The work load soon becomes high 
enough to make this solution impractical. The on-duty officer at UD-KC finally 
manages to get in contact with the head of her unit and the head of UD-KC, 
filling them in on the events of the early morning (Fi 2005a:145f ). The head of 
UD-KC decides not to contact the political leadership of the ministry, but rather 
delivers a report to the director general of administrative affairs since he is also 
the chairman of the emergency preparedness group at UD. The director gets the 
impression that there is no due reason for alarm: no solid information exists of 
Swedes being affected, all the key functions have been activated, and UD seems 
to have the situation under control. As a routine measure, the unit head contacts 
RKP’s ID Commission and is informed that it has already been activated in 
response to the events (Fi 2005a:146). RKP has also already concluded that UD 
will have to take the lead on the collection and registration of incoming data. 
that the ID Commission will separately do the actual data-crunching required 
to identify individuals, and that the two organisations must make this division 
of labour clear and known amongst themselves. This plan meets with approval 
from the UD representative (Hansén 2005:32ff, 50f ).
Both the director and the unit head are on vacation away from Stockholm 
and neither judges the situation to be critical enough to warrant an immediate 
return to the UD offices. The UD-KC unit head also receives calls from the head 
of the RK phone exchange and from the press office, trying to stress the dire situ-
ation for the phone operators and for the scant few desk officers trying to answer 
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questions – many of which are being asked to handle consular matters, which is 
outside of their area of expertise. The message is that there is a desperate need 
for some kind of management-level leadership of the effort, but the reports are 
rebuffed as being “out of order (Fi 2005a:145f, 149f; Hansén 2005: 32ff, 38). At 
the same time, reports start coming in from Sri Lanka and the Swedish embassy 
in Colombo, where no clear picture exists of the extent of the damages or whether 
any Swedes have been affected. An international call for aid to Sri Lanka also goes 
out through UNDAC (United Nation Disaster Assessment and Coordination), 
which gets the attention of SRSA, as does a similar request sent by the UN via 
EU-MIC (Monitoring Information Center). The agency responds to UNDAC 
half an hour later, saying that they can supply personnel and equipment with 
very short notice (Fi 2005a:151; KU 2006:137). From an internal discussion 
between the duty officer, the head of the operative division, and the head of a unit 
in the same division, it seems highly likely that a significant number of Swedes, 
both in Thailand and in Sri Lanka, will have been directly hit by the disaster. 
The Director General of SRSA is also informed about the situation. Meanwhile, 
since SRSA sorts under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, a contact 
is made between FÖ/CIV and the UD department of Global Security (UD-GS), 
explaining the aid requests and SRSA’s intention to put three operations into 
effect: a shipment of emergency supplies; a team responding to the UNDAC call, 
which can depart later in the day; and a monitor responding to the EU-MIC call. 
All three operations are aimed at Sri Lanka, and the EU-MIC response, being 
only a single person and responding to a UN call, gets an immediate go-ahead 
(Hansén 2005:28f; KU 2006:137).
Back at UD, the first formal written report on the event from the Bangkok 
embassy is received by fax at 08:28, depicting an escalating crisis (Fi 2005a:1907ff, 
140f ). Thai authorities have started their disaster response, and while no hard 
data is available, there are rumours of mass casualties. However, as one might 
expect on a Sunday during Christmas, the UD offices are not well-staffed and 
the mere handful present at the ministry are too occupied with answering 
phones, finding people, and routing calls to notice this delivery. None of the 15 
employed at UD-KC are present, and the on-duty officer function is set up to 
be able to work from home in exactly these kinds of situations. At this point, 
the Government Office phone exchange is staffed by all of three operators; the 
average waiting time to get through is one hour; and the dual-digit display in 
the exchange showing how many calls are on hold is constantly pinned at 99 
(Fi 2005a:126, 140; Hansén 2005:33, 38).
As the pressure mounts and information about the event spreads across the 
evening news, a skeleton staff starts to assemble at the offices. At 09:00, the UD 
press director arrives the ministry’s press office (UD-PIK) and starts trying to clear 
up the communication with the media, after having been contacted by a friend 
whose relatives were in the area and who reported mass casualties and destruc-
tion. She also contacts the unit head and director at UD-KC to communicate the 
206
Stressing Knowledge
lack of management present, but is told not to bother with how the department 
staffs its offices. Half an hour later, two desk officers at UD-KC enter duty, one 
from their home and the other on location at the UD office, both having been 
called in by the unit head (Hansén 2005:38f ). It is only during the following 
hour, some 1½–2 hours after its arrival, that the faxed report from the Bankok 
embassy is noticed and processed, but since it lacks any clearly specified recipient, 
this information stays within the four units where the report has been received: 
UD-KC, UD-ASO (the department for Asia and Oceania), UD-PIK, and the still 
unstaffed emergency response secretariat (Fi 2005a:104, 188; Hansén 205:33f ).
Completely separate from the confused internal information flow at the UD 
offices, the minister for international development receives a briefing at this 
time from her senior political advisor, but this briefing only really relates to the 
EU-MIC and UNDAC calls for aid to Sri Lanka since these are more traditional 
foreign-aid requests. However, in other contacts with the ministry’s cabinet sec-
retary and staff at UD-GS, she has come to understand that some measures will 
be needed, not only in Sri Lanka but also in Thailand to aid stranded Swedes 
(Fi 2005a:142). The director general of SRSA comes to the same conclusion 
following a direct eye-witness account over the phone. When contacting the head 
of operations at SRSA, she learns that no official request for aid has gone out 
from the Thai government, which means that such an operation will not auto-
matically be funded, but rather requires a special directive from the government 
in order to receive the necessary funds (KU 2006:16). Nevertheless, the head 
of operations contacts the deputy director of UD-GS to explain the situation 
and the need for an SRSA mission. The deputy forwards this information to his 
director and to the state secretary to the minister for international development, 
and also contacts the minister directly. All three give their preliminary approval 
to the mission, and the deputy then contacts the SRSA operations head to relay 
the news and to tell him to start preparing some kind of operation in the area 
(Hansén 2005:34f, 44f ).
At 09:50, the on-duty officer at UD-KC once again calls the head of her 
department, pointing out the lack of any kind of operational leadership and 
how the situation was quickly becoming unmanageable. Shortly afterwards, the 
head of her units, who was not part of this previous call, contacts the on-duty 
officer to remind her of the chain of command at the ministry and reprimand 
her for bypassing a step in that chain. She is also told to stay at home, ostensibly 
because she has already worked all night, rather than come into the office to try 
to lead the work being done there (Fi 2005a:145f; Hansén 2005:33f ). Similarly, 
by 10:00, the department focusing on Asia and neighbouring regions, UD-ASO, 
has finished their first report for the head of the department. From a very early 
stage, the deputy director at UD-ASO is worried about the number of Swedes 
that will most likely have been on, or close to, the popular Thai beaches as the 
waves struck. When asked for further directions, the head of the department 
judges this to be a matter where UD-ASO must follow UD-KC’s lead rather than 
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act on its own, and she gives the order to wait for any support request from that 
department (Hansén 2005:26f ).
By 11:00, the director general of SRSA and her head of operations have 
concluded that an official government directive will be required in order for 
SRSA to be able to send any kind of aid mission to Thailand (Fi 2005a:151f ). 
She therefore calls the state secretary of the defence minister at FÖ to argue the 
need for such a mission. The state secretary calls his counterpart under the foreign 
minister, as well as UD’s cabinet secretary to inform them of this need. Since 
there has been little to no contact between these two and the individuals involved 
in the earlier conversation between UD-GS and the minister for international 
development, he and is told that it is UD’s call whether or not such a mission 
should be sent and that no such plans exist at the moment. Nevertheless, he 
offers SRSA’s services should the need arise (Hansén 2005:45; KU 2006:137).
At the press office, the information officers are as leaderless as the staff at 
UD-KC, and they struggle to keep on top of the news flow (Fi 2005a:146f ). The 
ministry’s press director makes one of the first attempts at raising the matter to 
the political level at 10:30 by asking the foreign minister’s press secretary if the 
minister should issue a statement, and is told to await a reply. Just after 11, a 
news report makes the claim that no Swedes have perished in the disaster, and the 
press office has to scramble to issue a correction: there are no such indications, 
and at that point there are simply no official reports of any dead or wounded 
(Fi 2005a:127). A revised news report is issued almost an hour later. In the 
meantime, the original report, conflicting with what Swedes have heard directly 
from friends or relatives in the region, further increases the pressure on the entire 
Government Office phone exchange, and on UD in particular. While dealing 
with this mix-up, a message comes back from the press secretary. The foreign 
minister will not make any statement at this time (Hansén 2005:34). The message 
to the media becomes increasingly mixed when the second in command at the 
Bangkok embassy states that there have been two confirmed Swedish casualties, 
this only minutes after the redacted report has gone out that no information in 
ether direction exists (Fi 2005a:127). The reports from Thailand are either not 
picked up by, or not disseminated within UD-PIK, which makes the press office 
contradict the reports from the field. When asked, they instead keep repeating that 
no information exists about any confirmed Swedish casualties, even as the media 
reporting from the disaster area keep suggesting increasingly higher numbers of 
dead and wounded (cf. Fi 2005a:127; Hansén 2005:34).
The information flow within the rest of UD is just as lack-lustre as the 
small trickle of desk officers that arrive after having been called to work are 
swallowed up by an unending flow of incoming calls. Two more officers arrive 
at UD-KC at lunch time, and together with the colleague who had come in 
earlier in the morning, they decide to join the beleaguered operators at the 
main Government Office phone exchange, once again leaving the KC offices 
empty (Hansén 2005:38). The conversations during the morning have given 
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the director of UD-KC the impression that the matter is being handled, albeit 
at a high work-load, and that there is no immediate need to raise the issue to a 
higher level. As a result, the ministry’s cabinet secretary is largely left out of the 
loop. Rather than hearing any reports directly from UD, he is contacted by the 
state secretary to the defence minister, who is passing on information about the 
planned SRSA operations since these will require intra-ministry co-ordination. 
Beyond this information, the cabinet secretary’s only source of information has 
been the media reporting during the morning hours and a brief contact with the 
Ministry of Foreign Aid (Fi 2005a:146f; Hansén 2005:33, 35; KU 2006:16f ). 
Some of the senior administrators who could conceivably, and with ease, escalate 
the matter to the state leadership level have arrived at the Government Offices 
by now, but their exact whereabouts and activities will later become a point of 
contention. The state secretary to the foreign minister claims that he arrived 
at the Government Ofices at 10 and stayed there for the remainder of the day, 
informing himself on the matter over the phone with the UD cabinet secretary. 
Media investigations after the event instead suggest that the state secretary visited 
the UD offices on a number of occasions, and the cabinet secretary goes on to 
claim that no calls were made. A technical investigation into the matter offers no 
conclusive evidence of any visits to the UD offices, but also shows that no calls are 
made between the cabinet and state secretaries at this time, and further suggests 
that the any attempts at collecting information on the crisis on the part of the 
state secretary were shallow at best (cf. Daléus 2005:84f, 87f, Hansén 2005:37; 
Hirschfeldt et al. 2007:15ff).
At RKP, the formal internal responsibilities for the upcoming operation are 
being drafted and disseminated within the national police organisation. A call 
is made to the head of the active unit at UD-KC asking for the ministry to send 
what information they have gathered so far in order to get the data collection 
effort started, and after some urging, a first set of data is transferred. However, 
due to the order sent out during the early morning not to follow standard 
procedures in answering the calls at UD and to skip most of the note-taking, 
the quality of the material varies wildly. As time passes and the need to do so 
becomes increasingly obvious, the staff answering the phones start ignoring the 
morning order but it is still done in a largely ad-hoc manner using whatever 
tools are available. In fact, the on-duty officer who issued the order eventually 
starts taking notes herself. Some notes are recorded digitally but a lot is simply 
done using pen and paper on whatever available forms seem most suitable. The 
distribution of labour between RKP and UD was made clear between the head 
officer on duty and the active unit head for the respective organisations but 
does not seem to have spread within UD or the phone exchange office. The unit 
head at UD-KC also takes a number of calls from the travel agencies servicing 
the region, where they describe what they know of the situation so far (Daléus 
2005:94; Hansén 2005:51f ).
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Another attempt at raising the issue to the political level is made at 14:00, when 
the UD-PIK press director contacts the prime minister’s press secretary to see if the 
PM is planning on making a statement and if this should go into the information 
package being prepared for the ministry’s web site. The package is part of an 
attempt to bring some order to the work at the press office. The press director is 
told that the press secretary will find out and come back shortly. In the meantime, 
the minister for defence is following the events through the media in her home, 
bedridden with fever and gastroenteritis (Fi 2005a:146f ). As she learns that the 
UD and RK cannot keep up with the incoming phone traffic, she contacts her 
senior political advisor and asks him to scramble some personnel from FÖ that 
might help offload the call flow. At the same time, both agree that this is first and 
foremost a matter for UD to handle (Hansén 2005:34f ). At 15:00, the PM’s press 
secretary returns with the message that the PM will not make any statement at 
this time because no demand exists for such a statement (KU 2006:18f ). It later 
becomes clear that the press secretary has assumed that the Swedish involvement 
would at most entail some kind of foreign aid, mainly because the press has made 
no attempts at reaching the PM through her – indeed, when someone finally 
calls later in the evening, it is regarding a question that just so happens to be 
best answered by the minister for international development. Likewise, the PM 
himself mainly follows the international media reporting and therefore receives 
little to no indication of any Swedish aspects of the event. Instead, it largely seems 
to him to to be a matter of a natural disaster striking a number of developing 
nations dotted around the Indian Ocean (Hansén 2005:34, 37; KU 2006:18).
Over at UD-GS, it is becoming increasingly clear that Swedish tourists are 
in need of aid and that SRSA is not just willing but expertly able to mobilise 
the required expertise in very short order, not just in Sweden but on location 
in Phuket (Fi 2005a:152f ). A desk officer manages to get a call through to unit 
head at UD-KC to suggest that such a team should be deployed, but since there 
has been no request for such aid from the consulate, she declines the offer. The 
deputy director at UD-GS also tries in vain to reach the unit head and the director 
at UD-KC on multiple occasions. Instead, he gets through to the press secretary 
to the minister for international development and asks him to tell the UD cabinet 
secretary to issue a formal request for an SRSA mission. Soon thereafter, the 
press secretary returns the call, relaying a message from the UD-KC director via 
the cabinet secretary that SRSA is not able, allowed, or willing to do anything 
at this moment (Fi 2005a:152f; Hansén 2005:45f; KU 2006:138). The deputy 
director returns with the news to the SRSA head of operations and is told that 
the agency needs a formal request in order to be able to do anything. In response, 
he asks the head of operations to skip the formalities and just make sure that a 
mission is underway soon. He also contacts the his own director of UD-GS to 
explain that UD-KC seems hesitant to deploy SRSA, asking the director to apply 
some director-level pressure on the cabinet secretary. Soon thereafter, the state 
secretary to the minister of international development calls the director with a 
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very similar request. However, the cabinet secretary cannot be reached, and the 
director eventually resolves to make the formal decision himself. Even though it 
will technically be a mission to help Swedes, and therefore should be a consular 
matter to be paid for by UD-KC, it can be provisionally funded through the 
UD-GS-controlled pool for disaster management. With the financing arranged, 
the Ministry of Defence is informed that the SRSA mission can go ahead (Fi 
2005a:153; Hansén 2005:45f; KU 2006:138).
While the funding problem seems to be solved, there are still many other 
questions left unresolved for the mission itself. The agency determines that this 
will not be a search-and-rescue mission, nor is it really a matter of dealing with an 
earthquake – to things the agency specialises in – but rather some kind of disaster 
survey with no clear pre-existing routine or work format. A formal request will not 
only require funding, but also details describing the purpose of, and demands on, 
the mission, neither of which exists. In addition, the conflicting messages from 
different departments at UD makes it dubious, or at best just unclear, whether 
or not the ministry has actually approved the mission. Another possible issue, 
at least from UD’s perspective, is that the Thai government has not formally 
requested any aid, which would technically prohibit Swedish governmental and 
agency officials from acting in the country. Attempts are made to contact the 
Thai Ministry of the Interior, but the calls are left unanswered (Hansén 2005:49).
During the afternoon and early evening, a handful of desk officers come into 
the UD offices to help manage the situation. Some of them have been working 
from home but have found it impossible to keep up with the work flow. The 
director of UD-PIK also finally arrives at the office and is shocked by the com-
plete chaos and lack of leadership at the ministry; she is the first individual in 
a managerial position to have arrived and actually witness the situation at the 
office. By now, many have been working for 12 hours straight and need to be 
relieved, and there is no word on how the call flow will be handled during the 
night shift. The time difference pretty much ensures that just as the calls from 
Sweden start to drop off, calls from the areas struck by the disaster will start to 
pick up. A meeting at the cabinet secretary’s office is set up for 10:00 the following 
morning, where management representatives from all UD departments are to 
be present, as well as representatives from a couple of key Government Office 
functions. With this decision, the ministry’s emergency response group is officially 
activated (Fi 2005a:147; Hansén 2005:38ff; KU 2006:130f ).
Preparing an appearance in the early evening news, broadcast at 19:00, the 
minister for international development almost exclusively discusses the relief 
mission to Sri Lanka since little other information has reached her during the 
day (KU 2006:19). In trying to get a clearer picture of the work done at the 
ministry, she is referred to the director at UD-KC, who conveys his impression 
that the matter is, by and large, being handled. Additional staff has been called 
in to deal with the workload and some 20,000 Swedes are estimated to be in 
and around the general disaster area (Fi 2005a:147). At this point, she is the 
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only minister tied to UD that had been in contact with the foreign ministry 
and who has had to make a public statement. Even this is largely by accident, 
due to the early-morning call to send out SRSA representatives. The minister for 
migration is abroad and has received no particular information, and the minister 
for foreign affairs has only been in contact with the upper management level 
and has been assured that the matter is being handled. This message is partly 
due to the management level not being present to witness what is going on at 
the ministry, and partly because of the lack of official information, which makes 
them reluctant to pass on any impression that this is a major crisis. Meanwhile, 
those who are aware of the situation though the unending phone calls are too 
busy with dealing with those calls to compile reports to the management level 
(Hansén 2005:35, 40f ).
The director of UD-PIK attempts to rectify the situation by calling the cabinet 
secretary and the director of UD-KC, demanding that a leadership structure 
be established at the offices and that relief personnel is called in. She receives 
assurances on the second point, but no further directions for the evening. While 
the cabinet secretary arranges the staffing issue, the director makes a final call to 
the head of operations at SRSA to inform himself of the status of the agency’s 
mission to Thailand and is told that no formal decision has been made.
6.2.2 Days two and three – grasping the scope
Monday the 27th sees a greater understanding of both the disaster in Southeast 
Asia and of the crisis in Stockholm. Both are the focus of the morning print 
and broadcast news, finally offering a clear picture of the scope to those who 
have only received reports during the previous day that it is being managed. 
The prime minister recalls the national trauma of the MS Estonia disaster ten 
years earlier, which resulted in 852 lives lost (Fi 2005a:148). By the reports, the 
tsunami may be of a similar magnitude, only with vastly more people wounded, 
stranded, or traumatised – a total that is likely to dwarf the number of deceased. 
On contacting the UD cabinet secretary, he learns of the 10am meeting, and 
asks to be kept informed about any new developments. He then starts to travel 
back to Stockholm by car (KU 2006:20). The UD state secretary initially plans 
to be present at this meeting, but is instead swamped by requests for comments 
from the media. The minister of foreign affairs, on the other hand, has not been 
informed and the morning news paints a very unfamiliar picture for her (Fi 
2005a:148). Consequently, she tries to reach the head of administration at UD 
to set up a meeting at 10:30, but gets no response since the head is currently on a 
flight back to Stockholm. Also in during the early morning hours, more attempts 
are made by the travel agencies to establish a proper contact with the ministry, 
but little comes out of it for the time being (Daléus 2005:95; KU 2006:20f ).
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At the emergency meeting, the group is in contact with the Swedish ambassador 
who has reached Phuket during the night and who has now travelled to Khao 
Lak to witness the effects of the tsunami in person (Fi 2005a:113, 129). Fifteen 
minutes in, the minister of foreign affairs comes into the meeting, having just 
arrived and looking for the cabinet secretary to get herself briefed on the situa-
tion. The emotional report from the ambassador becomes the first official report 
of the devastation: at least ten Swedes are confirmed dead, 200–300 have been 
hospitalised, and several hundreds are reported missing. Several urgent needs are 
identified: reinforcements at the Bangkok embassy and Phuket and Colombo 
consulates; vastly increased capacity at UD-KC and at the RK phone exchange; 
expedient aid to Swedes who have lost their travel papers; disaster care and 
support at the airports for travellers coming back from the area; and some kind 
of mission to Thailand for SRSA and the ID Commission (Fi 2005a:152, 168). 
The ministry also needs to contact the travel agencies serving the region to see 
how well they are able to handle the flood of returning Swedes and if they need 
any support.
One thing that is left unmentioned is how the work at UD should be managed 
and organised, and as the meeting draws a number of managers away from the 
Monday meeting regularly held at the same time, the ministry at first looks as 
bereft of direction as the day before. This impression is strengthened by the fact 
that the unit head and director of UD-KC who played a role in the proceedings 
the day before arrive well after the meeting has ended (Hansén 2005:42f ). As a 
result, and in spite of the unit head who had set up the division of labour between 
UD and RKP returning to the office during the morning, the efforts at collecting 
information on Swedes in the region remain almost as disjointed as the day before. 
While more desk officers and operators are available to take incoming calls, the 
ones assigned to this duty tend to be new and lower-ranked, with little to no 
experience or familiarity with official procedures. A basic self-selecting triage 
system is set up by publicising a special phone number for next of kin – anyone 
calling this number is automatically routed to one particular set of desk officers 
who are supposed to be able to provide a bit more information to them and 
also to gather what information the next of kin have to offer (Hansén 2005:52).
At the Ministry of Defence, no further agreement had been reached in regards 
to an SRSA mission (Fi 2005a:153; KU 2006:139). At 10:15, the director gen-
eral of the agency discusses the matter with the state secretary to the defence 
minister, and points out that this will soon become a political problem as it looks 
like the Swedish government is entirely passive. The nature and purpose of such 
a mission becomes the focus of much of the work being done at the ministry 
during the morning, and over at UD, the potential stumbling block of sending 
Swedish agency personnel is cleared up when the deputy foreign minister of 
Thailand publicly announces that the nation welcomes all international aid 
(Hansén 2005:47, 49).
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Also during the morning, the foreign minister’s state secretary at UD and the 
prime minister discuss the need for a high-level meeting when the PM arrives 
in Stockholm. The meeting is set for 14:00, followed by a press conference at 
15:00 (Fi 2005a:129). The Government Offices are also contacted by the half 
state-owned Swedish-Finnish telecommunications company TeliaSonera who 
offers its services to set up a call centre and routing services to alleviate some of 
the pressure on the RK phone systems. This offer is declined. Over at the National 
Police, the ID Commission begins entering information into their databases 
related to disasters and the identification of the deceased, and starts preparing to 
receive information from the registration efforts over at the Government Offices 
(Hansén 2005:43, 50, 53).
At lunchtime, a meeting is held at FÖ where SRSA and the Swedish Emergency 
Management Agency (SEMA) discuss the option of sending an observation 
team. Both agencies already have some personnel on site – mainly employees 
who have been caught up in the disaster during their vacations in the region – 
but a more specialised and properly equipped team is needed. In part, this is a 
stop-gap measure to work around the fact that no clearly defined or properly 
financed mission can be designed at this point, but the fear that the “observers” 
will end up having to solve problems they have not trained for puts an end to 
that idea. While observers might indeed be needed, a correctly staffed and out-
fitted service team needs to accompany them to deal with any such issues, and 
it is still unclear what “correctly” means in the context of the tsunami aftermath 
(Hansén 2005:47f; KU 2006:139).
At the 15:00 press conference, the outwards messaging is muddied and unclear, 
but a new conference is promised for two hours later, with the cabinet and state 
secretaries present and available for questions – a decision that is news to both 
of them (KU 2006:21f ). The hour leading up to this next press conference is 
therefore spent trying to get an updated picture of how the situation is being 
managed. News arrive that the travel agencies do not have the capacity to bring 
everyone home at once, and it becomes clear that many desk officers have gone 
way outside regular procedures in contacting other government and local agencies 
to fulfil both their own and the agencies’ information needs. It is decided that a 
special coordinating group has to be set up to manage these contacts, to ensure 
that the correct ministries are kept in the loop of what “their” agencies are doing 
(Daléus 2005:95f; Hansén 2005:43f ). As far as the travel agencies and airlines 
are concerned, existing capacity is booked up until at least the end of the week, 
and while the regularly scheduled flights will bring people home as planned, 
this obviously does not cover the many thousands who need to return ahead of 
schedule. An option is discussed to make use of the EU emergency management 
system, and in particular the solidarity clause, to borrow airlift capacity from other 
member countries. This option is soon dismissed on the grounds that a similar 
operation only a month earlier had required months of planning to get off the 
ground. Another problem is that regular seats on a regular flight will not cover 
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all the needs. The director of UD-KC, having recently served as ambassador in 
Bangkok, is familiar enough with Thai health care and consider it adequate, but 
still recognises that a lot of people will require medical transports. He therefore 
initiates a probe of what will be needed to meet those needs (Hansén 2005:57ff).
At 17:30, the defence minister’s state secretary and the cabinet secretary 
at UD discuss the issue of sending an SRSA team to Phuket (Fi 2005a:153f; 
KU 2006:140). The state secretary requests that an official point of contact be 
established so the financing can be sorted out once and for all, and is directed to 
the director of UD-GS. The state secretary then asks the director for FÖ/CIV to 
contact her counterpart and also informs the FÖ general counsel and the minister 
for defence to inform them about the plan and obtain formal clearance to go 
ahead. He also asks the counsel general if it is possible to dispatch the SRSA 
without a governmental decree and is told that this should be possible (Hansén 
2005:48). While preparing for an appearance on the evening news, the minister 
for international development calls the defence minister to ask about what the 
delay is on the SRSA mission. Having given the go-ahead for that mission hours 
ago, this comes as a surprise and she once again contacts her state secretary only 
to be told that UD had never returned with an answer. After asking him to put 
some more pressure on UD from his end, she relays this answer back to the inter-
national development minister who in turn calls the deputy director at UD-GS. 
The deputy is told that SRSA can call the defence minister to receive official 
clearance, but the director general of the agency feels that it more appropriate 
to call on the minister’s state secretary instead, who cannot give the mission a 
“go” (Hansén 2005:48; KU 2006:140).
By 18:00 it has become clear that the morning’s attempts at triaging incoming 
calls and adding more people to the system has not appreciably reduced the 
pressure on the Government Offices (Fi 2005a:130; KU 2006:22). The small 
endeavours to improve the effectiveness of the note-taking are swallowed up by 
the sheer volume of incoming information. In an effort to resolve this issue, the 
idea of hiring external call centre services is revived and met with approval. A 
smaller company is contracted to take basic calls using an established UD-standard 
procedure starting the next morning. Another idea that is broached but not (yet) 
implemented is to turn the tables on the call flow and send out a mass SMS to 
Swedish-owned phones in the region, asking the recipients to contact their next 
of kin. Finally, to bring some desperately needed efficiency to the information 
gathering, a consultant is brought in to analyse the needs and potential solutions. 
The consultant concludes that an existing information sharing application is 
probably the best option – its original purpose is something completely different, 
but it is capable enough and, more importantly, very familiar to the UD staff 
(Hansén 2005:52f ).
By 22:30, it has become critical to untangle the knot of the SRSA mission 
and get it underway, and the defence minister’s state secretary calls the director 
of FÖ/CIV to check on the status of the mission and is told that UD still has 
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not contacted her. She tries to initiate contact with the director of UD-GS but 
cannot reach him, but is instead contacted by one of the UD-GS desk officers 
who asks her to get SRSA moving, urgently – UD will finance the mission, and 
the foreign minister has made it clear that the exact technical details can be ironed 
out later. When the director calls SRSA, she is told that there still does not exist 
a mission profile clarifying what kind of personnel is needed, and even then, 
FÖ has to issue a formal decree to send the specified mission off and the matter 
will have to wait until the next day (Hansén 2005:49; Moseley 2005:202f, 208; 
KU 2006:22, 140).
Tuesday, December 28 proceeds much like Monday. UD is still largely using 
ad-hoc methods of registration and still distinct lacks management. The call centre 
company joins the fray, adding some 30 phone operators who route calls and 
make simple registrations – anything more complicated than reporting someone 
as alive, dead, or missing is passed on to the desk officers at RK (Fi 2005a:131). 
This turns out to equate roughly half the calls being made. On the RK side, 
another 30 desk officers are added to the work force – 15 at UD who have been 
called for extra work, and 15 borrowed from other ministries. Efforts also start 
at adjusting the existing information sharing software into an application that is 
more suited to the current needs – meanwhile, the largely paper-based registration 
continues as before. Similar customisations of existing systems are being made at 
RKP to accommodate these special circumstances and the extraordinarily large 
amount of persons involved (Hansén 2005:51, 53; Fi 2005a:165ff).
As the quandary of the SRSA mission is coming to a close, a new issue takes 
centre-stage: how to get the stranded Swedes home. The day before, the low 
availability of transport capacity was made clear, so now it is a question of finding 
that capacity elsewhere. In principle, this is an operative and business matter that 
lies far outside of what the Government Offices deals with on a regular basis, but 
the public pressure is building for the government to do something. Separately 
at UD and FÖ, it is discussed whether the Swedish Airforce’s transports can be 
used.16 At UD, the conclusion is that the aircraft lacks the speed, capacity, and 
facilities to carry passengers in a meaningful way. At FÖ, a decision is made to 
put the aircraft on alert status for the purpose of carrying supplies to the region 
(Hansén 2005:58).
By lunch, FÖ finally makes a formal decision to send an SRSA to Thailand, 
along with the agency director general, the minister of foreign affairs, and repre-
sentatives from the Church of Sweden and the Swedish Red Cross (KU 2006:23f, 
140). The previously discussed mass-SMS is also sent, and largely achieves its 
16 The Air Force uses the TP 84 (a variant of the turboprop Lockheed C-130 Hercules) as its bulk 
transport aircraft. It can carry 20 tonnes of cargo or up to 90 passengers depending on con-
figuration, and has a maximum range of 3,500km. The straight-line distance between Sweden 
and Thailand is closer to 9,000km.
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intended effect of getting more solid and coherent status confirmations from 
those who have come through the disaster relatively unscathed (Fi 2005a:131). 
When the plane carrying the SRSA mission and the other representatives take 
off a few hours later, two days and a half has passed since the first report arrived 
at the Government Offices. Even as the flight is in the air, the actual mission 
remains somewhat unclear and a the first proper briefing is held during the fight 
(Hansén 2005:49, 55; Moseley 2005:204).
From a problem-solving perspective, the afternoon is mainly spent on trying 
to resolve the issue of transporting Swedes back to Sweden. At UD, a meeting 
is held with representatives from the Scandinavian embassies in Stockholm and 
from the jointly state-owned SAS Airlines to see if the countries can find a shared 
solution. However, outside of a couple of smaller aircraft, the airline cannot free 
up any of its capacity until later in the week. The standing order from the political 
level is now that anything goes and that no expense should be spared in finding 
flights to fill in the gap. With such loose reins, a flight could be arranged for 
almost immediate departure. The medical transports would naturally sort under 
the National Air Medevac Service – a program jointly run by the National Board 
of Health and Welfare, the Civil Air Administration, and SRSA – but the formal 
program is still under development. Instead, the agencies have to scramble to 
resuscitate an older incarnation of the same idea and combine it with some of 
the support functions that are more or less ready to use (Åbrandt & Lumsden 
2005:25; Fi 2005a:131, 155ff, 272; SoS 2008:20f, 46f ).
As work is being finished on the customised information-sharing platform, 
the head of RKP contacts the director of administrative affairs at UD to inquire 
whether the ministry could make use of the data management expertise at the 
police board. The internal count at RKP lists some 1,500 individuals missing 
whereas the official count from the government is twice that, which suggests that 
either some information is not reaching the police even though they are supposed 
to be the collection end-point, or there is a lot of duplicate information in the 
RK lists. It turns out that the triage system and separation between registration 
and handling of cases has created a situation where anyone who is missing but 
presumed dead is moved to an internal list at UD-KC, meaning they will not 
appear to anyone on the outside and therefore risk being registered as missing a 
second time (Hansén 2005:53f ). During the day, the question is also raised by 
the media whether the casualty lists should be made public to allow the public 
to spot and call in to correct errors – a question that receives no official answer 
(Daléus 2005:108).
On Tuesday evening, a meeting is held between a number of UD and RKP 
representatives to further discuss the database issue. The police representatives 
present the system they have devised for tracking all the individuals involved, 
based on a relational database and spreadsheets, and suggest that this is something 
the RK effort should make use of as well. The idea is met with little enthusiasm; 
the information-sharing platform at UD is already familiar to the desk officers 
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and is ready to be rolled out. Changing course, waiting for yet another imple-
mentation round, and re-training everyone in a new system at this time seems 
wasteful. In addition, porting the data from one system to the other will get 
messy and there is some scepticism on the UD representatives’ part whether the 
RKP system will be able to handle the large number of – and diverse nature of 
– the entries collected so far. Nevertheless, it is decided that the responsibility 
for, and maintenance of, the casualty lists will gradually transition over to RKP 
to aid the work of the ID Commission. The ID Commission is scheduled to 
depart to Thailand in two days, but RKP is now advised that a second team will 
be needed in Sri Lanka as well (Fi 2005a:134; Hansén 2005:54, 60).
6.2.3 The new year – structure and cool-down
As more procedures are put into place, more desk officers are called in, and a 
modicum of leadership is applied to the work, matters start to gel into the rudi-
ments of a routine. The pressure of incoming calls remains high, reaching a peak 
during Wednesday and Thursday with roughly 100 desk officers and operators 
handling some 4,000 incoming calls each day. By the new year, the flow is down 
to 1,000 calls per day and the regular RK organisation re-establishes itself after 
both the Christmas holidays and the crisis. The air-lift capacity problem slowly 
starts to be resolved as well – Wednesday morning sees the arrival of the first 
chartered flights, and two aircraft and the required medical personnel has been 
scrambled to qualify for the first “medevac light” flights. The technical capacity 
is not on the level planned for the finished program, so the flights cannot carry 
intensive-care patients, but are at least sufficient for stable patients who can not 
use regular commercial air travel. The short notice also means that the aircraft are 
fairly small, only barely offering more range than the Swedish Air Force transports 
but at greater speed and capacity – it is a 20-hour flight with three stops between 
Bangkok and Stockholm (Åbrandt & Lumsden 2005:228f ). 
On Thursday, yet another meeting is held to discuss the data sharing between 
UD and RKP, this time with external consultants who analyse and suggest 
improvements on how the work is being organised. Immediately on trying to 
implement the new system developed at UD, there is a snag: the software only 
works on a select few machines, and cannot be rolled out universally to everyone 
engaged in the effort. The consultants opine that the police organisation is already 
well established and working, with a clear leadership structure and proven systems 
for keeping case diaries, whereas UD has none of that – at most, the organisational 
structure is clear, but it is not really working as well as it should. This analysis 
is further reinforced by media reports that the travel agencies cannot hand over 
their passenger lists and other information they have collected, because UD 
cannot answer the question of where or to whom these lists should be delivered. 
A decision is made to transfer all the collected data to RPS, who will structure 
and systematise it and then provide UD with a cleaned-up version. The next day, 
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work starts at UD to do an internal quality control pass on information gathered 
so far in order to eliminate duplicates, correct names, and double-check that the 
information is still valid and accurate. The quality control effort engages almost 
as many workers as the registration did during its peak, and continues for days 
(Hansén 2005:54f ). The same evening, the prime minister announced that the 
lists will not be made public, both because the quality control effort is underway 
and because the information could be used for criminal purposes such as spot-
ting good targets for burglaries and similar crimes. From the perspective of the 
police, this reasoning is a lesser consideration. Instead, RKP concludes that there 
simply is no need to make the information public or to engage in some kind of 
crowd-sourcing to fact-check the entries since RKP’s own quality control proce-
dures are deemed more than sufficient (cf. Daléus 2005:108; Hansén 2005:56).
Among other things, RKP engages in some data house-keeping over the week-
end by cross-referencing its lists of confirmed returnees with the population registry 
controlled by the Swedish Tax Agency to validate the data, and an agreement 
is reached to let RKP take complete control over all lists of individuals struck 
by the disaster (Fi 2005a:233). The hand-over is to take place on the following 
Tuesday, January 4. The Swedish Tax Agency also contacts UD, assuming that 
it will want to do a similar cross-refencing check, but is told that the ministry 
has no plans on any such effort.
The week is capped by a final information mix-up: as a second team from the 
ID Commission arrive in Colombo as ordered by UD to deal with any missing 
or unidentified Swedes there, it is soon becomes clear that there are none (Fi 
2005a:134). Their work in Sri Lanka done, the team departs for Thailand a day 
later to join the on-going efforts there instead.
Contrary to – or perhaps inspired by – the assertion two days earlier that 
UD does not plan to check its information against the population registry, just 
such a check-up is done on Monday, January 3. The data is also analysed by 
the agency Statistics Sweden to evaluate the integrity and coherence of the data 
set. The hand-over to RKP goes ahead as planned the following day. While the 
checks-ups by the Swedish Tax Agency and Statistics Sweden have filled in some 
gaps in preparation for the transition, the quality control work is still lagging 
far behind, to the point where the data is classified as largely unreliable by the 
police. The delays in getting a computerised reporting system up and running 
means that a lot of the material only exists in paper form, and thus has not gone 
through either of the two vetting processes. Now, this material has to be physi-
cally transported, organised and digitised by the RKP technicians. The data has 
to be ready in by the end of the week as it is to be disseminated to local police 
agencies and municipalities, in particular in preparation for the new school term 
starting the following Monday. As Friday, January 6 comes to an end, the data 
processed by RPK goes out to local authorities, with a notice attached that there 
may be some remaining errors and discrepancies.
219
Chapter 6: The 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami
An agreement is made that the police will feed their collated data back to UD 
so the ministry can continue its business of handling the many consular mat-
ters that have arisen due to the disaster, but no actual exchange happens (Fi 
2005a:233f ). This is affects the work load less than might be expected since 
the rules for assisting Swedes abroad have been thoroughly gutted over the last 
week. Relatively few emergency passports or other provisional papers have been 
issued since the Thai authorities have removed the need for a passport to leave 
the country. Media and public outrage increases over the terms and the paper-
work required for providing economic assistance to stranded citizens. The idea 
that disaster-stricken individuals have to stand the regular bureaucratic red tape 
to escape from the area is ridiculed and decried as unconscionable. Normally a 
short-term loan with all the accompanying documentation one might expect, the 
economic assistance becomes a simple non-refunded grant that can be had with a 
signature, and in some cases just for the asking (Daléus 2005:107; Fi 2005a:85f ). 
The operational part of the crisis has now completely shifted to the relief and 
identification efforts on the ground in Thailand – itself a complex and winding 
story to be told – and the ministries and agencies back in Sweden start to return 
to some state of normalcy. By January 2, the evacuation from the Phuket area 
is largely complete; two days later, the Bangkok evacuation nears completion as 
well (Fi 2005a:120), but the work to find, identify, and send home the bodies 
of the deceased and to rebuild the areas destroyed by the tsunami continues for 
months. However, yet another crisis is brewing as a result of the first few days’ 
confusion and indecision.
6.3 Aftermath
The stories told by the returning Swedes stick to one theme: a distinct sense of 
being abandoned to fend for themselves, met by callous and uncaring represent-
atives from the Swedish government. A similar sentiment is offered by volunteer 
workers on the ground during the early stages of the relief effort: even as they try 
to make sense of a senseless situation and create some order in the ensuing chaos, 
they are lectured by Swedish authorities for not following proper procedures. 
Likewise, the early response from the Government Offices is heavily criticised 
for not sympathising with the anxiety and grief of those calling in; for providing 
information of little use or of a contradictory nature; and for simply not being 
available (cf. Fi 2005a:129). Here, too, the often rigid adherence to the normal 
rules in a decidedly abnormal situation becomes a source of criticism, as all kinds 
of extraordinary issues are being squeezed to fit into the mould of the existing 
standard procedures. The early confusion of who should be doing what adds to 
the aggravation, as individuals are being asked to contact a number of different 
agencies to report missing friends and family members. The two-day delay in 
getting an SRSA mission off the ground further compounds the issue, offering a 
clear outwards illustration of the dithering that goes on within the government.
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All of these are relatively minor details compared to the political storm that soon 
erupts. As it becomes increasingly clear that key ministers and decision-makers 
were absent, ignorant of the events, and generally made no visible decisions until 
more than a day had passed, the public reaction to the management of the crisis 
takes a sharp turn for the worse, and it was not all that good to begin with (Fi 
2005a:269ff, 326ff). The focus of the public ire comes to rest on the political 
level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the cabinet secretary, the state secretary 
to the foreign minister, and on the foreign minister herself. The former two seem 
to not be able to get the story straight of who said what to whom and when, 
and the minister’s complete absence from the proceedings during the first day 
– topped off by her going to the theatre in the evening rather than leading and 
bringing order to a confused ministry – is interpreted as outright negligent. The 
narrative also soon finds its designated hero in the travel agencies as a contrast to 
the politicians, since they were quick to identify the crisis, quick to act, and were 
thoroughly and consistently professional in how they treated their customers.
Already two days after the disaster, as the Government Offices slowly start to 
achieve some semblance of organisation, the question is raised of an inquiry into 
the top-level management of the crisis. On Wednesday, December 29, the first 
seed of what will grow into the “Disaster Commission” (Katastrofkommissionen) 
is publicly announced, but soon itself becomes the target of criticism. The first 
appointees are deemed far too closely tied to the government to offer a trusted 
opinion on the matter. The commission is formally assembled and approved on 
January 13, and steadily grows over the coming months. It delivers its final report 
on the matter on December 1, 2005, offering a number of key critiques of the 
handling of the crisis and suggesting a number of improvement to the Swedish 
national crisis management system (Fi 2005a).
6.4 Analysis
Unlike the previous two cases, with their very prolonged and at times almost static 
turn of events along a single axis, the 2004 tsunami is an acute and complex tale 
of intertwined processes and decision-making (or lack thereof ). Instead of one 
clear main actor using or misusing expertise to try to understand the workings 
of a clear antagonist, we have a multitude of diverse and even fragmented actors 
trying to understand an event at a distance. Rather than a relatively finite set of 
potential advisors on a single well-delineated issue, we have – even in this drastically 
cut-down narrative – a dozen different actors requiring information and getting it 
from, quite literally, thousands of sources. The disaster itself is almost incidental 
to the crisis that unfolds, and the information needs are quite different, both in 
nature and in scope, from what we have seen so far. The complexity, but on the 
problems themselves and in the tangle of agencies handling the crisis, unfortunately 
makes it next to impossible to draw up a clear and comprehensive timeline like 
the ones for the FBI cases. Any attempt would, suitably enough, look more like a 
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seismograph readout as questions, problems, and points of confusion are rapidly 
passed back and forth between the many actors involved.
At the heart of it all, we have this: a single understaffed department in a ministry 
on vacation has to collect and process information from several thousands of 
Swedish citizens and also sort and distribute that information as required by a 
number of other departments, ministries, and agencies (cf. Fi 2005a:16f, 19f ). 
The ministry is also the organisation that formally owns the mandate to decide 
on most of the critical matters related to the disaster. As always, the devil is in 
the details. At first glance, this combination is not all that strange or even cause 
for alarm since, as the case itself illustrates, national organisations such as the 
RPS and RKP are specifically made to deal with such broad-spectrum issues on 
the international arena. No, the devilish detail is exactly where this crisis unfolds 
– within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – and exactly who is the victim in the 
disaster – Swedish nationals.
Had either of those two details changed, things might have turned out very 
differently, but as it is, during this event we have a ministry that by and large 
focuses on matters of policy on a grand arena and of relations between nations 
and international or supranational organisations. All of a sudden, this ministry 
has to deal with individuals rather than states; it has to deal with down-to-earth 
operational matters rather than policy issues; and it has to deal with Swedes rather 
than foreign nations. None of those are high priorities for the ministry, as the 
general set-up amply demonstrates. This particular combination is handled by 
UD-KC, which is itself only just over a dozen individuals strong. Although the 
department likes to boast – not entirely without merit – that it manages crises 
every day, it is not set up to handle anything of the magnitude of the tsunami 
aftermath. Even so, the division of labour within UD is such that the tsunami 
clearly falls within the purview of this small department, making them the lead 
unit to decide on all matters pertaining to the Swedes affected by the disaster.
There certainly are related issues that were handled by other departments. 
UD-GS, for instance, managed the foreign-aid and international cooperation 
part of the events, but from a Swedish perspective, that aspect was largely 
overshadowed by the consular matters, Similarly, UD-ASO managed the actual 
foreign-relation aspect that became largely void during the period studied here 
once the Thai government opened its borders to all international support. These 
differences in focus and their every-day applicability also have a clear impact on 
what the different departments know during the crisis. There is no reason for 
UD-KC to be familiar with the capabilities of SRSA, whereas key personnel at 
UD-GS should have had (and did have) that knowledge. On the other hand, 
UD-KC could perhaps have been more in touch with the travel agencies and 
airlines since those are actors that might have a direct impact on the kinds of 
problems that a Swede in consular distress might encounter. Instead, the general 
attitude at the time was that the travel arrangements were a matter between 
the individual traveller and whatever company they chose to do business with. 
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Should there be any problems, UD might find it reasonable to extend a loan or 
issue provisional passports, but it was then up to the individual to sort things out 
with the company, or better yet, they should contact their insurance company 
and get their assistance there instead.
What we have here, then, is a similar situation to Waco but with an even 
more fractured main actor. The FBI of 1993 had two factions that had a hard 
time communicating with each other, they were at least pursuing the same goal 
– albeit with different means – with a shared understanding of the problem. 
On the other hand, UD presents us with half a dozen organisations within the 
ministry, each with its own goal to pursue and with its own, if not world view, 
then at least perception of the problem. And that is just counting the depart-
ments that were directly involved. As the tsunami case shows, there were some 
communication issues here as well.
The curious thing is that, at first, things get off to a good start. The officer 
on duty makes some very astute calls based on very limited information. The 
estimated number of Swedes in the region is spot on and remains unchanged 
even as more accurate information comes in. The number of calls the ministry 
is about to receive is perhaps overestimated but still amounts to far more than 
what it can handle, and an immediate need for massive reinforcements is correctly 
identified. Finally, the unbearable response times that standard procedures will 
yield are also identified, as is the need to understand the nature of earthquakes 
and tsunamis. This is where the officer on duty starts getting unlucky in her 
information gathering. She cannot get hold of the expertise she is looking for 
since many at the Geo Centre are on holiday somce ot os Boxing Day, and a 
Sunday to boot. Once she finds someone to answer her questions, the information 
she gains also seems rather perfunctory and she stops digging further into the 
matter – it is a textbook example of the identification paradox at work.
The good start comes to a grinding halt in the next step of the process, as the 
information gathered is spread through the organisation, or more accurately, as 
it runs into a number of roadblocks. The most obvious of these is the hierarchy 
of UD, and especially of UD-KC. The head of the on-duty officer’s unit receives 
a number of reports, from the officer and from other sources, since she is the 
“correct” level where this information should be received. However, the infor-
mation does not spread very well or very far from there, and it certainly is not 
transformed into anything actionable. Rather, the severity of the situation seems 
to be diluted at this step, and it is downgraded even further as the information 
travels up the chain to the UD-KC director. The issue is downplayed, and is 
therefore not escalated to the political level since there does not seem to be 
anything for them to be worried about of at this stage. Other information, such 
as the contact with RKP on the handling of registered information is apparently 
not communicated either, and the first reports from the travel agencies seem lost 
in the void. It may seem a bit harsh to also blame the unit head for making the 
reports from the embassy be ‘temporarily lost,’ except for the fact that her meek 
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actions in response to the previous reports, and her apparent unwillingness to 
actually lead her unit, contributes to the work overload that ironically keeps that 
very report from being noticed for nearly two hours.
Then again, what about the other recipients of that very same report? Those 
departments have already gathered a fair amount of information through their 
own sources, but there appears to be little to no lateral communication between 
the departments, possibly due to the strictly enforced hierarchy of the ministry, 
or at least of UD-KC. On two separate occasions, the unit head reprimands desk 
officers for bypassing or upsetting the correct reporting order, which further 
suggests a culture of compartmentalisation beyond what the organisational 
structure of the ministry already hints at. There are also hints of a “someone else’s 
problem” mode of thinking, not just at UD-KC, but at UD as a whole and even 
the Government Offices in general. Once the other departments have identified 
the disaster as a matter where UD-KC should take the lead, they become almost 
passive – waiting for leadership that is yet to come since the leadership at UD-KC 
has concluded that matters are being handled without their input.
The SRSA mission illustrates this larger pattern more clearly. The Disaster 
Commission Report identifies a pattern where, at first, neither UD nor FÖ 
seems willing to make the final decision since that might burden them with 
having to finance the venture as well. Even when the financing issue has been 
resolved – many times over – both ministries exhibit a tendency to just do their 
part and let the matter drop, waiting for someone else to pick it up and do the 
next step in the process without much prompting. However, when you add such 
a largely leaderless and significantly overloaded actor as UD-KC to the mix, the 
chances of “someone else” picking it up, or even noticing that it is their turn to 
do something, are drastically reduced.
6.4.1 Organisational context
One explanation for this pattern can be found in the overall set-up of the 
Government Offices. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, while 
the government itself is up for a complete renewal every election, the offices 
supporting that government can be surprisingly static. The staff members at 
RK are highly specialised in their issue areas and nealy 95% are not politically 
appointed. Consequently, this offers fertile ground for building territorial 
boundaries between the different ministries, and for squabbles to erupt over 
those boundaries. Hansén (2005:72f ) identifies UD and FÖ as having a history 
of engaging in exactly this kind of rivalry, and also suggests that differences in 
status between the departments within both ministries may affect how flexible 
they are in applying rules and finding solutions. Here, UD-KC’s status as the 
odd one out is reinforced by their having a smaller budget and poor salaries 
compared to the other departments. Hansén suggests that this sends the signal 
that the department is of low priority, and therefore does not have the clout to 
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become too creative and flaunt the rules. It may also explain the stricter hierarchy: 
any step up from the perceived bottom has to be guarded more ferociously here 
than in departments where everyone is more comfortable with their position.
Even so, UD as whole is a status-conscious organisation to begin with. As 
discussed earlier, it has deep historical roots and also represents the nation in a 
very outwards-facing manner, more so than almost all other ministries. In and 
of itself, this breeds a hierarchical culture that will reappear in all of its facets. At 
the same time, it is worth noting that this culture seems more prevalent within 
UD than between the ministry’s department and other ministries and agencies. 
As the chronology shows, a fair amount of communication happens between 
different levels at UD and FÖ – any dissension seems to exist mainly between the 
senior bureaucrats and possibly on a state secretarial level, rather than between 
desk officers at the two ministries or between the ministers in charge of them. 
On the other hand, there is a fairly clear distinction between “inside” and “out-
side” at play at UD. The most clear example of this is the way in which outside 
reporting is consistently treated as somewhat unreliable and unconfirmed. It 
is not really until the Bangkok ambassador – a ministry insider – recounts his 
observations that everyone from the ground all the way up to the political level 
accept the fact that this is a massive disaster and that Sweden has been badly hit.
Another territorial boundary squabble that rears itself in the tsunami case is 
a more recent conflict between UD-KC and RKP. A few years earlier, the two 
organisations butted heads over the handling of the Linate Airport disaster in 
mid-2001 (Fi 2005a:230), and rather than seeing a repeat of that episode, RKP 
chose to largely let the ministry do whatever it wanted to do and then fixed things 
internally on its own end as UD handed over the information it had gathered. 
While it would certainly offer its services to the ministry, RKP did not push very 
hard, nor did it really communicate how it would treat the material once it was 
delivered. Instead, it was the hired consultants that delivered the news that RKP’s 
processes and organisation were much more suited for the task of managing the 
casualty lists than UD. It may have kept the peace but most likely also delayed 
the transfer of responsibility and allowed more poorly structured information 
to be registered. This, in turn, created more work and more uncertainty about 
the validity of the data that was finally delivered, both to RKP and then to the 
local authorities.
One of the main problems from an analytical standpoint, then, is the lack of 
a single unitary actor that can easily be assigned as the key unit to be analysed. 
The national agencies have their independence from the ministries and from 
each other. In the tsunami case, they mainly served a peripheral role as sources 
of expertise that were available to the core decision-makers. The Government 
Offices was obviously split between its various ministries, and thier long-standing 
rivalries were triggered during the crisis. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with its 
many departments, also suffered from internal rivalry, each department having 
its own stake in the crisis, its own perspective on what needs to be done, and all 
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had different knowledge and information to bring to the table. The Department 
of Consular Affairs was split between the upper layer of fairly passive leaders 
and the lower layer of panicked desk officers trying to manage in spite of their 
working conditions. At every fork in this road – and sometimes more often than 
that – there was some information blockage that hampered the flow of infor-
mation and kept knowledge from being passed from one group to the next. The 
historical narrative has focused on the political level – from the foreign minister 
to her state secretary and the cabinet secretary – but the problem of blockage 
was both deeper and wider than that. In particular, the UD department heads 
kept leaving issues unresolved, uninvestigated, and unreported on a number of 
crucial occasions, leading to much of the confusion about not just the crisis but 
the state of the Swedish response as well.
6.4.2 The nature of the crisis
Labelling the Swedish handling of the tsunami as a disaster may seem a bit 
repetitive and redundant at this point. It was a watershed moment in the nation’s 
crisis management history, but for the sake of the purpose of this thesis, it is still 
necessary to identify the main actor and the reasons why the events at the end 
of 2004 qualify as a crisis for that actor.
That is also one large difference from the previous two cases. Previously there 
was one clear actor who engaged with one clear opponent. In this chapter and the 
next, there are numerous organisations to choose from, each offering a particular 
viewpoint on the events and different lessons to be drawn from them. As discussed 
in Section 3.1.2, the actor chosen here is Foreign Ministry as a whole. It is large 
enough to allow for some dissection without immediately arriving at the level 
of the individual, and it has enough actors and sources of knowledge around it 
within the context of the event to allow for the types of interactions we are look-
ing for. It is also an actor for which the characteristics of a crisis can be defined 
without resorting to trivialities or truisms that lead us nowhere.
Time pressure
Interestingly enough, the time pressure was a fairly simple factor in the tsunami 
crisis and yet it was not of the more intuitive “act before it is too late” variety. The 
moment an earthquake hits, what ensues on the ground is largely unavoidable. In 
the aftermath of a tsunami, warning systems can be developed and employed to 
at least mitigate the loss of life, but once the wave itself is set in motion, there is 
no stopping it (cf. Bödvarsson 2005:14). Similarly, once the waves hit the shores 
surrounding the Indian Ocean in 2004, the destruction was massive and near-in-
stantaneous, followed by a relatively short rescue phase that was largely handled 
by the local authorities. From a Swedish perspective, there was never enough 
time to mount any type of normal rescue operation – a fact that wasidentified 
at an early stage by the search-and-rescue expertise at SRSA.
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Instead, the time pressure from the Swedish standpoint came in the form of 
providing expedient service to Swedish citizens. Of course, by and large, the 
attempts at providing these services failed completely for a myriad of reasons. 
As previously mentioned, matters got off to a good start in that the initial esti-
mates and evaluations were very quick and commendably accurate. The first 
set of SRSA missions to Sri Lanka and the decisions associated with them were 
also efficiently resolved and effected. Then the issues started to stack up in rapid 
succession, and the equation of time and people available to resolve these issues 
could be solved. There were too many phone calls and too many demands on 
the attention of the handful of individuals working to allow any kind of efficient 
or expedient information flow. There was too little information and not enough 
free time to improve on it to paint a picture that was dramatic enough to fully 
convey what has happened, and this delayed the political response. The delay in 
and of itself created yet another time pressure to ‘do something soon or else to 
be seen as doing nothing at all,’ and the back-and-forth between two ministries 
expecting the other to make a decision, with neither fulfilling the needs of the 
party who would actually effect that decision, meant that time keept ticking away 
and the pressure kept increasing. By the time the SRSA and state representative 
mission took off for Thailand, it was already seen as too late in the public eye.
Probably the main bottleneck here was the failure to communicate and 
escalate an understanding of the scope of the disaster, which was largely due to 
the perception inside UD that most of the available sources were unreliable – a 
detail that will be discussed later in this chapter. The justification not to report 
matters higher up the chain of command because there were no confirmed 
casualties meant that the political level remained uninformed. In addition, 
certain individuals who were in a position to declare an emergency ro call in 
additional personnel were not activated or made to participate in what was going 
on. Consequently, this communications failure reduced the amount of available 
and actionable knowledge.
A second chance at acting quickly came in the form of trying to arrange 
transports for stranded tourists, but it too was at first delayed by the lack of esca-
lation to the appropriate decision-making level. Somewhat paradoxically, once 
the decision-makers gave the agencies free rein to solve the problem as quickly 
as possible, it is perhaps solved too quickly – the solution for creating medevac 
flights used aircraft that are not really suited for the distances involved and that 
were equipped with outmoded stretchers that only barely fulfilled the needs of 
being able to transport bedridden patients.
In the aftermath, this response and its multiple delays were in sharp contrast 
to the efforts made by the charter travel agencies, who identified the scope of 
the disaster at an early stage and were quick make arrangements for additional 
flights for their stranded customers. This narrative is further aided by tales of 
how the companies struggled to get in contact with the ministries in order to 
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request much-needed support – an image that resonated with both the stranded 
travellers and their relatives, as many of them had also tried to do the same in 
the days following the tsunami and with similar results.
Uncertainty
From the very start, the entire situation was rife with uncertainty, and it did 
not really let up until UD was elieved of the responsibility to maintain the 
casualty lists a week after the disaster. To begin with, the concept of a tsunami 
was itself something most of the ministry personnel were wholly unfamiliar 
with. There was some internal knowledge of earthquakes from previous Swedish 
aid missions to stricken areas, but this was a new phenomenon with unknown 
consequences. The question, then, was what could actually be done? What was 
the real problem that needed to be solved? It was readily apparent that people 
expected the government to send help and to do something, but what? The MS 
Estonia disaster a decade earlier offered some guidance. Here, it was crucial to 
identify the dead and missing and to get as many bodies back home as possible. 
The ID Commission was an excellent and proven answer for that problem, but 
its work would most likely to take months and would not satisfy the need for 
immediate action.
The confused nature of the SRSA mission, even after all the turns to get it 
approved, demonstrates that this uncertainty existed well into the week following 
the disaster. Indeed, the team arrived only a few days before the first areas were 
deemed to be evacuated. They also arrived without much of the equipment 
they would prove to need, and with little means to support the provisional 
efforts already in place. This was exactly the kind of problem that an immediate 
observation team was intended to solve, but as discussed and as we will return 
to, both political and practical considerations got in the way. Indeed, this was 
another area of uncertainty: what would be the fate of an observation team 
should one be assembled? would they get swallowed up in the chaotic disaster 
work on site? Would they be able to fulfil their purpose? Would they even be 
allowed to operate in the area?
The next point of uncertainty was very much an internal matter. Different 
departments, and even different units at UD had differing perceptions of what the 
situation entailed and what resources were available. Knowledge of the capabilities 
of SRSA were localised in a handful of individuals at UD-GS, for instance, and 
as mentioned, there are distinct differences between what the desk officers, the 
managers, and the political leader levels knew of the events. There was no com-
mon picture, and while some individuals may have a more complete picture of the 
situation, it was not shared nor escalated to the decision-makers that at the early 
needed it to understand the severity of the situation. The real uncertainty here, 
then, was just as much an effect of assumptions as of pure ignorance. Time and 
time again, decision-makers (in particular) assumed that they have been given 
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a good view of what is going on and did not investigate matters further, or they 
assumed that a matter was being handled without actually knowing who is doing 
what. The truth was often that no-one was doing anything. Again, it may be 
debatable whether or not such identification-paradox phenomena might really 
qualify as uncertainty, but they definitely contributed to the general confusion 
of what was going on around the Government Offices at that time.
Of course, the biggest point of uncertainty was the status of the Swedes 
caught in the region. In a sense, this was the crux of the matter, around which all 
other issues revolve. It was the imposition to collect the answers to this question 
that brought the ministry, and indeed large part of the Government Offices, to 
its knees, thereby heavily contributing to the blocked information flow both 
into and out of the offices. The matter was further complicated by the ad-hoc 
collection methods being used and, at least initially, the lack of co-ordination 
of these efforts. There were only limited means available to control for duplicate 
data or to insert corrections, few means to maintain coherent case files that can 
be followed up on, and no coherent method for gathering and cross-referencing 
the kind of information that was needed here, especially not at the volumes 
generated by such a large disaster.
Related to this there was a final point of uncertainty, edging more towards 
the ambiguity end of the spectrum: what would be the best methods for dealing 
with this massive flow of information? At first, the decision was to do nothing 
and instead direct people to other agencies better suited for the task. This strategy 
quickly fell by the wayside as there did not seem to be anyone who actually was 
better suited, and the urge to help in spite of everything took over. The early 
efforts seem to be have neem done more just to do something rather than to 
work towards a clear and cogent purpose. While this was far from suitable, it 
still created its own inertia and as new and improved methods became available, 
there was also some resistance against them: is it really worthwhile to try to 
switch from one system to another? It might indeed have been worth shedding 
the often haphazard, manual, paper-based methods of the first few days for a 
more standardised digital storage system, but was it worth replacing that system 
with a different, unfamiliar one? Add in a mixture of organisational pride and it 
becomes a question of who was better suited to do the data collection? Could it 
be transitioned smoothly to a different organisation? Almost by chance, it turned 
out that the newly developed UD system, for all its merits of familiarity, could 
not be rolled out en masse, which eventually answered the question by default: 
the paper-based system simply had to go and the only viable option was to give 
RKP full responsibility over the casualty lists.
The state and topic of uncertainty certainly shifted over the course of the 
week, but at no point did it really go away. Instead, as one issue was resolved to 
some degree, another one reared its head – possibly one that had been there all 
along but had not been prioritised – all while the great puzzle of the casualty 
lists loomed in the background.
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Critical values at stake
There were a number of values at stake for UD during the events of Christmas 
and New-Years 2004, and while they were initially fairly disparate and tied to 
different departments at the ministry, they soon became intermingled as they 
served to support the same larger goal.
For UD-ASO, the critical value to maintain were the good relations with the 
nations in the region. This entailed not sending state or agency representatives 
uninvited and thereby trampling all over the sovereignty of other states. There were 
rules for such interactions, and as luck would have it, those rules were followed by 
the affected governments: Sri Lanka formally requested international aid through 
UN agencies and mechanisms, and after some initial hesitation, Thailand followed 
suit. The initial perception of proposed SRSA mission to Thailand was that it 
had no legal basis unless done in the very simple form of an observer team with 
no operational capacity. At the same time, and as expressed by almost everyone 
involved, the chances of such a team remaining mere observers and not getting 
involved in operative matters were close to nil.
UD-GS faced a similar problem, with the added complexity that it was their 
job to send SRSA on exactly these kinds of missions. Again, it is a question 
of what good a Swedish rescue services team could do since the situation was 
unlike the kinds of earthquake search-and-rescue missions for which the SRSA 
was renowned. The reconstruction would require a completely different type of 
team and would need a much longer time-frame than what was being suggested 
during the first few days. Nevertheless, this was one occasion where the Swedish 
image as a helping nation was put to the test and where it could not be allowed 
to fail given the relation the tourist trade had created between the nations. By 
and large, this was an easy value to protect once the aforementioned issues of 
sovereignty had been resolved, but then it became a problem of actually getting 
the mission underway – a task that was hampered by the unresponsiveness of 
UD-KC, by the unwillingness of SRSA to go on a mission without a properly 
declared purpose, and by the apparent inability of FÖ to actually sign off on the 
mission. Some of these issues were as much of a signal to Sweden itself as they were 
one to the international community, which added another layer of pressure and 
demands on the department. In addition, even though it may not strictly have 
been UD-GS’ (or UD-ASO’s) responsibility to maintain and uphold, there is no 
escaping the image of UD as a failing crisis manager – indeed, a failing ministry 
altogether – which was quickly being constructed in the public discourse. The 
carefully groomed self-image of the ministry as being perhaps a little bit better 
than the other was getting severely tarnished, and the confidence in its ability 
and legitimacy was in rapid decline.
In keeping with its odd status at the ministry, UD-KC faced a somewhat 
different set of problems that needed to be resolved. First and foremost, it needed 
to be able to maintain its functionality as a the office for consular matters. That 
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is, to provide services to Swedes abroad and to answer questions posed by Swedes 
back home. It also needed to act as the lead organisation for the efforts being put 
together by the other departments at the ministry and by the national agencies. 
In general, maintaining the service level expected by the Swedish  citizenry was 
the value at stake, but it was soon revealed that those expectations did not  necessarily 
match the standard practices (or indeed the law) on which the department oper-
ated. The question then became one of how to maintain at least a semblance of 
good service while still adhering to due process and not get called on the carpet 
at a later stage by the Audit Office or some parliamentary committee. This was 
likely a particularly hard blow to an organisation that is so rule-bound as this one.
At the same time, being the lead department for a large-scale consular crisis 
would have been an excellent opportunity for UD-KC to shine and to do what 
they do best, if only they could keep on top of the work-load. Of course, this 
did not really work out since the problem it was facing was simply too huge for 
the small department to handle. Even when the organisation received the peak 
amount of support, its practices were deemed inefficient and its attempts at being 
flexible in meeting the needs of the situation were mainly seen as disorganised. 
Granted, the point of comparison is the RKP and its many support functions – 
a joint organisation purposefully designed to handle exactly these kinds of vast 
data flows, and particularly for the purpose of determining identities. Even so, 
more self-image was at stake here than for the rest of the ministry.
Finally, for UD-PIK, the episode was a matter of staying on top of the media 
message and conveying accurate information, but from the very start, it was forced 
to play catch-up. Again, there was an inherent conflict between the wish to pro-
vide timely and accurate reports on the one hand, and on the other the general 
UD tendency of not putting too much trust in external sources. This conflict 
was exacerbated by the fact that embassy staff were making public statements 
without consulting the press office – something for which the staff in question 
later got reprimanded – and that the message coming out of the ministry as a 
whole became inconsistent and mixed. Eye-witness reports made it clear that 
people were missing in droves and many are presumed dead; “rogue” personnel 
made semi-official statements that some of these reports had been confirmed; 
but not until trusted in-house sources offered their accounts was the press office 
ready to offer any kind of firm claim.
In short, there is constant escalating time pressure at play in this episode; there 
is a constantly shifting uncertainty; and there are enough critical values at stake 
to make stalwart nervous, especially since a number of those values relate to a 
precious self-image. It is no doubt that UD was in a state of crisis, and as hinted 
at a number of times, there are several indications of identification paradoxes to 
suggest that the crisis really only had one way to evolve.
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6.4.3 Anticipation of due process
In a sense, most of the processes that were involved in the tsunami crisis could 
have been – and actually had been – anticipated well in advance. However, there 
is one simple but crucial difference that turns all such assumptions on their col-
lective head: volume. UD-KC was designed to handle cases involving individuals 
or small groups – perhaps even an entire stranded flight due to cancellations or 
some technical error. Swedes are in general a well-travelled people with a fair-to-
decent amount of practice in not getting themselves into too really deep trouble. 
The expected load on the consular office was and remains fairly low relative to 
the number of trips being made each year. What the office was not designed to 
handle was 15,000 people – enough to fill a medium-sized town – many of them 
stripped of all their belongings and with no way of fending for themselves and, on 
top of that, enough anxious friends and relatives to fill a decent-sized city. Many 
of the existing processes at both UD and the Government Offices collapsed or 
took on a wholly unpredicted nature as a direct result of this one factor.
Issues such as the swamped phone exchange are almost too obvious to even 
mention, but they are either indicative of, or the direct cause of, the larger pattern 
of issues that arose from the disaster. An immediate example of this was the 
relationship – or perhaps more accurately, the lack thereof – between UD-KC 
and SRSA. It was not uncommon for Consular Affairs to have the lead role in 
a case. It happens commonly enough to warrant keeping a dozen desk officers 
around to deal with such issues. It was also not uncommon for SRSA to go on 
search-and-rescue or support missions in disaster areas. It could maintain an 
inactive resource pool 1,500 individuals deep and provide them with enough to 
do, often enough, to keep them around without any significant drop-outs due to 
disuse or boredom. What was less common was a situation where a large-scale 
disaster happens that required an SRSA operation but where the nature of the 
disaster was such that it was UD-KC rather than UD-GS that took the lead.There 
were o pre-established routes of communication between the operative agency 
and the policy-level leadership of the operation for such cases, nor between the 
policy leadership level and the department at FÖ to which the agency formally 
reported. At best, there were accidental acquaintances or shared policy meetings 
on the lower political level, but no experienced and familiar connections lower 
down in the respective hierarchies. In addition, since there had never been any 
need to acquire it, there waslittle to no innate understanding in either organi-
sation of what the other was capable of (or not). The Boxing Day tsunami was 
just such a case and came to expose all these gap.
At the same time, previous large disasters had made their mark in parts of the 
organisation. The historical analogy of MS Estonia returns on multiple occasions 
among decision-makers involved with the tsunami (cf. Fi 2005a:143, 146ff, 298ff, 
351), and many of the issues in that case were the same, albeit on a smaller scale 
than what happened in the aftermath of the tsunami. It is interesting to note that 
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the individuals who made this connection almost universally predicted that the 
phones would start ringing off the hook, whereas it was the unit head who could 
call in additional personnel – but did not – who also scoffed at the analogy and 
labelled it as “hysterical.” The potential uses, abuses, and misuses of analogies in 
decision-making has an entire literature of its own (cf. Khong 1992) and goes 
outside of the scope of this study, but given how strong a trigger it is for those 
that make the connection, one can but wonder what the response would have 
been had more individuals in key positions had accepted the similarities at an 
early stage and dared to anticipate the flood of calls. This analogous connection 
and comparison does not seem like an unreasonable leap of logic to make.
On the other hand, as the week following the disaster showed, even a large 
amount of desk officers and operators chipping away at the problem might not 
be enough if the procedures for collecting all that information were inadequate. 
Here, the failure to anticipate what would follow was a bit more curious. At 
a very early stage, reasonably accurate estimates were made as to how many 
Swedish nationals might be affected. Even without the added load of friends and 
relatives suggested by the MS Estonia analogy, this represented several thousands 
of individuals who somehow had to be accounted for. The curious choice, then, 
was the decision to try to employ regular procedures and regular forms on this 
extraordinarily large number of people. Here, it is difficult to fully separate 
an expectation of the scope of this registration from the expectation based on 
the analogy. When the on-duty officer gave the general instruction not to take 
notes, it was based on the latter judgement. Still, once that instruction was set 
aside, why did no-one expect the reamaining standard procedures to be wholly 
unsuited for the task at hand? Instead, it took three days and a fair amount of 
consulting to create a more worthwhile process.
The attempt at clinging to this new process is itself telling. Even though RKP 
offered to support the ministry with a better system,17 UD stuck with its newly 
developed application mainly because of its familiarity. It may not have been 
much, but at least it was something that could be anticipated and that evoked 
some sense of habit. Meanwhile, there wass explicit distrust in the new system 
offered to the ministry. In the end, this process fell by the wayside too as the 
responsibility for maintaining the lists transitioned over to RKP.
A similar mistrust, albeit of a more closeted nature, was apparent in how the 
Foreign Ministry reacted to the different reports from the region. In the first day, 
there were plenty of media reports and tallies being made by local organisation, 
17 “Better” in the sense that RKP’s relational database was a better tool for the kind of cross-refer-
encing and fast searching that was called for in this process than the document-based information 
sharing system employed by UD. As the label suggests, a relational database records relations 
between entries for easier collation and referencing, whereas a document-based system offers 
ready-made documents with no particular relationship between them.
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but none of these made much of an impression on how the ministry leadership 
perceived the situation. These were all deemed not quite trustworthy or too vague 
to elicit any kind of strong response. Even setting aside the wish from UD-PIK 
to not go public with erroneous figures, the adherence to the line that there were 
no confirmed casualties signals that only some sources were deemed ‘credible’ 
despite the fact that all data pointed to a similar trend. When the ministry’s 
internal source confirmed those numbers and trends, however, the data suddenly 
became valid and “real.”
So far, we have in rapid succession ticked off four of the seven process devia-
tions listed on page 61, without any mechanisms in place to counteract them: a 
requirement to engage with a different (that is, unfamiliar) organisational culture; 
an ambiguity in how the collaborative process is meant to work; an uncertainty 
about the value and content of information; and a mistrust in the problem for-
mulation. This alone should be enough to conclude that in the tsunami case, there 
was no anticipation of the process due. But what of the remaining three? There 
is a decent amount of evidence to suggest a mistrust in the collaboration process 
with other ministries, in particular FÖ, but only really at the management level. 
As previously mentioned, the ministers above that level seemed to cooperate well 
enough, and there appeard to be a fair amount of co-operation between desk 
officers. There did not not seem to be any inherent mistrust in the knowledge 
brokerage; everyone seemed willing to look for relevant expertise if they saw the 
need for it. Of course, the problem was rather the identification paradox of not 
always seeing that need to begin with, or of thinking that a cursory answer will 
be sufficient. At most, the mistrust of external sources might come into play 
again, but that only really means that bar for qualifying as “relevant expertise” 
is raised higher than one might otherwise expect.
Finally, there is the requirement to go through generalist intermediaries to 
either spread or find required knowledge. This is perhaps most clearly where the 
internal hierarchy of the ministry comes into play, at least within UD-KC. Here, 
there were clear and strict channels of communication, and staff both on the 
inside and the outside was admonished if and when they tried to bypass these 
routes. Perhaps tellingly in hindsight, one of the deviations from the due process 
thus existed within the chosen unit of analysis, which does not bode well for the 
openness of the organisation as a whole.
6.4.4 Organisational closed-ness
Once again, it is very tempting to look at this large bureaucratic organisation, 
then glance over the keywords for describing a closed organisation, and call it a 
day. It is made even more tempting by the fact that we are dealing with a Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and the international arena is not exactly well known for its 
informality or flexibility, or for everyone outright wishing for a highly dynamic 
environment where everything constantly changes. Some hope might be gleamed 
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from the fact that, efforts to maintain stability to the contrary, it is a dynamic 
arena where new problems constantly arise that may require some flexibility or 
a light touch – diplomacy, one might even say.
The problem is that we are not necessarily talking about the international 
arena here, though, but rather the interplay between ministries and agencies 
in Sweden, and even between departments within these organisations. From a 
methodological perspective there may be cause for concern since, as mentioned 
earlier, we are not looking at a unitary actor with a single behaviour. There are 
gradations and variations depending on the situation and context.
Guiding principle
Throughout the narrative of the case, there is one facet of the work being done 
and the internal decision-making processes that kept reappearing across the board 
at UD: a necessity to stick to the rules. Again, this might not be all that surprising, 
all things considered, since we are talking about an organisation that has to 
operate on a number of different arenas at once and ensure that their efforts are 
not rejected on any of them. In particular, an overarching goal is to project the 
image of Sweden as a good international citizen, in other words, being a nation 
that does not unduly step on anyone’s toes. This apparently carries through to 
the departmental level, where one department dutifully follows the rules and 
waits for the lead department to make decisions, even when the lead department 
is very obviously overloaded and in no condition to decide anything any time 
soon. The same behaviour was even observed – although admittedly as a more 
scattered pattern – on the individual level, where the order of the hierarchy had 
to be be obeyed even if it meant bringing work to a stand-still.
On the other hand, the tsunami episode offers numerous examples where 
almost every actor involved broke, or at least bent, the rules at some point. 
The willingness to fund the SRSA mission out of the disaster relief funds, even 
though they were really going on a consular mission; the eventual abandonment 
of almost every rule pertaining to economic assistance; the multitude of requests 
to SRSA to just get on a plane with claims that the papers would be in order by 
the time they landed; and RKP entering into an agreement to provide UD with 
cleaned-up data, which they immediately broke. Indeed, SRSA almost ended 
up being the least rule-breaking party of the lot. Then again, this was a crisis 
and there were extraordinary circumstances at play. We also need to remember 
that we are looking at a political organisation in a heavily politicised event where 
the minister was under pressure to do something, right now! If the order came 
from above to ignore the rules – as they explicitly did in the case of chartering 
jets for passenger and medevac transportation – what would a regulation-guided 
organisation do?
From that perspective, the behaviours of the actors become a bit less strange. 
The ministries, and the departments within them, took orders directly from 
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the politicians being pressured by the public; the agencies, by law, did not. The 
ministries are supposed to effect the will of the government, although it is usually 
done through budget bills and reallocations of large-scale efforts rather than over-
night airplane charters, whereas the agencies can, and did, dig in their heels and 
simply say “no”. Moreover, the agencies are generally far closer to the operational 
level of any problem-solving endeavour, which is also where reality starts putting 
limits on what is actually possible. It is easier to agree to an extraordinary plan 
at a ministerial level and provide ample remuneration, than to actually put that 
plan into action in a situation when it simply cannot be done using the time 
or resources available. No amount of compensation after the fact will create 
more of either right here and now. In addition, for every frivolity in regards to 
established rules on the ministries’ part, there are many more examples of rules 
being followed beyond the letter, seemingly to ensure that, should something 
go wrong, at least they had followed procedure where it really mattered or in 
some other way engaged in text-book regulation-guided behaviour. The many 
reprimands and gag orders issued at different times at the Foreign Ministry in 
order to control the message outwards and maintain the chain of command are 
typical examples.
The intuitive understanding of a ministerial bureaucracy seems to hold 
true, then, but not always in the manner one might expect. Still, in spite of the 
occasional departure from the norm, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs qualifies as 
using ‘regulation’ as its guiding principle by a fair margin.
Instrumental work flow
The instrumental work flow of the ministry presents a much more difficult 
distinction. On the one hand, there are innumerable standard procedures to 
be followed when dealing with anything on the daily ministerial agenda, which 
strongly suggests a rigid work flow. On the other hand, at no point during the 
tsunami crisis were those standard procedures at play or even applicable. In a sense, 
it is this departure from the norm that characterised the work done during the 
first week of the crisis – indeed, it may even be considered a defining character-
istic of crises, which would expose a horrible bit of near-circular reasoning in the 
model. In fact, given the number of times the work methodology shifted during 
the first three days alone, there is a strong temptation to classify the whole effort 
as fairly flexible – after all, the work had to be done using any means necessary 
and without proper leadership, and that certainly sounds flexible does it not?
What we need to remember, though, is that it is not necessarily the actual 
outcome that is of interest, but the intent – the prescribed way of doing things 
as an organisation-wide standard. We also need to remember what was actually 
done during those days. A consistent pattern that emerges is the attempt at 
applying standard procedures even though they did not really fit, to make use 
of the standard forms that were designed for a very different purpose, to try to 
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use the standard document management system to track relational data, and 
above all the strict compartmentalisation of tasks. This is a behaviour that was 
demonstrated across the entirety of the Government Offices and which exhibited 
itself in the form of the “someone else’s problem” mode of thinking described in 
the previous section. The last point in particular suggests a degree of inflexibility 
that borders on harmful for the overall effort to take care of stranded Swedes 
half-way around the globe.
As with the guiding principle, there certainly are a number of examples of 
breaking the norm – one of the first instructions given is to ignore the standard 
procedures for note-taking, just to start from the top. But what were the actual 
results of this instruction? Almost none. It does not take long for the responders 
to fall back into the flow of taking notes using pre-existing forms, even though 
this drastically slowed down the response time and even though the forms did 
not fit the problem very well. Much of the work done during the first week can 
actually be seen as a prolonged attempt at returning back to the standard order 
of doing things. The first instance may very well be attributed to a dawning real-
isation that no-one seemed to actually want the information that was provided 
by those who called in, or simply to a sense of duty towards doing the type of 
case reporting that was clearly called for, but from an analytical perspective it is 
nevertheless a return to standard procedures. In addition and irrespective of any 
such reasons, a flexibility-oriented work flow would strongly suggest that new 
templates and reporting structures would be invented to match the task at hand, 
rather than seeing obsolescent paper forms being unsuitably reused.
The final wrangling of the SRSA issue creates an interesting puzzle that 
somewhat contradicts the picture so far. On the one hand, we have one depart-
ment that broke the supposedly regulatory guiding principle of letting the lead 
department lead, in order to push through the mission before time ran out, and 
in doing so also demonstrated some flexibility in how missions are decided on 
and funded. If the department in charge proves incapable, someone else may be 
willing and able to step in and get things done. This decision was undeniably 
easier to make since the minister in charge removed all limits on spending, but 
it still demonstrates a more flexible approach to getting things done quickly. In 
turn, this effectively means that the department got to formally make a decision 
that it had informally approved almost two days earlier, and with the UD-KC 
now paralysed by its workload, UD-GS could restore matters to their normal 
order and send SRSA off like they always do. At that point, though, the argument 
leans not just towards interdepartmental or bureaucratic politics, but starts to 
approach outright conspiracy theory especially since the contacts entirely excludes 
the management levels where these kinds of competition seems to exist the most. 
The truth probably lies somewhere in-between these extremes: yes, the UD-GS 
staff was used to getting SRSA missions underway, but was is done more to cut 
the proverbial Gordian knot than as a power play between two departments.
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One final complicating matter in judging this aspect of the openness/closed-ness 
spectrum is the nature of the work done on a daily basis and which becomes 
the key concern during the crisis. The fundamental issue is this: what is the 
degree of freedom offered to the case-by-case judgement that is made according 
to the existing rules and regulations? The formulation of the model offers as 
one of its examples of flexibility the ability to adapt and adjust procedures on a 
case by case basis, and offers the adherence to standard operational procedures 
as a characteristic of rigidity. So where does that leave us if the SOP. dictates 
a case-by-case flexibility? The opposite is simple enough: if as part of a highly 
flexible list of options, there is the possibility of applying an SOP, The SOP 
may be rigid, but then again, so is any single course of action once chosen and 
adhered to. The ability to choose whether or not to go for this one rigid option 
still means that the process as a whole is flexible. The potential rigidity in such a 
setup is just that: a potential, encapsulated in a larger array of viable choices – a 
simple way out for the unimaginative. Reverse the relationship and we have to 
ask, what are the boundaries of the encapsulated flexibility? Is it just a limited 
array of pre-vetted procedures where one should be chosen because it seems to 
fit the best – a thinly veiled flow chart or a multiple-choice question where the 
possible routes are still as rigid as can be? Or is it actually complete flexibility in 
disguise, only it is decreed in such a way as to ensure that no-one labours under 
the misapprehension that there is one true way of doing things?
We also return to the problem of distinguishing between the normal and 
the extraordinary. If we accept the notion that this is an ideal type and the ideal 
is what the organisation strives for under the best of circumstances, it may help 
clarify exactly what indicators we should look for, but it also rather disqualifies 
crises as a good or valuable data points. With the case in hand, we can therefore 
dismiss the at times free-wheeling nature of how the ministry chose to deal with 
matters during the crisis. The circumstances were not ideal; it was also not an 
added affordence to meet with the special demands of the period; it was the staff 
trying to apply their regular work habits and shedding the parts that simply were 
not feasible at the time. The ideal is still essentially one of ‘rigidity,’ even though 
it is designed to allow for some judgement calls to be made.
Preferred outcome
Contrary to expectations, the preferred outcome aspect of the open/closed divide is 
probably the simplest one to establish for the ministry. The existence of numerous 
gatekeepers of “proper” behaviour in the chronology, the way telephone responders 
– including the call centre staff – is equipped with standardised questionnaires, and 
the way at least outgoing information is screened and normalised all point towards 
a strong preference for consistency. This is itself consistent with the nature of the 
work done at the UD-KC: enacting public policy in strict accordance with the laws 
and guidelines that prescribe how such services should be offered. Once again, 
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though, we have the clash between the ideal type and a complex and at times 
seemingly contradictory reality. The tsunami case certainly exhibits all of the above 
characteristics, but it also presents us with a situation where the application of 
existing rules is incredibly inconsistent. Consular affairs are not exactly bywords 
for “lax” or “free of bureaucracy” – quite the opposite – and yet it does not take 
long before many of the stricter rules regarding how the consular department, 
and even the ministry as a whole, should act in relation to the individual were 
thrown out completely (if only temporarily). At first glance, this looks like the 
initial labelling of the ministry needs to be revised or at least provided with some 
nuance. In truth, though, the problem here is not with the application of the 
rules, but with our expectation of what it is we are observing.
The preferred outcome is consistency, but the question that has to be answered 
is consistency in what? We must not forget that, unlike the national agencies, 
this is very much an organisation under direct political control and as such, one 
of its key roles is political messaging. The changes in how rules are applied can 
pretty much universally be attributed to a drastically altered message. It is no 
longer an option to tell Swedes that “yes, we can help you, but this is a favour 
you will have to repay, and do be a bit more careful next time”. Instead, after 
three days of accidentally sending out the message that the government did not 
know and did not care about the ordinary citizen, the single acceptable message 
by the time the regular rules for assistance were thrown out was simply “yes, we 
will help you.” The preferred outcome of consistency in this case is not one of 
never changing, and certainly not one of always applying the same rules, but of 
consistently speaking a single, clear message with a single voice.
This also explains and encapsulates the internal consistency that is being 
enforced during the crisis: it all comes down to creating that singular voice and 
keeping rogue elements from contradicting the official message.
6.4.5 MESO usage
As previously mentioned, the tsunami crisis offers a much more complex actor 
than the FBI cases and this creates something of a challenge for how to meas-
ure the MESO-knowledge usage. Specifically, we have to consider the internal 
information flow as well as the external one; the same goes for the information 
needs that arise during the crisis. Just because UD as a whole has established 
contact with some form of expertise does not mean that this knowledge was 
actually being applied where it was needed. Perhaps one department “owned” 
the connection, but the need was in a different one, and neither knew of the 
other’s resources and needs. In particular, and similar to the situation at Waco, 
there were a couple of crucial information blockages at play that created artificial 
subdivisions in the organisational knowledge pool that did not quite follow the 
divisions visible in a regular organisational chart Fortunately, this is exactly the 
kind of ambiguities and missing links that the three knowledge types are meant 
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to explore and expose. Another fortunate circumstance, but only really from 
an analytical perspective, is that the number of issue areas, expert actors, and 
connections in the tsunami case were fairly limited.
Meta-knowledge
The tsunami crisis is more about what the organisations do not know than about 
what they do know. Unfortunately this twists the already difficult-to-parse question 
of meta knowledge into something that starts to resemble pure word salad. Rather 
than asking if the different parts of the organisation know what they know and/
or what they do not know, reading through the events of the tsunami crisis raises 
the question “don’t they know that they don’t know?”
Nowhere is this more clear than the upper management of UD-KC, where 
for the longest time there was a perception that from a Swedish perspective, the 
disaster was relatively minor and that the ministry was not running head-long 
into a major crisis. As a result, the knowledge of the situation, both abroad and 
in Stockholm, was rapidly diluted as we look higher and higher up in the chain 
of command. No-one seemed particularly interested in taking stock of what 
was actually known throughout the organisation. Instead, they assumed that 
others would inform them in full and that there was no information loss in the 
transition from one person to the next. On a regular day, there might have ben 
some merit to this assumption as being present at the office would give you 
access to the general ambience and other cues that might suggest that things 
aren’t quite as quiet as some want to claim. This is also a reoccurring theme in 
the Disaster Commission Report, where several sections are spend discussing the 
difference between being available and being present (cf. Fi 2005a:14f, 19f, 195 
;Hirshfeldt et al. 2007:12f, 30ff). The report suggests that a major part of the 
miscommunication that occurred during the first day was due to the fact that 
the managers and political leadership were trying to stay informed via phone and 
SMS alone. The process had all the hallmarks of an identification paradox and 
the negative feedback loop it can generate: a poor knowledge of the situation at 
the UD offices leads to the faulty conclusion that everything was more or less 
working as intended, and that there were no important issues that need to be 
clarified. This in turn meant that nothing was done to address the situation, 
and soon it deteriorated to the point where no-one had either the time or the 
macro-perspective view required to correct that initial assessment. Since no 
updates were issued, things must still be working more or less as intended. The 
spiral was only broken when one director actually witnessed the chaotic work 
environment without having been caught up in it. This provided an opportunity 
to recalibrate the skewed perception that had been shared among the upper 
management and political level.
The on-going saga of RKP and the casualty databases is yet another example 
of poor meta-knowledge. In an ironic twist, the root of the problem was that 
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information could not be shared among those that needed it, and the most 
immediate solution was to reconfigure a pre-existing technical solution into 
something that everyone involved would at least be familiar with. When RKP 
entered the scene as an external party and genuine expert on the matter, their 
offer to help was dismissed. There are two key missed opportunities for applying 
meta-knowledge at play here. The first and most obvious one was the lack of 
insight into the organisation’s own needs and into the capabilities of the tool they 
had chosen. This is what fed into the dismissal of RKP’s solution: it was not seen 
as necessary or as suitable, even though it would become clear only a few days 
later that it more than satisfied both those aspects. The other, more clumsy one, 
was the failure to understand the purely technical limitation of rolling out the 
document management system on a larger scale: only a relatively small amount 
of the available computers could even run the software.
A third part of the use of meta-knowledge is the ability to share knowledge 
across departmental boundaries, but this, too, was largely missing from the 
ministry. The hierarchical and status-bound structure created a heavily compart-
mentalised environment. Information mainly flowed upwards, and was shared a 
the mid and top management level. The problem was still, of course, that with 
very few exceptions, these management levels were not present and showed little 
interest in informing themselves of the state of affairs. The problem was further 
compounded by the specialisations of the different departments and the rather 
dissimilar type of work they do. For instance, a good understanding of the SRSA 
only existed in one place in UD-GS, and the fact that it existed at all was largely 
unknown outside of that particular department. This lack of meta-knowledge, 
combined with the practice of having lead departments that controlled all business 
pertaining to their area of expertise meant that they might need to make decisions 
on the deployment of assets and capacities that they were completely ignorant 
of – hardly an ideal set-up. 
At this point the question is, were there no positive examples of meta- 
knowledge in use during the tsunami crisis? As it happens, there were a few, and 
of a limited scope, but they tended to be very localised and the knowledge gained 
soon became stuck in the general blockages that existed due to the manage ment 
structure. The early morning of Boxing Day offered the most clear-cut examples, 
when representatives at the three key UD departments involved – KC, GS, and 
ASO – each on their own inquired about the disaster and its potential conse-
quences. The unfamiliarity with earthquakes and/or tsunamis, depending on 
the department and its previous experiences, was identified and rectified, and 
each representative came up with a good estimate of how many Swedes might 
be involved. Note, however, that we are only really talking about identification 
of knowledge gaps here; had there been proper meta-knowledge at play, it would 
have been a concerted and distributed effort, and some of the inquiries would have 
become completely unnecessary since the knowledge already existed in-house.
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Another interesting, but perhaps not entirely positive, example of meta- knowledge 
at work was the eyewitness report on December 28 from the ambassador to Bangkok. 
It qualifies as meta-knowledge in the sense that the embassies and consulates 
sort under the Foreign Ministry, and it also represented one of the key moments 
when critical knowledge inside this larger organisation was identified and shared 
among a number of individuals who needed it. As such, it is perhaps not strange 
that it came to redefine the perception of the disaster and of the still escalating 
crisis for the people present. The less than positive note is that, strictly speaking, 
none of this was new information, It already existed within the organisation 
through individual calls from the public, from direct friends of UD staffers, from 
businesses operating in the area, and from personnel connected to the both the 
ministry and many of the agencies that were at least obliquely connected to it. 
None of that information had been systematically inventoried or spread, however, 
and in spite of the sources, much of it was largely considered suspect. Above all, 
this is the one instance where the knowledge could conceivably be considered 
organisation-wide and thus qualify as a legitimate use of organisational knowledge. 
The rest are at best individual uses, where one person identified a personal rather 
than an organisational information gap that needs to be filled.
Empathic knowledge
Curiously enough, there are actually more examples of positive empathic knowledge 
use than of meta-knowledge, even though the former is supposed to be somewhat 
contingent on the latter. In this case, however, it is more a matter of there being no 
meta-knowledge use to speak of, which necessitates the use empathic knowledge 
to at least gain some understanding of what is happening around the organisation. 
Even then, and much in the same vein as the few instances of meta-knowledge 
use, it is more of an individual usage than something the organisation engaged 
in. Examples of this include the contacts made with FÖ, SRSA, or the agencies 
involved with the not yet operational National Air Medevac service (cf. Åbrandt 
& Lumsden 2005; SoS 2008).
If there is one more legitimate use of this type of knowledge, it is in the 
contacts made with SAS Airlines as part of the attempts to get an air bridge 
going and to jump-start the medevac flights. Here, the airline was not just 
asked to offer up its own airlift capacity, but also to broker contacts with other 
carriers and chartered aircraft. The use of SAS was in and of itself something of 
an expression of empathic knowledge. The airline is partially state-owned and 
has a clause in its charter to provide airlift capacity to the state should the need 
arise. It is therefore the natural place to go to – even if just the most trivial sense, 
it becomes that dependable “other party” that empathic knowledge is meant 
to reveal. A close candidate for a similar treatment would be the armed forces, 
except that no contact was made since their aircraft were deemed unsuitable for 
the purpose. It is interesting to note here that, at almost exactly the same time, 
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FÖ put those very same aircraft on alert status, not for the mission UD had in 
mind – the aircraft are indeed poorly suited for that – but for what at the time 
seemed to be an inevitable supply mission down to the disaster-stricken region. 
The connection was not quite there at this point, but the anticipation of what 
others might be planning and of what capacities the own organisation could offer 
is still very much present. The seeds of empathic knowledge use were there, but 
were not fully put to use.
While the examples of positive knowledge use are higher in this category than 
in the previous one, the outright failed examples are fewer. While the former is 
something of a curiosity, the latter case is much as expected: without a meta- 
knowledge base to build on, the opportunities for using empathic knowledge 
should be reduced as well. Since the number of opportunities is reduced, the 
number of times that those opportunities can be missed follows suit.
The two central missed opportunities both revolved around the work to register 
missing people and casualties. The first instance is a classic case of tripping up one’s 
own organisation by failing to communicate how it is handling information, 
thereby causing further mismanagement. In an attempt to limit the availability 
and exposure of sensitive information, especially on those individuals suspected 
to be deceased, their entries were removed from the universally available reposi-
tory. Based on decade-old experiences, the privileged information was only made 
available to a fairly small select group of trusted desk officers who had previous 
experience in handling sensitive matters. The problem was that information on 
these individuals was still being collected by, or volunteered to, the desk officers 
and operators staffing the phones, who dutifully (re)entered the information in 
the system. The set-up in and of itself is not a bad idea, but the lack of indicators 
of what was going on – the lack of empathic knowledge that someone else knews 
more on the topic of these particular entries – created a fair amount of duplicate 
and contradictory information. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, there 
may at times be difficulties in separating empathic and second-order knowledge, 
and this failure at making use of the former provides a good example of why. Had 
the process been better designed, it would have had the appearance of the phone 
operators knowing that there was more to know – that is, they would appear 
to have some second-order knowledge of the sensitive entries. The empathic 
knowledge of being aware of who else had access to this information would have 
been wholly encapsulated within this understanding. It is only in the failure of 
the second part of that equation that we notice that there are two parts at all.
The second empathic-knowledge failure related to these lists was a contin-
uation of one of the meta-knowledge failures discussed in the previous section. 
In the discussions with RKP and the information consultants, there was initially 
a tone of almost boastful self-assuredness that UD’s newly created system was 
uniquely well-suited for what they were trying to do. The failure resides in the 
fact that no-one seemed to appreciate the expertise and competence the national 
police would have to have had in the area in order to even do their job. It is not 
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just a case of not knowing that someone else has expert insights to offer, but 
outright scoffing at the idea that anything of the kind might exist. UD was soon 
set straight on the matter as the outside consultants quickly concluded that not 
only was the other system more fit for purpose on the software side, it was also 
backed up by a well-functioning, well-led and proven work flow – none of which 
was really an appropriate description of UD’s processes.
Second-order knowledge
The two instances related to the database squabble are the only clear instances 
of anything resembling second-order knowledge usage. This is hardly surprising 
as we expect the three knowledge types to follow one from the other – if we see 
little of a previous step, we should see even less of the next one in line. Only 
once the internal knowledge resources have been used up (meta-knowledge) 
and the immediate surroundings canvassed for more (empathic knowledge) 
is it time to figure out where to go next, commonly by asking around in the 
knowledge network for more contacts. If there are no known knowledge gaps 
and no contacts to be queried, the opportunities for second-order knowledge 
usage rapidly dwindles into nothing. This is an apt description of what we are 
seeing in this case and why.
At a stretch, the collection of information on people in the region based on 
calls from the public could be seen as a prototypic instance of the idea: knowledge 
was needed about who had been affected, so how do you find out? You ask them 
to make contact – or as more commonly happened in this case, you sit by as they 
do it on their own accord. Even so, this was something that happened because 
the public made it happen, not because the organisation itself had set up a system 
to tap into the knowledge of the public. It is a coincidental usage at best rather 
than a carefully selected strategy.
6.4.6 Conclusions from the tsunami
The tsunami is often quite rightfully considered a seminal moment in modern 
crisis management in Sweden. This chapter has only looked at a thin slice of 
the first phase of one of the many crises that erupted in the wake of the disaster. 
Beyond what happened in and around the Foreign Ministry offices in Stockholm, a 
number of ministries and national agencies were involved, not to mention regional 
and local agencies. There is also the ensuing political crisis and the politicisation 
of the commissioned review process, both of which are only hinted at in the 
narrative presented here. The work done on site in the disaster-stricken areas is 
yet another story in and of itself. The slice examined here shows a ministry in 
chaos at every level, one that showed a brief promising start but which was so 
blocked up by organisational inefficiencies and defective leadership that it started 
to stumble almost immediately and never really caught up.
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The culture of prideful self-sufficiency and prestige had its flip side exposed in 
almost every way possible, and yet, at the ground level, the amount of effort put 
out to try to right the listing organisation is staggering. As we will see in the next 
chapter, some of these issues received immediate and much-needed attention to 
ensure that a similar situation will not arise again, and the knowledge processing 
is at the heart of those changes.
In terms of answering the analytical questions, the Boxing Day tsunami crisis 
can be summarised as follows:
• It was most definitely a crisis for the principal actor.
• The processes being used were not anticipated.
• The principal actor could not maintain an open mode of operation.
• The principal actor demonstrated very few instances of MESO-knowledge, 
and even among those, most were failures.
• A negative reinforcement cycle that increases the degree of crisis can be 
observed.
Unlike the previous case where there were some potential ambiguities, these 
observations are trivial to convert to the binary states of the model:
• Degree of crisis: high.
• Degree of anticipation of process: low.
• Degree of closed-ness: high.
• Degree of MESO-usage: low.
The only variable that might conceivably be subject to discussion is some aspects 
of the closed-ness, but as described in the previous section, the factors that might 
muddy the waters are either by far drowned out by the behaviours that show the 
closed-ness of the organisation, or they are simply slightly curious or unexpected 
expressions of closed behaviour that have not been considered so far.
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The Arab-Israeli conflict has been a constant source of tension at least since the 
founding of the modern state if Israel in 1948 – arguably starting in the civil war 
of 1947 that eventually led to the establishment of the state a year later. While 
the intensity and individual belligerents of the conflict have both varied over 
the decades, it is neither a particularly new nor a very surprising source violent 
episodes and threats to regional security and stability. In 1967, Israel initiated the 
pre-emptive Six-Day War in response to a military build-up in the surrounding 
nations of Syria, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic (later Egypt). This war 
netted Israel a number of new territorial claims, including the Golan Heights and 
Shebaa Farms along its northern borders to Syria and Lebanon. Some 40 years 
later, the conflict over the Shebaa Farms area, in particular, once again heated up 
after an increasing number of skirmishes between Israeli and Hezbollah troops 
had taken place. Usually these exchanges followed a pattern of raids or rocket or 
mortar from within Lebanese territory, answered by air strikes from Israel. By mid-
2006, the conflict had been building over six years and had become an almost 
regular seasonal occurrence (cf. BBC 2001-07-01, 2004-01-20, 2005-06-29; 
CNN 2004-05-07; MFA 2006-06-01; Matthews 2012:15ff).
Still being a travelling people, and in spite of it being the middle of summer 
when the need to escape to warmer climes is not as strong, there were more than 
8,000 Swedes in the Lebanon region. Since 2001, only an honorary consulate had 
been kept up and running in Beirut due to budgetary reasons, and the general 
area as a whole was managed from the embassy in Damascus, Syria (Kulling & 
Sigurdsson 2008:14, 24, 36). Meanwhile, 2,000 miles away, the government 
apparatus in Stockholm was in the middle a reformation and learning process 
resulting from the tsunami disaster a year and a half earlier. When the low-intensity 
conflict escalated into a full-blown war, this apparatus, still comprised of the same 
agencies with the same responsibilities as during the tsunami, suddenly had to 
solve a very similar problem of scrambling together the means and resources to 
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evacuate the nation’s citizens. This time, there was ample warning of what was 
about to happen and the distances involved were not nearly as remote, but on 
the other hand, the evacuation was from a war zone with hostilities still going on 
rather than from the scene of a completed natural disaster. It was also an election 
year, so the pressure to “do it right” this time was enormous.
7.1 Background
Only a few days after the 2004 tsunami, the seeds of what would be known as the 
“Disaster Commission” (Katastrofkommissionen) were planted, and on January 13, 
2005, it bloomed into a formal investigation of the crisis management of, not just 
the government, but the entire Swedish crisis management system (Fi 2005a, b; 
Regeringskansliet 2005:15f, 26f, 35f, 93f; 2006:29f; Hirschfeldt et al. 2008). 
Throughout 2005, and in the midst of a political and media storm surrounding 
the foreign minister in particular, and the top political leadership of the ministry 
as a whole, the commission worked to piece together the stories of the actors 
involved – from government officials and bureaucrats, to entire organisations, 
to individual victims and their next of kin. Even before the report came out on 
December 1, 2005, a public narrative had been constructed where the farther away 
a given actor was from the top government political and policy decision-makers, 
the more they “did the right thing”, with specific individuals and even entire 
private companies seen as the heroes of the story. The final commission report 
offered a slightly more nuanced picture of the events, but still presented scathing 
criticism against the Foreign Ministry (UD) in particular, the Government 
Offices (RK) in general, and indeed against the general uncoordinated nature of 
Swedish crisis management.
A lot of the criticism had been anticipated, and as the report was being put 
together, some immediate measures were already being taken to answer some 
of the more glaring issues that had become obvious, future commission reports 
notwithstanding. In particular, the tsunami disaster had revealed that the division 
of labour between a number of different agencies, including UD, was not as neat 
and clear-cut as previously assumed (Fi 2005c:509f; Regeringskansliet 2005:26f; 
35f ). UD ostensibly had the mandate to send Swedish aid, including personnel, 
abroad, but largely lacked any experience of the operational side of such affairs, 
whereas the agencies with said experience were hamstrung by having to go 
through convoluted proper channels. Similarly, the division of labour between 
the national and the county level turned out to rest on the rather flawed assump-
tion that people only ever got into real large-scale emergencies at home, where it 
was the responsibility of the local or county level to handle those issues. Should 
something happen abroad, it was suddenly UD’s problem to deal with, and again, 
they lacked the experience, expertise, and staff to handle anything other than the 
odd lost passport, stolen travel funds, or run-ins with foreign law-enforcement. 
While the UD desk officers took pride in solving these personal crises on a daily 
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basis, tasks such as mass evacuations, the care and transport of hundreds of ill 
and injured, and the coordination of dozens of Swedish and foreign agencies 
was something very different.
It had also become clear that the history and culture at UD had left the 
Department for Consular Affairs (UD-KC) in a state of disrepair (Hirdman et al. 
2005:363f; Fi 2005c:512ff; Regeringskansliet 2005:93f ). This was the rather 
small office that handled actual operational matters, not the grandiose foreign 
policy issues; it dealt with Swedish nationals in a bind, not foreign dignitaries; it 
was an extension of the social safety net, rather than a projection of Sweden on 
the international arena. The political and public-relations repercussions of this 
culture now had made themselves known, and it turned out that the Swedish 
people expected the beleaguered desk officers at this small unit to help them by 
the thousands, with time-critical life-and-death issues, just as well as they did 
with a handful of cases of lost travel documents. At the same time, the very same 
desk officers were the ones who had to support the embassy and consulate staff 
abroad, who of course had been inundated to the same degree at their local offices.
The immediate solution to these problems was to set up a number of emer-
gency teams or functions to fill in the gaps, should a similarly large crisis abroad 
ever happen again (Hirdman et al. 2005:373; Regeringskansliet 2006:83; UD 
2005, 2006:4). From UD’s point of view, three such functions were of particular 
importance:
• A rapid response team, consisting of personnel from a large number of agencies 
that would provide proper on-site coordination of efforts, as well report back 
to the various Stockholm offices of those agencies.
• A disaster readiness team, specifically meant to reinforce and support the 
embassy and consular staff abroad in the event of a crisis in the local area.
• An on-call decision-making function where someone was given the authority 
and obligation to expedite operational decisions, should the regular channels 
be blocked or otherwise unavailable.
The two latter points were specifically critical as a quick patch for the issued 
identified at UD-KC; the top management that did not quite have the ear of its 
minister (be it for personal reasons or because its issues were deemed low priority), 
and a lack of redundancy in its ability to staff not just its own offices but also 
the many offices abroad (Brändström 2016:50ff; Hirdman et al. 2005:363f; Fi 
2005c:514f; KU 2006:128ff).
7.1.1 New actors in the mix
The rapid response team was something slightly different: an attempt to achieve 
greater crisis coordination of efforts, not just between the various ministries, but 
between the ministries and their agencies, and between then national, regional, 
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and local levels. In particular, it had been noted that while some connections 
already existed, such as between the well-travelled Swedish Rescue Services 
Agency’s (SRSA) own disaster response teams and UD, or between UD and the 
Ministry of Defence (FÖ, the ministry to which SRSA formally reported), there 
were numerous other connections at the agency level that would be served well 
by being more centralised (UD 2005-11-12).
The tsunami crisis had quickly revealed the expertise and resources of the 
National Police Board (RPS) to be invaluable, and along with SRSA it offered an 
avenue of contact into its numerous local and regional agencies who would 
eventually and inevitably be the ones to handle the cases once Swedish nationals 
returned home. The coordination with these local agencies was yet another defi-
ciency in the national system that had been uncovered and which would receive 
criticism in the commission report – not so much in terms of the information 
passed between the agencies themselves, but in how there was little understanding 
or preparedness at the central and national level for what the regional and local 
agencies needed in order to do their job. Two national agencies in particular 
had shared the task of coordinating between agencies and between levels in the 
system: the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, and the National Board 
of Health and Welfare – the need to include them in this new rapid response 
team was indisputable (UD 2005-11-12).
The Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA)
Contrary to what its English name might suggest, the Swedish Emergency 
Management Agency was not responsible for any kind of emergency manage-
ment. The Swedish name, Krisberedskapsmyndigheten (KBM) – literally “the Crisis 
Preparedness Agency” – was slightly more accurate in that it rather indicates the 
support role of the agency. In practice, it dealt with gathering and coordinating 
information about past and current crises, and supporting other agencies in 
their planning, training, information sharing, and similar knowledge needs (Fi 
2005a:137; KU 2006:135).
This role as a central crisis information clearing house also tended to make 
SEMA a natural coordination centre for multi-level and multi-agency activities, 
since its day-to-day mission already was to keep all these agencies informed of what 
was going on. Its operative staff consisted mainly of analysts and researchers, as 
well as a technical section to manage and oversee a number of national technical 
support systems. As far as operative participation goes, SEMA personnel would 
regularly appear as observers or provide information support for missions run 
by agencies such as SRSA and SoS.
The National Board of Health and Welfare (SoS)
Somewhere in-between the SRSA and SEMA in both nature and focus, but 
with a different professional basis, the National Board of Health and Welfare 
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(Socialstyrelsen, or SoS) was, and remains to this day, the Swedish central agency 
for social services, public health, health services, and the prevention of infectious 
diseases. Whereas the SRSA slanted more towards operational expertise in rescue 
services, SoS leaned more towards the research and analysis side, and towards 
various forms of individual care. Like SRSA, SoS maintained a pool of experts 
for emergency consultations in the event of a crisis, only the SoS pool mainly 
contained practicing physicians and medical researchers (Fi 2005a:138; KU 
2006:142; Koraeus 2009).
Similar to SEMA, but with a clear focus on public health issues, it also main-
tained a pool of observers in the field of disaster medicine (“Katastrofmedicinska 
observatörsstuder”) who studied and reported on the health-care facet of major 
crises, and presented their findings in the so-called KAMEDO report publication 
series. Since major disasters are generally rare in Sweden, these pools of experts 
were poised to be deployed around the world where their analytical expertise 
and professional knowledge were needed in order to collect more data for their 
studies (Koraeus 2009). Not being as operationally focused as SRSA, and with its 
efforts being more aimed towards evaluating and distilling best practices for use 
in Swedish crisis management, SoS lacked the international brand recognition 
of SRSA outside of a niche group of researchers that shared interests with the 
KAMEDO group. At the same time, SoS had even more freedom to deploy its 
personnel abroad, since it did not entail an official Swedish government opera-
tion within another sovereign nation. It was a form of free and open academic 
research rather than a projection of Swedish foreign policy, and consequently 
fewer diplomatic formalities and niceties needed to be observed.
Nationally, and on an every-day basis, the agency acted more in a supervisory 
and oversight role, providing expert guidelines for the health-care sector and for 
its lead department within the Government Offices, the Ministry of Health and 
Social Affairs. Besides the KAMEDO teams, the agency maintained a number of 
expert groups and knowledge centres where the focus lay on crisis management 
in the field of public health, including evaluation of threats to public health, 
consequence analyses, and monitoring of world events. While the actual health 
care itself was administered at the county level, the inner workings and needs of 
that system and of its patients were not always universally understood by other 
actors, so the expert groups were also meant to provide support to other local and 
national agencies in all matters related to health care, such as the coordination 
of information, and guidance on the topic of the Swedish health care system 
(Koraeus 2009).
Along with SRSA, SoS was also responsible for the implementation of 
municipal ‘POSOM’-groups: teams of experts in psychosocial care, aimed to help 
individuals caught in disasters or other larger emergencies. Both agencies had 
noticed a need for a comprehensive approach in caring for not just the victims 
of a disaster, but their families, friends and even to whole communities. Again, 
the actual care was administered at the municipal level rather than by either 
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of the two agencies, but as “parents” of the system and with their role as both 
subject-matter experts and supervising agencies of the related policy areas, they 
were still closely involved with how the groups are being employed throughout 
the nation (Kulling & Sigurdsson 2008:33f; 50ff). The need for this kind of care, 
and for the coordination of regular health-care of Swedes returning to their home 
counties from facilities abroad had been revealed as highly critical in the aftermath 
of the 2004 tsunami, including the need to coordinate medical transportation. 
Here, too, the close connection between SRSA and SoS became apparent as both 
agencies were the main actors in maintaining the not-yet up-and-running Swedish 
National Air Medevac function (SNAM, cf. Åbrandt & Lumsden 2005:25; Fi 
2005a:272; Kulling & Sigurdsson 2008:32, 53f; SoS 2008:66f ).
For the newly created rapid response team, the role of SoS’ was largely a for-
malisation of the role it had naturally taken during the tsunami aftermath: on-site 
observation, recommendations to regional health-care agencies back home, and 
providing direct contact channels with medical professionals, when necessary. 
By 2006, the work to make SNAM fully operational had not just improved the 
readiness of actual air-lifting capabilities, but had also created yet another pool 
of personnel to call on for more hands-on operational tasks. Actually getting 
it in the air would still be a complicated matter since the responsibility for the 
different components of the function was distributed between the SoS (function 
coordinator, especially for finding qualified medical staff), the Swedish Civil 
Aviation Authority (in charge of capability assessments), the Västerbotten county 
council (the coordinating body for the national health care side, in particular 
for the distribution and transport of patients to their final destination), and the 
Norrland University Hospital in Umeå (the national specialist, and informal lead 
agency, on air medevac equipment and service development). In practice, any 
one of these could raise the question of whether SNAM should be activated, but 
all parties needed to give their go-ahead and ensure that they could provide their 
part of the service. And, of course, there was the matter of securing funding for 
any such activation, where the responsibility would vary depending on exactly 
how, why, and where the function was needed.
7.1.2 The political aftermath of the commission report
All these changes took place over a longer period of time, but the final release 
of the Disaster Commission report on the handling of the tsunami established 
that the measures taken so far would not be enough. In particular the report 
pointed towards the need for a much more centralised crisis management func-
tion, both at the ministerial level and at the national agency level (Hirdman 
et al. 2005:370ff). While it often took on a similar role, SEMA’s mission and 
mandate did not fully cover such a function, and the Government Offices lacked 
any formal crisis coordination – at best ad hoc ministerial or collegial meetings 
or meetings that might fill that need, but as the tsunami crisis had shown, this 
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was far too dependent on key individuals to be systemically reliable. This con-
clusion was further emphasised as the public pressure on the government and 
on the foreign minister in particular increased steadily during the year after the 
tsunami (cf. Brändström 2016:107; Daléus 2005:99ff, 109ff; DN 2005-02-13; 
SR 2005-12-02; SvD 2005-12-02; KU 2006:105ff, 114ff). By March 2006, 
her position as foreign minister had become untenable and she resigned. She 
was replaced by the acting President of the United Nations General Assembly.
It was also an election year, and the tsunami was still a yoke on the shoulders 
of the incumbent government – replacing perhaps the most criticised member of 
the cabinet might assuage some of the voters, but the image of the government 
as incapable of handling crises still lingered. During the summer, the election 
circuit would start to heat up, and it was not hard to guess what issue would 
continue to take centre-stage during the proceedings, at least unless some solid 
evidence could be conjured up that things had improved, drastically. Aside from 
the new coordination functions in the Government Offices, a number of laws 
underwent significant revision to further clarify the roles and responsibilities of 
various national and local government actors, as well as for numerous agencies. 
In particular, the function of “on-duty desk officer” – a dedicated 24/7 point-of-
contact role that already existed in some of the more crisis-focused agencies – was 
formalised and made universal throughout the entire national crisis management 
system (Prop. 2005/06:133).
7.2 Chronology of Events
Fairly predictably by the pattern of the preceding years, July of 2006 sees an increase 
in hostilities along the Lebanese-Israeli border, and in particular surrounding the 
Shebaa Farms territory. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have been anticipating 
an attack some time during the first couple of days of the months, but in spite 
of presenting an obvious target for the Hezbollah, nothing has happened to 
the forces deployed in the area (Matthews 2012:28f, 33f ). Instead, on July 12, 
something completely new happens: an Israeli vehicle column is ambushed by 
Hezbollah forces on the Israeli side of the border, and two soldiers travelling in 
the column are captured in the ensuing chaos. The Hezbollah team retreats to 
the Lebanon side of the border with their captives, and the IDF in pursuit suffer 
further casualties as they run into additional ambushes on Lebanese territory 
(MFA 2006-07-12a, 2006-07-12b).
Israeli officials declare the abduction and the further killings an act of war, 
and without waiting for a response from the Cabinet, the IDF starts shelling 
and conducting bombing raids against Lebanese infrastructure and against 
known Hezbollah bases and positions. Among these first strikes, the Rafic Hariri 
Internation Airport in Beirut is one of the targets, and at the same time, naval 
forces move in to attack similar targets in Beirut and along the southern coast, 
cutting off the larger sea routes out of the country. 
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No formal declaration of war takes place, and although there are some early 
attempts to blame the Hezbollah attack on the Lebanese government, the govern-
ment quickly denounces the initial raid and declares that this is a conflict between 
Israel and Hezbollah only, but also warns that it will respond if the IDF starts 
attacking Lebanese official buildings or tries to push too hard or moves too far 
north. The Lebanese government calls for a UN-backed cease-fire on July 14, 
but the drafting of such a resolution drags on, and it takes until August 11 until 
a full resolution can be written and adopted by the UN. It then takes another 
three days for the resolution to take effect and almost another full month – until 
September 8 – before the Israeli naval blockade is lifted (MFA 2006-07-12b; 
UD 2006:5).
In the meantime, both Hezbollah and Israeli forces continue to target each 
other’s infrastructure, as well as direct military targets. As a consequence, as the 
war drags on, travel inside and out of Lebanon becomes increasingly difficult, 
perilous, and unpredictable, as roads, bridges, railways, and runways are put out 
of commission, and as air and sea traffic risk being misidentified and getting caught 
in the cross-fire. The Hezbollah are better armed and trained than expected, 
which causes a number of initial setbacks for the Israeli forces, On July 14, a 
navy corvette is forced to withdraw after being hit by an anti-ship missile thereby 
demonstrating an escalated threat level, and in response, Israel escalates to a full 
ground-war by July 20 (MFA 2006-07-12b; UD 2006:6f ). 
7.2.1 Responding to a crisis
Still in early July, as tension in the region rises, SRSA decides to send a team to 
Cyprus to reinforce an existing mission in the region and to expand it to also 
include observations of the escalating violence in Lebanon. The team arrives on 
July 11, and start monitoring the situation (Kulling & Sigurdsson 2008:42). 
The very next day, the actual war breaks out. By the 13th, the escalation of 
the situation is beyond any doubt, especially since a number of key transport 
routes have been taken out of commission by Israeli air- and artillery strikes, 
which will undoubtedly have an impact on any attempts to render aid to the 
region. This fact is reported back to the SRSA situational assessment unit back 
home in Sweden. One part of this unit is an analysis group tied to SoS, acting 
as liaison between the two agencies on matters related to observations of world 
events. One of the SoS analysts in this group contacts the central office with a 
request that they start a “remote magnitude assessment” of the situation, and in 
particular the potential need for medical support, which is approved (Kulling 
& Sigurdsson 2008:14, 37f, 44f ).
During the day, the on-duty desk officer at UD notes that the ministry is 
receiving a substantial amount of phone calls inquiring about the situation in 
Lebanon. The still fresh experience of the tsunami soon evokes the realisation that 
the regular four-person strong reserve for reinforcing the telephone exchange will 
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not be sufficient, and further staff is called in. In addition, a special call centre 
and registration unit working in shifts is set up to handle the actual calls them-
selves. Within the next week, it has expanded to employ over 120 individuals 
over the course of a full day (UD 2006:7f, 17). A meeting is held to assess what 
is going on, where the immediate conclusion is that a full-on war may break out 
at any moment, and that a fair amount of Swedish citizens may be in the area. 
An early estimate suggests that some 1,000 people may require evacuation, and 
that the evacuation routes are rapidly diminishing in number. By chance, a UD 
desk officer is in Beirut on holiday at this very moment, and is immediately 
detached to the honorary consulate to assume direct control there. However, 
it is still just a consulate and is far too small to be able to handle this kind of 
situation, especially since the security of the site cannot even be guaranteed and 
it may soon be cut off along with the rest of Beirut. A decision is made that, 
while the Beirut consulate could definitely needs be supported with additional 
disaster readiness staff, the much larger embassy in Damascus will be the central 
local office for handling the escalating crisis and will be the main recipient of 
any reinforcements. For now, until the logistics of getting more personnel in 
place, the one desk officer already on site will be the reinforcement for the Beirut 
consulate (Kulling & Sigurdsson 2008:16; UD 2006:7f ).
That evening, UD contacts SRSA to request additional support personnel for 
the embassy, but also to further reinforce the team already in place in Cyprus, 
since that is likely to be a destination for people fleeing Lebanon by sea (SoS 
2006:3f ). A rapid response team is to be convened for the next morning to start 
coordinating the many issues related to the war and to the inevitable evacuation 
effort. At this early stage, the team only consists of representatives from various 
units and departments within UD itself, and its first task during July 14 is to 
try to establish means of communication with the belligerents in order to secure 
a safe evacuation route, and to get in contact with as many Swedes as possible 
(Kulling & Sigurdsson 2008:14; UD 2006:8). The use of mass-SMS was met 
with some success during the tsunami, and working routines have since been 
established at UD, but the question is how many will receive those messages 
considering that key infrastructures, including communication facilities, are 
among the high-priority targets (UD 2006:5, 8).
Attempts are also made to find out what measures other EU countries, as well 
as private travel agencies, are taking and if there are any opportunities to coordinate 
those efforts, especially when it comes to chartering ships and similar means of 
mass transportation. The matter is shown to have a fair bit more political priority 
than what was seen during the first days of the tsunami, as the Foreign Minister 
is an active participant in the EU-level discussions. Inquiries are also directed 
to the companies as to whether they are able to provide contact information for 
their customers. The reports from the Beirut consulate are disconcerting: air 
transport is no longer viable, and most of the larger roads have been bombed, 
the main exception being some of the roads leading north. The city of Aleppo in 
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northern Syria is selected as a candidate for a first stop in the evacuation. Once 
there, and out of harm’s way, more options are available for further transpor-
tation (SoS 2006:5f; Kulling & Sigurdsson 2008:38; UD 2006:8). However, 
until some means of transportation into Beirut can be established, such efforts 
have to be arranged and coordinated by and from the understaffed consulate, 
which may be more than the small team there can manage. The desk officer is 
therefore granted permission to try to shore up the staff by hiring locals – the 
same goes for arranging the actual transportation. In the afternoon, the topic 
of this precarious situation and the need to find immediate solutions is brought 
up at a cabinet meeting, where it is quickly decided that additional funds will 
be allocated to the UD budget for the purpose of managing the escalating crisis. 
The matter is no longer internal to just UD, but has spread to include a number 
of different ministries that may soon be involved in the crisis management – 
notably the Defence Ministry (the ministry to which both SRSA and SEMA 
report), the Ministry of Justice (RPS’s ministry), and the Ministry of Health and 
Social Affairs (the reporting ministry of SoS) – and the issue has been raised to 
the political level at the Government Offices (UD 2006:8f, 14).
At SoS, a crisis team is set up, and measures are taken to enumerate the key 
points of contact with the major city councils. Anticipating a further escalation 
of the conflict and an increase in the support needed, the agency also starts taking 
stock of what personnel is available in its different staff pools for immediate 
deployment abroad (SoS 2006:3f; Kulling & Sigurdsson 2008:38). Over at 
SRSA, work is underway to put together a support team, most likely headed for 
Cyprus. SRSA requests additional support from SoS and RPS, the latter mainly 
to provide security for the team. Later in the day, this mission is expanded into a 
larger, more comprehensive support mission for the various Swedish delegations 
in place or on route. The expanded mission also includes the handling of customs 
and immigration matters, and the identification of refugees from the area who 
might carry Swedish visas. These tasks are delegated to RPS, who thus becomes 
involved in the efforts beyond simply providing security, and onto actual police 
matters that require coordination with the relevant agencies back in Sweden. 
For its part, SoS suggests to UD that it put together a small assessment team 
for now, and start preparing a larger medical team for later deployment. Since 
there are no current reports of any injured Swedes in need of immediate medical 
attention – although it is likely that some psychosocial care will be needed on 
arrival – this suggestion is met with UD’s approval (SoS 2006:3f; Kulling & 
Sigurdsson 2008:43).
On Saturday, July 15, UD more formally extends the RPS part of the mission 
to include the various identification tasks, addressing the agency directly rather 
than using SRSA as a go-between. Meanwhile, the first SRSA team takes off, 
along with a handful of UD disaster readiness staff, but they are all initially headed 
for Damascus since that is where the additional support is needed the most at 
the moment – anyone who finds their own way out of Beirut will most likely 
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arrive there and be in need of immediate assistance after the treacherous journey. 
But even as this team leaves, it is decided that a lot more is needed to cover the 
presumed escape routes, notably Nicosia and Larnaca in Cyprus, and Aleppo 
(SoS 2006:5f; UD 2006:9). While UD will arrange the actual transportation, 
the on-site logistics of getting everyone on and off the chain of boats, buses, and 
airplanes will be handled by SRSA personnel. As such, the rapid response team is 
drastically expanded, and SRSA is tasked with finding as many reserves as it can 
from its emergency staff pools. All in all, 55 people are engaged in the team. The 
first of which arrive in Cyprus that evening. From the initial collection of UD 
units and departments, the coordination effort has now expanded to include the 
Prime Minister’s Office, the Government Office’s administrative department, the 
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs, the administrative department of the Parliament, the Swedish Armed 
Forces, the National Criminal Police (RKP), SoS and SRSA (UD 2006:9, 14).
By the end of the day, two ships have been requisitioned to transport evacuees 
from Beirut to Larnaca, with a combined capacity of 1,650 individuals. These 
ships will also transport the personnel into Beirut to aid the consulate and to 
provide further logistical support in the city. In addition, the three parties in the 
war have all guaranteed safe passage for a bus convoy headed north to Aleppo, 
arranged by the Damascus embassy and Beirut consulate. With the pieces of 
the logistics puzzle largely in place, the actual evacuation effort can now begin 
(SoS 2006:5f; UD 2006:9).
7.2.2 Bringing people home
On Sunday, July 16, the bus convoy heads for Aleppo, carrying some 750 
individuals. They are met by the UD and SRSA personnel flown in during the 
day, who arrange for further transport to Sweden. Most of the evacuees arrive 
in Sweden by air the next day. While the sea route could potentially carry larger 
volumes, the security situation is unclear, especially when taking into account 
an anti-ship missile attack against an Israeli corvette just two days earlier. At the 
same time, the estimates for the number of people in the region are continuously 
adjusted – at least a couple of hundred additional individuals are now said to be 
trapped in southern Lebanon, where the majority of the combat action is taking 
place. The means for getting them out is still unclear (Kulling & Sigurdsson 
2008:39; UD 2006:9f ). Four days into the war, Swedes start arriving back 
home, and they have less than kind words to say about how the government has 
handled the situation so far. The evacuations are chaotic; information is scarce; 
the personnel handling the evacuation and trying to manage the large groups of 
evacuees are described as disorganised and generally unprepared for the task at hand. 
The initial media reporting suggests that this may not just be a second tsunami, 
but actually something even worse in terms of how ill-prepared the national 
agencies are (cf. Expressen 2006-07-16; Dagen 2006-07-17; GP 2006-07-17, 
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2006-07-18; Helsingborgs Dagblad 2006-07-17). While the foreign minister has 
certainly not been laying idle, the unstated question seems to be how involved 
he really is in the crisis management effort. The first major meeting with the 
crisis management group is reported to have taken place on the day before, a full 
three days into the war. Some of the Mediterranean EU countries have already 
made great strides in getting their citizens out of the region. In spite of the large 
transportation capacity that has been secured and the EU coordination efforts 
a few days earlier, Sweden is seen as lagging behind (cf. Expressen 2006-07-16; 
GP 2006-07-16; TT 2006-07-16).
Also during the 16th, SoS decides to activate two of its medical teams and 
to send them to Aleppo and Larnaca. These are the main reception areas where 
evacuees will need medical attention and where the medical staff can assess what 
needs should be communicated to hospitals back in Sweden and whether more 
advanced care will be required (SoS 2006:6ff; Kulling & Sigurdsson 2008:14ff, 
39). When discussing the matter with SRSA and SEMA, the conclusion is that 
SoS is better positioned to coordinate the information with the counties and 
municipalities in Sweden, and to arrange the reception back home. At first, 
SEMA takes on the task of maintaining and distributing the passenger lists to 
all parties involved, but it soon turns out that RPS already has working systems 
for assembling such lists, and means of distributing them on the county- and 
municipality level. The RPS process entails letting the information spread to the 
County Police Commissioners, who would then pass it on to the counties, who 
in turn would deliver it to the individual municipalities and local levels. In short, 
it would let the structure of the Swedish emergency management system work 
as a distributed self-informed sorting device to make sure the proper information 
reached the right end user. This as opposed to the SEMA system of trying to 
handle all the sorting and filtering centrally and in bulk. The agencies also discuss 
the potential need to activate SNAM, but the assessment is that there is no 
particular need for that kind of advanced medical care (SoS 2006:6ff; Kulling 
& Sigurdsson 2008:75f ). Aside from getting the issue of information sharing 
sorted, Sunday and Monday are spent shoring up the detachments in Cyprus, 
in Syria, and in Lebanon itself.
By Monday, assurances have been given that the ships will be allowed safe 
passage, which both allows a team of 14 to arrive in Beirut and drastically 
reinforce the consulate, and to get a first load of evacuees to Cyprus. Over the 
next week, most evacuations are made by boat, and the buses previously used 
for the convoy to Aleppo are now used to get the evacuees down to the harbour 
instead. Private companies, and in particular most of the travel agencies trying 
to get their customers out of the conflict zone, still mainly rely on bus transports 
headed north. However, between the convoy and this first shipment to Larnaca, 
it becomes obvious that the initial estimate of 1,000 Swedes is grossly understated 
(UD 2006:10). Similarly, some cracks in the coordination efforts start to appear. 
While SoS is responsible for coordinating the care-giving both abroad and on 
257
Chapter 7: The 2006 Lebanon Evacuation
the local and regional level in Sweden, there is a lingering assumption that it 
should responsible for the passenger lists, even though SEMA (temporarily) has 
taken over that responsibility. This message has apparently not gotten through 
to everyone (SoS 2006:11ff).
As responsibility for the passenger lists is transferred to SEMA and then to 
RPS, another crack in the system appears. Their respective systems have been 
designed to store and convey the information that the respective agencies need for 
their daily work; for example, place of residence, so the right local and regional 
actors can be contacted and coordinated, and various biometric information 
so their identity can be checked and confirmed. However, to fulfil the needs of 
SoS, both at the national level and at the reception areas in Cyprus and Syria, 
information related to the health of the prospective patient is of key importance. 
This information is recorded by their observers and medical teams, but is lost 
in transmission as there is no way to record it in the other agencies’ systems. 
Similarly, back at the UD call centre, the routines for registering information 
about individuals who might be trapped in the war zone is still largely paper 
based, just like during the tsunami, and a second-tier team is fully employed with 
transferring this data from paper form into a shared database, causing delays and 
additional opportunities for errors (SoS 2006:14ff, 18ff; Kulling & Sigurdsson 
2008:61ff; UD 2006:18ff).
Nevertheless, the measures in place seem to be working, and Tuesday, July 
18 continues much as the day before as far as the Swedish efforts are concerned. 
The effort to quickly secure sea transportation has paid off as far as not needing 
to rely all that much on other countries for mass evacuation, but that work is 
still limited to Beirut – other areas in southern Lebanon now prove to be more 
troublesome. Fortunately, a deal is made and the Danish and Norwegian efforts 
in the care are utilised to bring people out of the southern areas, and on July 
19th, another group is bused to safety (UD 2006:11). At the same time, the 
high-capacity sea lines of communication and the reinforcements arriving at the 
Beirut successfully reduced the workload at the consulate to manageable levels 
as evacuees are now beginning to arrive in Cyprus en masse.
Meanwhile, and perhaps as a consequence of these efforts, the initially very 
critical media narrative starts to turn. The foreign minister makes several appear-
ances to soberly assess the situation and explain why things have happened the 
way they have so far (cf. SvD 2006-07-17, 2006-07-18; TT 2006-07-17; DN 
2006-07-19; GP 2006-07-20; Aftonbladet 2006-07-22). Editorial pieces start 
appearing with the suggestion that, maybe he cannot be blamed for a situation 
that is rooted in half-decade old decisions, and that, on the whole, he is taking a 
very hands-on approach to the situation and is seen as wanting to address some 
of the more critical gaps and vulnerabilities that have been exposed during the 
last couple of days. The criticism is rather pushed downwards, towards to the 
operative level and to the organisations dealing with the practicalities of the 
evacuation. While it now seems relatively easy to get people out of the war zone, 
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at least when considering the inherent chaos and danger that such a situation 
entails, the problem is instead in the evacuation centres and in carrying out the 
final leg bound back to Sweden. These centres are not situated in a war zone, but 
are nevertheless chaotic, and many evacuees report that they feel stranded in a 
limbo where they have no idea what (and when) will happen next (cf. Aftonbladet 
2006-07-19; .Helsignborgs Dagblad 2006-07-19; ÖP 2006-07-19).
Over the next couple of days, some 4,000 individuals pass through on their way 
home (SoS 2006:29ff; Kulling & Sigurdsson 2008:15f, 17f, 70ff; UD 2006:10f ). 
However, reports are filtering back to SoS that some of the later arrivals at the 
Swedish airports are much worse off than they were at the beginning of the crisis. 
The question of activating SNAM is raised again, but the assessment is still that 
the need is not really there. Instead, it is suggested that only the nurses attached 
to the program are called in to accompany the evacuees on the final flight home. 
This would allow them to administer light care, to assess the conditions of the 
evacuees in more detail, and to perform some limited triage in preparation for the 
landing, should any special needs become apparent. Additionally, this measure 
would help circumvent the issue of medical information not surviving intact as 
it passes through the IT systems set up to catalogue evacuees.
As with many of the initial questions in the tsunami case, the issue with 
activating anything related to SNAM is simply one of financing. The staff is 
selected and commissioned by SoS – that is the agency’s overall role in the 
SNAM function – but the current mission is headed by SRSA on a UD mandate. 
SoS receives its funding from the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs; SRSA 
sorts under the Ministry of Defence; and UD is yet a third ministry that just 
happens to have existing mechanisms for sending funds SRSA’s way. This time, 
however, the need for expedience is better understood, and the inter-agency and 
inter-ministry co-operation has been given more leeway. Consequently, there is 
more trust that it will all be sorted out in the end so the matter is resolved within 
a couple of hours. That evening, eight nurses are flown down to the reception 
areas in Cyprus and Syria, and they are followed by two more the next morning 
(Kulling & Sigurdsson 2008:18, 53ff). In the end, the SNAM mechanism is only 
used to select and call in qualified personnel to the region, either to monitor 
and triage evacuees as they arrive at the harbours, bus stops, and airports that 
will take them out of the war zone, or to provide assistance on flights headed 
for Sweden. Initially intended as a full-service air medevac service, the system 
proves to offer enough flexibility to allow for a more customised rapid response 
to the particular needs of this situation (Kulling & Sigurdsson 2008:78). Similar 
flexibility is exhibited by UD in a decision to grant temporary Swedish passports 
to any foreign nationals with Swedish residence permits but who lacked travel 
papers, so as to expedite – or even bypass – any regular bureaucratic wrangling 
of such issues. The focus is to afford people who are allowed to go to Sweden to 
get to safety there as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, the air transport chain back 
to Sweden is now up and running, making some 20 flights between July 19 and 
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July 23, with a near-constant stream going from the harbour to collection points 
in the area and then onwards to the airport at Larnaca. Here, the frustration 
starts to mounts among the evacuees since almost a thousand of them have to 
be shepherded through the process each day, at times only aided by as few as 
four or five SRSA staffers (SoS 2006:32ff; Kulling & Sigurdsson 2008:17f, 40).
By June 20, the land war has started in earnest in southern Lebanon, and at 
the same time, the last ship sails from Beirut. By now, some 5,000 individuals 
have been evacuated – five times the original estimate – and more are known 
to be trapped in the southern region. The Beirut UN office is evacuated by ship 
the same day, and some 80 more Swedes are allowed on board. More and more, 
other means of transportation have to be arranged, often in cooperation with 
other EU nations (UD 2006:11).
On the 21st, another bus convoy arranged by the Danish government is used 
to get Swedes out of the southern region, and the number of individuals showing 
up at the reception points in Beirut and Damascus starts to drop off considerably. 
The bus transports previously procured to take people to Aleppo and to the ships 
in the harbour are decommissioned on July 23. Evacuations made after that are 
either done using other nations’ transports, or are arranged privately. In addition 
to the drastically lower volume of evacuees, the teams in place at the reception areas 
have new established working routines for new arrivals, which further reduces 
the workload. Consequently, the reinforcement and support teams are slowly 
being scaled back (UD 2006:11f ). At the same time, the narrative of the crisis 
management is almost completely turned around. Even the more critical news 
outlets now start to describe the evacuation as a success, all things considered, 
and that while there may have been problems and struggles on an individual 
level, the government effort appears to have made marked improvement over 
what happened in 2004. Unlike then, the political message has been one of 
acknowledging problems and trying to fix them, as opposed to the blame-shifting 
and avoidance that marked the tsunami from day one.
7.2.3 Success (?)
The last meeting of the rapid response team is held on July 31, and several of 
the reception teams are dismantled the week earlier. While the evacuees keep 
coming until the cease-fire takes effect in mid-August, it is more of a slow drip 
than a constant stream, and can be dealt with by the regular staff detachment 
and in accordance with these new routines. As the war comes to an end, the 
daily workload at the consulate leans more and more towards Lebanese citizens 
looking to acquire visas or asylum in Sweden. In total, some 8,400 individuals 
are evacuated from the region over the scant month the conflict has lasted (UD 
2006:12).
The public story of the crisis is still somewhat split. The evacuees themselves 
still express the same points of criticism as they did from the very start, similar 
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to what was said during the tsunami, but the political commentators instead 
look at the mechanisms involved in the whole operation and highlight numerous 
improvements in form and function.
The government agencies and ministries, and UD in particular, offer up 
a much more unified positive image of what had happened. Information was 
shared, issues were addressed, pragmatism overruled formal correctness, and 
timely decisions were made that secured critical assets and competences at an 
early stage. As the political commentary turn its way, the government rolls out 
a message of improvement and success. This is redemption for, and genuine 
learning from, the tsunami failure. Dissenting opinions are offered by other – 
mainly non-governmental – organisations that were on the ground, who describe 
the agencies’ activities as confused, unfocused, at times even unprofessional (cf. 
DN 2006-08-12; UD 2006:4f, 13ff; Murray 2011:137). However, the surviving 
larger narrative remains that of a successful bit of crisis management and national 
cooperation. 
7.3 Aftermath
In spite of this reported success and the many new means and methods of coop-
eration that the episode created, less than half of the main actors involved were 
around for very long after the evacuation. The incumbent left-wing government 
was still encumbered by the tsunami failure and the political storm that ensued. 
The Lebanon evacuation may have restored some faith in the system, but the 
general election in the autumn of 2006 still handed power over to a right-wing 
coalition. Soon after coming into office, the wounds of the tsunami were once 
more ripped open as the existence of the so-called “tsunami tapes” was revealed: 
backup tapes of data traffic on the proceedings during the crisis that had been 
assumed lost and could shed light on some of the remaining controversies regarding 
who knew what, and when, during the first few days of the crisis (Hirschfeldt 
et al. 2007). The Disaster Commission was reconvened to study this material and 
potentially change its conclusions. While the main thrust of the report remained 
the same after some adjustments, additional criticism was levelled against the 
upper echelon at UD for being even less prepared and in the know than had 
previously been assumed.
The two events demonstrated the close relatedness between the agencies 
SEMA and SRSA, and since two weeks before the Lebanon war, a report had 
been in the works that would later go on to suggest that the two agencies merge, 
along with the tiny National Board for Psychological Defence, into a new agency 
geared more towards actual crisis management (Fö 2006a, b). This new joint 
agency – the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) – became a reality on 
January 1, 2009.
Hoping to improve the flow of information between the ministries and 
between the central government and the national agencies, the new government 
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also took to heart the idea from the Disaster Commission Report to create a crisis 
coordination function within the Government Offices, sorting directly under 
the Prime Minister’s Office (Regeringskansliet 2006:29f; Salomonson 2007). In 
many ways, this was envisioned as a complement to – maybe even a replacement 
for – the multi-agency rapid response team constructed at the ministry level, 
especially when combined with the information and expertise that MSB was 
meant to provide.
 A curious late addendum arrived almost three years later in the form of the 
Swedish TV docu-drama “Diplomaterna” (The Diplomats). Green-lit by UD in 
2005 and shown during the spring of 2009, the series followed a diplomat in 
Abu Dabi who, in one of the episodes, quite accidentally became a coordinator 
for the evacuation effort. The Lebanon-focused episode reignited the criticism 
levelled against the evacuation, as it showed scenes of confusion, chaos, and 
general unpreparedness among the UD staff. Missing equipment, a general lack 
of understanding of the mission, and an overall inexperience of working with 
Swedish citizens as opposed to foreign dignitaries was broadcast on prime time, 
alongside images of the staffers and diplomats enjoying what looked more like 
an extended vacation with cocktail parties and lounging on sandy beaches. UD 
was also accused of trying to use its editorial influence to pretty up the events of 
the episode through the addition of information cards telling the now-standard 
narrative of success, although ultimately, the producers decided against any such 
alterations (cf. SvD 2009-01-23; DN 2009-03-03). Nevertheless, there is a rift 
between the glamour of international relations on one hand, and the operational 
chaos of dealing with the consular woes of the regular citizen on the other – an 
image that found a receptive audience among the viewers, and which briefly 
forces UD to once again go into image maintenance mode to explain that they 
are indeed there to serve the individual as well as the nation.
7.4 Analysis
The Lebanon evacuation is a curious – almost self-contradictory – case of pro-
longed rapid response. Since it involved pretty much exactly the same organisa-
tions, and in many cases the exact same individuals, and a fairly similar type of 
crisis as the tsunami case, it should offer the same kind of complex and intertwined 
interactions between the various agencies. However, a lot had changed in the year 
and a half that separate the two events. Deliberate measures had been taken to 
disentangle the complexities that caused so many problems in 2004. In particular, 
a genuine attempt was made to streamline and coordinate the decision-making 
processes in the various agencies involved, and to try to focus on solving the 
issue at hand rather than whose issue it was to solve.
It may at first seem strange to say that a war is the same type of crisis as a 
natural disaster, but it is reiterating that neither the war nor the tsunami were crises 
for the actors involved in and of themselves – at least not on the organisational 
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level of analysis chosen for this study. Rather, the crisis in both cases was one 
of getting Swedish nationals out of harm’s way as quickly as possible when they 
were stuck in a foreign country. The issue was also one of understanding and 
coordinating the capabilities of dozens of actors on all levels of government, 
and some in the private sector, from within the (still) small offices of an offbeat 
department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some of those issues may have 
been resolved through sheer experience and learning, but as we shall see, those 
effects are largely short-circuited by the solution chosen by the principal actors 
in the story.
At the same time, there is a lot in the scenario to contradict the supposed 
success story that the Lebanon evacuation is often presented as. While the 
system as a whole may have worked better – and this, too, will be a matter for 
later discussion – some of the individual parts seem to have performed worse. 
The most immediate example is the initial estimate of the scope of the crisis: the 
on-duty desk officer who received the first reports of the tsunami was off in her 
estimates of how many might be affected by maybe 10%, and later estimates of 
the workload UD would have to suffer were about as accurate. The problem was 
that these estimates never reached the decision-makers who could have reacted 
to this huge number. By comparison, the first estimates of how many would 
be affected by the Lebanon war were off by a whopping 750%. The estimate 
still suggested that a large problem was at hand, and it was quickly heard by the 
necessary decision-makers who reacted appropriately, but the estimate was still 
almost an order of magnitude wrong. As luck would have it, one of those early 
decisions was to procure as much logistical capacity as possible, which neatly 
ended up nullifying that misjudgement.
A less immediate, but far more obvious example, as was noted at the time, 
was that the “early” judgement still came pretty late. The tsunami happened early 
on a Sunday morning during Christmas, in a completely different time zone; 
by Monday – the very next day – decisions were made and mission plans drawn 
up; by Tuesday, teams were in the air and Swedes started returning home. All 
this after a sudden and unforeseen event at perhaps the most inopportune time 
imaginable. In comparison, the hostilities along the Lebanese-Israeli border had 
become a predictable seasonal affair, and while it may have in the middle of the 
Swedish summer vacation, the war started on a regular Wednesday. Even with 
that forewarning, with an observer team accidentally already in place, and with 
staff even more accidentally on location at the centre of things, it still took two 
days from the start of the war until any real decision-making could take place. It 
then took two days more before the logistical machinery started to work. While 
no-one at UD really missed the war starting, the issue it would grow into only 
became clear as the telephones started ringing off the hook – a situation very 
similar to how the tsunami crisis escalated in its early stages. So where is the 
improvement and success?
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7.4.1 Organisational context
The first place to look is in the newly established structures for reporting and 
sharing information, and also in a new-found willingness to initiate action. 
That is not to say that the boundaries of old had been razed, but rather that 
they were a bit more flexible than before. The close cooperation between SRSA 
and SoS through their assessment units already offers a short-cut between the 
two very different ministries they report to, and while UD is initially outside of 
that particular loop, its inner, inter-departmental communication had improved 
considerably, again short-circuiting a barrier for coordination that existed during 
the previous crisis. As this structure was put into place explicitly to be expanded 
and to include other agencies, it is not surprising that these two loops soon are 
intertwined, and that information is shared more readily.
Here, we can note the first lesson learned: that issue ownership was not a 
hard and fast rule. That is, UD-KC should not necessarily have the only say in 
all consular matters, at least not the ones that involve other agencies. Since it 
was largely unaware of the capabilities of those other organisations (for instance 
the SRSA), decisions that involved the deployment of those agencies needed to 
be made in collaboration with other departments that better understood exactly 
how, and in what capacity, the agencies could best be deployed. For their part, 
the close connection between SRSA and SoS meant that, even if SRSA had not 
been directly approached, it would have become involved the very moment SoS 
got into contact with UD or vice versa, which happened at a very early stage. 
So the need to include others in the decision-making process would necessarily 
require a process that allowed for yet more parties to get involved, quite unlike 
the insular and narrow-focused decision-making that was present during the 
tsunami crisis.
The main question here, then, is whether this can qualify as a significant 
cultural change at UD, or whether it is more in the nature of the burgeoning 
crisis and how it triggers memories of a very similar situation during the tsunami 
crisis. If it is the former, then some deeper learning has taken place, and we can 
expect the ease of including various external actors to continue. If it is the latter, 
then it is more a matter of the type of analogous cognitive processes described 
by Khong (1992), with all the potential pitfalls this entails. Unfortunately, the 
material is not extensive or detailed enough to allow for a definitive answer 
on this question. For our purposes, however, it suffices to note that an arena 
of interaction has sprung up within the organisation, where the exchange of 
knowledge can take place.
A more distinct and marked improvement over the handling of the tsunami 
is how the organisations involved seem a lot more comfortable in yielding 
responsibility to better suited actors. During the tsunami, we saw UD-KC and 
RKP compete over who would ultimately manage the lists of identified indi-
viduals, whereas in the Lebanon case, UD delegated all such matters. At first, it 
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goes to SoS, because of its natural connection to the county-based health care 
system, then it is passed to SEMA, because of their more encompassing role as 
information coordinators in the larger crisis management system, and finally it 
ends up at RPS, because it does the same thing, only more organically. Granted, 
there are some kinks in the system. This rapid passing of the torch makes other 
actors lose track of who is actually responsible for maintaining the passenger lists 
until SEMA takes it on as one of its information coordination tasks. Another 
issue is the inadvertent loss of information that simply does not fit into the 
database schema employed the RPS. It may be argued whether this is more a 
case of yielding or of dodging responsibility, especially with the initial fiasco of 
the tsunami identified persons lists, but I would argue that if it were a case of 
trying to dodge responsibilities, we would have seen the baton being passed on 
more times than this, and we would also not have seen SoS make later measures 
to supplement the information flow with its own information feed to the health 
care actors. In a sense, SoS ended up doing exactly what it intended to do at 
the very beginning, but without the effort of actually collecting all the personal 
information. Instead, it could leave that part in the hands of the identification 
expertise of RPS, and concentrate on adding its own medicine-specific knowledge 
wherever it was needed.
7.4.2 The nature of the crisis
As mentioned earlier, the Lebanon evacuation is in many ways very similar to 
the tsunami a year and a half earlier: the same actors are involved in solving the 
same kind of problem – the transportation and care of thousands of Swedes 
caught in a disaster abroad – while under intense political and public pressure. 
While the cast of characters has been expanded for the case description, the actor 
chosen remains UD, not just because it offers a straighter point of comparison 
between the cases, but because it is still at the centre of the kinds of structures 
that are of interest for this study. The tsunami had been a crisis, not just for the 
top political level, but for the organisation as a whole, and it exposed a number 
of deficiencies in how the ministry went about its business. Irrespective of the 
changes at the top, Lebanon became a second test for that same organisation – 
the question was to what extent it was still the same after the reorganisation and 
optimisations that had happened during the preceding year.
As discussed in Chapter 3, however, the nature of the material and of the 
crisis itself is such that the balance of the narrative does not follow this central 
actor as closely as the material on the tsunami. As expected, in a success story 
everyone talks about their own accomplishments; in a failure, the scapegoat – 
whether the title is deserved or not – gets all the attention. Even so, the scattered 
sources offer enough insight to discuss the key issues at stake for this analysis.
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Time pressure
Unlike the tsunami case, the time pressure in the evacuation is more of a classic 
ticking-clock scenario. The Swedes in the region are caught in the middle of 
an escalating war, and the longer they remained there, the worse the odds that 
they will end up injured, wounded, or killed. On top of this, there is also a time 
pressure that directly echoes the pressure the government was under during 
the tsunami: being able to provide the service expected by the Swedish citizens 
from their government. This aspect comes with the added twist of being directly 
comparable against the events of 2004, and the is expectation that matters 
should have improved since then. The actual services demanded were much 
the same: information about the situation, information about how to get out, 
and the purely practical matter of finding an actual way out of the region. A 
final twist was the fact that there was a potential for competition over resources. 
Unlike in South-east Asia, where in spite of the devastation, it was reasonably 
easy to actually get air transport to the location and fly people out (meaning the 
transport capacity could potentially be sourced almost from anywhere around 
the world), the options available in Lebanon were much more limited. Not only 
was the threat still very much active, but the expedient solution of direct air 
lifting was completely out of the question. While not as directly under threat, 
trains relied on static and sensitive infrastructure that itself became a target on 
both sides of the conflict. That left boats and road transport, neither of which 
is quickly sourced nor entirely safe unless security guarantees could be obtained 
from the belligerents.
At the same time, the time pressure really should be a lot lower due to the 
nature of the underlying threat: the Shebaa Farms conflict had become a regular 
occurrence for the last six years, so while it may have come as a surprise that it 
would flare up into a full-blown war, some preventive measures could have been 
taken to ensure that travellers in this particular region at this time of year had 
some extra backup. In a way, UD had “solved” this issue already long before the 
tsunami, and even more vocally afterwards in the explicit policies and laws governing 
travellers’ right and obligations when they venture into unstable regions. It is in 
large part their legal responsibility to have a backup plan of things heat up. Thus, 
the time pressure release that might have come from having made arrangements 
beforehand was largely beyond the ministry’s control.
Even so, it is telling that the very earliest efforts were focused on procuring 
means of transportation in and out of the region, even if unconventional methods 
had to be used. Even though he got help from the embassy in Damascus, the 
fact that a desk officer who happened to be at the centre of things was given 
very free reigns to procure and coordinate some kind of transport highlights the 
perceived importance of solving this issue as soon as possible. Some of this may 
be due to the relatively late start in getting a response going – the ministry was 
already behind the curve, trying to catch up. It is also telling that a pattern from 
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the tsunami repeats itself here: both times, the ministry weighs a timely response 
against an informed response. In Thailand, it takes the ambassador’s eye-witness 
report to really set things in motion; in Lebanon, it takes the desk officer’s report 
from the half-beleaguered city to set everyone’s priorities straight. However, once 
that situational picture is established, there is considerable swiftness thereafter. 
Ships and buses are procured, and guarantees for their safe passage are arranged 
from parties who really have more pressing issues at hand.
In the aftermath, both the criticism and the praise is well-founded. It took 
longer for the Swedish government to act, but once they acted, they did so more 
efficiently than many others. Actual safe delivery of the stranded individuals takes 
precedence over a speedy one, even if this means drawing down additional crit-
icism for seemingly just as slow as last time, or maybe even slower. At the same 
time, great expedience and speed is afforded the attempts to improve the local 
presence, which again becomes a double-edged sword. On the one hand, this 
means the many contingents can aid in solving the uncertainty issue earlier, but 
on the other hand, some of the personnel may not have been fully briefed or not 
up to the task at hand. It should be noted that a consistent theme in the reports 
on the evacuation is that SRSA’s fortuitous early presence gave them a head start 
on evaluating the situation. SoS comes a close second due to its analysts being 
hooked directly into the SRSA observation effort. UD’s fondness for accounts 
from trusted sources – that is, UD personnel – on the ground means that while 
it had access to both SRSA’s and SoS’ information from an early stage, it was not 
enough on its own to act on other than to approve the agencies’ closer observation 
of the situation. The first request to the two agencies also mainly entails support 
for these observation efforts. Only as more trusted reports come in describing 
the critical condition is a decision made to actually make use of agency-specific 
expertise, notably medical staff to care for evacuees, police personnel to deal 
with identification and customs issues, and SRSA personnel for logistical and 
technical issues. Not until SEMA enters the scene are any of the agencies really 
trusted with observation and information sharing, even though observation in 
particular, is a forte of both SRSA and SoS.
At any rate, there is no doubt that there are multiple time pressures at play 
for UD, and that it mainly becomes a matter of priority in which pressures are 
more important to resolve first. Establishing a reliable situational picture comes 
very near the top.
Uncertainty
The fact that situational awareness is such a top priority suggests that uncertainty is 
the one factor UD abhors the most, yet feels there is a lot of. The actual under standing 
of the war, the geography, the political arena the root causes to the escalation is 
encapsulated in an entire department dedicated to the region. Instead, it is once 
again the more practical, operational matters that stump the ministry. How many 
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Swedish nationals are in the region? What means of transportation are available? 
Where is everyone going? How can we establish secure lines of travel and com-
munication? What is everyone else doing, and how does that affect our options? 
Together these present more ambiguity regarding potential outcomes than the 
outright uncertainty about what is actually going on – wars and evacuations are 
known, if unpredictable, entities. The fact that the event itself is a known entity 
and that practical and process matters are the main source of uncertainty means 
that there are no immediate identification paradoxes at play. We would have to 
dig a bit deeper and unduly stretch the concept to really find one.
One point of uncertainty that caused numerous headaches during the tsunami 
is dealt with very early on and then treated as more of a nuisance than an abso-
lute hindrance: financing. Almost from the very start, the government approves 
additional financing to deal with the evacuation, which certainly provides a 
comforting buffer for future wranglings. Figuring out exactly who will pay what 
takes a second seat to having the right people actually approve the planned cause 
of action – since the money is there already, the exact details can be figured out 
later. A similar source of uncertainty that seems to have been left by the wayside 
is the distrust in other organisations’ practices and methods that was present 
during the tsunami. It turned out that UD was not the only one who knew 
what it was doing and who might even be allowed to continue to do its thing. 
This conclusion may have been further buttressed by the steps towards a more 
inclusive atmosphere inside UD, where it was no longer quite as necessary to 
be in a competition for status with the other departments. The establishment of 
both the rapid response teams and the disaster readiness teams point towards a 
blooming realisation that all the subject-matter expertise at the ministry works best 
in some kind of synergy or larger context provided by some other subject matter.
However, while those are marked improvements, they are significantly 
counter-balanced by the massive misestimation of the scope of the operation. 
Unfortunately, the material offers no deeper insight into the reasons behind 
this mistake. It could just be that tourists are easier to track and that their travel 
data is fairly trivially collected from industry sources, whereas trips to Lebanon 
happen for different reasons that do not leave as big of a mark in the databases. 
At the same time, it is perhaps not entirely accurate to label this as uncertainty or 
ambiguity. After all, they had an answer, and thus the uncertainty was resolved. 
Just because the answer turned out to be wrong does not mean it did not exist. 
At a stretch, the estimate might be considered a mild identification paradox: 
the ministry was not aware that it should perhaps look more closely into how 
many individuals they it be expected to help, but the core feature of the paradox 
is that one does not even know that a question exists to be asked. Here, it was 
accurately identified as a key issue; the question was known and it was asked, 
and while it did not receive the best of answers, it was still something they could 
work with, plan from, and expand on as time went by. As new information came 
in, the estimate was revised, but even then, the uncertainty lay more with the 
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consequences of this re-evaluation than with the number itself. Once transports 
had been secured, the decision was rather to go “by gut feeling” than to worry 
about if the number was right or not. If more people showed up, then they could 
be transported at a decent rate too; if fewer did, the operation could slowly be 
scaled back. So while there may have been some ambiguity of choice, it does 
not seem to have been one that induces the complexities, conflicts, or trade-offs 
that are the hallmark of the uncertainty-as-analytical-term in the crisis definition. 
Much like how the FBI chose not to make time a factor in Montana, it seems 
that – at least on this particular point – UD chose not to make precise estimates 
of evacuees a cause for stress.
Nevertheless, and as repeatedly noted in the analysis of time pressure, there 
is a fairly clear attempt from the ministry to resolve the inherent crisis conflict 
triangle by trading away time to lessen ambiguity. While this would have been 
an easy choice if there were no real time pressures to begin with, we have already 
seen that this is not the case. Instead, a better understanding of the situation 
is simply a higher valued commodity than time – a slightly delayed action is 
the lesser evil. That is not to say that this is the only way that particular trade 
happens, only that it is the general trend. With the decision to give the Beirut 
and Damascus stations free hands to try to sort something out, in spite of the 
consulate only really being staffed by a regular desk officer as its one proper UD 
representative, they chose to introduce a fair amount of risk and uncertainty into 
the proceedings rather than to wait until the station staff could receive proper 
reinforcements. Some of this can certainly be explained by the fact that waiting 
would itself introduce risks and uncertainties. At the time, there was no telling 
when – if at all – the Beirut consulate could be reached from the outside, and 
there was a definite risk that the station would be lost and thus of no use at all if 
they waited for a better time. So instead, UD played the hand it was dealt since, 
while it was perhaps a bit of a gamble, it still offered more knowns than what 
the next day might bring.
So it is beyond question that uncertainties and ambiguities existed. They 
were prime targets for swift resolution, but they could not be fully opted out of 
or ignored – only prioritised and weighed against other options.
Critical values at stake
A complicating factor in all of this is that time and expedience were in and of 
themselves components in the values at stake. Due to the similarity of circum-
stances, the actual values at stake within the various UD departments are almost 
blueprint copies of what we saw in the tsunami, but the fact that the tsunami 
had happened added an additional layer on top of this. Now the ministry as a 
whole critically needs to convey that it can actually work as a whole rather than 
as a collection of disparate entities. Perhaps more than the individual wants and 
needs of the departments, what was at stake this time was the reputation of the 
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ministry itself, and each department simply must perform better towards its 
“customers” this time around.
Exactly who the recipient is for each of the departments has not changed much. 
For UD-KC, it is the Swedes stranded in the region; for UD-GS, it is largely the 
other agencies and ministries, in Sweden and abroad; and for the department 
of this geographic region – the Middle East and North Africa (UD-MENA), as 
opposed to UD-ASO in the tsunami case – it is the actual belligerents. This time, 
they are all in the public eye, which at the same time makes the press office less 
of a shield to effectively hide behind, but also demands that the office will have 
a lot more to do in providing an accurate picture of what is being done.
A small factor of relief is that since the event is an escalating war rather than a 
natural disaster, there is less of a conflict between projecting the image of Sweden 
as a supplier of aid to other nations and the need to help its own citizens. At a 
later stage, there might be a call for Swedish support for UN interventions or for 
post-war activities such as mine-clearing, but while the conflict is hot, sending 
direct humanitarian aid is not a top priority. This helps focusing on the task 
UD has ahead of it, across all departments. In the short term, it is very clearly 
about aiding Swedish citizens. In the mid- and long term, depending on the 
events and outcomes of the conflict, more classic foreign aid might be needed, 
but that will be a question for the future and by then, the matter of providing 
aid to Swedes will hopefully have been fully resolved. Thus, it rather becomes a 
question of proving that the newly instated support and response mechanisms 
work and are effectived.
In the end, the heart of the matter is still one of preserving – or perhaps of 
restoring – the ministry’s self-image after the battering it took during the tsunami 
crisis. The newly replaced foreign minister position helps a little in offering a 
fresh start as far as high-level decision-making goes, but the ministry is still its 
own separate bureaucratic organisation with its own history and prestige, all 
detached from whatever minister is temporary in the top seat. It was imperative 
to show that UD is actually capable of taking the lead in this kind of situation, 
and to coordinate the numerous national and international actors involved, and 
not have the whole thing collapse within a week. But it is important to once 
again note exactly what part of this image took the fore-front. As mentioned, 
expedience and speed were crucial components in the criticism that had been 
levelled against the government, including UD, during and after the tsunami. 
However, that criticism was more focused on a handful of key decision-makers 
than on the organisation as a whole. From the ministry’s perspective, the blame 
for the delays can pretty universally be shifted onto others (although they may 
not always agree). When the Lebanon situation arose, restoring the self-image, 
at least internally, meant to do things right – expediently, yes, but doing them 
right and ensuring good outcomes was a higher priority. Function was a more 
critical value than speed. But more than that, this time, though, function and 
“doing it right” was not analogous to following proper procedure. A good out-
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come was valued higher than strict adherence to routines and regulations. No 
laws should be broken, of course, but mere policy and tradition were not good 
enough reasons to avoid a workable solution. Luckily, as with the chosen solution 
for manning the Beirut consulate, this new flexible attitude also happened to 
save a fair amount of time.
As previously mentioned, some of this confidence is no doubt borne from 
the fact that the ever-pressing matter of funding was sorted out at a very early 
stage, leaving the question of who should pay for what as a matter of accounting 
to be sorted at a less stressful point in time in the future. The prime example of 
this is the issue of figuring out how to deploy the SNAM nurses. What might 
otherwise have been a drawn-out haggling session between four agencies and 
three ministries was compressed into convincing everyone that the money was 
there; the services would be paid for; and if everyone just signed at the dotted line, 
the more time-critical matter of getting the nurses in the air could be resolved 
immediately, and the administrative details could be straightened out later.
So while there is once again no doubt that critical values were at stake, it was 
also fairly clear how these values were prioritised. The key issue was repairing the 
ministry’s image by managing to solve the problem of getting people home. The 
exact formalities of this solution were less important than the end result, and 
while it may have stung to be lambasted for being even slower than during the 
tsunami, avoiding mistakes took priority over doing things quickly, unless not 
acting quickly meant risking an opportunity that could be lost. There was also a 
distinct lack of clashing values between the different departments and between 
the different actors involved, which further helped in clarifying these priorities.
All in all, the evacuation definitely represented a crisis for UD, but it ended 
up being a fairly mild one due to the clarity of the task at hand. It may not be the 
complete self-defined, non-crisis the FBI managed to chose in Montana, but it 
was also not the completely unknown and uncontrollable chaos of the tsunami. 
There was a clear time pressure, especially in terms of improving situational aware-
ness, but there was also a strongly sense of satisficing in the strategies adopted 
to get this awareness. UD had to wait to get some reliable information, but after 
that, “some” was enough. At most some criticism could be levelled against their 
perception of what it constituted ‘reliable’ information; the sense that only UD 
itself could really provide such information still lingered. Likewise, there were 
some clear points of uncertainty, or at least of ambiguity of choice, but there 
was also a definite order of priority between these ambiguities that kept them 
from causing a deadlock, and the highest priority was one that could be traded 
against time, which was available to a reasonable degree. Similarly, while there 
were clearly several values at stake, these too existed on a ladder of priority and 
while the time factor could have been a potential case for conflict, it was such 
a low priority that it did not cause the whole machinery to deadlock from 
wavering indecision.
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7.4.3 Anticipation of due process
In terms of anticipation, the Lebanon evacuation is a very different beast from 
the tsunami. The event itself was in some ways anticipated – the Shebaa Farms 
conflict had been brewing for years, and was always a potential powder keg 
waiting to be set off. The fact that the SRSA was already in Cyprus to monitor 
the situation more closely shows that it was not an sudden, wholly unpredictable 
affair. The degree to which it would affect Sweden, on the other hand, was more 
surprising, as is shown not just by the relatively slow response at UD, but by 
its failure to even remotely accurately estimate how many citizens were in the 
area. The war itself was obvious, and of some concern, but it was once again 
by means of getting inundated by phone calls that the ministry discovered that 
this would be another large-scale evacuation crisis. Here, though, experience 
shows its advantage. Setting aside all other changes, over the past year and a half, 
the fact that it was now faced with the same challenge of responding to a huge 
volume of consular cases, of figuring out a way to get everyone home safely, and 
of providing information for next of kin back in Sweden should in and of itself 
mean that the process that would ensue could be anticipated.
But more than that, the processes and procedures had just been given a 
thorough revision and refinement in an attempt to identify and fix the proce-
dural shortcomings the tsunami had unveiled. Much like for FBI after Waco, 
one of the more critical realisations was that some processes cannot – indeed 
should not – be anticipated, but rather be loosely guided by general principles 
aimed at achieving some end goal. Following the rules and procedures should 
not be a goal in and of itself in these kinds of dynamic situations since no rigid 
bureaucracy can ever be constructed to fully map out in strict processes all the 
kinds of problems that might arise when thousands of individuals need to be 
processed, in a war zone, in just a few days.
Instead, in learning from the tsunami, UD had adopted deliberately flexible 
aid functions that assumed from the get-go that its actual composition could 
not be known ahead of time. This meant that, while the every-day procedures 
at UD might still be fully at work within the confines of its own walls, it should 
always anticipate a need to collaborate with any number of other actors, and 
not even just governmental agencies, which will all have their own processes 
and procedures. In what might almost be seen as a Zen-like paradox, the min-
istry adopted a due process of anticipating that the due process could not be 
anticipated. That is not to say that it was all unknowable – for the most part, 
UD would work with other governmental agencies, in particular ones its had 
previously worked with, all of which shared the same fundamental administrative 
roots and traditions. UD also seemingly learned that the every-day processes for 
consular matters would require some modifications it order to also work when 
processing large volumes, but more than that, the ministry learned that it was 
not always necessarily UD’s job to do the processing to begin with. During the 
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tsunami, there was a week-long tug-of-war as to who would who would work 
on the processing, using what system, and for what purpose. In the Lebanon, 
case, a lot of the processing was decentralised and delegated to other agencies as 
long as there was no actual consular-affair issue that needed to be resolved. The 
ministry still had to act as one of the primary information hubs for the public as 
far as the state of the evacuation and the state of the war, but rather than trying 
to be the centre of everything, a lot of the information dissemination was handed 
over to SEMA. Similarly, the processing and distribution of evacuee lists was 
delegated to the RPS, and the reception, transportation, and similar logistical 
matters were in to a large extent handled by SRSA and SoS.
In other words, there seemed to be a new-found trust in the abilities of other 
agencies’ abilities to use their particular processes, and that any information that 
was needed could then be queried from them rather than having everything stored 
centrally at UD. While some issues certainly arose from this mix of methods and 
systems – notably the medical information that was lost in transmission – they 
were no worse than the haphazard chaos that grew out of the ministry’s attempt 
to do everything during the tsunami.
The willingness to step away from the regular hierarchies and decision-making 
processes was also made apparent by how the Beirut consulate matter and the 
financing was handled. While the former may have been a source for criticism 
from other actors – it turns out that there might be some sound foundation to 
the idea of seniority position and a professionally progression, all of which was 
bypassed by having a fairly junior desk officer be in charge, For the purposes of 
this study, it is a clear example of UD temporarily eschewing its regular, strictly 
hierarchical culture. The partial SNAM activation likewise showed a similar 
willing ness to get something going, and worrying about crossing the t:s and dot-
ting the i:s later, again going against the grain of the normally very bureaucratic 
culture at the ministry. At the same time, both instances demonstrate that this 
was not just the ministry playing fast and loose with the rules. The Beirut station 
was properly reinforced as soon as it was possible, and the exact details of the 
SNAM deal were ironed out during the following days. Both are instances of UD 
not shying away from an opportunity when it presented itself, yet still making 
sure that, in the end, something as close as possible to normalcy was maintained.
By introducing the new support and rapid response functions, the ministry 
had implicitly accepted that other organisational cultures were simply something 
they would have to deal with and that ambiguities would arise, but that this was 
not an unsolvable problem. There was a markedly higher trust in not just the 
collaborators and their competences, but in the collaboration process in and of 
itself, to the point where it had become a formalised ad-hoc structure that UD 
personnel must be aware of.
This means that almost all the deviations listed in Section 2.6 have been nulli-
fied before the fact, leaving little to no cause for any kind of “procedural surprise.” 
The type-7 deviation – a requirement to go through a generalist intermediary 
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– is not really applicable to this particular case, since the subject-matter that the 
ministry needed to communicate was well within its own field of competence. 
Had the subject of analysis been SoS rather than UD, however, a very clear 
example of this deviation would have been the use of the RPS IT systems and its 
inability to properly retain the medical data that the doctors and nurses in the 
field gathered. Even then, the parties involved fairly quickly found a solution to 
this problem, making any process issues short-lived and either way, this episode 
never directly affected UD. It is still worth bringing up, though, since the ministry 
was the coordinating authority that assembled the various agencies, and from 
that perspective, it offers a hint of the lack of understanding of the needs of those 
other parties. The ministry simply solved the issue by washing its hands of it by 
delegating the matter to SEMA and RPS to sort out to the best of their ability. 
In a bit of an ironic twist, this instance of indirectly causing process issues for 
other agencies ends up demonstrating a higher degree of procedural flexibility 
and lack of surprise on UD’s part. Overall, then, the changes made since the 
tsunami have, if not completely removed all kinds of procedural surprise, then 
at least significantly improved the ministry’s ability to anticipate and adapt to 
unknown processes that will come into play during a crisis.
7.4.4 Organisational closed-ness
As with the previous case, it tempting to look at the change in procedures, at 
the many unusual solutions employed by the ministry, or – in a meta-reading 
of the text – just at the fact that we have a before-and-after comparison of an 
organisation that has reformed itself following a crisis, and based on this start 
ticking the boxes for the open organisation. However, as before, this is still the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While tarnished, its image as a high-prestige organi-
sation dealing with the very formal world of international relations remains and 
this is indeed one of the factors motivating its behaviour during the crisis. So it is 
perhaps best to resist the temptation and instead consider how the organisation 
acted throughout the crisis. As mentioned in the previous chapter, though, we 
should perhaps not expect to be able to extrapolate too far from the unusual 
circumstances that a crisis entails – it is an inherently dynamic and unfamiliar 
situation, which will most likely create all kinds of odd solutions that may act as 
black swans in our attempt at categorising the organisational behaviour.
Guiding principle
When we look back at the highlights of the case with a mind towards discovering 
the ministry’s guiding principles, this problem quickly becomes obvious. The 
narrative contains a number of instances where UD goes outside the normal 
order of business: the delegation of authority to SRSA and RPS; assigning junior 
staff to manage a consulate; and approving teams and missions without the usual 
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formality and adherence to hierarchy. The whole rapid response team concept in 
and of itself is centred on the idea that normal processes will not suffice in a crisis 
situation. With all that in mind, it is easy to think that this is an organisation 
that has embraced informality as its guiding principle.
However, drawing such a conclusion would be to gloss over the larger context 
of each of the individual incidents. Yes, tasks were handed off to other agencies, 
but it was largely done so based on the experience from the tsunami, which 
taught the ministry that these tasks, while ostensible related to the work done at 
UD-KC, are not what the department is really good at or at times even trained 
for. The other organisations had already established procedures for that type of 
work, whereas, in comparison, similar efforts at the ministry would need to be 
largely unscripted or improvised to cope with the anticipated volume of cases. 
It is almost the exact opposite of turning away from regulation. Instead, it is the 
ministry concedes that the regulations it usually adheres to are not actually fit 
for purpose in a crisis situation so sticking with them will inevitably mean that 
the regulations have to be abandoned at some point. Meanwhile, the regula-
tions of the other actors involved are not just fit for purpose but are specifically 
designed to deal with extraordinary circumstances. Thus, in temporarily adopting 
or incorporating those foreign, “crisis-hardened” regulations, UD can stay in 
a regulation-bound mode much longer and much more consistently. In fact, 
the situation becomes even more to regulation-bound this way – just not to the 
regulations that UD would normally apply.
For the consulate and expedited mission approval, it is important to note 
that these were very temporary measures, approved to cease an opportunity that 
might otherwise be lost, but that measures were taken to restore normal order 
and ensure that as the work continued to be done “by the book” as soon as pos-
sible. In a slightly longer perspective, the same phenomenon can be observed in 
how the offices in Damascus and Nicosia were reinforced. At first, all manners 
of additional support was needed from a wide range of agencies, but they were 
there to take the brunt of the initial shock wave and to establish working routines. 
It barely took a week before the flow of evacuees had lessened and the existing 
UD staff was up to speed on the routines, at which point the support effort was 
dismantled. Soon, it was a regular UD office doing regular UD work, albeit in a 
slightly irregular situation. Thus, the change was not one away from regulation, 
but more a pragmatic realisation that what was already in place would again be 
insufficient to handle the expected volume of cases.
A similar interpretation, writ large, also explains the rapid response and disaster 
readiness setup. Temporary set-ups are meant to deal with extraordinary circum-
stances, but these set-ups are themselves regulated. They, too, do not represent a step 
away from regulations, but a way to regulate how to handle the extraordinary. 
They are what Lindkvist et al. (2014) call “ad-hoc formal” structures – that is, 
a prepared temporary measure that is regulated in much the same way as any 
other organisational structure, and which is a known, but normally inactive 
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part of the regular structure. The ministry goes slightly beyond this particular 
terminology by allowing for a wide range of different compositions of actors, 
but that is more a matter of a flexible work flow than of lacking regulation. As 
before, this should probably not surprise us in the case of UD. Its mission, its 
area of expertise, and its age-old culture are all geared towards strict and formal 
regulation and organisational behaviour. Temporary solutions are just that: tem-
porary, not informal. At most, the rapid response structure may introduce a bit 
of informality between the different departments at the ministry compared to 
before or compared to how they work on an every-day basis, as does the intro-
duction of the on-call decision-making function, but the fact that these are still 
pre-planned and regulated functions means that, on the whole, the Ministry of 
Foreign affairs retains ‘regulation’ as its guiding principle.
Instrumental work flow
As already mentioned, the one thing the new crisis measures offer is a drastically 
increased flexibility in how work is handled, not just internal to the ministry, 
but in its relations with other ministries, agencies, local and regional authorities, 
and private-sector actors. Here, the fact that these measures turn out to be a part 
of an overarching regulatory mindset just strengthens the indication that this is 
now an accepted part of the organisational behaviour and not just an isolated 
anomaly. Yes, their use is limited to extraordinary circumstances, but that still 
means that the organisation intends to adapt according to circumstances, rather 
than to steadfastly stick to its regular structure and methods.
In particular, the ad-hoc structures allow for a more flexible work force to 
tackle a more dynamic and evolving situation; it allows for direct contact between 
actors that would normally not communicate to any greater extent; and it allows 
for a more flexible work schedule where task priorities are allowed to change over 
time, and where there is a better shared situational awareness. Here, more than 
in the case of the guiding principle, the anomalous decisions regarding staffing 
and financing point towards a truly open organisational mindset. Yes, everything 
should return to normal as soon as possible, but until then, abnormalities are 
accepted and the larger the gain, the larger the anomaly is allowed to be. It is 
also worth reiterating the point made in the previous chapter: just because any 
given course of action is rigid once it is enacted does not necessarily mean that 
the setup as a whole is rigid – it may just mean that there is really only one way 
of enacting that particular option, but that there is a great flexibility in exactly 
which option is chosen. There may be some hard-to-define boundary where a large 
number of prepared strategies are essentially just a part of a larger and still very 
rigid decision-making process, but this is a semantic question for another time.
Here, though, it is clear that the extraordinary crisis measures are there 
specifically to allow for “unscripted” and untried strategies, as long as they seem 
sane enough to work so we neatly avoid the definitional problem in the Lebanon 
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case. Whereas in the tsunami case, we saw the anomalies in how work was done 
as exactly that: anomalies, the introduction of the special crisis measures means 
that the anomalous has become part of the acceptable work-flow. Normalcy 
should eventually prevail, but it is counter-productive to try to force the issue 
before circumstances allow for it, so instead, affording everyone a more flexible 
approach to problem-solving is seen as taking advantage of what opportunities 
and temporary benefits can be achieved. Even so, it does not mean that the solu-
tions are chosen completely at a whim – the ministry’s choice to sacrifice a bit of 
time to get a clearer situational picture suggests that it still wants to at least be 
aware of what “solution space” is available. It is sometimes said that, in crises, a 
bad decision today is better than a good one tomorrow, but UD does not seem 
to fully subscribe to that saying. Rather, it seems to go by the logic that, before 
you make a bad decision today, see how bad it is in comparison with what else 
you can decide at the moment. It is not a total flexibility, but rather a flexibility 
tempered by a kind of information satisficing.
Unlike in the tsunami case, then, the distinction we had to struggle with as far 
as distinguishing true flexibility from rigid rules that simply were not applicable 
is no longer a problem. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has very kindly already 
made that distinction for us. Any normal rules that are applicable, are applied; 
for everything else, the new ad-hoc structures are there specifically to find flexible 
solutions and alternatives. Here, some minor tendency towards rigidity may be 
observed. The goal of these processes is to quickly find a routine to deal with the 
unforeseen problems that have come up. It is an attempt to still adhere to the 
administrative norms and to maintain an acceptable level of rule of law.
On the whole, this is the only real arguments that can be made to support 
the notion that the ministry falls into the rigid category, but it is a fairly weak 
one. It is more an indication of the established focus on regulations as a guiding 
principle, or maybe of consistency as a preferred outcome, not on rigid adherence 
to those regulations. The solutions are still temporary – adapted for the specific 
moment – and therefore cannot really be considered as a type of rigidity. At 
most it turns into a semantic argument over what constitutes normalcy – that 
is, to a state of affairs where rigidity can be maintained – and how much effort 
is put into returning to that state, but in the end, every larger decision made in 
relation to the rapid response and disaster readiness teams is one of finding a 
flexible solution to a new problem using every tool at the disposal of these teams.
The mere fact that a decision was made to institute these teams is almost 
enough on its own to reject a ‘rigidity’ classification. It also implicitly gets rid of 
the “someone else’s problem” mode of thinking that plagued the tsunami case, 
since it is the response team’s shared responsibility to figure out solutions, and 
everyone is in it together. Thus the flexibility in joining up may be somewhat 
forced, but again that does nullify the fact that the flexibility is there – it may be 
less flexible than it would be if everyone felt fully invested in the affair, but that 
is just a difference in degrees, not a complete reversal into rigidity. 
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With the caveat that these are measures solely meant to be employed under 
extraordinary circumstances, then, everything points to ‘flexibility’ as being the 
instrumental work flow for the ministry during the Lebanon evacuation, and 
the caveat is itself rather an argument in favour of this label. A rigid organisation 
would not have implemented such special-case measures but would have struggled 
to the end to keep doing things the way it had always done them.
Preferred outcome
We have already touched on one indication that consistency is the preferred 
outcome for UD. This should perhaps not surprise us since it is part of the 
bureaucratic and administrative tradition of not just the ministry but of the entire 
Swedish model for government agencies and indeed with the fundamental idea of 
rule of law. Agencies should always strive to be consistent in their interpretation 
and implementation of laws and instructions. In truth, very little has changed 
on this point since the tsunami. The means of getting to that outcome may have 
been afforded a bit more freedom, but at the end of the day, there is very little in 
the case to support the notion that the assessments and outcomes should differ 
from one detachment or office to the next, or that judgements should be much 
different than they normally would.
It is only in this distinction between crisis and normalcy that we may find 
any indication of wanting to adjust the outcome. On the whole, it is supposed 
to be the individual’s personal responsibility to ensure their safety and ability to 
travel. UD-KC issues travel advisories to help people avoid volatile areas where 
they may get into sticky situations, Technically speaking, there is no obligation 
to actually evacuate anyone from a dangerous area, but in practice, this is not a 
politically tenable position. Thus, an argument could be made that the evacuation 
as a whole represents a kind of dynamic outcome, but such a conclusion falls 
afoul of three key words: “as a whole.” The response was actually consistently 
applied to everyone who was affected. Likewise, the one large decision made to 
make an exception to standard procedures and afford anyone with a Swedish 
residence permit a temporary passport to simplify the process of leaving the war 
zone. The ministry is a policy-driven bureaucracy, and both of these instances 
are simply new policies that should be consistently applied to everyone. They are 
not attempts at finding tailor-made solutions for each individual.
At a stretch, the work done by the rapid response and disaster support teams 
might be seen as a form of dynamic outcome since they do have to be tailored 
for the specifics of the moment, but again, these are also simply policies to be 
consistently applied, should the situation call for it. The teams are a tool, and 
a temporary one at that – not an outcome. Again, it should be clarified that 
the consistency of the outcome does not mean that everyone will receive the 
same answer when interacting with UD, but rather that the rules and guidelines 
applicable to their case will be used with a high degree of consistency. Hence why 
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even very extraordinary measures can be considered consistent. It might not be 
consistent with every-day proceedings to be given a temporary Swedish passport, 
but under these specific circumstances, the special-case rules and guidelines for 
doing so are supposed to be consistently applied for any and enquirers, 
7.4.5 MESO usage
An unfortunate consequence of the supposed success story of the Lebanon 
evacuation is that the material does not go into quite as much detail as to who 
discussed what with whom, which makes a good MESO analysis that much 
more difficult. Unlike FBI in Montana, this case is simply known for being a 
success and for using better inter-agency coordination, not for any specific use of 
knowledge to solve a particularly tricky knowledge-based problem. As mentioned 
on several occasions, the actual event itself was already well within the established 
and explicit area of competence of the ministry, which somewhat obscures the 
interactions and knowledge sharing that nevertheless took place. Instead, it has 
to be gleamed from reports by other actors and in the ways UD approached a 
handful of specific issues.
Meta-knowledge
Somewhat paradoxically, it is in the field of meta-knowledge that we find both 
the high-point and the low-point of the ministry’s knowledge management. 
Throughout the crisis, the ministry consistently identifies and tries to resolve a 
number of knowledge gaps regarding the situation in Lebanon and in particular 
Beirut. The organisational tradition of preferring reports from its own staff is still 
alive and well, and while there is a lot of knowledge to go around among the other 
agencies and organisations that are already en route to or in place around the war 
zone (all of which are known to UD since it had to approve a number of them), 
the beleaguered state of the city is not fully appreciated until contact is made 
with the junior desk officer visiting the city. As with the case of Thailand the year 
before, none of this really should have been new information at this point, which 
suggests that in spite of its emphasis on seeking information, the organisation 
still had problem taking inventory of what was already available. Something 
similar is also the only reason that can be deduced for the initial estimate of how 
many individuals might need to be evacuated from the area. The estimate was 
seemingly made without any attempt to check against other sources that might 
have offered a more accurate appraisal. While lucky circumstances would allow 
these issues to pass by without causing any acute problems, they still illustrate a 
lack of critical reflection on what is supposedly known. This is something of a 
backside of the kind of satisficing logic that is normally praiseworthy in crises: 
do not wait for perfect information when good enough is already at hand. But 
how do you determine whether what you know is good enough? As mentioned 
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earlier, it is not quite an identification paradox, since an knowledge gap was 
actually correctly identified and a sensible and informed question was asked to 
fill that gap – the problem is rather that the answer was not critically assessed.
A fortuitous detail was that these two issues conspired to actually create 
a solution to a brewing problem before the problem could fully develop. By 
demanding that staff in Beirut and Damascus took care to monitor the situation 
and to make their own arrangements for transport, irrespective of whatever could 
be worked out from Stockholm, and that they stay in place rather than join to 
try to create a single, better-staffed office, an apparent transport over-capacity 
was created just as it was revealed that this capacity was actually needed. Had 
the decision been made to simply trust the estimate and to either rely on just 
a single ship and/or may two trips with the bus convoy, the evacuation would 
have become much more time consuming and stressful. Indeed, based on that 
the first estimate and on what was later found out about the logistical solutions 
among other Nordic countries, it may have seemed sensible to just tag along with 
their convoys. Instead, two wrongs made a right: by not clarifying how many 
needed to be evacuated and by not fully trusting the reports of others, someone 
was on site to discover that far more Swedes had turned up, and that there was 
now both enough shipping capacity to carry them in large groups, and enough 
busing capacity to get everyone to the ships.
In contrast to this lucky self-nullifying knowledge gap, there was the coordi-
nation done between the Swedish agencies in conjunction with the rapid response 
team effort. The team itself is an interesting knowledge arena that we will get 
back to in a bit, but from a pure meta-knowledge perspective, it is interesting in 
that it demonstrates a kind of self-awareness that the ministry had not shown 
the last time. Specifically, this meta-knowledge manifests itself in the assignment 
of the various tasks associated with the evacuation effort. Instead of wanting to 
appear as the omnipotent Ministry of Foreign (or indeed any and all) Affairs, it 
was made clear that UD would mainly take on the role of communicating with 
other nations and with the Swedish public, and to resolve the consular matters 
which was its role to handle anyway. Experience had taught the organisation that 
its competence did not lie in identifying and cataloguing thousands of people; 
in micro-managing logistics; or in disseminating information to regional and 
local agencies. So these competences were sought elsewhere and assigned to 
other agencies. Also, while maybe not a meta-knowledge issue in the strictest 
sense, UD knew that the whole endeavour would be funded, at least for now, 
which freed up some decision-making capacity to deal with finding solutions to 
any actual evacuation issues that might arise. Being able to pay is perhaps not 
seen as a regular competence, but is far from an insignificant factor in making 
things happen.
This is a rather different, yet in many ways more illuminating, form of 
knowledge than has been discussed in the other cases. For those, the intuitive 
understanding of the term was sufficient in describing what the organisations 
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did and did not know in relation to the specific case. But in the Lebanon case, 
and especially when comparing it to the 2004 tsunami, it is worth remembering 
Polyiani’s (1966) original analytical definition as the process of interpreting, 
understanding, and making use of available information. The ministry had access 
to a lot of information, but it could not make good use of it and was aware of this 
fact. This awareness is something the organisation had acquired after the tsunami 
débâcle, demonstrating not just an instance of learning in a classic sense, but of 
improving its knowledge management skills and, from the point of view of the 
framework used for this study, in improving its meta-knowledge.
On the whole, we have a meta-knowledge situation that is almost the mirror 
image of what we saw during the tsunami. There are a handful of negative 
examples, weighed against numerous positive ones. The main reason why it is 
only “almost” a mirror image is that the negative examples in the Lebanon case 
are far more severe than the positive ones from the tsunami. However, aside 
from the encouraging signs of self-awareness shown in the how the ministry 
chose to largely limit itself to its areas of competence, there is also the rapid 
response team as a concept. Initially, the team only consisted of representatives 
from various departments within the ministry, which means that it is in and of 
itself a type of meta-knowledge usage: it is the organisation figuring out what its 
different parts know and are capable of. So while there certainly were a couple of 
significant knowledge gaps, there were more than enough instances of properly 
used meta-knowledge that the net total becomes a fairly positive affair.
Empathic knowledge
Beyond its initial role of being an example of extracting some meta-knowledge 
from the organisation, UD’s decision to expand the rapid response team to over 
a dozen different agencies and governmental actors also made it an arena for 
creating empathic knowledge. This was an area where, in spite of everything, 
the ministry had already fared fairly well during the tsunami, but by formally 
establishing this function as an ad-hoc extension of its regular procedures, the 
empathic knowledge use becomes almost systemic throughout the organisation.
It needs to be emphasised that there is no inherent contradiction in first saying 
that the ministry did not seem to fully trust the reports of other agencies, and 
then saying that the organisation had improved its empathic knowledge. The 
latter is an observation that the ministry had a better understanding of what 
kind of knowledge the other agencies could provide, and what they needed in 
return to do their respective jobs; the former is simply a result of UD’s choice 
not to make use of the knowledge it knew was available. This is a very important 
illustration of the both the intersection and the difference between empathic 
and meta-knowledge. If you know that someone else possesses some particular 
piece of knowledge (empathic knowledge), but you also know that you have 
no need of that knowledge at the moment, or perhaps even that you know it 
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better than they do (meta-knowledge) then not making use of what they know 
is not something negative or paradoxical; it is simply a case of not bothering 
with something irrelevant. Of course, the complication in the Lebanon case is 
that the supposed meta-knowledge in question was somewhat presumptuous, 
or even outright wrong, but that is a slightly different matter.
A similar distinction between the two concepts can be noted in relation to the 
division of labour: UD took on a specific set of tasks based on its competence in 
those areas, but it also delegated a number of tasks to other actors based on their 
competences. It is a fairly trivial, but still illuminating example of how the two 
knowledge types differ, even when dealing with the exact same event.
The case material offers a distinct – almost suspicious – lack of failed empathic 
knowledge use, at least as far as UD goes. Some of this can undoubtedly be 
attributed to the narrative of success that has been constructed surrounding 
the event, in particular if the ministry is to be believed. Without being overly 
conspiratorial, there is reason to believe that the reports focus on what has 
improved since the tsunami, which still leaves plenty of room for things that 
work as poorly as they did before, but which are left unmentioned because they 
are not considered noteworthy. This is just how those things work, Even then, 
it may be seen as a positive sign that at least nothing seems to have become worse 
in the preceding year, or it would have generated more attention. An example 
of this that is unrelated to the work done by the ministry can be found in the 
reports compiled by SoS. Since it had to suffer the consequences of this particular 
setback, it is only natural that its reports mention how important patient data 
went missing as it was being stored and transferred through the RPS IT systems. 
Here, we see that RPS did not fully understand the knowledge needs of SoS and 
of the health-care system, and conversely, SoS did not fully recognise that there 
was such a knowledge gap in RPS until after the fact. It was a mutual lack of 
understanding of the needs and capabilities of the other.
All that said, and aside from the positive development of the rapid response 
team and the consistent and general use of it as a source of knowledge what 
everyone was doing, there is still only a handful of real examples of successful 
empathic knowledge use on UD’s behalf. Even then, it is only really the same usage, 
repeated over and over again. In particular this entails its use of competences 
from SRSA, SoS, and RPS to create support teams for the existing UD efforts in 
Nicosia, Damascus, and Aleppo. These uses were certainly valuable to the crisis 
management effort, but they are not nearly as interesting in terms of untangling 
some otherwise unfathomable mystery the way FBI had to approach the millen-
nialist movements in Texas and Montana. To a large extent, this is due to the 
fact that the ministry is faced with a known and familiar type of event, and that 
the expertise to understand this situation already exists in-house. Instead, it is a 
rather mundane matter of figuring out competences and areas of expertise related 
to the evacuation effort, and assigning tasks in accordance with those. As such, it 
is difficult to definitively say whether the empathic knowledge use has improved 
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since Christmas 2004 – we can simply state that there is definite evidence that 
empathic knowledge is consistently being used.
Second-order knowledge
As a direct consequence of the lack of a grand mystery, and of the division of labour 
between the different agencies, there is just as little evidence of any second-order 
knowledge usage during the Lebanon evacuation as we could find during the 
tsunami crisis. The logic here is the same as it was back then: unless there is no 
meta-knowledge available to solve a given problem, and unless empathic knowledge 
has unsuccessfully been employed in finding any immediate solution, there is 
no real need to start to look further afield in an attempt to locate new sources of 
knowledge that might help you understand the problem at hand. None of these 
situations were fully actualised for UD during the evacuation, at least not in 
practice. A strong case could be made for the incorrect estimation of the number 
evacuees. Here, the ministry could have been well served by trying to find some 
new source of information. However, as mentioned, such use is predicated on 
understanding that the information already available is inaccurate, and by the 
time this was understood, the whole matter had lost most of its relevance because 
a working solution had already been found.
For a more direct but still fairly minor example from the case as a whole, we 
once again have to look beyond UD and onto the continued woes of SoS, in 
particular, the confusing episode when the responsibility for the passenger lists 
shifted from SoS to SEMA and then to RPS, Throughout this process, many lost 
track of exactly who had what information – a question that was further com-
plicated by the fact that SoS separatly attempts to collect and distribute patient 
information to the regional health-care authorities. Before additional measures 
were taken by SEMA to properly coordinate the information dissemination, 
SoS had to repeatedly act as a knowledge broker between agencies looking for 
information on the evacuees, and RPS who had taken over the role of maintaining 
that database. As a more detailed study of second-order knowledge usage, this 
might be an interesting case, but it is far removed from UD and its involvement 
in the evacuation, and thus is merely a curio for the purposes of this study.
7.4.6 Conclusions from the Lebanon evacuation
The Lebanon evacuation has gone down in history as something along the lines of 
the anti-tsunami. It may have failed to fully redeem the incumbent government 
for its failure a year and a half earlier, and may have come too late in the election 
season to make much of a difference, but it is still touted as a successful example 
of crisis management. Then again, it is debatable how much of an influence either 
of the events really had on the election (the left-wing block lost to a right-wing 
coalition), and had the evacuation been a failure, it would at most have changed 
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the margin by which the left-wing block lost. As a success story, it probably 
mattered more on the ministerial level, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs now had 
something to point to and say that it could indeed handle a large-scale disaster 
abroad. Still, there is some reason to question this narrative. The early media 
reports were less favourable, as were scattered reports from NGOs and private 
individuals, but later, the reporting turned around to paint the episode as more 
of a success, and especially as a victory for the newly appointed foreign minister.
Even so, the actual handing of the situation shows some significant deficiencies 
that were not present during the tsunami. It took almost two full days before 
the war was properly identified as a potential crisis, and only then because of the 
increased volume of phone calls to UD. It then took three more days before any 
real evacuation efforts were underway and one day more before those evacuated 
finally arrived back home in Sweden. This can be compared against the tsunami, 
where the crisis was identified within a matter of hours at the analytical level, 
and the volume of phone calls merely served to confirm the worst fears about 
the scope of what was going to take place in the following weeks. It took two 
and a half days before the first evacuees arrived from in Sweden. In other words, 
it took as much time during the Lebanon crisis to simply identify that there was 
a problem and to start thinking about some kind of solution as to it took after 
the tsunami to go from a cold start (through what was generally considered the 
most horribly delayed crisis responses in modern times) to finally getting people 
home. The analytical level that was off to such a good start early on during the 
tsunami, only to stumble at the finishing line as it was blocked at the political 
level, did not even manage to tie its shoe laces properly, metaphorically speaking, 
in the Lebanon case. The entire assumed premise for action was wrong and the 
estimated scope of the event was off by an order of magnitude.
That is not to say that the success narrative is completely wrong. This time, 
the upper management and the political level were quick to act, and the many 
alterations made to the structures and processes turned out to work really well. 
Almost all of the systemic deficiencies and pathologies had been resolved. It was 
certainly a success on a political-symbolic level as well as on a procedural level, slow 
start notwithstanding. We will have reason to return to this discrepancy between 
the practical execution and the political and bureaucratic definition of success.
In terms of the analytical questions, the Lebanon evacuation can be sum-
marised as follows:
• It was a crisis for the principal actor, but not a very severe one.
• The processes used were anticipated.
• The principal actor could only partially maintain an open mode of operation.
• The principal actor demonstrated numerous instances of MESO-knowledge, 
but also a couple of significant failures.
• No significant reinforcement cycle that increased the degree of crisis can be 
observed.
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For the last point, it should still be noted that some of the MESO-knowledge 
failures created a significant potential for a deteriorated crisis situation, but that 
potential was not actualised.
There are a couple of ambiguities that create problems when converting these 
observations into the binary states of the model. While it is undoubtedly a crisis 
situation, it does not suffer from any feedback and the ministry manages to set 
its priorities in such a way that the value conflicts are reduced. The organisation 
is still closed, by and large, but has definitely opened up since the tsunami. And 
finally, just like in the Montana case, only two of the three knowledge types are 
really present as far as MESO-usage goes.
Thus we arrive at the following variable values for Lebanon:
• Degree of crisis: high.
• Degree of anticipation of process: high.
• Degree of closed-ness: high, but with a noteworthy tendency towards more 
openness.
• Degree of MESO-usage: more high than low.
Again, as we will shortly see, a purely binary division would remove a small but 
significant change that will play an important role in the case comparison in 
Chapter 8. The degree of closed-ness, in particular, is critical to note, in part 
because it highlights a methodological problem that warrants further discussion, 
and in part because of how it affects the outcome of the hypothesised link between 
closed-ness and MESO-usage.
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This chapter will answer the main questions posed by the thesis. How do crises 
affect organisations’ level of closed-ness? How do unfamiliar externally imposed 
work processes affect the same? And how does the level of closed-ness affect an 
organisation’s ability to make use of its MESO-skills?
This will be answered by testing three hypotheses:
i) Organisations will fall back on well known, prescribed, and preferably con-
sistent problem-solving procedures when subjected to the stress of a crisis. 
Crises will thus push organisations towards a more closed behaviour.
ii) Unless already anticipated and incorporated in how the organisation inter-
acts with outside actors, a sudden presence of an externally enforced process 
will thus push organisations towards a more closed behaviour.
iii) The degree to which an organisation is open or closed decides how well and how 
willingly an organisation makes use of external knowledge. An organisation 
that moves towards increased closed-ness will thus lose its ability to apply its 
MESO-knowledge.
Along with these questions, it is also worth recalling the conditions for falsifying 
the hypotheses set up in the introduction. The main thrust of the thesis is that 
open organisations will be more willing to source and graft new knowledge 
into their problem-solving processes, so seeing the same behaviour in closed 
organisations would render the hypothesis void. The question then turns to 
what, exactly, causes an organisation to be open or closed. This thesis offers the 
suggestions that crises and/or a requirement to adopt to unfamiliar work processes 
will, independently of each other and for different reasons, push organisations 
towards well known, consistent, and “safe” behaviour – i.e. towards closed-ness. 
Thus, should we see closed behaviour even in the absence of crises and where 
the processes are well-known, either or both of these suggestions will lose their 
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explanatory power. While this might not nullify the model as a whole quite as 
severely as the loss of a link between closed-ness and the (in)ability to make use 
of external expertise, it would still render half of the model void and leave us 
with a dire need to find another explanation to fill the void left behind. That is 
not to say that there might not be additional factors that generate the same kind 
of change more or less independently of crises and formal settings, but those are 
beyond the scope of this thesis.
8.1 Questions and answers
In this section, we will go through and present the results of the case analyses, 
side by side, to find answers to these hypotheses without much of immediate 
comment. In the next section, the findings will be scrutinised more closely to 
offer up a bit more nuance and qualification as to what has actually been found 
and to the answers to the research questions. 
8.1.1 Hypothesis I: Varying degrees of crisis
For the four cases, we generally find that a high degree of crisis coincides with a 
higher degree of closed-ness. We have two cases – the tsunami and Waco – that 
are most definitely crises; one case – Lebanon – that is still a crisis, but which 
is reasonably well-managed; and one case where the tensions are occasionally 
hight, but on the whole, it was as minor a crisis as an event could conceivably 
be and still entail a siege-like situation between two heavily armed opponents. 
On the other side of the equation, we have two cases that exhibit a highly closed 
behaviour in the principal actor – tsunami and Waco – and two cases that exhibit 
a markedly more open behaviour – Lebanon and Montana. 
Degrees of closed‑ness
High Low
Degree of crisis
High
Tsunami,
Waco
Lebanon →
Low Montana
Figure 8: The relationship between crisis and closed-ness
The main outlier is the Lebanon case, the reasons for which will be discussed in 
the next section, but which still fits the general hypothesised pattern. As such, 
based on these cases, and subject to the qualifications that we will get into shortly, 
we have no reason to reject Hypothesis I.
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8.1.2 Hypothesis II: varying degrees of anticipation of process
Next, we can conclude that between the cases, we generally find that a low 
anticipation of process coincides with a higher degree of closed-ness. We have 
two cases where the anticipation was low: Waco and the tsunami; and two cases 
where the anticipation was high: Lebanon and Montana. The other side remains 
the same as before, with Waco and the tsunami being high closed-ness cases; 
Montana being low closed-ness; and Lebanon being somewhat awkwardly stuck 
in the middle of the two extremes.
Degrees of closed‑ness
High Low
Anticipation of process
High
Montana
Lebanon →
Low
Waco,
Tsunami
Figure 9: The relationship between anticipation of process and closed-ness
Again, while the Lebanon case is an outlier with its simple trend towards a more 
opened behaviour, it still fits the predicted general pattern. Based on this, we 
have no reason to reject Hypothesis II.
8.1.3 Hypothesis III: varying degrees of closed-ness
Finally, we can conclude that as a general rule, higher degree of closed-ness 
corresponds to a lower MESO-usage. On the one hand, we have the two cases 
showing a highly closed behaviour – the Tsunami and Waco – contrasted against 
the markedly more open Lebanon case and the very open Montana case. On the 
other hand, we have two instance of low MESO-usage – again, the tsunami and 
Waco pair – and two instances of high usage – Lebanon and Montana.
Degree of MESO usage
High Low
Degree of closed‑ness
High
Tsunami,
Waco
Lebanon 
↓
Low
Montana
Figure 10: The relationship between closed-ness and MESO-usage
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Here, the mere “trend towards” an open behaviour in the Lebanon case proves to have 
a significant effect on the knowledge use, where, although it is debatable – and will 
indeed momentarily be debated – exactly how open or closed the principal actor 
is. Nevertheless, we can state that it is at any rate higher and more open than the 
tsunami and Waco cases, and that this shift towards an open behaviour has the 
result predicted by the hypothesis. Thus, we have no reason to reject Hypothesis III. 
8.2 Qualifications on the case comparisons.
It is worth reiterating that the case selection is such that we do not have fully 
symmetric pairs of cases to compare. As described in the initial case analyses in 
the previous chapter, there is only one case where the crisis component is truly 
missing – the Montana Freemen standoff – and likewise, there is an unfortunate 
co-variation in the anticipation of process between the “successful” cases of 
Montana and Lebanon. These are also the cases where the organisations exhibit 
an increased degree of openness. As such, the examples illustrating more closed 
behaviour are a bit lopsided, and some additional care should be taken in the 
analysis since comparisons purely along the crisis and formality axes will also 
compare across political systems and policy domains – differences that might 
have an impact on the final result.
Due to the asymmetric nature of the cases studied, this last point it worth 
highlighting further. There are multiple independent paths to the same outcome, 
and each factor on its own will not be able to predict the behaviour we see in the 
organisation – some other factor may explain that behaviour. Likewise, crises or 
formal arrangements might be the natural environment for some organisations, 
which means that they are somewhat “inoculated” against their effects. It is also 
important to note that we are not looking at a binary state, but rather a sliding 
scale between the improbable extremes of, on the one hand, completely ignoring 
all kinds of external input, and on the other hand never listening to any kind of 
internalised knowledge within the existing organisation. As a result, the presence 
of a crisis situation alone, for instance, does not tell us much about the openness 
or closed-ness of an organisation. It may still exhibit some fairly open behaviour, 
which would at first glance seem to contradict the notion that crises lead to 
closed-ness, but in reality, it is just that we have never studied that organisation 
in its non-crisis mode where it would indeed show to be even more open. When 
attempting to falsify the hypotheses, therefore, the question should not really be 
whether or not we simply see open or closed behaviour, but whether or not we 
see increased openness or closed-ness, and whether or not there might be some 
other explanation for any such changes. 
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8.2.1 Examining Hypothesis I
As noted in the individual case assessments in the preceding chapters, we have three 
examples of crises among the cases: the 2004 tsunami, the Lebanon evacuation 
and the Waco siege, and we have but one example of a non-crisis: the Montana 
Freemen standoff. Between the four, we also have two examples of increased 
closed behaviour: the tsunami and the Waco siege. Put another way, we have one 
case of a non-crisis, and this also turns out to be a case of open (or non-closed) 
behaviour but as discussed in chapter 3, this weak modus tollens needs some 
 further qualification. As mentioned earlier, we cannot really deduce anything from 
variation in closed-ness between the tsunami and Lebanon cases as a function 
of crisis, because they were both crisis events. At most, we can hypothesise that 
there is some other factor at play to cause that variation. One such factor could 
be the MESO-induced feedback loop that deepened the crisis in the tsunami 
case, but which was completely absent in Lebanon. While Lebanon is slotted 
into the “high crisis” box here, it is slightly unfair to suggest that it was a crisis 
on the same level as the tsunami. At the same time, it could not really be said 
to be a low-crisis or a non-crisis affair like Montana. The Lebanon case is also 
slightly problematic in that, on the whole, its principal actor still exhibited pre-
dominantly closed behaviour, but in comparison to how it was in the previous 
case, it became significantly more open. So when the case is placed in the “low 
closed-ness” corner, it must be interpreted as a historical “trend towards,” rather 
than as an absolute value at the time of the crisis.
What we can observe, then, is that there are rather different versions of 
closed-ness involved even among the crisis cases. While the Lebanon evacuation 
may be classified as more open compared to its sister case, the 2004 tsunami, it 
is still far more closed compared to the other open case, the Freemen standoff. 
The Lebanon evacuation was handled by a select group of organisations that 
did not particularly change during the course of events, many of which had 
worked in this constellation before, so the openness was limited to the actors 
already present in that setup. Compare this limited openness to the shifting set 
of actors involved in the Freemen case, where third-party negotiators came and 
went and stayed for drastically different lengths of times as the usefulness of their 
services was constantly reappraised, and the difference in what we might qualify 
as being “open” becomes quite stark. Yes, while the Lebanon evacuation might 
be an example of more open behaviour compared to how the 2004 tsunami was 
handled, it rather seems that being a crisis meant that even the Lebanon evacuation 
was an example of more closed behaviour when compared – admittedly across 
both policy domains and national boundaries – to the Freemen case. The model 
would suggest that the presence of a crisis has already pushed the actors towards 
a more closed behaviour in both the Lebanon and the tsunami cases, and that 
some other factor pushed the tsunami case even further down the same road, 
which is consistent with the kinds of outcomes the cases present.
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At the same time, the Freemen case offers something of a causal conundrum. 
Suggesting that it was an example of ‘normalcy’ might be stretching the semantics 
of the word somewhat, but as Chapter 5 argued, it cannot really be seen as a 
crisis either. The model would suggest that the low intensity allowed the FBI to 
remain open, and that the openness in turn allowed them to make use of their 
MESO-knowledge skill set to come up with a solution for the problem at hand. 
However, the actual chain of events raises the question of an alternative interpre-
tation: had it still remained a non-crisis without those skills? It could be argued 
that it was kept from being a crisis due to the lack of time pressure, but the Waco 
siege took a very long time to go through its paces as well, and the key difference 
between the two is that the agency explored more options in Montana. So was 
the Freemen standoff a non-crisis because the FBI had the right MESO-skills, 
or could the FBI make use of the right MESO-skills because it was a non-crisis? 
Or was it a self-reinforcing cycle where a slight let-up in pressure at some point 
let the whole thing snowball in a positive direction?
The last option perhaps seems more likely, but there is still a chicken-and-
egg kind of a mystery hovering in the background that needs to be unravelled. 
In truth, the MESO skill set is a theoretical construct – it is a different aspect 
of organisational knowledge and organisational learning invented to highlight 
particular lessons an organisation can draw about its environment, and it was 
specifically invented to study certain facets of crisis decision-making. As such, it 
will obviously be a factor in how that organisation approaches problem-solving in 
crises, including how they choose to frame a given situation to the point where 
it might not even in the strictest sense be a crisis any more. The FBI did not 
escalate the Freemen standoff into a full-blown crisis because previous experi-
ences and existing frameworks for acquiring knowledge let the FBI manage – if 
not entirely eliminate – the uncertainty side of the crisis triangle. This decision, 
in turn, let the bureau maintain a degree of control over all uncertainty factors 
throughout the (non-)crisis through the (further) use of MESO-skills. In Waco, 
in contrast, the initial uncertainty never went away and the agency was locked 
in a mind-set and a set of expertise that never allowed for new interpretations 
that might have demystified its opponents’ actions and motivations. Had it not 
been as deliberate and explicit a strategy from some of the key actors, it would 
have been a text-book case of group-think.
So what about the Lebanon evacuation? Why does it not follow the same 
pattern of letting the agencies involved “define away” the crisis when they had 
obviously learned from the tsunami and acquired some much-needed MESO-
skills to deal with similar situations? For one, it was because the crisis was not 
entirely theirs to define. While there was intense initial media interest in the 
Freemen standoff and the presence of the militia had affected a large number of 
people in the region, the siege itself only really involved the FBI, the Freemen 
and the negotiators the agency brought in. In the Lebanon evacuation, there were 
two countries in armed conflict with each other in a region with multiple con-
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flicting factions, and multiple agencies had to cooperate across multiple national 
boundaries. The core task was to mitigate the crisis felt by the evacuees. Both the 
initial response and the aftermath of the tsunami had taught these agencies that 
trying to define away such an event on the behalf of the actual victims would 
only cause an even bigger crisis to erupt. Even so, the skills acquired arguably 
still had the effect of at least lessening the crisis felt by those actors as they now 
had some means of combating uncertainty, much like the FBI, albeit to a much 
lesser degree. Finally, and perhaps most obviously, the Lebanon evacuation was 
an event triggered externally by a mutual escalation of violence in an already 
volatile region, whereas the Montana standoff was something initiated by the 
FBI itself. It is undoubtedly easier to prepare for your own actions, contemplate 
the consequences, and consider available options for dealing with them before 
you begin.
Thus, there might be a limitation to the pre-crisis applicability of these skills, 
as a function of the scope of the crisis to be handled, which in turn might help 
resolve the circular nature of the effects discussed above. While MESO-knowledge 
might quite simply provide some feeling of assurance and confidence in the crisis 
managers, positive thinking will only carry them so far until the sheer complexity 
and difficulty of operational matters become overwhelming. It is at this point 
that the in-crisis skill set is needed to allow new knowledge to be mixed into the 
crisis management organisation and yield new solutions to unfamiliar problems, 
but until – and possibly beyond – that point, they remain a source of uncertainty 
that can keep the crisis alive in the minds of the decision-makers. In a sense, 
then, the existence of MESO-knowledge within the organisation imbues the 
crisis managers with another cognitive heuristic along the lines of the “mental 
slides” of naturalistic decision-making theory (cf. Zsambok & Klein 1997; Cohen, 
Freeman & Wolf 1996). The decision-maker initially recognises the situation for 
what it is – namely something wholly unfamiliar – and has a well-known strat-
egy in mind to deal with exactly that kind of situation. This should indeed help 
remove some of the confusion and ambiguity of the detection and sense-making 
phases of a crisis, which under optimal circumstances will be enough to make 
the crisis as a whole entirely manageable. In most cases, though, it is more likely 
to work as the kind of instant-learning methodology the MESO-knowledge set 
was initially envisioned to provide, and will “merely” act as a decision support 
function in the normal course of the crisis management.
In all, there is little in the cases to base a rejection of the hypothesis on. We 
see organisations become more closed when suffering a crisis, and when we see 
(relative) openness in spite of a crisis, the behaviour is still far more closed than 
in the crisis-free case. Thus, this suggests that the crisis has indeed instilled a 
minimum lower bound on how closed the organisation can become – or, perhaps 
more intuitively, that it creates an upper bound on how open the organisation 
can stay during the crisis. Ideally, as mentioned in chapter 3, a third pair of events 
involving the same actors showing a crisis-free event as a point of comparison 
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could have provided further confirmation, but runs afoul of the problem of 
finding something that does not distinguish itself in any way and analysing it as 
something apart from the noise of all other everyday activities.
Such a study would be an excellent topic for further examination, as would the 
aforementioned distinction between preparatory MESO-knowledge (that might 
even be enough to quell a crisis entirely), and operative MESO-knowledge (used 
during a crisis to keep ambiguity and uncertainty in check). However, all of this 
largely still relies on the presumption that openness actually does influence the 
ability to make use of external knowledge, but remains to be seen. What seems 
clear is that crises put a damper on that openness, and that there is some sort of 
influence on the crises themselves from the ability to call on experts for answers.
8.2.2 Examining Hypothesis II
For the comparison between anticipation of process and degree of closed-ness, the 
distribution is entirely symmetrical, but to the point where it almost becomes a 
problem. There is a high degree of covariation between the two variables, which 
means that very little can be gleamed by contrasting the US cases to the Swedish 
ones when looking at this factor in isolation. We would need to proceed to a 
multivariate analysis using both crises and processes as factors for closed-ness 
to build a good picture of how these two factors interact, which again means 
we would ideally need at least one additional pair of crises to add to the mix. 
However, much like the distinction between the two high-crisis states of the 
tsunami and Lebanon cases, we might be able to get some mileage out of the 
fact that the Montana case exhibited a feedback loop where MESO-usage helped 
improve the anticipation of process. While the variables are still binary, we might 
tentatively suggest that there is at least a distinction in practice between how 
much the actors in the two cases managed to anticipate the events to follow, with 
Montana having that imperceptibly higher degree of anticipation.
So here too, there is little to reject the hypothesis – a higher anticipation of 
process does indeed seem to be conducive with maintaining a higher degree of 
openness. In addition, Hypothesis II offers an explanation for the variation we 
previously observed between the tsunami and Lebanon cases in spite of both them 
being crises, where the variation is explained by the variation of anticipation of 
process. This in turn lets us deduce that the combination of high anticipation 
and low crisis has a higher impact than either of the two factors alone. As we may 
recall, Lebanon is only classified as “low closed-ness” as a trend towards, rather 
than as an absolute value since, in practice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still 
fulfilled two out of three conditions for closed behaviour, which was still one 
less than it managed during the tsunami. Perhaps if this case had also been a 
non-crisis, the trend would have been even greater and UD would have been 
able to operate in a fully open mode, much like FBI did in Montana.
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8.2.3 Examining Hypothesis III
The final assumption that needs to be tested is to what degree closed-ness has an 
impact on how well organisations are able to introduce new knowledge into their 
decision-making processes. One of the immediate observations to be made for 
this comparison is that the case pairs are mismatched in one potentially critical 
area. The decision-making process, duties, and liabilities were all split between 
a number of different actors in the tsunami and Lebanon cases, in the form of 
levels and departments and to some extent the participation of outside agencies. 
Meanwhile, the Waco and Montana cases dealt with a single – if not entirely 
monolithic – actor, then at least one with a standardised operational practice 
and a unified policy. Even though the focus of this study in the former two 
cases lies on the Foreign Ministry, the complexity of the crisis and the division 
of labour between the different ministries in the Swedish government mean that 
it is entirely possible to come across issues where the ministry simply was not 
supposed to deal with a given question. The question of what, exactly entails 
external knowledge – the resource that MESO usage is meant to help find and 
graft onto the existing decision-making process – becomes somewhat fuzzy.
The case descriptions offer an argumentation for why these values are used, 
but it is still worth noting that there may be a qualitative difference between 
what constitutes complete MESO usage for a constellation such as UD – with 
the political level directly above it, the many other agencies attached to it, and 
the often very different departments within it – and a more clearly defined 
organisation such as the FBI.
It should also be noted that while both the Lebanon and the Montana cases 
are labelled as “high MESO”, the reality is that they both only scored two out 
of the three indicators: second-order knowledge was largely absent in both 
instances. And finally, there is the matter of the hidden quantitative difference 
between the degrees of closed-ness in the Montana and Lebanon cases. Again, 
both are given the same value, but as mentioned the Lebanon case only really 
gets that label in comparison because of how the organisation has evolved from 
the state it was in during the tsunami. However, as we shall see, these factors do 
not actually present much of a problem for the purpose of answering Hypothesis 
III – quite the opposite.
Even though UD is teetering on the edge of complete closed-ness in the 
Lebanon case, it seems that the remaining sliver of open-mode operation is 
enough to deliver a significant amount of MESO usage. In particular, as the 
case description shows, it manages to increase the amount of meta-knowledge 
applied to the crisis, which was almost completely absent during the tsunami. At 
this point, it may also be worth remembering that FBI’s classification as open in 
the Montana case is also not unequivocal. It scored two out of three indicators 
for openness, and yet, it only marginally outperformed UD in terms of MESO 
294
Stressing Knowledge
usage. If we go beyond the initial conception of these variables as binaries and 
instead count indicators, allowing for some partial or attempted uses, we get the 
following “scoreboard” for the two variables:
Degree of 
closed-ness
Degree of  
MESO usage
Montana 1 2.5
Lebanon 2 2
Waco 3 1
Tsunami 3 0.5
Table 3: Scoring closed-ness and MESO-usage
Hypothesis III is perhaps not as categorical as first conceived, but it is still not 
falsified. Fully closed organisations are categorically far worse at using any kind 
of MESO-knowledge than even a slightly open organisation, and as the openness 
increases, so does the usage of MESO-knowledge. Still, this relationship and the 
hypothesis it rests on is indeed less clear-cut than the other ones. The way both 
the variables and the underlying concepts have been formulated also creates a 
fair amount of wiggle-room for any one case, where even a small qualitative 
difference can significantly (perhaps even overly) affect the final valuation. With 
a more refined methodology and more cases, this relationship might even be a 
candidate for a quantitative study of cause and effect.
8.3 Further considerations
The main thrust of this study is an examination of the impact of two stress factors 
on the behaviour of organisations. As always, though, there are numerous other 
aspects at play in the actual cases that have some more or less peripheral influence 
on the outcome and which may warrant an examination and explanation from a 
different perspective. The case selection has been strategic in that it picks a two 
internally very consistent and comparable events, but that leaves the question of 
how well the two pairs themselves can be compared given the differences between 
them. There are also some internal aspects that differ between all four cases that 
are worth looking closer at, as well as a couple of the underlying theoretical 
assumptions, now that we have some empirics to test them against.
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8.3.1 Foreign and domestic arenas
Perhaps the most obvious difference between the cases is that the US pair deals 
with a very specific, well-outlined issue area in a domestic arena, whereas the 
Swedish cases deal with a highly complex multi-issue and multi-agency problem 
as events unroll in a foreign arena. On the one hand, we have the FBI dealing 
with what are clearly FBI matters, albeit with an unconventional opponent in 
an unfamiliar setting; on the other hand, we have large sections of the entire 
Swedish civil society dealing with the fallout of war and disaster on foreign soil, 
ostensibly centrally managed by the highly generalist and not at all operation-
ally focused Foreign Ministry. Setting aside for a moment the specific areas of 
expertise of the two actors, and how well it maps to the problem they are tasked 
with solving, the nature of the two arenas themselves – domestic versus foreign – 
should reasonably have an impact on both the “problem space” and the “solution 
space” available to the actors. That is, the range and scope of potential problems 
that might arise in dealing with the different crises, as well as the potential and 
available solutions that need to be considered are drastically different between 
the two pairs.
At the end of the day, the FBI simply has to do what it always does, broadly 
speaking: enforce federal law in collaboration with local agencies, and with direct 
oversight by the Justice Department and the attorney general. The bureau’s juris-
diction, chain of command, and hierarchy of responsibility are, while not exactly 
simple, at least codified and clarified in law, instructions, and similar official 
policy documents. If there are transgressions, they can fairly easily be identified 
and defined using those documents as a baseline, and indeed, the Waco case 
demonstrates this in almost every way possible. The use of untested equipment 
and tactics borrowed form the armed forces, skirting the Posse Comitatus Act 
by the narrowest margin, became an immediate point of contention in the legal 
proceedings that followed the crisis, and as blame was assigned, it followed the 
chain of command in a very straight fashion. Compare this to the complexities 
of the equivalent Swedish case, where it was a constant point of contention 
during the tsunami crisis whether or not the Foreign Ministry should even 
be the one to coordinate, much less actually do any of the tasks it took upon 
itself. While the ministry certainly has the responsibility to render assistance to 
Swedes who run into difficulties abroad, the extent of that assistance was not 
well defined, nor well known either within the ministry or among the citizens 
who clamoured for aid. Layered on top of this confusion was the added issue of 
offering disaster relief to a number of stricken nations, many of which were not 
on the usual recipient list for that kind of aid. Instead, other agencies sorting 
under other ministries had the experience and expertise in these areas, but were 
now strangely contingent on approval and funding from the Foreign Ministry 
to go ahead with aid missions that would have seen a near-automatic approval 
under almost any other circumstances. The “foreign arena” was something the 
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Foreign Ministry considered “its own,” and as such, irrespective of how much 
other agencies already operated in that arena, this was not the time when they 
would be allowed to do so without the ministry’s approval. This was because, 
layered on top of everything was the fundamental issue of international relations, 
which certainly was the ministry’s specialty, but which now collided with its 
role as the local representation of the Swedish government for Swedes abroad.
In short, the problem was that the arena encompassed so many different 
issues, and such a volume of individual cases to be handled, that it completely 
overwhelmed the ministry’s ability to handle them all – an issue that remained 
during the Lebanon crisis, but where the inter-agency and inter-ministry coordi-
nation and cooperation had been (somewhat) clarified before the fact. Overlaps 
and interdependencies had been investigated, and while not every potential 
problem might have been mapped out, at least attempts had been made to raise 
awareness of the fact that such problems could arise and a formal forum had 
been set up to deal with them. Compared to the FBI cases, again, this is a much 
smaller shift, both in complexity and in the solutions employed, than what we 
see in the transition from Waco to Montana. In the latter case, there was some 
internal reshuffling and re-strategising as far as how FBI teams should operate, 
and agency policies were relaxed when it came to what kind of external aid the 
bureau would accept. But all of it is very localised within the bureau itself – 
there is little to no change extending outwards from there, since it was a single 
domestic law-enforcement issue all along. In contrast, there was an enormous 
overhaul in Sweden in the wake of the tsunami, with a slew of new laws and 
instructions to agencies; numerous clarifications as to who has what responsibility 
(even on foreign soil), a massive revamp of the entire national crisis management 
system with a new national agency, and a new section within the Government 
Offices established to specifically deal with the multi-level, inter-agency, and 
inter-ministerial coordination that the tsunami had revealed to be necessary.
The question is, then, what this difference means for the model constructed 
for this study? Is it equally applicable to both arenas, or are we looking at a 
problematic mismatch in the cases? One thing that we can immediately con-
clude from this comparison is that we are dealing with two very different levels 
of knowledge needs for our principal actors. The FBI needed to adjust existing 
methods to take into account a different psychological and motivational profile 
of the opposition, which, as at least the Waco case shows, is mainly a matter of 
fighting organisational inertia as far as methods and core assumptions. What 
was been learned by the time of the Montana standoff is that the standard model 
of purely criminal motivations needed to be reassessed on a case-by-case basis, 
and that other motivations might require a different frame of analysis that the 
bureau will not have – indeed, should not have – in-house. The knowledge need 
is therefore mainly one of understanding the limits of capabilities and capacities, 
and figuring out a way to fill the gaps should the need arise. Not a small task, by 
any means, but still a task that is an extension of what the bureau is already doing. 
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In the Swedish case, however, it was a matter of not just finding new knowledge 
and/or figuring out new interfaces for plugging that knowledge into an existing 
structure. Rather, it required a reassessment of the organisation’s role, and only 
then figuring out what knowledge is actually needed for that role. There are two 
aspects to this that warrant further discussion, One is that this difference sounds 
an awful lot like the distinction between single-loop and double-loop learning as 
it is discussed within organisational learning theory (cf. Argyris & Schön 1978; 
1996), and we will get back to this point later on in this chapter. The other is 
that it highlights a significant difference in the need for knowledge auditing and, 
in the language introduced in this study, the need for meta-knowledge.
We can thus refine the initial question to one of whether or not the different 
knowledge needs, and in particular the “volume” of knowledge (for the lack of 
a better term), devalue the conclusions drawn from the case comparison. It also 
triggers two follow-up questions of whether the domestic arena is somehow less 
complex than the foreign one, or if there is some other reason for the difference 
between the case pairs. Tackling the second follow-up question first, and to cause 
a momentary point of controversy and outrage among political scientists, the 
answer is quite simply “yes,” but it is so by design rather than by inherent nature. 
Specifically, it is an artefact of the institutional set-up of the two governments, 
which warrants its own discussion and clarification, and will be addressed later 
on in this chapter. For now, and with that blunt answer in hand, we instead turn 
to the question of what it means for the model that the two arenas studied put 
such different requirements on the knowledge workers involved.
At first glance, such a variation in the volume of knowledge needed should 
not actually make a huge difference for the model: it does not care about the 
difficulty of the task, only the circumstances and the effects of good knowledge 
usage. Arguably, the higher the demand, the trickier it may be to source and 
apply the requisite knowledge, but the fundamental proposed correlation between 
organisational stress, open/closed-ness, and MESO usage is still just as applicable. 
The higher knowledge demand of the foreign arena would in this model show up 
as a form of increased stress. There is more uncertainty in the crisis, or there are 
more processes that cannot be anticipated, and we might therefore predict that a 
foreign-arena issue will tend towards more closed-ness and worse MESO usage. 
It is an after-thought, but it is one that bears out in the empirics: the Swedish 
foreign-arena cases did show this tendency. It does not mean that the case pairs 
are incomparable, but it means that one has a position of advantage in terms of 
exactly how highly it can score on those two traits. It also means that we may have 
found a good candidate for a least-likely type of study to further hone and refine 
the model, and it should be re-emphasised that even in this worst-case scenario, 
we saw the exact kind of correlation the model would suggest, just more weakly 
expressed than in the relatively simpler domestic case. In a different sense, this 
difference in knowledge demands may be seen as a reinforcement mechanism 
for the identification paradox discussed in Section 2.1. A more complex issue 
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arena creates a feedback loop where larger knowledge needs simply mean that 
a smaller portion of those needs can be met, creating more uncertainties that 
end up further stifling the ability to sort out the few needs that remain. Much 
as suggested by the cybernetic approach (Steinbruner 1974; 2002), the coping 
mechanism for increased uncertainty is to go even further towards the familiar, the 
known, and the “safe” choice – that is, it seeks the consistency that characterises 
a closed behaviour.
In short, the difference between the arena is not a problem as such for the 
model or for the case comparison, but it rather means that the higher closed-ness 
observed in the Swedish cases is perhaps something that we should have been 
able to predict from the very start. The question is more one of how generalisable 
this observation is: should we expect it in all organisations that deal with the 
foreign arena as opposed to the domestic one? We will return to this question 
later in this chapter.
8.3.2 Institutional differences
So what about the outrageous claim of the foreign arena being more complex that 
led us down this path to begin with? It is not really a normative or value claim, 
but rather an observation of, and a consequence of, the institutional design of 
the two governments involved. In both the U.S. and in Sweden, there is a specific 
department or ministry for foreign policy, and the breadth of issues that sort 
under this umbrella is nothing short of staggering. This is typically the design 
in which the work demanded of the state is divided. All manner of domestic 
issues will have their own ministry; anything related to foreign policy only has 
one or two, if defence is included. In practice, of course, the distinction is not as 
clear-cut, as domestic issues will spill over into, or be affected by, what goes on in 
other parts of the world, and it would even be unrealistic to expect supposedly 
domestic agencies to have no foreign connections at all. Indeed, in the Swedish 
cases, it was the sudden realisation that the Foreign Ministry was not the only 
ministry dealing with matters in foreign countries that tripped up a lot of the 
early response. But herein lies another potentially complicating factor in the case 
comparison: the Swedish cases involved not just the foreign arena itself, but also 
this cross-over between foreign and domestic, with all the policy confusion entails. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. cases were very clear-cut: they were purely domestic issues 
handled by a domestic agency – or at least a domestic branch of that agency, 
since the FBI as a whole has an explicit role in more clandestine dealings with 
other nations through its capacity as the primary counter-espionage agency.
Another crucial difference is just that: the FBI is after all just an agency sorting 
under a larger department, whereas the principal actor in the Swedish cases is UD – a 
ministry situated in a completely different spot in the overarching governmental 
web of institutions. This means that, once again, we should perhaps not expect 
them to have the same kind of pressures – internal or external – or the same level 
299
Chapter 8: Conclusions
of knowledge needs. The FBI simply needed to understand how the Davidians 
and the Montana Freemen differed from the regular crop of armed and barricaded 
hosta-taking criminals that the bureau was used to handle. UD, on the other 
hand, had a long laundry list of issues it needed to understand the nature of a 
natural disaster and a war; the competences and capabilities of dozens of agencies 
and local and regional authorities that did not even sort under the ministry; the 
operative needs of thousands of individuals caught up in the events, in spite of 
not being an operative agency, at least not in dealing with that volume of people; 
and it had to deal far more directly with the political aspects, since that is what 
the ministry does in its role as an extension of the government.
Setting aside the matter of politics for a moment, this difference alone raises 
a question that is very similar to the matter of the foreign-domestic divide. Even 
without the differing complexities of the arena, which are mostly due to how 
policy arenas in general are divided up, does the difference in situation cause issues 
with the model or with the comparison? Fortunately, the answer also appears 
to be very similar: no, it is more a factor in deciding the exact scope and nature 
of the uncertainty and anticipation that sets up the context for the cases, rather 
than some essential difference that makes them incomparable.
So far, the differences have mostly been discussed in terms of the “problem 
space” for the actors involved – that is, the span of issues that they have to deal 
with – but the institutional difference is perhaps even better illustrated by the other 
end of the spectrum: by the span of solutions available to the respective parties. 
The FBI may be lower down in the hierarchy of governmental departments and 
agencies, and the field offices, teams, and task forces lower still in the internal 
hierarchy of the FBI itself, but this also means that the bureau is far closer to 
the actual problem solving. Indeed, the special agents are the operational tip of 
the spear to deal with the crises that erupt. The bureau is certainly bound by 
policy and laws and to some extent even direct political control, but it is still an 
independent agency with a fairly free rein to solve problems within its specific 
domain. This means that the “solution space” is far more clear-cut, both in terms 
of exactly what means and methods are available, but also in terms of being 
free to choose those means. In a sense, the difference between the Waco and the 
Montana cases is a realisation on the FBI’s part that both of those spaces are 
larger than they might have previously thought. There are some criminal-looking 
groups that it will have to deal with, without necessarily having standard crim-
inal motives in mind, and there are some pretty inventive solutions that can be 
employed without going out of bounds of what might be considered proper FBI 
procedure. It is the benefit of being that independent agency. Meanwhile, UD 
had to take a slightly different journey from a different starting point. While it, 
too, had to reassess and expand on its problem space after the tsunami, a part of 
the learning process was a narrowing of the solution space. The self-image of the 
ministry was that it solved crises every day and could handle everything had to 
be shed. At he same time, the actual capabilities and competences of the ministry 
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had to be mapped out and clarified. While some new specific techniques and 
solutions were certainly conceived, the net effect of the learning process was that 
some tasks that the ministry previously thought itself capable of proved to be 
best left to others. With the unfair benefit of hindsight, this might not seem all 
that surprising. The role of the ministry is to issue instructions to agencies and 
local offices, and to distribute funding, not to be operative problem solvers. At 
the same time, and important lesson was that there was an operational branch 
of the organisation: the Department of Consular Affairs. The fact that it was this 
operational nature that had kept its internal status down in the organisation as a 
whole, was yet another important lesson, if nothing else because it highlighted 
the limited capability of this small office.
An important aspect to note in this, which may further complicate a specific 
comparison between the U.S. and Sweden, is the Swedish prohibition on minis-
terial rule over the independent agencies. The exact extent of application of this 
rule may be debatable. There are numerous highly publicised instances where 
ministers have broken the rule, and it is definitely not uncommon for ministers to 
“discuss” current issues with the heads of agencies, where the distinction between 
discussion and direct orders may be reduced to mere semantics. Even so, it is still 
a far cry from the direct involvement of the attorney general in the FBI cases, 
where she ultimately was the one to approve or deny which specific strategies 
should be employed. However, all this distinction really does is that it narrows 
down the solution space for both principal actors in the cases, albeit from different 
angles. For the FBI, and despite its overall freedom to pick the exact strategy 
to employ, there was a restriction on how they ultimately could bring the two 
cases to an end. The attorney general’s involvement in the resolution of the Waco 
siege is the more obvious example, but even the relative hands-off approach of 
the Freemen standoff had its limits, as costs escalated and local political pressure 
for a conclusion slowly mounted. For UD, its institutional situation had similar 
effects but for almost the exact opposite reason. With little to no real operative 
capability of its own, and with little to no formal control over those who did 
have that capacity, the ministry was limited in what solutions it could even start 
working on or even know about. In addition, its closeness to the national political 
leadership and its strongly traditional and hierarchical internal structure, meant 
that before any potential solution could even be offered, it had to be vetted by 
numerous decision-making layers, each capable of vetoing any politically sensitive 
or inconvenient suggestion. Even as the vetoing powers of the middle levels were 
in the process of being scaled back following the tsunami crisis, the many layers 
of decision-making still remained during the Lebanon evacuation,
Perhaps it can be argued that, with all that in mind, the institutional situated-
ness and setup might not matter all that much. By its very nature, governmental 
bureaucracy will entail restrictions in the solution space in one form or another. 
Whether they are limitations from above on what decisions are “allowed” or limi-
tations from below on what strategies and decisions can actually be implemented 
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and realised, is a minor contextual detail. However, it does make an important 
difference for the model. The restrictions for the FBI were well known and well 
understood – direct political control in a high-profile case was not something 
new, and the forms for doing so were already established. This means that the 
institutional arrangement offered very little deviation from the anticipated 
process. There were other deviations in other processes, but they resulted from 
the specific case rather than from the system design. By contrast, and contrary 
to what one might have expected for a top-echelon organisation in the national 
bureaucracy, the tsunami case highlighted a significant lack of anticipation of the 
processes that would ensue, in many ways because of where the Foreign Ministry 
is situated. Had it just been a matter of foreign aid, foreign policy, or plain old 
diplomacy, anticipations may have been met, but not when all these other min-
istries and national agencies and regular citizens suddenly got involved. Some 
of this confusion can be directly attributed to a form of identification paradox: 
handling Swedes stranded, or even deceased, abroad may very well have seemed 
like the sort of thing that UD deals with – indeed, that is what UD-KC does on 
a daily basis – so regular processes might ostensibly work. It was just that it did 
not work when subjected to these volumes. Nor did it work if the regular channels 
of delegation and coordination were disrupted or if local capacities were destroyed 
by the very same disaster that the Swedes were fleeing from. It also did not work 
cooperate well with the need to coordinate with Swedish regional and municipal 
authorities to handle the sudden flood of people in need of care. Whether or not 
matters were ultimately handled more satisfactorily during the Lebanon evacu-
ation is a different discussion, but at least in this – in the anticipation of what 
processes would be involved – it was a marked improvement over the handling 
of the tsunami. All the aforementioned issues with the standard procedures had 
been identified and some tentative solutions had been devised.
In the end, the matter of institutional differences between the principal actors 
studied manifests itself in the model in the form of differing abilities to anticipate 
the process. The broader scope of the Foreign Ministry’s area of responsibility 
means that more actors might get involved and make new, strange demands, 
whereas the FBI’s role as an operative agency inherently means that there are not 
just fewer institutional connections to manage, but also that the connections are 
better known before the fact. In much the same way, the difference shows up as 
differing levels of uncertainty and ambiguity in the respective crises, in particular 
in regards to what options are available and the consequences of picking any one 
of those options. These are direct effects of one actor being an operative agency 
and the other being a central ministry, and thus should hold true irrespective of 
the difference in domestic and foreign arena layered on top of it.
An interesting detail to consider here is a recurring pattern on a sub-organisa-
tional, perhaps bureaucratic, level. One of the defining characteristics of the Waco 
case was the internal conflict between the different FBI teams on the scene. In the 
analysis, this was mainly discussed in terms of how this affected the knowledge 
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usage, in particular how it precluded proper meta-knowledge to be obtained. 
A similar effect, and a similar discussion, could be observed in relation to the 
tsunami case, where the differing status levels between the UD departments and 
between the hierarchical tiers caused knowledge not to be shared. However, this 
pattern has been observed in other cases and through other lenses before. Perhaps 
most notably, this effect is commonly discussed in relation to bureau politics, 
where the competition between units and departments is highlighted as the main 
cause (cf. Allison 1971; Allison & Zelikow 1999). This raises the question of 
whether such competition might have an impact on, not just the MESO usage 
directly, but on the preceding open/closed variable, and that the MESO-usage 
effects might only be an indirect consequence of that more direct effect. In 
other words, could it be the case that fierce competition between units cause an 
organisation to close up in some form or another? From this study alone, little 
can be said on the matter, and based purely on the definitions of openness and 
closed-ness, it could intuitively go either way depending on how one assume 
that an organisation functions. One school of thought would perhaps suggest 
the exact opposite: that competition would foster more flexibility and dynamics 
as the competitors try to be “better” than everyone else. On the other hand, and 
perhaps more in line with the bureau-political line of thinking, the organisation 
is not really meant to be a competitive arena, but becomes one anyway. “Being 
better” might not actually mean an improvement, as such, but may rather simply 
imply that other parts of the organisation are doing worse. This would flip the 
equation around completely. Such competition would be characterised by trying 
to circumscribe a competing department with more rules and restrictions. It would 
entail a logic of correctness and appropriateness, as opposed to a logic governed 
by effectiveness and consequences. In other words, it would promote sticking to 
the rules and regulations – perhaps adding even more of them – and showing that 
the competitor is much worse at following those rules. Such behaviour would 
be more consistent with, and push further towards, the ideals of closed-ness. 
Coincidentally, the four cases studied here include two where such competition 
existed, and both were characterised by high degrees of closed-ness. Conversely, 
the two cases other cases, where the units and departments worked in unison, 
were both characterised by high degrees of openness. It is tempting to jump to 
the conclusion that we have another cause and effect here, but we would have 
to revisit the cases to fully map out the bureau-political positions and struggles 
to really argue that point with any greater conviction.
Of course, there still is that additional layer, and it is a weakness of this par-
ticular study that the two cannot be separated empirically. Ideally, a second pair 
of actors with the opposite dynamic should have been studied as well: a ministry 
dealing exclusively with domestic matters, and an operative agency with a 
strong foreign-arena focus or presence. For now, it is therefore impossible to say 
exactly how the policy domain and the institutional factors combine, interact, 
or reinforce each others, other than that it stands to reason that a lower, more 
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operative level should effect much the same kind of uncertainty and ability to 
anticipate as would a more narrowly defined policy and problem arena, and that 
at any rate, the two should not be in a position to cancel each other out. Based 
on this, we could probably anticipate more closed behaviour and lower degrees 
of MESO usage when the policy arena is more complex and further away from 
the action on the ground.
8.3.3 Politicisation
The closeness to the political level is another factor that differentiates the two 
case pairs, and it is also a factor that somewhat changes the overall historical 
narrative of the different events. It is telling that, while Waco was a débâcle in 
many ways in its own right, one thing that clearly separates it from the Freeman 
standoff is the presence of the political leadership in the central decision-making 
process. As mentioned, a new attorney general had just entered office as the 
crisis erupted, and her first case to handle was an already highly public fumble 
from a different federal agency. The fact that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives sorted under the Treasury Department at the time18 
meant that at least the initial raid on the Davidian compound was not her 
immediate headache, but the FBI’s handling of the siege became a thorn in 
the side of the Justice Department throughout the spring of 1993. Not only 
had the raid – entirely intentionally, but ultimately for the wrong reasons – 
garnered lots of media attention, but the reasons for the raid and the nature of 
the siege were entangled in fundamental cultural issues such as gun control and 
freedom of religion, while also being entangled in accusations of sexual abuse 
of children and production and distribution of drugs. It simply could not avoid 
being politically charged, and as a member of cabinet got involved in selecting 
strategies, that politicisation now threaded its way all the way into the White 
House. As such, the failure to bring the siege to a peaceful conclusion became 
not just an operative failure on the FBI’s part, but also a political failure for the 
newly installed Clinton administration. In an interesting twist, and in spite of 
offering such an easy avenue of attack, the subsequent congressional hearings 
were less split down party lines and more along where the hearing members 
stood on these contentious issues, which perhaps further raised the awareness 
of the case as something rather special. The hearings are in and of themselves a 
chapter of the story that is worthy of a deeper study, and in particular how the 
members positioned themselves along the spectrum of strong law enforcement 
versus individual rights versus the various (ultimately disproved) accusations of 
morality crimes.
18 The ATF was shifted to the Department of Justice through the Homeland Security Act in 2002 
as part of a larger move to consolidate many of the law enforcement agencies under either the 
newly founded Department of Homeland Security, or under the existing Justice Department.
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All of this is an aspect that is almost completely absent in the Montana case. 
While the media interest was initially high, if nothing else than because it bore 
all the hallmarks of being another Waco, it was truly a stand-off in every sense of 
the term: the FBI took a more stand-off approach to the Justus Township, and 
the Department of Justice and the attorney general took a stand-off approach 
to the FBI’s choice of tactics. Nationally, interest waned very quickly as nothing 
happened, and only local and state media paid any real attention to it. Similarly, 
the political involvement only reached as far as one member Montana House of 
Representatives when Karl Ohs became a key part of the negotiation effort rather 
than a part of the decision-making chain. There were certainly attempts made by 
various right-wing and militia organisations to raise the spectre of Waco and to 
reignite the same debate on gun control and religious rights, but on the whole, 
the case did not offer much of a stage for that kind of grand-standing, and their 
involvement in the effort was short-lived. The eventual operative success of the 
stand-off obviously helps, but the lack of a high-profile political component is 
yet another factor as to why the case is fairly obscure outside of the groups that 
were directly involved. Much like a deeper study into the hearings on Waco, it 
would be interesting to delve further into the exact nature of these dynamics: how 
much of the success was due to the fact that FBI did not have political pressure 
from above, and how much of the lack of political pressure was due to the fact 
that the FBI was very explicit from the very start that it would not repeat the 
mistakes of Waco? This pressure has only been obliquely represented in this study 
through the general definition of the crises: that there was some time pressure 
and some values at stake, but the exact nature of that pressure was somewhat 
outside the scope and theoretical focus of the inquiry as it the focus of the study 
was the operative stage rather than the political aftermath.
From a knowledge management perspective, the political level of these cases is 
interesting in that, while Waco was an obvious case of the political level wanting 
to know more but not getting good answers, the attorney general also stood for 
perhaps the most earnest attempt at actually figuring out what was going on and 
at reaching a more knowledgeable answer. It was simply unfortunate that the 
FBI was not able to see any omissions in the information it would provide. In 
the aftermath, this too became a point of contention, as the FBI leadership was 
not too subtly accused of withholding information from the attorney general, 
wilfully or just due to ignorance, by not honestly pursuing the questions she was 
asking. Three years later, and perhaps largely owing to the bureau having a new 
director without that particular personal and political baggage, the interaction 
between agency and department was more on a reporting basis, giving the FBI 
full freedom but also full responsibility for its actions.
The Swedish cases almost completely reverse this dynamic between the oper-
ative side and the political component. The crises were to a large part just that: a 
political crisis – or the potential for one in the case of the Lebanon evacuation. 
For example, in the tsunami case, while the operative component was obviously 
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key in determining how the crises evolvid, the fact that we are directly dealing 
with the Government Offices, with a prestigious ministry, and with cabinet 
members (who do not get involved until things have spiralled out of control), 
and with their cabinet and state secretaries (who let that happen), all means that 
this political component was mixed in from day one. Indeed, the long-shadow 
political crisis of the tsunami lingered until after the Lebanon crisis was over, and 
after the subsequent election where the incumbent government was voted out 
of office, both of which far beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, what 
was only a vague and even secondary contextual factor in the FBI cases here 
becomes perhaps the most critical value at stake: trust in the government and in 
the politicians in charge. Consequently, and even more clearly than in Waco, the 
operative failure was also inherently a political failure. The central government 
had quite simply not done its job, and over the coming months, heads would 
figuratively roll. Also much like at Waco, the knowledge management aspect of 
it is very clear: bottlenecks in the prestige-filled hierarchy prevented information 
from flowing and kept the politicians out of the loop to the point where they 
almost seemed to be the last people to know and to act – hardly the image a 
well-functioning government wants to convey.
In a sense, then, the politicisation of the tsunami crisis is almost too apparent 
to be interesting; the failure is too obvious, as are the consequences of that failure. 
The more interesting aspect is what the political context this failure sets up for 
the Lebanon evacuation. The appointment of a highly respected and highly 
merited former UN ambassador and ambassador to the U.S. as the new foreign 
minister was a very clear attempt of wiping the slate clean. The new appointee 
was a foreign-policy professional with decades-long experience, not just another 
politician. That is not to say that the new minister had no party ties – far from it, 
since he had been a political advisor to the prime minister as far back as the early 
1980s – but rather that his career was not one within the party like most other 
ministers had. Similarly, the slight restructuring of the Foreign Ministry itself 
and the establishment of functions to coordinate work between the Government 
Offices and various national agencies was a clear signal that the nature of political 
control had changed.
The irony of trying to use de-politicisation as a political signal is better left 
for another time, as is the debate as to how much the tsunami crisis ultimately 
affected the 2006 general election, but it is safe to say that it was politically 
mandatory for the Lebanon evacuation to be a success in order to roll back some 
of that earlier failure. It would be cynical to suggest that the success story por-
trayed in official reports and documentation afterwards is just a product of this 
requirement, especially since the perception of the handling of the evacuation 
turned positive even as the crisis unfolded. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
the development of that particular narrative. From the ministry and the foreign 
minister, the message was pretty consistent throughout: this episode would be 
handled and everyone would get home – it would not be another tsunami. At 
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first, media commentators offered an at best guarded view of these promises. It 
was not until the first evacuees safely arrived back home that the promise seemed 
to bear out, and the handling of the situation started to receive some praise. But 
this is also where the story converges: on the one hand, the political commen-
tary praised the administration and in particular the new foreign minister. On 
the other hand, the personal commentary from the evacuees – both those who 
have already arrived and those still waiting in the war zone – contained sharper 
criticism. Once again, there is a deeper study to be made here to figure out if 
this is difference in perspective between: “it was not as bad as we had imagined” 
versus “…but we are still stuck in a war zone;” sober assessment versus feelings 
of entitlement; or a utilitarian measure of total systemic performance versus the 
individual horror stories, all of which were selected and presented by the media 
outlets to speak to their respective audiences. Whatever the explanation, there 
certainly seems to be an expectations gap, and the exact extent and nature of that 
gap seems to have differed from one commentator to the next. If the expectation 
was for some improvement over how the tsunami was handled, that expectation 
was definitely fulfilled. If the expectation was for the Swedish government to 
immediately pull you out of the burning fire, it was definitely not.
But perspectives aside, there is still an interesting mismatch between the 
actual performance in the two crises and the image that has been preserved. 
Unlike the sudden earthquake and tsunami, UD had plenty of fore-warning of 
the Lebanon conflict, but it still took three to four days before a response time 
was fully assembled and staff reinforcements were shipped out to the area. It 
took one more day before the means and methods of evacuation were secured. 
In the supposedly mismanaged and delayed handling of the tsunami, this was 
all done in the first two days. Even as an in-case comparison, UD’s response 
was slow: SRSA took note of the escalating tension and the historical hostility 
almost a week before the war broke out, and a monitoring team arrived one day 
before the Israeli attack. SRSA’s information sharing with SoS and RPS was up 
and running while UD was still trying to set up lines of communication with the 
local offices to stay informed of what happens in the region. Similarly, and again 
in sharp contrast to the “slow” tsunami response, the assessment of the scope of 
the situation at UD in Stockholm was slow and inaccurate. Only hours after the 
tsunami hit the beaches in Southeast Asia, a very accurate estimate was done of 
how many Swedes may be directly affected, of how many friends and relatives 
back home would be affected indirectly, and of what this meant in terms of work 
volume for the ministry. In comparison, the early estimate of the scope of the 
Lebanon evacuation was off by an order of magnitude, and consequently so was 
the estimated need for transport capacity, care, and support back in Sweden. 
This estimate grew daily and was not nearly accurate until the last transport has 
already left the war zone. Even with new strategies like sending mass-SMS, the 
information sharing was perceived as lacklustre and even outright inaccurate by 
the evacuees still in the area.
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In terms of these kinds of performance metrics, the response to the Lebanon 
crisis was almost categorically worse than that following the tsunami, but what 
had improved is the information flow within the Government Offices. The 
assessments may have been slow and inaccurate, but they immediately reached 
central decision-makers, who could then indicate an awareness of the situation 
and describe how it was being handled to the best of the government’s ability. 
From the outside, of course, a quick and accurate assessment and handling of 
the situation that is caught up in the bureaucracy will appear just as bungled, or 
worse, than one that is slow and an inaccurate but immediately communicated, 
especially when the reasons for the apparent slowness in the former case are 
revealed. So where the tsunami was a political crisis caused, not by operational 
error, but by deeply flawed information sharing, the Lebanon case was a political 
success brought on by good information sharing but with some significant hidden 
operational errors. The former became politicised because the politicians could 
not give timely and informed answers; the latter was less politicised because this 
time, they could provide those answers, and any inaccuracies could be explained 
away as a fairly natural consequence of the fog of literal war.
In a very real way, the immediate political fallout of the two events mirrors the 
kind of positive and negative reinforcements suggested by the theoretical model: 
a lack of knowledge leads to further pressure, causing missteps and a highly criti-
cised outcome, whereas good knowledge management deflates the same pressure, 
allowing for more room to breathe and an outcome that is perceived as successful. 
There might be reason for worry, though, since the cases almost make it appear 
as if the quality and accuracy of the information is of secondary importance, 
but then, that is also an issue inherent in the fundamental crisis definition used 
here. A perceived low uncertainty should by all rights alleviate the stress of a crisis 
according to this subjective view, with all the benefits that follow, so of course 
the less accurate information will do the job. If it is good enough to actually see 
the management through to a satisfactory resolution of the crisis, then so much 
the better, but in terms of shaping the stress that causes the problems envisioned 
by the theoretical model, a comforting foundation is all that is needed to let the 
more open approach prevail, which will then hopefully, iteratively, produce better 
and better information as events move along. The politicisation of the two events 
follow a very similar logic. Unsurprisingly, an apparently proactive and to-the-
best-of-our-knowledge approach wins more favour and is much harder to criticise 
than a reactive one where the decision-maker never seems to know anything. In 
the end, the operative response will of course also matter, but gaining that early 
support will – again to no-one’s surprise – offer more room to manoeuvre and 
more freedom of choice for the actual decision-making in a crisis.
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8.3.4 The learning and cybernetic aspects
In the many changes that happened between the tsunami and the Lebanon 
evacuation, perhaps the most outwardly obvious lesson learned was that it is 
politically imperative to look in control. However, under the surface, this is 
obviously not the only learning that has taken place. Indeed, in both case pairs, 
the learning aspect is one that needs some closer examination before we can 
fully appreciate the hypotheses posed in this thesis. In particular, a criticism that 
can be levelled against the entire approach is that, yes, MESO-knowledge and 
organisational stress are conceptually interesting, but is this not just a matter of 
good old-fashioned organisational learning? The Swedish cases look like good 
candidates for single-loop learning, where new and improved methods are devised 
to deal with hitherto unknown problems, and the FBI cases look like an instance 
of double-loop learning, where the bureau reassesses not just the problem itself, 
but its own role and fundamental approach to problem-solving. The fact that 
the operational performance was reduced between the Swedish cases, and the 
fact that solving the supposed critical flaw at Waco did not turn out to be all 
that necessary for bringing the Freemen standoff to a close are both ultimately of 
subordinate interest. At the end of the day, in both case pairs, the actors involved 
improved their crisis management from one event to the next – it is just that the 
lessons learned were not what one might have intuitively expected, which, in a 
sense, just further demonstrates that they are genuine cases of actual learning.
Going back to the fundamentals of the subjective crisis definition, the issue 
that both organisations solved – or at least successfully managed – was to pull 
the legs out from under the trilemma illustrated back in Figure 4 on page 50. 
At UD, and in the Government Offices in general, the critical value at stake 
was almost entirely a political one, albeit with some practical underpinnings: 
avoiding the appearance of being caught flat-footed and incapable of dealing 
with the situation. Instrumental change was put into place to solve exactly that 
problem, and in spite of some initial criticism, the final narrative of the crisis is 
one of accomplishment and success. It may not have been enough to keep the 
incumbent government in power in the election the same year, but for a time, at 
least, past failures had been vindicated. In particular, the systemic flaws that had 
been identified in the disaster commission report had almost all been addressed. 
Yet the odd bird of UD-KC, with its operative, non-diplomatic, non-foreign 
policy focus was no longer treated quite as much as a lesser assignment for less 
competent managers. Formalised means of contact and cooperation had been 
prepared for when the ministry needed to coordinate with domestic agencies and, 
of course, the much-maligned foreign minister had been replaced by someone 
whose apparent primary interest was not to build or further a political career, 
but to solve problems on the international arena. These are cultural changes, 
structural and policy changes, and leadership changes, respectively – all meant 
to remove old bottlenecks and improve the problem-solving capabilities of the 
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ministry. What we do not see are any changes in the overall problem definition 
that would suggest that this is an instance of double-loop learning (Cangelosi & 
Dill 1965; Argyris & Schön 1978, 1996; Huber 1991). At most, the realisation 
that the Foreign Ministry might occasionally deal with domestic – or at least 
domestic-like – matters might count, but this was hardly news. Even at the time, 
the cliché that “abroad” was the largest Swedish county was alive and well, and 
the tsunami crisis simply drove home what this cliché meant in practical terms 
of having to care for a large number of people. Indeed, the arrangements made 
after the crisis largely reinforce the notion that it is not actually the ministry’s job 
to care for these individuals, but rather to expedite their return into the waiting 
arms of their home counties and municipalities, where the regular social safety 
net would take over.
By contrast, the FBI’s lesson from Waco was that, while it was ostensibly – 
and under most ordinary circumstances – a law enforcement agency, this did 
not mean that every problem it would encounter in the field was strictly one of 
law enforcement. Not every hostage barricade situation would have any hostage 
takers that the bureau negotiators could negotiate with for the release of the 
hostages, because the hostages might not exist either. Nor might there be a 
barricade for the tactical team to breach, should those negotiations fail. In fact, 
Waco demonstrated that highly trained negotiators might not even be the best 
suited for those negotiations to begin with. From a historical point of view, the 
failure of military involvement and the use of military tactics at Waco, and the 
subsequent lack of both in Montana, also offers an interesting counter-example 
to the militarisation of U.S. law enforcement that was in full swing during the 
1980:s and 1990:s (cf. Balko 2006; Kohn 2008; Gregory 2014). The learning here 
is not just about figuring out new structures and strategies or about sorting out 
a cultural divide between different branches, although that certainly happened 
too. The establishment of internal and external groups (like CIRG and CIAG), 
and the new policy of intermediary negotiators are some of the examples of that. 
But all of those changes are in service of a fairly drastic redefinition of one of 
the fundamental problems the bureau is meant to solve, as well as of a subtly 
redefined role for the bureau itself in that problem-solving effort. Ultimately, 
the task may still be seen as one of enforcing the law and bringing miscreants to 
justice, but methods for doing so and the reasons behind those methods – rooted 
in a difference of world view and philosophy, rather than just regular criminal 
behaviour – had to be revisited to be fully adept at that task.
Curiously enough, while the learning literature may make this distinction 
between single-loop and double-loop learning, it can also be illustrated in a very 
similar way using the terminology of Steinbruner’s cybernetic approach. As we 
may recall from Section 2.5, there are two essential modes of operating: Track I, 
where problems are analysed and categorised, and solutions picked from a fairly 
fixed and pre-defined set of problem frames; and Track II, where every problem is 
continuously given a trial-and-error treatment, and a specific solution is evolved 
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through rapid iteration. In this perspective, the Swedish cases demonstrate an 
organisation that has a Track I-style behaviour, and where the major change 
between the two cases is that new categories and new solutions have been added 
to the repertoire. Some strategies that were tested during the tsunami crisis had 
become standard procedures by the time the Lebanon war came along. Other 
strategies had been conceived of, but the opportunity was missed the first time 
around, so they were rolled out during the Lebanon crisis before it is too late. 
The consistency of a known problem with a known solution is very much at play 
here, and the appearance of these kinds of standard practices is perhaps not all 
that surprising when we are dealing with such a large organisation that has to 
operate in so many places at once, with a constant risk of losing contact between 
the different offices. It is the stereotypical bureaucratic rigidity in action: even 
if the solution might not always be optimal, at least it removes the uncertainty 
of having inconsistencies in how the supposedly unitary government interacts 
with the individual citizen.
Again this can be contrasted against the U.S. cases, which more represent a 
move from Track I to Track II behaviour. Where the FBI approach was previously 
heavily regimented and directed by standard operating practices (SOP), but 
where the core assumptions turned out to be disastrously inconsistent with the 
reality the special agents were facing, it was later altered to be more accepting of 
and attentive to those inconsistencies, so that the procedures could be constantly 
tweaked and (hopefully) improved on to meet the latest challenge. The fear that 
this Track II behaviour might revert to Track I remains unrealised because of the 
conscious effort to let things take time and to spend that time on trial-and-error 
experimentation for reducing the very uncertainty that might otherwise trigger 
the move back to pure consistency-seeking. The Track II behaviour becomes 
self-sustaining – perhaps even self-reinforcing – through a cycle of defusing the 
time pressure of the crisis, using that lowered pressure to experiment, and removing 
ambiguity and uncertainty through the experimentation, which then further 
defuses the pressure of the crisis. The change is not just one of new solutions, 
but of a new logic of problem-solving. The difference between the two cases is 
unfortunately such that we cannot fully know what the effects would have been 
if the uncertainty and ambiguity in dealing with the Freemen had increased and 
thus triggered the same undynamic behaviour exhibited at Waco. Still, there 
are some hints to that effect. As time wore on and the negotiations seemed as 
stalled as they ever were with the Davidians, old ideas of repressive tactics such 
as the deprivation of electrical power and direct contact with the outside world 
resurfaced and were put into action. From an experimental standpoint, it is 
almost unfortunate that this Track I-style reversion coincided within a few days 
with the Track II-style experiment in the form of a completely new negotiation 
approach, using the CAUSE lawyers as an intermediary. The latter proved highly 
constructive, the influence of the former was left uncertain, and the stand-off 
was brought to an end within a matter of days. 
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The learning and cybernetic perspectives on what changes between the events, 
and how the two case pairs differ from each other, are interesting in their own 
right and even complementary to each other. We can not only describe a learning 
process or a difference in approach, but also start to explain exactly what was 
changed in the process and what caused the difference in mindset to occur between 
otherwise very similar cases. So why is this not enough? Why do we need to 
muddy the waters by bringing in the idea of knowledge, especially with the new 
conceptualisation offered through the distinction between meta-knowledge, 
empathic knowledge, and second-order knowledge? What does knowledge 
management bring to the table that is not already there?
For one, this combination still does not really explain what has been learned 
other than some broadly defined behaviours and potentially ambiguous  structural 
changes. As briefly discussed in Chapter 2, there are numerous artefacts of apparent 
learning that turn out to be almost completely vacuous. Fantasy documents 
show that on-paper change of structures and procedures may have little to no 
effect on how things are really done, and the concept of superstitious learning 
suggests that actual change may just be done for the sake of change, without 
any real practical applicability to the actual problems at hand. It is one thing to 
say that an organisation has begun relying on Track II-style experimentation to 
deal with a dynamic problem space; it tells us nothing as to whether that experi-
mentation is really appropriate for the situation or whether it is truly effective or 
not. Similarly, it may be interesting to observe the shift in tracks and how it is 
a response to a crisis, but exactly why the crisis would trigger one behaviour over 
the other is left unanswered. For another, the exact nature and reasons behind the 
 consistency-seeking experimentation, and especially of a change from one to the 
other, are left vague and uncertain. There is also the problem that learning is most 
commonly conceptualised as something that happens between events: you learn 
from one to behave differently during the next, but there is very little to account 
for changes that may occur, say, during a crisis. The feedback process stretches 
over years, and the distinctions made in the cybernetic approach are assumed to 
be deeply ingrained mindsets that also only slowly change over time. But what 
happens in the dynamic environment of a crisis? These perspectives offer very 
little in the way of explanation for how behaviours might change moment to 
moment in response to, not just the evolution of the event itself, but the setbacks 
and serendipities of the organisation tasked with dealing with the crisis. Why 
does an organisation that experiments to find customised solutions on a daily 
basis – which both UD and the FBI do by virtue of having to deal with so many 
unique individual cases – suddenly become inflexible when the pressure mounts? 
Both perspectives deal with forms of organisational cognition, but do so with 
fairly limited means of dealing with how that cognition may be affected by the 
moment to moment change of an evolving situation.
Adding knowledge to the mix allows for a “medium” that this cognition 
may act on or through. The different cybernetic tracks use, produce, and trans-
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form knowledge, and learning explains how not just the knowledge itself, but 
the processes behind it are encoded within the organisation for future use. 
Knowledge management in and of itself offers some additional suggestions on 
how these creative and transformative processes may work on a daily basis, but 
it, too, presupposes a fairly generous timespan to let the process take place. 
Instead, its real value is in how it conceptualises knowledge and how it exposes 
an important social aspect to the act of knowing that lets us unravel and put a 
name on the actual activities that go on behind the scenes of those learning and 
experimentation activities.
8.3.5 Preparedness and prevention – amending the model?
Before going into detail about how the knowledge and behavioural perspectives 
offered by this thesis help us describe those activities, it is worth mentioning one 
thing that learning does that is not accounted for in the model. Learning, especially 
as it is used in crisis research, is commonly seen as the process that happens in 
the space between one crisis and the next. These lessons create a preparedness for 
future events and which might even prevent future crises outright. The Montana 
case is a text-book example: learning from Waco, the FBI prepared for future 
cases where there might be a need to coordinate and compromise between the 
slow-burning long-term strategy of negotiation and the violent shock of a tactical 
intervention, and for events when the bureau’s in-house analytical competence 
might not be sufficient to fully grasp the complexity of the situation. In doing 
so, the FBI did not outright prevent the Montana stand-off, but it was able to 
keep it from escalating into a full-blown crisis.
The model of the pressure on organisations does not particularly take such 
preparations into account, even though they could conceivably be explained 
through the proper use of MESO-knowledge. Gaps, knowledge needs, and 
knowledge holders are identified before the fact, and connections are made in 
case the need should ever arise. However, a prepared organisation has in many 
way short-circuited the problem context the model is meant to help us under-
stand. With sufficient preparedness, the processes are fully anticipated, and the 
ambiguities of a potential crisis are resolved before they even arise. Thus, there 
is no pressure that might effect the more closed behaviour and the restricted 
knowledge use the model predicts. The exact answers might not already exist 
within the organisation, but there is certainty about where they can be found, 
and the ambiguity of outcome is at least temporarily displaced to whomever 
is supposed to provide those answers. That is not to say that the answers will 
always be perfect. The mention of a temporary displacement is very deliberate, 
as misjudgement or miscommunication may still throw the whole thing off and 
trigger a crisis of its own. In some sense, this dynamic is encapsulated in the 
feedback mechanisms between MESO usage and the crisis and anticipation of 
process, but as the model illustrates, that feedback still presupposes that there 
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is some initial pressure that can either be deflated or reinforced by the proper 
application of knowledge, and that the feedback thus further reinforces whatever 
positive or negative effects there might be from the pre-existing pressure and the 
organisation’s response to that pressure. 
Reintroducing learning could help us capture that long-term dynamic without 
removing clarity from the current model of organisational pressure. The learning 
process would not be an in-event feedback loop, but rather the formalisation 
and encoding of new-found MESO-knowledge into the organisation as a whole, 
creating a new backdrop of assumptions, problem spaces, solution spaces, and 
anticipations that form the perception of the next event. Knowledge gaps identified 
during one crisis become part of the meta-knowledge that contextualises the next 
crisis. Likewise, empathic knowledge acquired when solving a given problem might 
set up anticipations for the next time the same problem arises, and the exchanges 
triggered by second-order knowledge may bloom into full-blown communities of 
practice by the time the next unforeseen event occurs. Rather than modulating 
the pressure here and now, this stored knowledge dictates future characteristics 
and capabilities of crisis preparedness and response, maybe even to the extent that 
the crisis can be avoided altogether because the next time, the exact nature can 
immediately be identified and the right knowledge brought to bear to solve it.
At the same time, we should perhaps be careful not to try to encode all forms 
of learning as an extension of this kind of feedback. MESO-knowledge is about 
increasingly self-referential layers of knowledge, and not about the skills required 
to tackle the technical or operational aspects of, say, planning an evacuation or 
negotiating a hostage release. These skills can of course also be learned from one 
case to the next, but that is not the learning that we are trying to capture here. 
At most, that type of learning would manifest itself as yet another point in the 
knowledge audit that forms the basis for meta-knowledge: since the last time, 
we now also know how to solve this particular problem. The ability to solve it 
needs to be kept separate from the knowledge that this ability now exists. That 
kind of instrumental learning is already sufficiently captured in the basic concept 
of organisational learning that we do not need to complicate matters further by 
mixing in MESO-knowledge. Indeed, the whole point of introducing the new 
knowledge categories is that they try to capture something completely different, 
so mixing them up would just defeat the purpose of having those categories to 
begin with.
Likewise, while there have been plenty of allusions so far that MESO-
knowledge may help in anticipating the processes of interaction with others, that 
kind of anticipation assumes that the interaction will be about information and 
knowledge sharing – processes that fall under the umbrella of either empathic 
knowledge or second-order knowledge. However, the anticipation of process 
could just as well be entirely a matter of explicit knowledge: some very specific 
but easily explained format has to be used, information has to be requested using 
a certain form, certain honourifics should always be used when addressing certain 
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individuals, and so on. Or it could be something as simple as remembering to 
always record incoming calls or meeting protocols correctly, because otherwise, 
time will be lost – and stress generated – when someone asks for an audit of 
how things have been handled so far. Especially in a political and bureaucratic 
context, this procedural tracking of activities can easily become a focus point of 
the accountability phase that comes after a crisis. The lingering crisis after the 
tsunami illustrates this perfectly, as do the accusations of evidence tampering 
levelled against the FBI after Waco. Learning not to make those types of mistakes 
has nothing to do with the kind of mutual understanding and trust-building 
that goes into creating empathic knowledge, but is rather a case of accumulating 
regular procedural or tacit knowledge.
No matter what type of knowledge we are talking about, though, there is a 
clear distinction to be made between the kind of learning that happens between 
events, which sets up the general context of anticipation and of problem definition 
of those events, and the kind of in-event feedback that happens as the current 
situation is continuously reinterpreted (or further misinterpreted) and as new 
knowledge is brought to bear.
8.4 What have we gained?
So what have we learned from this lengthy examination? I would highlight in 
particular three gains as valuable outcomes of this study: an expanded conceptual-
isation of knowledge to include the social context in which knowledge is created 
and used; a model of how external pressures affect the behaviour of organisations, 
and thereby indirectly affect how well they make use of these new categories of 
knowledge; and knowledge as an indicator of organisational learning.
8.4.1 Knowledge – more than just tacit and explicit
In examining the knowledge management literature, and in particular the 
SECI process of transforming and transferring tacit and explicit knowledge, I 
have found that there is an underlying assumption inherent in those processes 
about who holds knowledge, and how that knowledge finds its way to a new 
recipient in need of that knowledge. In order to successfully realise the sourcing 
and grafting of new knowledge, two principal pieces of the puzzle are required. 
First, one must sort out the tangled weave of what already is and is not known. 
Through the use of knowledge audits and capability gap analyses, an organisation 
can build up a repository of what I have chosen to call meta knowledge – that is, 
knowledge about knowledge. This includes not just what is known within the 
organisation already, but also what knowledge is missing and yet required on a 
regular basis to tackle the problems the organisation is tasked with solving. It 
should not be confused with the actual skills, capabilities, or areas of expertise 
themselves – meta knowledge is the awareness of those skills and abilities, or of 
the lack thereof.
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Second, the same type of analysis needs to be done on external knowledge 
holders to find out who among them have the capability of filling in the gaps 
uncovered by the audit. As the use of this capability generally does not come for 
free, it also helps to gain an understanding of the other party’s gaps and whether 
or not the one’s own organisation can help with that problem. I have chosen 
to call this empathic knowledge’ the knowledge of the abilities and needs of the 
other in relation to one’s own abilities and needs. Meta-knowledge and empathic 
knowledge are themselves explicit types of knowledge, at least on paper. They 
could conceivably be stored and presented as long lists of skills and areas of 
expertise that are already identified and/or located. Together, these two knowledge 
types will allow an organisation to identify and solve most known problem by 
pre-emptively sourcing internal or external expertise to handle those problems.
However, there is one critical hitch in this setup: the assumption that the 
problems are already known. For the cases when they are not, a third type of 
knowledge is needed. This, I have chosen to call second-order knowledge, or the 
knowledge of how to know more. This concept covers two main skills. The first 
is the ability to combine meta-knowledge and empathic knowledge to figure out 
that there are additional gaps not covered by the own organisation or by other 
know knowledge holders. An especially tangled instance would entail knowing 
that a contact has a contact dealing with some kind of problem you hardly 
even know exist, much less understand. The other skill is one of knowing how 
to ask the right questions and ensuring the quality of the answer, in spite of not 
having any in-depth knowledge of the topic. This, too, is an aspect of combining 
meta-knowledge and empathic knowledge: being aware of your own limitations, 
but also of the limitations of others, and in knowing that, you have a greater 
chance of intelligently communicating exactly what the gaps in your knowledge 
are and what problem you believe you are trying to solve. Unlike meta-knowledge 
and empathic knowledge, second-order knowledge is more tacit: it is a process 
rather than an easily expressed statement of fact, in particular the knowledge of 
how to ask and receive answers, since these can only be acquired in the interaction 
with others. As such, while it may be the most useful in a critical and confusing 
situation, it is also the most difficult to transfer or mass-produce within the 
organisation. Instead, chances are that it will exist in specific knowledge nodes, 
perhaps attached to looser interest groups or communities of practice that the 
organisation is involved with.
Second-order knowledge is a remedy to what I have come to call the identi-
fication paradox: the inability to properly identify a problem because you do not 
even know whom or what to ask to get a clear understanding of the problem. 
This issue is further reinforced when the problem at hand seems very similar 
to a different problem that you do understand – confirmation bias and similar 
cognitive errors pretty much guarantee that it will be misidentified as something 
it is not, leading to attempts to employ wholly unsuited solutions that may even 
make the problem worse.
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While these concepts offer an interesting new way of categorising knowledge – by 
layers of introspective awareness rather than by the ease of expression and trans-
mission that characterises the normal tacit/explicit split – they are not of much 
use on their own. Rather, they get their value from how they allow us to study, 
and perhaps even measure, organisational openness and organisational learning.
8.4.2 The pressure on organisations
By identifying the core components of crises – in particular the tension between 
urgency and uncertainty – and mapping them against theories of coping mechanisms 
used to resolve those tensions, I have devised a model of organisational behaviour 
under stress, where an increase in pressure makes the organisation “close” itself 
and increasingly rely on tried, tested, and “safe” methods of solving problems. In 
addition, I have identified an additional source of a similar kind of pressure in 
the form of unanticipated demands to adhere to a specific process when solving 
problems. Where crises are inherently uncertain, which provokes a fall-back 
to known procedures to relieve at least some of that uncertainty, unanticipated 
processes create uncertainty, in part because the process itself is an unwelcome 
surprise, and in part because it keeps the organisation from using those familiar 
processes that would relieve the uncertainty.
I posit that this pressure alters the organisation’s “mindset” – that is, whether 
it is open or closed; whether it prefers rigidity and consistency over flexibility 
and dynamic outcomes. I further posit that the degree of openness and closed-
ness will affect how well the organisation makes use of its MESO-knowledge. 
However, this is not a one-way relationship. Instead, there are feedback loops 
that allow MESO-usage to affect the perception of a crisis and the response to 
unanticipated processes, either negatively or positively, which may then further 
inhibit or allow a new cycle of MESO usage. Coupled with an inherent degree 
of openness or closed-ness of any organisational design, this means that some 
organisations are predisposed towards a self-reinforcing negative spiral where 
they close up and make themselves increasingly resistant to the use of external 
expertise. Conversely, other organisations are predisposed towards a self-reinforcing 
positive spiral where challenge opens up new avenues of flexibility and dynamic 
problem-solving.
Testing these hypotheses against two case pairs has shown that even a slight 
tendency towards increased openness seems to drastically improve the MESO 
usage. In one case, this fact then allows for a slow but systematic diffusion of 
the pressure of the situation, to the point where it can no longer really be called 
a crisis. None of the three hypotheses presented at the head of this chapter can be 
falsified, although the relationship between openness and MESO usage envisioned in 
Hypothesis III is at the same time more vague, but the effects more pronounced, 
than was initially predicted.
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Nevertheless, the model and the categorisation of organisational behaviour is 
helpful in understanding what motivates those behaviours and what the conse-
quences of them are. While presented as such here for methodological reasons, 
these categories are not, strictly speaking, categorical, but exist on a continuum 
depending largely on the purpose of the organisation, as well as on its situated-
ness in a larger context. In particular, it offers a framework for explaining how 
different political and public-administrative demands translate into different 
knowledge needs, and how this in turn comes around to offer differing capabilities 
to approach problem-solving in an exploratory or rigid manner. None of the 
individual observations are all that revelatory or shocking, but the dynamics – 
especially the self-reinforcing nature of knowledge use, and indeed the influence 
of such a basic concept as knowledge – are important for further understanding 
both the general case of organisations caught in an unfamiliar situation, and in 
the specific empirical cases used to test and illustrate these dynamics.
Empirically, the model has allowed me to dissect the cases from a fresh 
perspective to highlight a number of factors for both success and failure, and of 
particular note is the observation that success is far from an objective measure. The 
Lebanon case is of singular interest in this regard, in that it has won a historical 
reputation as a success story in spite of some really questionable crisis manage-
ment, all because there was only one measure of success that really mattered: 
the political symbol of an active government. What this meant on the ground 
was of lesser importance. Similarly, I have been able to capture and analyse 
that very rare species of crisis: the one that did not happen. The Montana case 
is a complete mirror-case of the débâcle at Waco, to the point where it should 
perhaps not even be called a crisis at all. Critical components required for that 
label were defined away at an early stage, and a lot of effort went into keeping 
matters that way throughout the stand-off. Here, perhaps more than in any of 
the other cases, the cycle of using of knowledge to defuse a crisis; and using the 
lack of a crisis to allow the sourcing and grafting of more knowledge is laid bare. 
The end result is a case that almost challenges the very definition of good crisis 
management but being so well-managed that the crisis went away. It is only 
really in comparison to its case twin, and knowing the disastrous consequences 
of all the similar decision points but different roads taken, that we can identify 
and imagine the potential disaster that was avoided.
Both Montana and Lebanon are thus “successful” cases, but for very different 
reasons. Again, from a purely empirical standpoint, this is a rare bird to catch in 
its own right, and having such similar, yet very different earlier cases to compare 
against, allows for an unusually clear-cut comparison of the nature of those 
differences and the effects they had on the final outcome. While the empirical 
matter is not intended as a primary contribution, it is still worth pointing out, 
especially in the all but forgotten Montana case.
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8.4.3 A measure of learning
The last major contribution I offer is the use of MESO-knowledge as an indicator 
for learning. The organisational learning literature can at times be scattered in 
its focus, but if there is a single common theme, it is that learning is difficult 
to study, not just because the concepts themselves can be complex, but because 
they are notoriously difficult to measure. Learning in the form of policy reform 
has generally proven a bit easier to trace and analyse since the output in the form 
of new policies is at least easy to find, if still difficult to classify (cf. Argyris & 
Schön 1978, 1996; Dekker & Hansén 2004; Birkland 2006; Nohrstedt 2007; 
Boin 2008; Hansén 2007; Deverell 2010:36). What I have presented in the 
cases in this study is not policy reform, however, but tangible change in the 
organisations involved. Rather than relying on ambiguous structural changes, 
or near impossible-to-observe cultural changes, or almost wholly internalised 
problem frames, I have fond an artefact that, while it offers some alternate 
explanations for how it changes, can also be studied in a long-term perspective 
to try to identify meaningful change, both as generated by single-loop learning 
and by double-loop learning. Second-order learning remains tricky, but should 
not actually be impossible to pick out, even at a distance, based on how the 
organisation sets itself up to deal with its knowledge needs.
The main limitation is that detecting second-order learning through MESO-
knowledge is a one-shot deal. It is one way to effect that particular type of learning, 
and once the principles of knowledge acquisitions have been accepted and work 
has been done to start acquiring new knowledge, the lesson is learned. Short of 
the organisation abandoning the practice altogether and then restarting from 
scratch, it is not really a lesson that can be learned twice in a row.
For single- and double-loop learning, on the other hand, the acquisition and 
encoding of new knowledge can be treated as instances of learning, as illustrated 
in the previous section. I posit that we can treat MESO-knowledge as a set of 
organisational skills that can be trained and altered over time, and that each 
such instance can be treated as a case of learning. It still behoves us to evaluate 
exactly what type of learning each such acquisition represents. In the Montana 
case, I argue that the evolution of a full set of MESO-knowledge structures and 
practices would suggest that second-order learning is taking place. I would also 
argue that the way these structures and practices are used in the case suggests that 
this is not any kind of false learning, but an honest and largely successful attempt 
on the FBI’s part to redefine itself as well as the problem in order to properly 
deal with a newly discovered set of issues. Conversely, the Swedish cases do not 
have that full set of skill development, but rather a limited set of connections 
through which meta-knowledge and empathic knowledge could be employed. 
And irrespective of the end goal – whether it was just to send a political message, 
or if it was truly an attempt to do better that did not fully succeed – the fact 
remains that changes were made to improve the knowledge flow and problem 
solving. As such, it readily seems to qualify for genuine single-loop learning.
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In some sense, and as previously discussed, the entire model could conceivably 
be used in a similar way. A deliberate change from one mindset to the other 
should also be a strong indicator of learning, but of exactly what is a matter to 
be decided for each individual case. The indicators for openness or closed-ness 
can fairly trivially be turned into indicators for learning, but it remains to be 
argued what the lesson is for each shift and whether or not this is actually an 
appropriate lesson in relation to whatever triggered the change. In one case, 
a change of principles towards stronger regulation may be positive learning 
in response to a failure caused by arbitrary and unfair decisions; in another, a 
change of instrumental work-flow from rigidity to flexibility may be a case of 
positive learning in response to trying (and failing) to apply the same rules to 
everyone, no matter how absurd the consequences. The question is what problem 
the organisation is trying to solve and what measures it is taking to effect that 
solution. The changes may manifest themselves in just the acquisition of specific 
MESO-knowledge skills or they may show up as entire mindset changes. Either 
way, the model and the methodology for applying it offer a reasonably clean 
and simple way of capturing such changes without the same difficulties and 
ambiguities of interpretation of already vague indicators that are often used to 
capture organisational learning.
As potentially valuable as this ability to measure learning is, it still leaves one 
critical issue in the learning literature unresolved – indeed, it could be argued that 
it almost makes it worse. Part of the point in studying organisational learning is 
a desire to improve that learning process. By adding in the MESO-knowledge 
concept, we have also added a complication to that part of the problem and we 
need to figure out what the conditions are for learning these apparently valuable 
skills. Simply treating them as indicators of learning tells us nothing of how and 
why they happen, and might actually just act as yet another layer of abstraction 
that keeps us away from understanding the mechanisms behind that learning 
process. With the predictability of the sun rising in the morning, in spite of this 
improvement in our tool set, we have to fall back on that old scientific chestnut: 
more research is needed.
8.4.4 Generalisability
Before employing these new strategies willy-nilly, it is first imperative that we 
consider how well they apply to anything at all. There have been a couple of 
evasions in the analysis that need to be reeled back in and re-examined. The 
first of these is the discussion of how task and domain complexity affects the 
organisation. In the discussion on foreign and domestic arenas and institutional 
design, I briefly strayed into arguing that a higher complexity automatically leads 
to a higher degree of closed-ness as a direct effect of one of the core assumptions 
behind the model: the more uncertainty, the more the organisation will tend 
towards a closed behaviour, and of course, the broader and the more complex 
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a given issue area is, the more the inherent uncertainty will be. The question 
is, then, whether this is a general pattern between complexity and closed-ness, 
or whether it is a combination effect of, in this particular case, the fact that the 
foreign-policy arena is complex, and that it is also not split up to nearly the 
same extent as the domestic arena. Conceptually, the latter seems more sensible, 
but this study is too limited to offer any kind of definitive answer. At the same 
time, it may very well be that while there is a lot of breadth to the foreign arena, 
there is not quite as much depth to it; furthermore, it becomes someone else’s 
domestic arena, and they would prefer if everyone else did not stick their noses 
too far into it. In that case, the worry over comparing foreign against domestic 
may be overblown, but again, the study is too limited to say so the worry will 
have to remain for now.
At any rate, there is a caveat attached to the study – and in particular the 
comparison – of different organisations in different fields. We should probably 
suspect some inherent differences in openness just based on the differing scopes 
and complexities of the fields alone. If we add in such variables as demanding 
different levels of security or having different origins, or even just attracting 
different professions, then suddenly the preferences may swing wildly, and 
with them the baseline for where we can expect to find the organisation on the 
open–closed spectrum before any kind of external pressure has been applied. For 
much the same reasons, we should probably expect different elasticity in their 
response to that pressure – some start out very open, but will shut down hard if 
they encounter any kind of stressful situation. Others may be far more closed 
inherently, but will not budge towards increased closed-ness even as the pressure 
mounts. Put in more practical (if perhaps extreme) terms, we should probably 
not expect a municipal library to exhibit the same baseline-and-response curve 
as an emergency service station. 
Still, we should expect the same pattern of falling back on the familiar and 
know – that is a move towards a more closed behaviour – when things start to 
fall apart. But even then, there is a false positive to watch out for. It is easy to 
imagine that a completely unprepared and unthinking response may end up 
looking dynamic when what it really should be called is “chaotic.” What we 
need to remember in attaching these labels is that these are pretty deeply rooted 
principles of how work should be done, why it should be done that way, and 
what outcome everyone expects out of those choices. An apparent flexibility from 
an organisations that never do anything different, except this one time, should 
not distract us from that general pattern. It is more likely that they have tried 
to do the same as always this time too, but it has had no positive effect, so now 
they are desperately trying anything they can think of. Once the panic is over, 
though, they will go back to that comforting rigidity and even if a new response 
is learned, it just means this response will be as rigidly applied as the rest.
Another issue in regards to applicability and generalisability is the core 
assumption in this whole study that knowledge matters. That is not to say that 
the whole thing has been a waste of effort, but that it is not hard to imagine an 
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organisation where external expertise will only very rarely be an issue. It may 
be less of an issue with public organisations since they generally provide some 
kind of service to society at large, and society tends to be fairly interconnected. 
It would require a very high degree of specialisation and yet a very low general 
usefulness of that specialist competence, but at the same time, a wide array of 
internal competence so as to not be dependent on any outside organisations. Some 
of the more self-contained high-reliablity organisations might qualify, because all 
prerequisite competence must already be in place to maintain that reliability for 
one reason or another, either because the organisation is geographically isolated or 
because the work is so sensitive that no-one can be allowed to interfere without 
previous clearance. But even in these cases, the general principles of the study 
are still applicable – we just have to be careful if we want to make comparisons 
across such wildly different organisation types, and control or compensate for 
those differences. It is a limitation on the clustering of study objects more than 
a limitation on the methodology and theoretical assumptions.
8.4.5 Methodological improvements
It is in these gaps that we find one of the main sources of methodological 
improvements. The case selection for this study has been one of finding very 
similar pairs, so as to show what a difference even small variations will generate. 
There was also a strong preference to contrast (perceived) success against failure. 
As such, the variations in my dependent variables were not as large as it could 
have been, in particular as far as truly separating the effects of crises from those 
of unanticipated processes. The only truly divergent case here is Lebanon, which 
only varies in respect to degree of anticipation compared to its case twin. Ideally, 
a complementary case pair could have been found where only the degree of crisis 
changes, but the degree of anticipation remains constant between the success 
and the failure.
Part of this is also related to a different methodological issue that had to 
be addressed and semi-corrected on the fly to really bring the point home: 
the variables are described as degrees, but are only really measured as binaries. 
As demonstrated throughout Section 8.2, this causes problems when trying 
to separate how very closed the high-scoring tsunami case is compared to the 
only-slightly-lower scoring Lebanon case. In the end, it can clumsily be solved 
by talking in terms of “trend towards” or by counting indicators, even though 
there has been no regard for the weighting of how valuable each indicator is 
compared to the rest, and no attempt has been made to turn this into a proper 
quantitative method. The numbers are there to show the trend, not to be of any 
kind of absolute value. Returning briefly to the question of generalisability, this 
is also a methodological weakness that needs to be addressed if we ever want to 
mix and match more divergent actors and cases. For the purposes of this study, 
the method is sufficient, but still in dire need of improvement to allow more 
data points from more objects of study.
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A related issue is that of different quality (and quantity) of source material. One 
of the reasons why this course method was chosen was because the cases are so 
different: Waco and the tsunami, being highly publicised disastrous failures, will 
have far more voluminous and far more detailed material available compared 
to the self-congratulatory success of the Lebanon evacuation and the terminally 
boring Montana case when nothing happened and everyone stopped reporting. 
Consequently, it was far easier to find the prerequisite detailed descriptions of 
the knowledge gaps and communications failures in the two unsuccessful cases 
than in the successful ones, which as discussed in Chapter 3 may unduly bias the 
failures towards appearing more negative, and the successes towards appearing 
more positive because those are the respective narratives history leaves behind. 
On top of that, the biases themselves may be uneven, making the negatives seem 
more negative than the positives are positive, again due to the different interest 
and level of detail in the surviving accounts. The coarse categorisation helps take 
the edge off of those biases, but the ideally, of course, that should not be needed.
For future studies, then, what is needed is a way to gradually appraise the 
principles, instruments, and preferred outcomes of the organisation studied, so as 
to offer a wider variance for the open–closed spectrum. Similarly, the deviations 
for determining the anticipation of process could be refined, offering further 
indicators for different levels of requirements, ambiguities, uncertainties and 
mistrust. The MESO usage already has some variance built into the fact that 
there are three different knowledge types, and that they are somewhat hierarchical; 
empathic knowledge is of little use without meta-knowledge to guide it. No 
matter how much of the latter is used, it still does not do much good without a 
solid foundation based on what the organisation actually needs to know. Here, 
too, adding degrees to each indicator would help, but the problem is that the 
degrees have to be contextual to the situation. A long-lasting, dynamic, and very 
complex situation might generate an inordinate amount of consultation across all 
three knowledge types, or it may generate very few instances of meta-knowledge 
usage because it just so happens to fall within the existing competence of the 
organisations, or vice versa.
As tricky as the knowledge side is, though, the supposed “degree of crisis” is 
probably the worst. In part because it intuitively sounds like a very odd concept: 
surely, it either is a crisis or it is not – how do we find degrees in that? In part 
because the crisis definition used here is subjective, so the degree of crisis may 
vary from nil to complete chaos and disaster depending on whom you ask within 
a single organisation, or even a single decision-making group. For the purpose 
of this thesis, the distinction has really been between “high” and “low”, perhaps 
with an unspoken allowance for “none” in the case of Montana. A different crisis 
definition could conceivably be employed, but care would have to be taken to 
ensure that it still adheres to the same tradition and view on knowledge and 
learning, and of the importance of both time and uncertainty, or the main thrust 
in studying knowledge use under crisis would be lost.
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8.4.6 Research agenda
Aside from these methodological quandaries, which for the most part lack a 
workable solution at the moment, there a couple of very specific studies that 
need to be made to further test the model and challenge some of the assumptions 
it has generated. One has already been mentioned: the inclusion of a case pair 
where the variance between success and failure is a different degree of crisis, but 
with a constant degree of anticipation. This would fill out an annoying void 
in the kinds of variance tested for, and might perhaps even begin giving some 
hints on what matters more – crisis or anticipation. Even so, without a more 
quantitatively designed large-N study, that matter will have to rest. It is also 
debatable if it really matters that much if crises stress organisations more than 
surprise – a better addition would probably be to test for other stress factors, 
such as trying to differentiate political pressure from operative performance or to 
have more explicit time pressures or limited resources. Of course, the pre-existing 
pressure from crisis makes these specific examples a bit more difficult since they 
are all already encompassed within the larger conflict between time pressure and 
values at stake conflict that is inherent in the crisis definition. George’s trade-off 
dilemmas (Figure 5 on page 52) offer some potential additions in the form of 
acceptability, support, and decision quality, but some inventiveness is obviously 
needed in figuring out more source of pressure.
Another avenue of refinement and research is to try to disentangle the questions 
of issue domain and complexity, of bureaucratic situatedness, and of strategic 
versus operative problem solving. At the moment, these three offer no real useful 
variation between the subjects studied since they all covary: the foreign-policy 
domain organisation is also situated just below the political level and is also (sup-
posed to be) solving strategic problems. The other organisation offers the exact 
opposite in every respect. What is needed is a foreign-arena organisation that 
explicitly does operative problem-solving and a domestic-arena strategic actor, 
but preferably still with some distance to the political layer so that it cane be 
contrasted against a domestic-arena organisation under strong political  control. 
Ideally, a purely operative organisation that is under direct political control 
would fill out the roster, but even with a system that allows for direct ministerial 
control, that mix between high and low will most likely not see many useful 
candidates. Instead, what is needed is a better-balanced controlled comparison 
between the domains, ensuring that the issue areas are of equal complexity and, 
that the stresses they are under are of somewhat equal magnitude.
Likewise, the potential for bureaucratic competition covaries with the other 
influences that are said to affect openness or closed-ness. Here, we would need to 
find otherwise very similar organisations, but with and without that competitive 
element, respectively, which then need to be tested against various calm and 
stressful situations to see what effect that competition has on how the organisa-
tions tend towards or away from a closed behaviour.
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Filling out with additional case pairs helps build on the comparisons that have 
begun in this thesis, but the need for more depends entirely on which part of 
the hypothesis we are interested in testing further. It is not really until we involve 
Hypothesis III – the relationship between open and closed and the use of MESO-
knowledge – that the factor of success and failure and of the feedback loops that 
further support or undermine those outcomes come into play. At the same time, 
it is also this relationship that is the least well supported by the existing findings, 
and which needs the most testing. An additional benefit is that such a set-up 
would also forcibly include more successful – by some measure – events, which 
are empirically scarce and, if nothing else, in need of discovery and cataloguing.
Last but not least, the fundamental MESO-knowledge concept upon which 
everything else rests needs refinement. In this thesis, the reintegration of MESO-
knowledge into learning, or vice versa, has mostly been a matter of acknowledging 
that there is an sizeable literature devoted to very similar concepts, but looking 
at distinctly different indicators, and of suggesting that knowledge may be used 
as a back-door into the study of a notoriously elusive phenomenon. Further 
refinement of this idea is needed, as well as empirical tests of the soundness 
of the methodology. Looking beyond that, it also touches on a larger aspect 
of the foundational ideas of Cyert & March (1963), Cangelosi & Dill (1965) 
and Polanyi (1966). In the six decades that have passed since, the concept of 
organisational knowledge has splintered into four fairly distinct topics: basic 
organisational learning, the idea of The Learning Organisation, the notion of 
organisational knowledge, and finally knowledge management. Other, related 
fields such as policy studies or crisis management studies have borrowed heavily 
from these ideas, but in splintering from that common root, fewer and fewer of 
them seem to borrow from each other. This study has tried to integrate some of 
the ideas of knowledge management into crisis management – a field that so far 
has mostly been concerned with learning as an aspect of the crisis management 
process. Perhaps it is time to widen that ambition and try to reintegrate parts 
of knowledge management directly into organisational learning and vice versa. 
In the end, it is a matter of creating and distributing actionable knowledge, and 
keeping them less strictly separated might do both fields some good.
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Executive summary
Who knows what, where, when, and how?
Hindsight is 20/20, as the saying goes. Anyone who studies decision-making 
during high-profile crises – or even just during tense and high-stress situations 
– will quickly come to learn how large a factor this post-fact insight can be in 
the final judgement of how the crisis was managed. It is a rule more than an 
exception that a general sense of “they should have known better” will arise in 
the aftermath of any traumatic event. If such opinions are not voiced, it is likely 
because no one really noticed that anything went wrong in the first place. This, in 
turn, only seems to reinforce the basic notion: when things go right, apparently 
the decision-makers did not know better.
However, as prevailing as this opinion may be, “should” is a very loaded 
and ambiguous modus and it raises a number of questions as to how fitting 
this conclusion really is and on what basis it is made. What should they have 
known? What difference would it have made if they had known? Are we even 
sure they did not know; perhaps it was just a calculated risk that turned out 
wrong this one time, or perhaps it appears as if it would simply not make any 
practical difference? Moreover, who are “they” that should have been engaged 
in this whole knowing business: the entire organisation, the decision-making 
group, the individual decision-makers, or the subject-matter experts who were 
supposed to advise all of the above? Above all, why should “they” have known? It 
may have been convenient and desirable if they had access to some key insight, 
but was such wish-fulfilment at all possible given the circumstances? Indeed, 
every single word in the common notion of “they should have known better” is 
open for debate, or even outright questionable.
While technocratic rule in policy- and decision-making has waxed and waned 
in popularity and influence over the years, it still remains an ever-present factor 
in modern bureaucracies. The Western tradition of public administration fun-
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damentally rests on a model of subdividing the governing of society into specific 
areas of expertise. An extensive and intricate structure of ministries, agencies, 
and offices has been constructed to distribute authority and responsibility for 
the running of various state functions. Each of them is then further divided into 
units or departments with a specific area of expertise (cf. Weber 1922; Mintzberg 
1979; Fischer 2009:17ff). Thus, the expert has long been at the very heart of the 
government structure , but as complexity has increased and different issue areas 
have become more interlinked, the specific set of expertise needed for a given 
problem has also become increasingly difficult to find in this distributed web of 
roles and responsibilities.
Yet another twist to the issue of “they should have known” is presented when 
considering who knows what, how to access them, and how to find out if the 
necessary expertise even exists. Maybe, by very intent, design, and definition, 
the decision-makers should not a priori be concerned with that critical issue that 
suddenly evolves into a crisis. Rather, they should have a functioning support 
structure that identifies and delegates questions and answers throughout this web 
of expertise, which recasts that rather accusatory assumption of knowledge into 
a question of what caused the knowledge support structure to fail. 
How do external stress factors affect an organisation’s ability to 
acquire and make use of knowledge?
This study tests the hypotheses that organisations fall back on well-know, prescribed, 
and preferably consistent problem-solving procedures when subjected to the stress of 
a crisis; that organisations can be forced to limit their problem-solving creativity by 
external regulations unless interactions with external actors have been anticipated 
and processes are already in place to deal with such situations; and that the degree of 
openness an organisation has to such factors will affect how willingly they make use of 
external expertise. The study builds on the classic conceptualisation of organisations 
as analogous to individuals, with their own unique set of behaviours and cognitive 
patterns (March & Simon 1958; Cyert & March 1963). Under this model, we 
speak of organisations as capable of knowing, of learning, of observing, and also 
of being stressed and shocked by the unfamiliar and unknown.
This study posits that it is this stress that causes organisations to close up 
and to fall back on the familiar and seemingly safe, which almost by definition 
precludes anything that is not already known. Crises, unfortunately, are charac-
terised by high degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity, so this means that at a time 
when more insight and understanding would be highly desirable for resolving 
those uncertainties, the organisation that has to deal with the problem at hand 
is in its least receptive mood towards that much-needed insight. Everything is 
already confusing, so adding even more unknown and strange facts to the mix 
hardly seems enticing. In addition, crises often require cooperation and coordi-
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nation with other actors, and this in turn becomes a second stress factor in that 
the forms and procedures for those interactions represent yet another unknown 
variable is thrown into the mix.
The study sets up an ideal-type axis of organisational behaviour that describes 
the degree of openness or closed-ness an organisation exhibits towards adopting or 
adapting to external influences. This is the core of a causal chain where, at one 
end, various factors may push the organisation towards more open or a more 
closed behaviour, and where at the other end, the change in closed-ness affects 
how well the organisation manages to source and graft new knowledge from 
its environment. There is an underlying assumption at play here, where  more 
knowledge inherently leads to better-informed decision-making, and implicitly 
qualitatively better decisions, which lies outside the scope of inquiry for this study 
and which therefore is left untested.
The study also introduces the concept of MESO-knowledge – a name 
derived from triplet of knowledge types that are at play in the identification 
and acquisition of external expertise: meta-knowledge, empathic knowledge, and 
second-order knowledge. These knowledge types represent the other part of the 
equation, offering a means to evaluate, if not outright measure, the knowledge 
usage of the organisation as a function of the degree of openness or closed-ness.
The analytical framework for the study combines these parts into a model of 
organisational behaviour where increasing organisational stress from crises and 
unanticipated working processes generate more closed behaviour, and where 
more closed behaviour in turn deteriorates the organisation’s use of MESO-
knowledge. Conversely, an organisation that can anticipate processes and mitigate 
the stress of a crisis will be able to retain an open mode of behaviour and thereby 
also retain the full use of its MESO-knowledge. In a final twist, there are also 
feedback loops where the level of MESO-knowledge an organisation can express 
affects its ability to anticipate processes and, at least partially, mitigate crises. 
The organisation can therefore find itself in a positive or a negative spiral. For 
example, stress can reduce the knowledge available and in turn the reduction in 
knowledge can increase the level of stress; whereas, a solid knowledge foundation 
can reduce stress and thus enables an even better application of knowledge that, 
in turn, reduces stress even further.
The open–closed model of organisational behaviour
Organisational theory has long established that different organisations have 
different preferences in how they structure their work processes. However, the 
main focus of these theories tends to be means and methods of coordination, 
control, and centralisation, and at times augmented by models of bureau-polit-
ical considerations (cf. Burns & Stalker 1961; Allison 1971; Mintzberg 1979; 
Rosenthal et al. 1991; ’t Hart et al. 1993; Groenendaal et al. 2013). While these 
perspectives are helpful in understanding the dynamics of the decision-making 
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groups and processes, they only tangentially touch on the underlying preferences 
that give rise to the behaviours that are of interest for this study. Instead, we 
turn to theories that approach the problem of dealing with complexity, such as 
Normal Accident Theory (Perrow 1984) and Cybernetic Theory (Steinbruner 
1974; 2002).
Combined, these models present a picture of organisations striving for either 
end of the spectrum of consistency, on the one hand, and flexibility on the other. 
This may entail a desired level of consistency in outcomes, in procedures, or in 
predictability of the types of problems that the organisation is meant to solve. 
The preference tends to coincide with other principles existing on similar spectra, 
such rigidity, informality, strict regulation, or dynamic problem-solving. These 
related spectra let us construct a triplet of characteristics that offer a means for 
measuring how open or closed an organisation is to using new solutions to 
address unforeseen problems.
Thus, we can conceptualise the closed organisation as one that operates on 
a principle of regulation, whose work flows are designed to be rigid, and where 
the end goal is to produce a set of consistent and outcomes in response to a pre-
dictable set of issues. Conversely, we can conceptualise the open organisation as 
one that operates on a principle of informality, whose work flows are designed to 
be flexible, and where the end goal is to dynamically adjust to and solve an array 
of unpredictable problems. In practice, no organisation will wholly be at either 
extreme, and elements of either end will always be present to some degree. For 
example, even the most flexible organisation will sometimes end up employing 
the same consistent solutions to the same known problems. Likewise, when 
subjected to the stress studied here, an organisation will not violently flip-flop 
from one extreme to another, but rather will exhibit a trend towards more open 
or closed behaviour. Perhaps a normally rather informal group will start to stick 
more closely to regulations when faced with an unknown problem because at 
least they can offer some basic guidelines on what to do. Likewise, even the most 
consistency-focused group will understand the need for some dynamic adjustment 
if no known solution – or even no known problem definition – exists that can 
be applied to the problem at hand.
MESO‑knowledge  –  re‑conceptualising knowledge as an interactive 
organisational skill
Just like the open–closed model can be found hidden in existing literature on 
organisational structure and cognition, the three knowledge types used in this 
study are a result of a rigorous reading of the organisational knowledge and 
knowledge management literature. In particular, the MESO-knowledge concept 
rests on Nonaka & Takeuchi’s (1995) work on the processes of knowledge transfer. 
Much like how Cyert & March (1963) and Polanyi (1966) describe “knowledge” 
as a process – as the “act of knowing” – Nonaka & Takeuchi describe how tacit 
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knowledge can be transferred through the SECI (socialisation, externalisation, 
combination, internalisation) process. It is a structured social interaction that 
allows procedural knowledge to be passed from one person or group to another.
The focus in their studies, and indeed in most of the field of knowledge 
management (KM) that their research spawned, is on the various intricacies 
in tacit knowledge and how to overcome the inherent problem of it not being 
(easily) transferrable. In particular, it becomes a problem when such knowledge 
is needed quickly, unexpectedly, and at an unforeseen locus in the organisation. 
An entire sub-genre exists on the sourcing and grafting of tacit knowledge (cf. 
Huber 1991), and a reoccurring theme is that social aspect. Thus, while on the 
surface, the literature preoccupies itself with the distinctions between explicit 
knowledge (“knowing that”) and tacit knowledge (“knowing how”), the research 
consistently returns to a rather different and much more interesting pronoun: who. 
Who has the knowledge that is being sought after? Who is familiar with these 
knowledge sources? Who is in a position to actually internalise that knowledge 
and act as a vessel of transference of sorts?
This is where the MESO-knowledge concept finds its footing and its use. 
Instead of re-treading the same old ground of tacit versus explicit that KM has 
already thoroughly investigated, it focuses on the questions that the literature 
has already identified as necessary to ask before any transference can begin, but 
ironically has failed to make explicit. The first question is one of knowing why 
some particular piece of knowledge is necessary: what does the organisation already 
know, what does it not know, and what gaps between the two need to be filled? 
This is meta-knowledge – that is, knowledge about (pre-existing) knowledge. 
With gaps and needs identified, the next question is the one already asked: who 
can fill the gap, or more commonly, who knows of someone who could fill it 
since the very existence of the gap suggests that it must be found elsewhere. This 
is empathic knowledge, or knowledge of the social connections and networks that 
exist within a community of practice or general field of expertise.
Last, in parallel to the concept of deutero-learning or second-order learning 
which is already familiar to students of organisational knowledge, there is the 
question of knowing how to know more, or second-order knowledge. This is the 
ability to ask the right questions to the right people when those people and the 
need for questions have been identified. More complex than meta-knowledge 
and empathic knowledge, this particular skill is reciprocal; it also requires that 
the other party understands what you need to know and why, which means those 
gaps have to be verbalised and communicated effectively. Almost by definition, 
the questions being asked will be asked from a position of profound ignorance, 
and the expert needs to be able to adjust or reorient such questions to what the 
person asking the question really needs to know. A core part of the entire concept 
of knowledge (going back as far as Polanyi’s 1966 foundational definition) is that 
it needs to be “actionable” so an answer that does not provide the questioner 
with any useful options cannot truly be considered knowledge to begin with.
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Describing it as a skill is not just a turn of phrase but an instrumental choice. 
MESO-knowledge is not just another thing for an organisation to know but is 
in very practical terms a skill that can be learned, exercised, and improved upon, 
and thus has an immediate applicability to the study at hand.
Investigating crises and unfamiliar problem‑solving processes
In investigating the interrelation between crises, unanticipated processes, organ-
isational closed-ness and the use of MESO-knowledge, this study analyses and 
compares four cases which have been categorised into two pairs.
The first pair is the FBI’s handling of the Waco siege in 1993 and the Montana 
Freemen standoff in 1996. In both cases, the bureau was faced with what appeared 
to be hostage-barricade situations where heavily armed group members had 
ensconced themselves in remote, well-prepared, and self-sufficient compounds 
in response to attempted law-enforcement actions against the leaders of the 
respective groups. In both cases, there were various external pressures to force 
a quick resolution to the situation – from political leaders and relatives as well 
as from within the various law enforcement agencies involved for fear that evi-
dence in the on-going investigations would be lost in the process, but also from 
numerous groups of experts that thought that their knowledge could help settle 
the matter peacefully. In particular, there was a strong religious element to both 
conflicts, which caused numerous miscommunications and thorough confusion 
among the FBI negotiators and the people in the compounds.
In spite of the similarities, the outcome of the two events could hardly be any 
more different. The Waco siege resulted in one of the largest law enforcement 
debacles of the modern era when an attempt to forcefully bring the episode to a 
close ended in a conflagration that consumed the entire compound, killing more 
than 70 people still left inside. The legal and social aftermath lasted for over a 
decade, and still remains a sore spot and a source of conspiracy theories to this 
day. The Freemen standoff, on the other hand, has largely been forgotten and 
almost unknown outside of law enforcement and militia circles.  It can almost 
be dismissed entirely as not being a crisis at all due to how undramatically it 
was resolved.
The study shows that the key difference between the two cases is that the FBI 
had taken the lessons of Waco to heart. By the time of the Freemen standoff, the 
bureau had come to understand and accept that the apparent hostage-barricade 
situations involved neither hostages nor barricades as well as the fact that not 
all opposition should be thought of or approached as criminals. Consequently, 
the bureau accepted that its own expertise in criminology and negotiation skills 
were not sufficient or even applicable to some of the cases it would inevitably 
have to solve. Instead, by clearly delineating what the FBI should and should not 
know, and finding processes and procedures for grafting and sourcing specific 
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expert knowledge for specific cases, it could implement a variety of negotiation 
strategies and keep talks going until the standoff came to an end.
Almost everything that was done wrong at Waco was (eventually) done 
right in Montana, including the FBI avoiding any kind of false learning or 
over-learning on exactly what was required to handle such situations. It would 
have been easy to look at Waco and assume that since the religious aspect was 
so significant in the miscommunication between the two parties, the similarly 
religiously charged Montana case would be solved using theological expertise. 
Instead, while theologians were certainly consulted during the standoff, it was 
ended because of the involvement of legal experts who were familiar with the 
biblically-based “Common Law” the Freemen adhered to and who were able to act 
as legal interpreters between Common Law and Montana state law. Through this 
layer of interpretation, the Freemen were convinced to take the matter to court 
rather than to obstinately continue the standoff against an equally obstinate FBI. 
Where the bureau had previously been very closed and had consequently failed to 
find or make use of any relevant knowledge available, it eventually demonstrated 
a far more open behaviour and ended up with half a dozen potential inroads 
to a peaceful solution, one of which eventually resolved the problem entirely.
The second case pair is the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s handling of the 2004 
Southeast Asian tsunami and the 2006 evacuation from the war in Lebanon. 
Again, we have two cases where the core issues were very similar: a large number of 
Swedes were stuck in a disaster area abroad and needed to be evacuated as quickly 
as possible. Many would probably require some kind of care, either on-site or 
during the trip home. The situation on the ground was such that it was difficult 
to get a clear picture of what was going on, and yet that was exactly what was 
needed in order to coordinate the evacuation efforts. In addition, the whole 
situation was a chaotic mix of issue areas and agency responsibilities that, by 
tradition if not strictly by law, had to be coordinated by the smallest office at the 
ministry. Some of the issues included foreign aid and technical assistance to the 
disaster area, health and psychological care to individuals caught in the disaster, 
border control to ensure that only citizens were actually being brought back to 
Sweden, and identification and registration of missing (and found) individuals 
that might be in the area. All of this had to be managed while at the same time 
maintaining communication and ordinary diplomatic relations between Sweden 
and the other nations involved.
Here too, we have a classic tale of modern political disaster. The tsunami crip-
pled the incumbent government and most likely was a large factor in explaining 
why it lost in the following election. It ended the careers of numerous politicians 
and politically appointed administrators in high offices, up to and including the 
foreign minister. It set in motion sweeping policy change to clarify the respon-
sibilities of citizens and the state alike, and acted as an impetus for a significant 
rearrangement of the Swedish national crisis management system. The Lebanon 
evacuation, on the other hand, was perhaps not the kind of non-crisis that the 
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Freeman standoff was, but has nevertheless gone down in history as a success 
and as a vindication of sorts for the agencies involved in the tsunami fiasco. 
As the study shows, the reality was a bit more complex since, in practical 
terms, a lot of the actual handling of the case was even worse than how things had 
been managed and done during the tsunami crisis. Politically and rhetorically, 
the narrative was one of having solved all the issues that had plagued the tsunami 
crisis. Governmental agencies had cooperated and coordinated their efforts, and 
quick and decisive decision-making had resolved numerous problems, both in 
the short and the long term, as opposed to the lingering indecisiveness that had 
made the tsunami crisis much worse than it needed to be.
At the same time, the study shows that there were some definite improvements 
made at the Foreign Ministry (UD) and with the agencies involved in terms of 
improving MESO-knowledge usage. There was an increased self-awareness of 
capabilities and knowledge gaps and also an awareness of what other parties had 
to offer to fill those gaps. The processes involved could, by and large, be antici-
pated and consequently friction and stress between the involved organisations 
was greatly reduced. Whether or not the response was truly any faster, it was 
nevertheless called – and was very effectively communicated as – a step forward 
in agency coordination, communication, and problem-solving. In an interesting 
twist, it was a political success far more than an operative one, but nonetheless, 
a political success was exactly what the government needed at the time to try to 
wash away the failure of the Swedish crisis management of the tsunami. Thus, 
the end goal was achieved (according to the principal agent), and one of the 
underlying reasons was the small but significant improvement in utilizing the 
key aspects of MESO-knowledge.
Lastly, the study makes a cross-comparison between the two case pairs to see 
what other aspects may have had an impact on the results. First among these 
is the difference between the domestic arena in the FBI cases and the foreign 
arena of the two UD cases. It shows a sharp difference in complexity in what 
the two agencies had to be prepared to deal with, and thus a very different array 
of knowledge that needed to be sourced and grafted. This may help explain, in 
part, why the FBI had managed to improve so much more than UD; basically, 
there was simply less adaptation needed in order to make a significant difference.
A second observation that in part builds on and extends from the first is that 
the two case pairs dealt with rather different institutional set-ups. In the hierarchy 
of different government functions and distributions of issue areas, the FBI sits 
lower down and thus has a much more focused role than the Foreign Ministry. 
Furthermore, the ministry is also much closer to the political leadership level 
and thus more sensitive to issue politicisation. Both the difference in arena and 
the difference in institutional situatedness, and certainly the combination of the 
two, can be expressed in terms of having differently large “problem spaces” – that 
is, the total array of issues that may arise and that the respective agencies may 
have to resolve. Similarly, the scope of the “solution space” for the two agencies is 
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just as, if not even more, different. Fortunately, with the larger array of potential 
problems for the Foreign Ministry also comes a larger array of potential solutions, 
but on the other hand the Swedish administrative tradition demands that the 
ministry remains at arms-length from most of those solutions, which drastically 
diminishes what the ministry itself can actually do to solve its problems. From 
a theoretical standpoint, this problem demonstrates a significant difference in 
how much anticipation of process is required between the two case pairs, and 
thus offers further explanation why we see more improvement between the two 
FBI cases. In short, the bureau had more opportunity and ability to control the 
stress from unanticipated processes.
Behaviours, knowledge usage, and feedback loops
The empirical investigation demonstrates both strengths and weaknesses in the 
model of organisational behaviour this study sets up. On the one hand, the cases 
show clear signs of confirming the hypotheses of the study and even suggest a 
stronger correlation between causes and effects than was initially assumed. On 
the other hand, the case study clearly shows the limitations of the analytical tool 
used and in particular of its rather course categorisation of the measured effects, 
which may in part explain the appearance of this stronger significance.
Irrespective of the actual results, the study shows the analytical usefulness of 
both the open–closed concept and of the notion of MESO-knowledge. Some 
methodological refinement is still needed in terms of putting an exact value to 
either concept, but they still offer a means to analyse, categorise, and differentiate 
a key set of behavioural patterns in organisations. On one end, open vs. closed 
encapsulates a number of preferences, rationales, and to some extent even per-
ceptions that drive organisational behaviour in one direction or another. While 
it is conceptualised as an ideal type, the underlying indicators still offer a way to 
indicate trends and movement towards either of the two extremes. As the study 
shows, this is enough to offer some insight into why we can see a given outcome.
At the other end, MESO-knowledge captures, not so much the common 
question of what an organisation, a group, or a decision-maker knows in more 
immediate terms, but rather the larger question of the actual usefulness of that 
knowledge. It is a set of skills that an organisation can acquire and use to better 
leverage what the organisation already knows, a large part of which is having a 
good grasp of what it does not or even should not know.
While the open–closed concept in some sense can capture and demonstrate the 
phenomenon on its own, the addition of MESO-knowledge helps us put a finger 
on the curious feedback mechanisms between knowledge and external sources of 
stress. The identification paradox (where a strange new problem cannot properly 
be identified or even probed or queried unless you already have enough insight 
justifying why any such identification or probing is unnecessary) is a recurring 
issue that second-order knowledge (in particular) is specifically meant to explain 
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as well as to solve. These feedback loops are problematic from a methodological 
standpoint since they can considerably muddle our understanding of exactly 
what issue is the root cause of which problem. Analytically, however, they are 
of key importance since identifying them helps us explain why some situations 
spin out of control and others can instead quickly turn into complete non-crises. 
The concept in itself is not particularly new – it is close to Weick’s (1988) notion 
of “enacted sense-making”, for instance – but this new analytical toolset offers 
additional methods of illustrating and explaining the underlying mechanisms.
Improvements in knowledge acquisition during stress
In addition to its analytical usefulness for the topic of this study, MESO-
knowledge is promising in offering a larger and perhaps even more interesting 
use in the realm of organisational learning. The process of learning is critical 
to understanding how organisations evolve over time, but it is also notoriously 
difficult to actually measure and analyse (cf. Argyris & Schön 1978, 1996; Senge 
1990; Nohrstedt 2007; Deverell 2010). With the notion of MESO-knowledge, 
however, we are given a set of indicators for organisational skills and activities 
that could help us solve that very problem.
A potential problem for this study has been that many of the improvements 
that can be observed between the  two cases in each case pair can be labelled as 
plain old organisational learning, suggesting that the different outcomes are a 
consequence of some set of improvements in the sense-making, decision-making, 
or some other crisis management process. However, the question remains of 
what, exactly, has been learned. Close scrutiny of the cases reveals that the com-
mon trait in these cases is the way critical knowledge was identified, collected, 
disseminated, and acted upon, and that the key points of learning all existed 
within the nexus of improving knowledge pathways. In general, better knowledge 
use gives rise to a clearer picture of the crisis and of what the organisations need 
to do to meet this challenge. A broader understanding of the issue complexity, 
both within and between all the organisations involved, gives rise to more 
comprehensive decision-making and also allows for clearer and more insightful 
meaning-making. It also helps with the termination of a crisis, partly because the 
scope of the problem is better understood and defined so it becomes clear when 
things are winding down, and partly because this scope can be communicated 
to the other parties involved and offer convincing arguments why no further 
crisis management is needed.
So these lessons learned are exactly the kind of introspective and extroverted 
analysis, stocktaking of assets and gaps, and exchange of knowledge resources that 
are the heart of the notion MESO-knowledge. Not only is MESO-knowledge 
a set of skills that in very practical terms and with the full support of existing 
knowledge management literature are supposed to help practitioners improve 
their processes, but it is also something that we as researchers can point to, and 
355
Executive summary
even measure, far more clearly than many other indicators of organisational 
learning. That is not to say that all learning can be measured this way, but as an 
analytical tool, the concept offers a reasonably easy and clear set of guidelines 
for what to look for in a case.
A program for further research
One thing that the model currently does not account for and which requires 
further research is the use of MESO-knowledge outside of or in-between crises. It 
is simply implicitly assumed that, while there may be some knowledge pathways 
or communities of practice in place already that will aid the application of these 
knowledge types, the crisis will still be a crisis and the unanticipated processes 
will still not be anticipated. However, with proper preparedness and with even 
better applied MESO-knowledge, these pressures may disappear entirely, and if 
that is the case, what happens to a model that presumes that pressure will affect 
how knowledge is used? Should we treat it as an extreme version of the positive 
feedback loop where pre-existing knowledge helps keep the flow of ideas clear, or 
should we just label it as normalcy and declare it to be beyond the scope of what 
we are studying? This was almost the case in the Freemen standoff, but luckily, 
from a research standpoint, it still offered enough pressure to make the effects 
observable – there was still some room for knowledge to be used (or potentially 
misused) to deflate or inflate that pressure. Organisational learning still exists 
as a model for capturing the actual process of making such improvements, but 
there is a gap and an edge-case between the two concepts that both need further 
exploration to help us understand the limits and overlaps of applicability.
In addition, the model itself needs further testing and scrutiny. The four cases 
used in this study only barely cover the minimum of variability that is required 
to start drawing conclusions from the model. Additional case comparison – in 
particular cases that involve the same actors in yet another set of similar circum-
stances – would help bring additional clarity to the exact relationship between 
the causes and effects that have been studied. On the other hand, the addition 
of a wholly different set of actors is necessary if we want to start disentangling 
factors such as issue domain, issue complexity, bureaucratic situatedness, strategic 
versus operative problem solving, and foreign versus domestic arenas. Similarly, 
only two stress factors have been included so far, and we can already expect those 
two to vary to a fairly high degree: crises mean surprises, and surprises mean lack 
of anticipation. Finding additional stress factors and cases that exemplify them, 
or better yet, finding those factors within the existing cases, would further test 
the soundness of the model.
Finally, the MESO-knowledge concept itself needs to be further refined. It 
works for the purposes of this study, but tweaking the indicators might allow us to 
either make the analytical tool more precise in how we extract information about 
the knowledge an organisation possesses or lacks. Tweaked another way, and the 
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concept might offer some room for generalisation that lets us use it as a broader 
tool for studying learning. MESO-knowledge is itself an attempt to bridge a gap 
between the organisational learning and the knowledge management literature, 
but there are a number of other fields of study that take an interest in closely 
related phenomena. Can some (re)conceptualisation of MESO-knowledge be 
applicable to policy learning and policy change, for instance, or to the debate on 
technocratic or bureaucratic governance? These related fields are already adding 
bits and pieces to the overall puzzle, so it should be worth-while to try to fully 
integrate those theories with the model presented here.
Keywords: advisory, crisis, expertise, knowledge, knowledge management, 
learning, organisational behaviour, organisational cognition, sense-making.
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Wie weet wat, waar, wanneer en hoe?
Achteraf is het altijd makkelijk praten, en eenieder die besluitvorming bestudeert 
tijdens crises, of gespannen en stressvolle situaties, zal snel uitvinden hoe sterk de 
invloed van inzicht achteraf kan zijn op het uiteindelijke oordeel in hoeverre een 
crisis adequaat gemanaged is. In de nasleep van een willekeurige traumatische 
gebeurtenis hoort men vaak dat besluitvormers “beter hadden moeten weten”, 
en als dit niet geopperd wordt is dat waarschijnlijk omdat niemand door had 
dat er überhaupt iets fout is gegaan. Deze tendens bevestigt een basale notie; als 
alles goed gaat, dan wisten besluitvormers het blijkbaar echt beter.
De crux zit hem in het “hadden moeten”, een uiting die de nodige vragen met 
zich mee brengt. Wat hadden zij moeten weten? In hoeverre had het uitgemaakt 
als ze het hadden geweten? Zijn we er wel zeker van dat ze niet beter wisten, of 
betrof het een ingecalculeerd risico met een onverwachte uitkomst? En wie zijn 
“zij” eigenlijk? De gehele organisatie, de besluitvormersgroep, de individuele 
besluitvormer of de experts op het desbetreffende gebied, in taak gesteld om de 
besluitvormers te informeren en adviseren? Bovendien, waarom hadden juist 
“zij” het beter moeten weten? Het was gemakkelijker geweest als zij meer inzicht 
hadden gehad in de situatie, maar de vraag blijft of dat door de omstandigheden 
überhaupt mogelijk was? Elk woord in “zij hadden beter moeten weten” staat 
dus, ondanks de frequentie waarmee de zin gebruikt wordt, ter discussie, en is 
zelfs uiterst betwistbaar. 
Technocratisch leiderschap in beleidsbepaling en besluitvorming is nog steeds 
significant aanwezig in moderne bureaucratieën, ondanks dat de populariteit en 
invloed ervan hevige variatie heeft gekend over de afgelopen jaren. In de westerse 
traditie van overheidsdiensten leunt de staat fundamenteel op de onderverdeling 
van de maatschappij in verschillende expertisen. Deze onderverdeling in minis-
teries, instanties en bureaus  stelt de overheid in staat om autoriteit en verant-
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woordelijkheid voor het functioneren van verschillende staatsfuncties eenvoudig 
te verdelen. Elk van deze bestuursorganen is verder verdeeld in departementen 
of eenheden met een eigen expertise (cf. Weber 1922; Mintzberg 1979; Fischer 
2009:ff). Dit uitgebreide en complexe web van rollen en verantwoordelijkheden 
heeft ervoor gezorgd dat de rol van de expert in een ander daglicht is komen 
te staan. 
De vraag wie exact welke expertise heeft, of de expertise al dan niet bestaat 
en hoe hen vervolgens te vinden, geeft een extra draai aan het vraagstuk omtrent 
“zij hadden beter moeten weten”. Misschien is het helemaal niet de bedoeling 
dat de besluitvormer zich bezighoudt met een kritieke kwestie die zich plotseling 
ontwikkelt in een crisis, maar juist dat het achterliggende web van expertise en 
kennis zich laat gebruiken als een functionele ondersteuningsstructuur voor 
besluitvormers om vragen en antwoorden te identificeren en te delegeren. De 
aanname dat ‘men beter had moeten weten’ kan hierdoor omgevormd worden 
in een vraag; hoe kan het dat de ondersteuningsstructuur faalde?
Hoe beïnvloeden externe stress factoren het vermogen van een 
organisatie om kennis tot zich te nemen en vervolgens te gebruiken?
Dit onderzoek test de hypothesen dat organisaties geneigd zijn om terug te vallen op 
bekende, vastgestelde en consistente procedures voor het oplossen van problemen tijdens 
een crisis; dat organisaties gedwongen kunnen worden de creativiteit van hun oplossend 
vermogen te beperken door middel van externe regulaties, tenzij zulke inmenging 
al verwacht werd en er processen aanwezig zijn om hier adequaat mee om te gaan; 
en dat de openheid van een organisatie ten opzichte van dergelijke factoren in grote 
mate bepaald hoeveel gebruik ze willen maken van externe expertise. Dit onderzoek 
leunt op de klassieke analogie waarbij organisaties handelen als individuen, elk 
met haar eigen cognitieve- en gedragspatronen (March & Simon 1958; Cyert & 
March 1963). Met deze opmerking wordt bedoeld dat organisaties in staat zijn 
kennis te vergaren, te leren en te observeren, maar ook gestrest en geschrokken 
kunnen zijn door het onbekende.
Dit onderzoek stelt dat het juist deze stress is waardoor organisaties de 
gelederen sluiten en terugvallen op het bekende en ogenschijnlijk veilige. Crises 
worden helaas gekarakteriseerd door onzekerheid en onduidelijkheid, waardoor 
de volgende tendens ontstaat; op het moment dat er juist meer kennis en inzicht 
nodig is om dergelijke onzekerheden op te lossen, bevindt een organisatie zich 
juist in haar minst ontvankelijke toestand. Alles aan een crisis is al verwarrend, 
en het toevoegen van onbekende en nieuwe inzichten en feiten is allesbehalve 
aantrekkelijk. Daarnaast vraagt een crisis vaak om vaardige samenwerking en 
coördinatie met andere actoren, iets wat voor nog meer stress kan zorgen omdat 
de procedures voor dergelijke interacties onbekend zijn. 
Dit onderzoek genereert een schaal waarop de openheid of geslotenheid van 
een organisatie ten opzichte van externe invloeden is beschreven. Dit is de kern 
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van een causaal verband waarbij aan de ene kant verschillende factoren in een 
organisatie meer open of gesloten gedrag kunnen opwekken, en aan de andere 
kant de verandering in de geslotenheid van een organisatie beïnvloedt hoe goed de 
organisatie kennis kan vergaren uit haar omgeving. De onderliggende assumptie 
is dat meer kennis inherent leidt tot beter geïnformeerde besluitvorming en dus 
betere beslissingen. Deze assumptie ligt buiten het focusgebied van dit onderzoek 
en zal daarom niet getest worden.  
Dit onderzoek introduceert daarnaast het MESO-kennis concept; een naam 
die voortvloeit uit drie kennistypes aanwezig in de identificatie en vergaring van 
externe expertise: meta-kennis, empathische kennis en ‘tweede-orde leren’. Deze 
kennistypes bieden de mogelijkheid om het kennisgebruik van een organisatie 
in relatie tot de open- of geslotenheid te evalueren, of zelfs te meten. 
Het analytisch kader van dit onderzoek combineert deze kennistypes in 
een model van bestuurlijk gedrag, waar een toenemende mate van bestuurlijke 
spanning door crises en onverwachtse werkprocessen een meer gesloten houding 
genereert, en waar een dergelijke houding op zijn beurt het gebruik van MESO-
kennis vermindert en verslechtert. Daar staat tegenover dat een organisatie die 
kan anticiperen op deze processen en de stress van een crisis kan verlichten, 
eerder in staat is een bepaalde openheid te waarborgen en daardoor volledig 
gebruik kan blijven maken van aanwezige MESO-kennis. Doordat organisaties 
gebruik kunnen maken van leerprocessen waarbij de hoeveelheid MESO-kennis 
van een organisatie het vermogen  beïnvloedt om te anticiperen op onbekende 
werkprocessen en het verminderen van stress, kunnen zij zich bevinden in een 
neerwaartse of juist opwaartse spiraal; stress limiteert de beschikbare kennis, 
terwijl deze afname in kennis zorgt voor een toename in stress, en vis-a-vis, een 
solide kennisfundament verlicht stress, waardoor organisaties beter in staat zijn 
kennis toe te passen en hiermee weer stress te verlichten. 
Het open‑gesloten model van bestuurlijk gedrag
Organisatietheorie heeft vastgesteld dat verschillende organisaties verschillende 
voorkeuren hebben in het structureren van hun werkprocessen. De nadruk ligt 
hierbij echter vaak op de middelen en methoden van coördinatie, controle en 
centralisatie, soms versterkt door modellen van bureaupolitieke overwegingen 
(cf. Burns & Stalker 1961; Allison 1971; Mintzberg 1979; Rosenthal et al. 1991; 
’t Hart et al. 1993; Groenendaal et al. 2013). Ondanks dat deze perspectieven 
nuttig zijn voor het begrijpen van de dynamiek van besluitvormersgroepen 
en -processen, hebben ze weinig betrekking op de onderliggende factoren die 
bijdragen aan de gedragstypen die relevant zijn voor dit onderzoek. In plaats 
daarvan richt het onderzoek zich op theorieën die het probleem van omgaan met 
complexiteit behandelen; Normal Accident Theory (Perrow 1984) en Cybernetic 
Theory (Steinbruner 1974; 2002).
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Deze theorieën tezamen schetsen het beeld dat organisaties mikken op consistentie 
of flexibiliteit. Een dergelijk model heeft ook betrekking op een gewenst niveau 
van consistentie in uitkomsten, procedures en verwachtingen van de verschil-
lende type problemen die een organisatie dient op te lossen. De voorkeur hierin 
komt vaak overeen met andere principes op vergelijkbare spectra, zoals starheid, 
informaliteit, strikte regulatie of dynamische probleemoplossing. Deze spectra 
zorgen ervoor dat we drie karaktertrekken kunnen construeren die mogelijk 
kunnen meten hoe open of gesloten een organisatie is met betrekking tot nieuwe 
oplossingen voor onvoorziene problemen. 
De gesloten organisatie kan dus gezien worden als een organisatie die handelt 
vanuit het principe van regulatie; waarvan werkstromen ontworpen zijn om 
onbuigzaam te zijn; en waar het einddoel het produceren van een set consistente 
antwoorden op een voorspelbare set problemen is. Aan de andere kant, een open 
organisatie is een organisatie die handelt vanuit het principe van informaliteit; 
waarvan werkstromen flexibel zijn; en waar het einddoel inhoudt dat onverwachte 
problemen dynamisch worden opgelost. Geen enkele organisatie zal zich in praktijk 
volledig aan één kant van het spectrum bevinden, en elementen van beide typen 
zullen terug te vinden zijn in de organisatie. Zelfs de meest flexibele organisaties 
zullen het wiel niet altijd opnieuw willen uitvinden, maar gebruik willen maken 
van reeds bestaande oplossingen voor bekende problemen. Een organisatie zal 
zich daarnaast ook niet radicaal van het ene extreme naar het andere begeven, 
maar eerder een bepaalde trend inzetten van open naar gesloten. Mogelijkerwijs 
omarmt een normaliter nogal informele groep steeds meer regulaties wanneer zij 
geconfronteerd worden met onbekende problemen, omdat deze regulaties hen 
basale richtlijnen verschaffen over wat te doen. Andersom zou dat betekenen dat 
zelfs de meest gesloten groep zal begrijpen dat het soms tijd is voor dynamische 
aanpassing, zeker als er geen bekende oplossing aanwezig is voor het probleem. 
MESO‑kennis – her‑conceptualisering van kennis als een interactieve 
bestuurlijke kwaliteit
Net als het open-gesloten model, kunnen ook de drie kennistypen ontdekt 
worden door een uitgebreide literatuurstudie naar organisatie- en kennis-
managementliteratuur. Het MESO-kennis concept rust op Nonaka & Takeuchi’s 
(1995) studie naar de processen van kennisoverdracht. Cyert & March (1963) en 
Polanyi (1966) beschrijven “kennis” als een proces, als de “kunst van het weten”. 
Nonaka & Takeuchi beschrijven op vergelijkbare toon dat impliciete kennis 
overgedragen kan worden door middel van het SECI (socialisation, externalisation, 
combination, internalisation) proces. Kennis is hier een gestructureerde sociale 
interactie waardoor procedurekennis van een persoon of groep naar de andere 
kan worden overgedragen. 
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Nonaka & Takeuchi concentreerden zich in hun studie, net als de meesten 
in het veld van kennismanagement (KM), op de variërende complexe compo-
nenten van impliciete kennis, en hoe we kunnen realiseren dat het makkelijker 
overdraagbaar is. Dit is vooral een probleem wanneer zulke kennis snel en 
onverwachts nodig is op een onvoorziene plek in de organisatie. Er is een heel 
sub-genre gewijd aan vergaren en implementeren van ‘impliciete’ kennis (cf. 
Huber 1991), en een terugkomend thema is het sociale aspect van overdracht. 
Ondanks dat de literatuur zich bezig lijkt te houden met het onderscheid tussen 
uitgesproken kennis en impliciete kennis lijken wetenschappers steeds terug te 
keren bij een andere vraag; een die nog veel interessanter is: Wie? Wie heeft de 
kennis waarnaar gezocht wordt? Wie is er bekend met deze kennisbronnen? Wie 
bevindt zich in een positie van waaruit er hij of zij deze kennis kan adopteren 
en over kan brengen? 
Hier vindt het MESO-kennisconcept haar basis en relevantie. In plaats van 
te concentreren op het veld waar KM al doorheen is gespit, richt het zich op de 
vraag die door KM is geïdentificeerd als noodzakelijk voordat overdracht kan 
plaatsvinden, maar nog niet duidelijk is benoemd en onderzocht. De eerste vraag 
richt zich op waarom sommige kennis noodzakelijk is: wat weet de organisatie al, 
wat weten ze nog niet, en wat is het gat hiertussen dat gevuld dient te worden? 
Dit is meta-kennis; kennis over reeds bestaande kennis. Als dit gat en benodigd-
heden geïdentificeerd zijn, luidt de volgende vraag: wie kan dit gat vullen, of wie 
weet er iemand die dit gat zou kunnen vullen, aangezien het bestaan van het gat 
suggereert dat er iemand van buitenaf gezocht moet worden. Dit is empathische 
kennis; kennis van de sociale connecties en netwerken binnen een praktiserende 
gemeenschap of expertise gebied.
De laatste vraag houdt zich bezig met uitvinden hoe men meer kan weten. 
Zulke tweede-orde kennis krijgt men van het juiste vragenstellen aan de juiste 
mensen wanneer deze reeds geïdentificeerd zijn. Deze specifieke kwaliteit is 
complexer dan meta- en empathische kennis omdat het van een gedeelde aard is: 
het vereist dat de ander ook begrijpt wat jij moet weten, en waarom je dat moet 
weten. Dit betekent dat het geïdentificeerde kennistekort gecommuniceerd dient 
te worden. De vragen zullen waarschijnlijk gesteld worden vanuit onwetendheid, 
en de expert dient daarom in staat te zijn de vragen aan te passen of te herleiden 
in de richting van wat de persoon écht moet weten. Een centraal aspect in het 
hele kennisconcept is dat het actiegericht dient te zijn: een antwoord waarmee 
de steller van de vraag achterblijft zonder nuttige en bruikbare opties kan niet 
gezien worden als kennis.
Het is een instrumentele keuze om het bovengenoemde te beschrijven als 
een kwaliteit. MESO-kennis is niet zomaar iets om te weten, maar iets om te 
kunnen, leren, uitvoeren en verbeteren, wat een onmiddellijke toepasbaarheid 
heeft voor dit onderzoek.
362
Stressing Knowledge
Crises en onbekende probleemoplossing
Dit onderzoek zal vier casussen analyseren en vergelijken, in groepen van twee, 
om de correlatie tussen crises, onverwachte processen, bestuurlijke geslotenheid 
en het gebruik van MESO-kennis te bestuderen. 
Het eerste duo betreft de FBI-werkwijze tijdens de Waco belegering in 
1993 en de Montana Freemen impasse in 1996. Tijdens beide casussen werd de 
FBI geconfronteerd met een gijzelingssituatie en barricades waarbij een zwaar-
bewapende en grote groep mensen zich had ingegraven in een afgelegen, goed 
voorbereide en zelfvoorzienende locatie als reactie op de mogelijke arrestatie 
van de leiders van de respectievelijke groepen. In beide gevallen was er sprake 
van externe druk om de zaak snel op te lossen; politieke leiders, familie van de 
gijzelaars, verschillende rechterlijke instanties die zich zorgen maakten om het 
verlies van bewijs in lopende onderzoeken, maar ook van experts die meenden de 
kennis in huis te hebben om de zaak vreedzaam op te lossen. In beide conflicten 
was daarnaast een sterk religieus element aanwezig, verantwoordelijk voor veel 
miscommunicatie en verwarring bij zowel de FBI-onderhandelaars als de mensen 
achter de barricades. 
De uitkomsten waren ondanks de overeenkomsten totaal niet vergelijkbaar. 
De Waco belegering resulteerde in een van de grootste debacles van de twintigste 
eeuw toen een poging om de bezetters uit te roken eindigde in een vuurzee 
waarbij 70 mensen de dood vonden. De rechterlijke en sociale nasleep duurde 
meer dan een decennium en de uitkomst is tot op de dag van vandaag voer voor 
complottheorieën. De Freemen impasse is aan de andere kant bijna vergeten en 
vergeven buiten de rechterlijke sfeer; het ondramatische einde zorgt er bijna voor 
dat het niet eens als crisis geclassificeerd kan worden. 
Het onderzoek toont aan dat het grootste verschil tussen de twee casussen is 
dat de FBI de lessen van Waco mee had genomen naar Freemen. De FBI had tegen 
de tijd van de Freemen begrepen en geaccepteerd dat sommige gijzelsituaties niet 
alleen uit gijzelaars en barricades bestonden, dat niet alle tegenstand voortkwam 
uit een criminele overweging en dat de FBI’s expertise in criminologie en het 
gebruik van geweld niet voldoende, of zelfs enigszins toepasbaar, was op sommige 
casussen. In plaats van te leunen op haar eigen kennis heeft de FBI duidelijk 
uiteengezet wat ze wel en niet wisten en hebben ze processen en procedures voor 
het vergaren en overdragen van specifieke kennis opgesteld naar gelang de casus 
dat vereiste. De FBI kon hierdoor verschillende onderhandelingsstrategieën 
implementeren en de gesprekken laten voortduren totdat de crisis opgelost was. 
Alles wat fout ging tijdens Waco werd uiteindelijk goed gedaan in Montana. 
Zo voorkwam de FBI bijvoorbeeld dat ze de verkeerde lessen leerde met betrekking 
tot de benodigdheden om dergelijke situaties adequaat op te lossen. Men kan 
geneigd zijn te geloven dat, omdat zowel tijdens Waco en Freemen het religieuze 
aspect een centrale rol speelde, het noodzakelijk was om in de Montana casus een 
oplossing te zoeken in de theologie. Dit bleek echter, ondanks dat er natuurlijk 
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theologen benaderd werden, niet de oplossing te bieden. Uiteindelijk waren 
rechtenexperts doorslaggevend in het oplossen van de Montana crisis omdat 
zij bekend waren met het op de bijbel gebaseerde gewoonterecht en daardoor als 
vertaler konden optreden tussen deze wet en de wet van de staat van Montana. 
Door deze aanpak werden de Freemen ervan overtuigd dat hun zaak het beste 
kon worden opgelost in de rechtbank in plaats van door te gaan met hun protest. 
De FBI nam tijdens Waco nog een zeer gesloten houding aan en maakte geen 
gebruik van de beschikbare kennis. Tijdens de Montana crisis nam de FBI echter 
een open houding aan en werden er meerdere oplossingen gepresenteerd vanuit 
verschillende expertises om de crisis vreedzaam op te lossen. 
Het tweede duo van casussen betreft de handelingen van het Zweedse Ministerie 
van Buitenlandse Zaken (UD) omtrent de Tsunami in Zuidoost-Azië in 2004 en 
de evacuatie tijdens de oorlog in Libanon in 2006. Ook hier zijn de kern compo-
nenten vergelijkbaar: in beide gevallen moest een groot aantal Zweden zo spoedig 
mogelijk uit het rampgebied geëvacueerd worden. Daarnaast hadden sommige 
van hen waarschijnlijk een vorm van hulp nodig op locatie of onderweg naar huis. 
De situatie op de plek zelf maakte het lastig voor hulpdiensten om in te schatten 
welke hulp precies waar noodzakelijk was, terwijl dit juist de informatie is die 
nodig was om de evacuatie voldoende te coördineren. De hele situatie was een 
chaotische mix van verschillende onderwerpen en verantwoordelijkheden die vaak 
gecoördineerd worden door het kleinste kantoor van het ministerie: buitenlandse 
hulp en technische assistentie aan rampgebieden; psychologische en lichamelijke 
hulp aan personen in het rampgebied; grenscontrole om te verzekeren dat alleen 
Zweedse staatsburgers mee terug worden genomen en identificatie en registratie 
van vermiste individuen die zich nog steeds in het gebied kunnen bevinden. 
Dit alles dient geregeld te worden terwijl de Zweedse staat haar buitenlandse 
betrekkingen met andere naties moet blijven onderhouden.
De tsunami werd een klassiek verhaal van een moderne politieke ramp. Het 
verlamde de regering en was waarschijnlijk een grote factor in het daaropvol-
gende verlies in de eerstvolgende verkiezingen. Het leidde tot het einde van de 
carrières van verschillende politici en hoge ambtenaren, inclusief de Minister van 
Buitenlandse Zaken. Het gevolg was een schreeuw om verandering in beleid, 
zodat de verantwoordelijkheid van burgers en de staat vergroot konden worden 
en het Zweedse nationale crisismanagementsysteem omgevormd kon worden. 
Aan de andere kant was de Libanese evacuatie, ondanks dat het een grotere crisis 
was dan de Freemen patsstelling, een groot succes en daarmee ook een vindicatie 
voor het fiasco van de tsunami. Dit onderzoek toont aan dat de realiteit een stuk 
complexer is en dat de Libanese casus een stuk slechter gemanaged werd dan de 
tsunami crisis. Politiek en retorisch gezien was de Libanese evacuatie echter een 
succes. Volgens het verhaal dat verspreid werd, waren alle problemen die tijdens de 
tsunami crisis naar de oppervlakte dreven opgelost en werkten regeringsinstanties 
samen bij het coördineren van hun werkzaamheden en het nemen van snelle 
en overtuigende besluiten. Tijdens de tsunami was dit volledig tegenovergesteld 
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en werd vooral de trage besluitvorming keer op keer aangehaald waardoor de 
gevolgen van de tsunami crisis erger uitpakten dan noodzakelijk was. 
Dit onderzoek toont verder aan dat het gebruik van MESO-kennis door het 
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en andere betrokken instanties flink verbeterd 
werd. Er was een sterk zelfbewustzijn omtrent capaciteiten- en kennishiaten. De 
betrokken processen werden grotendeels geanticipeerd, en frictie en stress tussen 
de organisaties kon hierdoor flink worden verminderd. Of de besluitvorming 
nu sneller was of niet, er werd in ieder geval duidelijk gecommuniceerd dat de 
coördinatie tussen verschillende instanties zeer effectief verlopen was en dat het 
probleemoplossende vermogen sterk was vergroot. Het is interessant om te zien 
dat het hier niet per se een operationeel succes betrof, maar meer een politiek 
succes. Dit politieke succes was wel precies wat de regering nodig had om de kater 
van de tsunami mee weg te nemen. Dankzij een aantal kleine maar significante 
verbeteringen in aspecten van het MESO-kennisconcept werd het einddoel bereikt. 
Als laatste stelt dit onderzoek een kruisvergelijking op tussen de twee casusduo’s 
om te zien welke aspecten invloed gehad hebben op de resultaten. Het eerste 
aspect is het verschil tussen de operationele locatie; de FBI-casussen speelden 
zich binnen de eigen landsgrenzen af, terwijl in de UD-casussen het voorval zich 
juist in het buitenland en over landsgrenzen heen manifesteerde. Dit brengt een 
sterk verschil in complexiteit met zich mee. Dit kan helpen verklaren waarom 
de FBI een zoveel grotere verbetering toonde dan het UD. 
Een tweede observatie is dat de twee casussen met verschillende institutionele 
toestanden te maken hadden. De FBI heeft een veel duidelijkere en gefocuste rol 
dan een ministerie omdat ze zich veel lager op de ladder bevindt. Daarnaast heeft 
een ministerie veel vaker te maken met politisering van dit soort onderwerpen. 
Dit aspect, in combinatie met het voorgaande, zorgt ervoor dat er een groot 
verschil is tussen de grootte van problemen waarmee de instanties geconfronteerd 
kunnen worden. Gelukkig betekent dit ook dat het oplossend vermogen van het 
UD veel groter is dan die van de FBI. Daar moet wel bij genoemd worden dat de 
Zweedse bestuurlijke traditie vereist dat het ministerie dichtbij deze vastgestelde 
oplossingen blijft, waardoor ze dus minder flexibel is in het oplossen van nieuwe 
problemen. Vanuit een theoretisch oogpunt laat dit zien hoezeer anticipatie van 
processen nodig is voor een succesvolle afloop en demonstreert het waarom de 
FBI veel meer vooruitgang heeft geboekt; de FBI had meer middelen en vermogen 
om de stress van een onverwachtse situatie onder controle te houden. 
Gedrag, kennisgebruik en feedback
Het empirisch onderzoek laat zowel sterke als zwakke punten zien in het model 
van bestuurlijk gedrag dat is opgezet binnen dit onderzoek. Aan de ene kant 
bevestigen de casussen de hypothesen duidelijk, en tonen ze zelfs een grotere 
correlatie tussen oorzaak en gevolg aan dan dat oorspronkelijk verwacht werd. 
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Aan de andere kant laat het onderzoek duidelijk zien dat het analytische kader 
zo zijn tekortkomingen heeft, voornamelijk de starre categorisatie van effecten. 
Desalniettemin laat het onderzoek duidelijk zien dat zowel het open-gesloten 
concept en het MESO-kennisconcept analytisch nuttige tools zijn. Het kan 
noodzakelijk zijn om enkele methodologische verfijningen toe te passen, maar 
deze concepten demonstreren nog altijd een manier om een set gedragspatronen 
binnen organisaties te analyseren, categoriseren en differentiëren. Aan de ene 
kant omvat het open-gesloten concept een aantal voorkeuren, beweegredenen en 
verwachtingen waarmee bestuurlijk gedrag in de ene of de andere richting wordt 
geduwd. Ondanks dat dit gezien wordt als een ideaaltype, bieden de onderliggende 
indicatoren nog zeker een mogelijkheid om trends en beweging aan te geven 
naar één van beiden extremen; genoeg om inzicht te verschaffen in het concept. 
Aan de andere kant omvangt het MESO-kennisconcept niet per se wat een 
organisatie, groep of besluitvormer weet, maar juist de grotere vragen omtrent 
het nut van deze kennis. Hiermee kan een organisatie beter kijken naar wat ze 
wel en vooral ook niet weten.
 Het open-gesloten concept is in staat om dit fenomeen te vangen en beschrij-
ven, maar de toevoeging van het MESO-kennisconcept zorgt ervoor dat we de 
interessante feedbackprocessen tussen kennis en externe stressbronnen kunnen 
analyseren. Tweede-orde leren is bedoeld om de identificatie paradox, waarmee een 
complex nieuw probleem niet adequaat geïdentificeerd kan worden, te verhelderen 
en op te lossen. Het is echter een vaag proces waarbij deze feedbackloops ons 
idee over wat exact de kern van het probleem is, kunnen verstoren. Analytisch 
gezien zijn deze feedbackloops van groot belang omdat ze ons kunnen laten 
zien waarom sommige situaties uit de hand lopen terwijl andere met een sisser 
aflopen. Dit concept is niet geheel nieuw, omdat Weick (1988) de notie van 
‘enacted sensemaking’ bijvoorbeeld al eerder introduceerde. Hoe dan ook, deze 
nieuwe analytische tool biedt ons aanvullende methodes voor het illustreren en 
uitleggen van onderliggende mechanismen. 
Verbeteringen in het vergaren van kennis tijdens stress
MESO-kennis biedt, naast het analytisch nut voor het onderwerp van dit 
onderzoek, nog meer binnen het veld van de organisatieleer. Het leerproces 
is essentieel om te begrijpen hoe organisaties zich over tijd ontwikkelen, maar 
het is ook berucht vanwege de moeilijkheidsgraad van het analyseren en meten 
van zulke processen (cf. Argyris & Schön 1978, 1996; Senge 1990; Nohrstedt 
2007; Deverell 2010). MESO-kennis geeft ons echter een set indicatoren voor 
bestuurlijke kwaliteiten en activiteiten waarmee we dit probleem op zouden 
kunnen lossen.
Een potentieel probleem voor dit onderzoek is dat veel verbeteringen in beiden 
casussen gezien zouden kunnen worden als ouderwets bestuurlijk leren waardoor 
gesuggereerd wordt dat verbeteringen slechts een gevolg zijn van verbeterde zinge-
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ving, besluitvorming of een willekeurig ander crisismanagementproces. Hierdoor 
blijft de vraag staan wat er nou precies geleerd is. Nauwkeurig onderzoek onthult 
overeenkomsten in beide casussen: de manier waarop kritieke kennis geïdenti-
ficeerd, verzameld, ontleed en geïmplementeerd wordt, en dat kernpunten van 
het leerproces allen voortkomen uit het verbeteren van kennistrajecten. Betere 
kennis, geeft een beter beeld van de crisis en wat er gedaan moet worden door 
de organisatie om het probleem op te lossen. Meer begrip van de complexiteit 
van de desbetreffende kwestie, zowel binnen als tussen betrokken organisaties, 
zorgt voor betere besluitvorming en betekenisgeving. Het helpt daarnaast bij het 
beëindigen van de crisis omdat het probleem beter in kaart is gebracht waardoor 
het duidelijk is wanneer het de verkeerde kant op ging, en dit vervolgens weer 
gecommuniceerd kon worden naar andere betrokken actoren.
Wat er daardoor geleerd is staat aan de kern van het MESO-kennisconcept: 
het doen van een introspectieve en extroverte analyse, een inventarisatie van mid-
delen en hiaten en het uitwisselen van kennisbronnen. Het is niet alleen een set 
vaardigheden bedoeld om beoefenaars te helpen bij het behalen van succes, maar 
ook een indicator die gebruikt kan worden door onderzoekers en wetenschappers 
bij het analyseren en meten van leerprocessen binnen organisaties.  Hiermee 
wordt niet bedoeld dat al het leren op deze manier gemeten kan worden, maar 
dat het concept kan dienen als een analytische tool waardoor men met een relatief 
eenvoudige en duidelijke set richtlijnen kan kijken naar een casus. 
Verder onderzoek
Dit onderzoek heeft zich niet beziggehouden met het gebruik van MESO-kennis 
buiten crises om of tussen crises in. Aangenomen wordt dat, ondanks dat er 
waarschijnlijk al kennistrajecten en gemeenschappen zijn die assisteren bij het 
implementeren van deze kennistypen, een crisis een crisis zal zijn als er geen 
aandacht wordt besteed aan onverwachte processen. Door nog betere voorbe-
reidingen te treffen en door de voordelen van het MESO-kennisconcept toe te 
passen is het mogelijk om deze druk in zijn geheel weg te nemen. In dat geval 
ontstaat er een nieuwe kwestie: wat gebeurt er met een model dat aanneemt dat 
druk en stress de manier waarop kennis gebruikt wordt beïnvloed? Moeten we het 
behandelen als een extreme vorm van feedbackloops of juist als een normaliteit 
buiten het bereik van het onderzoek? In de Freemen casus was dit al bijna het 
geval, maar gelukkig bleek er vanuit analytisch oogpunt genoeg druk te zijn om 
de effecten te kunnen observeren. Organisatorisch leren bestaat nog steeds als 
een model waarbij de processen voor het maken van verbeteringen gevangen en 
geanalyseerd kunnen worden, maar er zijn hiaten en randzaken tussen de twee 
concepten die geanalyseerd moeten worden om ons te helpen te begrijpen in 
hoeverre het toepasbaar is. 
Het model zelf dient ook verder getest en onderzocht te worden. Conclusies 
trekken over het model op basis van vier casussen is minimaal. Extra vergelijkingen 
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tussen casussen, het liefst met dezelfde actoren in beide gevallen, is noodzakelijk 
om meer duidelijkheid te verschaffen in de relatie tussen oorzaak en gevolg. Aan 
de andere kant is het noodzakelijk om een hele nieuwe set actoren toe te voe-
gen. Hiermee ontrafelen we de mysteries rondom zaken als kwestiedomeinen, 
kwestiecomplexiteit, bureaucratische plaatsing, strategische versus operatieve 
probleemoplossing en binnen- en buitenlandse speelvelden. Er zijn daarnaast 
ook maar twee stressfactoren genoemd, waarvan we nu al geleerd hebben dat 
crises voor verassingen zorgen en dat verassingen een gebrek aan voorbereiding en 
anticipatie verraden. Het analyseren van meer stressfactoren in dezelfde casussen 
zou het model verder testen.
Ten slotte dient het MESO-kennisconcept verder verfijnd te worden. Voor 
het onderzoek werkt het goed, maar het afstellen van indicatoren kan ervoor 
zorgen dat deze analytische tool preciezer werkt. Daarnaast kan het afstellen van 
indicatoren juist zorgen voor meer generalisatie. MESO-kennis is een poging om 
het gat tussen bestuurlijk leren en kennismanagement literatuur te overbruggen. 
Een aantal andere onderzoeksvelden houden zich hier ook mee bezig, en het kan 
interessant zijn om te zien hoe MESO-kennis hier aan bijdraagt. Kan een (re)
conceptualisering van MESO-kennis bruikbaar zijn bij beleidsleren en beleidsver-
andering? Of misschien voor het debat omtrent technocratisch of bureaucratisch 
bestuur? Deze onderzoeksvelden zijn nu al stukken toe aan het voegen aan de 
algehele puzzel, dus het is de moeite waard om dergelijke theorieën te integreren 
met het hiergenoemde model. 
Kernwoorden: adviserend, crisis, expertise, kennis, kennismanagement, leren, 
bestuurlijk gedrag, bestuurlijke cognitie, zingeving. 
Stressing Know
ledge
M
ats Koraeus
Stressing Knowledge
Organisational closed-ness and knowledge 
acquisition under pressure
 46 Volume 46
Mats Koraeus
Stressing Knowledge
Organisational closed-ness and knowledge 
acquisition under pressure
Organisations have been analytically conceptualised as being somewhat analogous to individuals 
for a long time. They have culture; they can learn; and they can behave in various odd ways. 
But how far can the simile be stretched? What other types of organisational cognition can we 
imagine? And what benefits can we gain by introducing new perspectives of this kind? 
This study shows that organisations can exhibit familiar symptoms of stress, such as closing 
themselves to the outside world and becoming unreceptive to external stimuli and input. They 
retreat to what is familiar and safe and put on blinders to hide anything that does not already 
fit with how they feel things should be, often in situations where they would be best served 
by being as open to and perceptive of these external stimuli as possible. Using a model of 
organisational behaviour that connects external pressure to an internal mode of operation and 
to specific knowledge-seeking behaviours, the study examines two case pairs—two success stories 
and two catastrophic failures—to examine patterns of organisational cognition. By comparing 
and contrasting the failure of the FBI during the 1993 Waco siege with its subsequent success 
during the 1996 Montana Freemen standoff, and doing the same with the Swedish Foreign 
Ministry’s handling of the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami and the 2006 evacuation from the 
war in Lebanon, a pattern emerges where certain types of knowledge proved to be the key to 
staying as open-minded, responsive, and dynamic as these crises demanded. This knowledge can 
be used both during a crisis to resolve some of the confusion and time pressure that is endemic 
to such situations, as well as before a crisis to mitigate or even stave off the approaching chaos.
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